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THE PROBLEM OF CROATIA FROM 1914 TILL 1918

by



GEORGE GRLICA

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES & RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1972

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES & RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled: "The Problem of Croatia from 1914 till 1918", submitted by George Grlica in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

Croatian history from the fall of Bach's absolutism (1860) until the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary (1918) forms a separate period, and constitutes one unit. In the first chapter we will elaborate about the period from 1860 until 1914, briefly describing the socio-economic, political, and religious aspects, particularly of the nationally and religiously complex and historical Croatian province, Bosnia and Herzegovina. This thesis will not deal with the activity of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor), 1914-1918, nor with its relations and ties with the Yugoslav Committee abroad, for reasons of space.⁽¹⁾ It will also not cover the influence of the decisions made at the Versailles Peace-Conference regarding the political destiny of Croats, an influence which is already known to a considerable extent through the work of Ivo J. Lederer.⁽²⁾

The basic intention of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government between 1914 and 1918, mainly as regards the political union of Croatia and Serbia. The documents^(*) will thus "speak for themselves", and we will draw certain conclusions subsequently.

(*) The quoted parts, when given in Croatian or Serbian - (and often they are mixed in words and style to an extent) -, are indicated in the original language in the footnotes, placed at the end of the thesis. Exceptions to the above statement are documents in West-European Languages, some of which are also placed in the footnotes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Cedric J. Lowe, Professor of History, at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Lowe for accepting the topic herein and for his generous assistance in the writing of this thesis. I also wish to thank Miss Lillian E. Leversedge, Head of the Selections Department, University Library, for having kindly permitted me to purchase the necessary source material without which this thesis could not have been written. In addition I wish to thank Ivan Miletich for his help and, last but not least, my warm thanks are extended to my wife, Gerda, for her close cooperation and typing of the thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
ABSTRACT	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
LIST OF CROATIAN AND SERBIAN ORTHOGRAPHY AND PRONUNCIATION	vi
MAPS	vii
 <u>CHAPTER</u>	
I. <u>THE BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM</u>	1
1. Socio-Economic Structure	1
2. Religious Conditions	22
3. Political Conditions	28
II. <u>THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE</u>	50
1. Trumbić's Connections with Homeland	65
2. The Role of the Croatian Emigrants in North America	70
3. The Role of the Croatian Emigrants in South America	74
4. Supilo's Journey in Russia	80
III. <u>PAŠIĆ VERSUS TRUMBIĆ IN REGARD TO THE IDEA OF UNION AND THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT</u>	92
1. Program of the Serbian Political Parties	92
2. The Differences in the Conception of Union	102
3. The Unsolved Question of the Internal Organization of the Future State as a Cause for Confrontation: Supilo-Pašić and Supilo-Trumbić.	108
4. Views of the Serbian Government upon the Catholic and Moslem Religions.	118
IV. <u>THE QUESTION OF VOLUNTEERS</u>	124
1. The Volunteers in Russia	127
2. The Volunteers of South and North America	141
V. <u>THE CORFU DECLARATION</u>	151
1. The Situation in Russia	151
2. The Motives which led the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee to the Declaration.	153
3. Analysis of the Conference	161
4. The Echo of the Corfu Declaration among the American Croats and the Break-Off of the Yugoslav National Council with the Declaration and the Serbian Government.	167

	<u>PAGE</u>
VI. <u>THE CONGRESS OF THE SUPPRESSED NATIONS IN ROME</u>	174
1. Attempts of the Entente-Diplomacy to split the Central Powers. Attitudes of the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government in this new Situation.	174
2. The Changing of the Entente Policy in regard to Austria-Hungary and its Reflections.	187
3. The Situation after the Congress of Rome.	204
VII. <u>THE GENEVA AGREEMENT</u>	209
1. The Struggle for the Diplomatic Recognition of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenes.	209
2. The Road to the Geneva Agreement and its Abandonment.	234
CONCLUSION	257
APPENDIX I Frano Supilo (1870-1917)	270
Footnotes (# 1-42)	286
APPENDIX II Ivan Meštrović (1883-1962)	291
Footnotes (# 1-14)	302
APPENDIX III The Corfu Declaration	308
APPENDIX IV The "Yugoslav United Youth" in Geneva	312
Footnotes (# 1-11)	316
APPENDIX V Trumbić's Letter to Pašić Dated October 1918	318
APPENDIX VI Trumbić's Memorandum to the English Government	320
APPENDIX VII Steed's Account on Orlando	323
FOOTNOTES TO ABSTRACT AND CHAPTER I (# 1-35) (*)	324
" " CHAPTER II (# 1-86)	329
" " " III (# 87-146)	341
" " " IV (# 147-212)	349-a
" " " V (# 213-250)	357
" " " VI (# 251-322)	362
" " " VII (# 323-411)	372
BIBLIOGRAPHY	386


(*) The first chapter, before its extension, was originally intended to be an introduction. However, when the thesis was almost completed, this chapter was incorporated into the body of the thesis. For this reason the numeration of its footnotes runs separately.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A-JAZU	= Arhiv Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti u Zagrebu. (Archives of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb)
A-JO	= Arhiv Jugoslavenskog Odbora. (Archives of the Yugoslav Committee)
Arhiv DG	= Arhiv De Giulli-Zagreb. (Archives of De Giulli)
br.	= broj (number).
Dim.	= Arhiv Mite Dimitrijevića. (Archives of Mite Dimitrijević)
Doc.	= Document.
God.	= Godina (year).
Jhrg.	= Jahrgang.
Knj.	= Knjiga (book, volume).
JAZU	= Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti i Umjetnosti. (Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts)
JNO	= Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana. (The Yugoslav National Defence)
MO	= Medzhunarodnya Otnosheniia v Epohu Imperializma. Dokumenty iz arhiviv carskogo i vremenogo pravitel'stva, 1878-1917 gg. (International Relations in the Epoch of Imperialism. Documents from the Archives of the Tsarist and Provisional Government, 1878-1917 years) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1934-1935).
(sic)	= Indistinctness or probable errors in the text.
sv.	= svezak (volume).
Tel.	= Telegram.
[...]	= Later additions or explanations by a third person.

LIST OF CROATIAN AND SERBIAN ORTHOGRAPHY AND PRONUNCIATION

- c - ts as in "cats"
- č - ch as in "church"
- ć - also ch but softer than č
- dj - like the d+y as in "did you"
- g - like g in "get"
- j - y as in "yes"
- lj - like lli in "million"
- nj - as in "new"
- š - sh as in "short"
- z - as the French j in "jour"



KEY



Croatia

60 miles

Adriatic Sea

[Source: Eterovich, Francis H., ed.: Croatia: Land, People, Culture. (Toronto), University of Toronto Press, [1970], vol. 2]

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
ndaries:

Provincial

Austro-Hungarian Empire

Kingdom of Hungary

Source: Hanak, Harry: Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A study in the Formation of public Opinion. (London, Oxford University Press, 1962)



From Z. A. B. Zeman: The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918.

Map No. 3



Prilog memorandumu »Savremeno srpsko nacionalno pitanje«

(Supplement to the Memorandum: "The Contemporary Serbian National Question") - [see p. 99]

[Source: Šepić, Dragovan: "O misiji Lj. Stojanovića i A. Belića u Petrogradu 1915. godine." In: Zbornik Historijskog instituta Jugoslavenske Akademije. (Zagreb [JAZU], 1960) Series: JAZU. Historijski institut, knj. 3]

Map No. 4



The Line of the Italian Occupation, 1918

[Source: Lederer, Ivo J.: Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference; a Study in Frontiersmaking. (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963)]

Chapter I

THE BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

In order to understand the questions involved in this thesis it was thought necessary to give some explanation of the pre-1914 background to the Croatian problem. This will be considered under three headings: the socio-economic structure of the various Croatian lands; the religious question; the growth of political parties. This introduction has, necessarily, been kept short and probably over-simplifies very complex questions.

Socio-Economic Structure

1. Croatia-Slavonia

Since the end of Bach's absolutism (1860) the political life of Croatia, as well as its constitution, was restored and Croatian had become an official language. However, this change affected only Croatia and Slavonia, the so-called "Provincial", or those Croatian countries which were under the direct jurisdiction of the Ban.⁽³⁾ Dalmatia and Istria, on the contrary, which received in 1861 for the first time their separate parliaments, were together with the Military Frontier (Vojna Krajina) under the direct jurisdiction of Vienna. After its demilitarization (1871), the Military Frontier was finally united with the mother-country in 1881. The unification of Istria and Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia was postponed till 1918, while at the same period Bosnia-Herzegovina was still an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore among all Croatian provinces it was the so-called Banal Croatia (i.e., Croatia-Slavonia governed by the Ban) which held the best position, appealing to its "Historic Rights" which referred back for centuries and upon which was built its Constitution.

According to the official census of 1857, Banal Croatia - or the Provincial - extended over 23,810 sq.km. with 851,516 inhabitants. From 1848 to 1861 Medjumurje also belonged to the "Provincial" (Banal Croatia) with its 55,940 citizens. In 1857 the Military Frontier occupied 18,722 sq.km. with 447,759 residents, while Dalmatia possessed 12,663 sq.km. with 415,628 inhabitants. The Istrian peninsula, including the islands of Krk, Cres, and Lošinj, amounted to 3,160 sq.km.⁽⁴⁾ with 234,872 citizens.

Due to this situation the Croatian countries entered into the parliamentary period as separate entities, even though the legal rights of their unity - excepting Istria - were recognized by Vienna. There were two main questions raised in the period 1860-1918: a) to achieve national unity of all the provinces in one state; b) to secure economic and financial independence.

The economic crisis which started in the spring of 1873 with the bankruptcy of some larger banks in Vienna, spread rapidly into all spheres of the Monarchy. Because of the economic structure of Croatia, this crisis was reflected in the agrarian field and lasted till 1895. The fall in grain prices brought reduced income to the farmers, while at the same time the taxes grew. According to statistical data given by Professor Jaroslav Šidak, the yearly average income of the taxes from Croatian-Slavonian agriculture was:⁽⁵⁾

1872-74	10,131,000 Kronen ^(*)
1883-85	20,514,000 "
1893-95	22,901,000 "

As a result of this whole situation tax indebtedness and bankruptcy amongst farmers' and small manorial estates-owners, who were unable to adjust themselves to the new economic and agricultural conditions in-

creased, while the great land-owners took the occasion to buy such bankrupted estates. By giving loans at a high rate of interest the merchant class also became richer and richer. The basic disproportion of this process was the creation of larger estates on one side and the existence of half-proletariat peasants on the other. The official census of 31 December 1895 shows that on the territory of Croatia-Slavonia there were 407,403 farmers' households; from this results the following table:

TABLE 1

Size of household	Number of households	Percentage	Area in acres	Percentage
Up to 1 jutro	53,886	13.24	24,373	0.51
from 1-5 jutara	126,289	30.99	370,630	7.95
" 5-20 "	192,656	47.30	1,933,117	41.46
" 20-200 "	33,983	8.33	1,117,623	23.92
over 200 jutara	589	0.14	1,217,251	26.11
Total	407,403	100.00	4,662,994	99.95

1 jutro = a local measure which varies from 0,6 to 0,9 acre
1 acre = 4,480 square yards

(Source: Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, vol. 4, p. 197, Zagreb, Leksikografski Zavod, FNRJ, 1960)

One can see above that 53,886 households, 13.24% of the total, possessed less than one acre of land, while at the same time 0.14% of households with over 200 acres held 26.11% of the cultivated land.

In these new economic conditions, which created the dualistic system in Croatia, such impoverished peasants could not provide for their economic life, neither in villages nor in towns and started therefore to emigrate to overseas countries in large proportions. The highest point of emigration to overseas countries lies between 1905 and 1907, i.e., at the moment when the economic prosperity of the industrial countries was

at its highest. Between 1900 and 1909, 1,887,238 people emigrated from Austria-Hungary to the United States, which makes the strongest contingent or 25% of the total immigration in the United States. The most intensive emigration was in 1907 with 338,507 people.

Up to 1898 there are no official statistics regarding emigration, either in Austria-Hungary or in Croatia. On the Ban's order of 12 December 1898 (No. 6,085), it was stated that the date of emigration of the population should also be included into other statistics. According to the official data given by the Croatian State Statistical Office (Hrvatski Zemaljski Statistički Ured) in Zagreb, in the period from 1899 to 1913, 186,573 persons left Croatia-Slavonia; from this number 166,577 emigrated to the United States of America among them were 165,156 Croatians.⁽⁶⁾ The rest were Serbs, Hungarians, and Germans. This figure, however, does not include the illegal emigration which was broadly known. Nevertheless, the main emigration stream came from Dalmatia; the statistics below, including the area from Šibenik to Dubrovnik, gives the following scale for the period 1880-1910:⁽⁷⁾

from 1880 to 1890	13,845	emigrants
" 1890 " 1900	12,490	"
" 1900 " 1910	<u>31,840</u>	"
Total	<u>58,175</u>	<u>emigrants.</u>

This number also included only the legal emigrants. From the 253,025 Croatians living in 1910 in Istria, according to Lakatoš, about 40,000 emigrated to overseas countries. The age of the emigrants, in percentage, was: from 20 to 29 years ca. 35%; from 30 to 39 ca. 30%; while only 3% were older than 50 years; and the rest were people younger than 20 years. These data specify that during the first decade of the 20th century the country lost about 6% of its residents through emigration, who generally

embraced mature men, that is, the best working power - an extremely hard loss for the development of the socio-economic basis of the country.

The rapid increase of the agricultural population in the country in comparison with the expansion of the ploughland, was another reason for emigration. The ploughland expanded in 25 years (from 1885 to 1910) by 5.9% (from 1,439,290 to 1,525,370 hectares -[1 acre = 0,40468 hectares]) and the agricultural population increased in two decades by 10.5%. The density of population in Croatia in 1857 was 37,6 inhabitants on 1 sq.km.

An other cause for the division of estates, especially tenancy in common (zadruga), was the penetration into the country of a "new spirit" of individual liberty: everyone wanted to be on his own. The standing growth of smaller estates resulted in general from the weakness of the economy which, at the end, led to the increase of the larger estates. When we compare the number of households in 1895 -(Table 1)- with the one on 31 December 1910 - though it does not have the same statistical criterion - we may see the drift of the structure of land holding:

TABLE 2

Size of households	1895 % of households	Area in %	1910 % of households	Area in %
Up to 5 jutara	44.23	8.46	43.20	8.38
5-10 "	27.25	17.26	48.21	41.76
10-200 "	28.38	48.17	8.45	23.87
over 200 "	0.14	26.11	0.41	25.99

Source: Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, Op.cit., vol. 4, p. 197.

From this table it appears that the main characteristic of the economic development in the Croatian-Slavonian villages, in the seventies and eighties of the last century, was the rapid dissolution of the tenancy in common (zadruga) and their transformation into individual properties.

The regime of Ban Khuen (1883-1903) tried to stop the disintegration of the Zadruga creating, on 9 May 1889, new laws. It was, however, too late to impede this disintegration because many of them (zadružne kuće) were already secretly split up years before the division was finally legally permitted. In fact such estates were individual properties, even though from the juridical point of view they were considered as "zadruga". At that time - according to the official census of 1895 - there were already 38,970 "kućnih zadruga" secretly divided in Croatia-Slavonia, i.e., about two-thirds of all tenancy in common.

So, while on one hand "the new spirit" -(penetration of capitalism in Croatia)- brought the dismemberment of the zadruga, on the other hand, with the years passing, this process of capitalism strengthened the new town-class, the bourgeoisie. The interests of this new class came soon in conflict with the interests of the ruling classes of Austria-Hungary which - through political means - checked the normal development of the Croatian bourgeoisie. As a result of this, industry was slow in developing; such weak industry was unable to absorb the surplus of labour in the villages. Thus the main cause for the great and rapid emigration from Croatia to overseas countries was primarily dependent upon the political reasons which caused the disproportion in the normal development of the country and not so much upon the economic reasons.

The main characteristic of domestic capital in the eight decades of the 19th century was its stagnation, whilst Hungarian capital was coming into its swing. In 1890 Croatia-Slavonia had, together with Dalmatia, the highest percentage of rural population in the whole Monarchy and the smallest percentage of population engaged in trade, industry and commerce.

In other words, the Croatian provinces were the least developed in Austria-Hungary.

TABLE 3

Structure of the population in Croatia-Slavonia according to professions in 1890.

Country	Total inhabitants	on 100 inhabitants x-percentage lived from				
		agri-culture	mining, artisan, industry	commerce, banking	intellectual occupation	other professions
Istria	317,610	72.84	11.70	7.66	2.50	5.40
Dalmatia	527,426	86.12	4.58	4.08	2.58	2.64
Croatia-Slavonia	2,201,927	84.64	8.39	2.35	1.94	2.68

Source: Šidak, J.: Op.cit., p. 319.

The population of Croatia-Slavonia increased by 15.53% from 1880 to 1890. From 1869 to 1910 the growth of the urban population went from 6.2% to 8.5%, but in 1910 still 90% of the total residents lived in villages. The total increase of urban population in Croatia-Slavonia during the period of the Croatian-Hungarian Agreement (1868) till the First World War was somewhat above 100,000 people.

With respect to the economy of small artisans, in the 1880's only the small bourgeoisie grew to a considerable degree because there were not yet favourable conditions for the development of the domestic upper-bourgeois classes, particularly the industrial bourgeoisie. Together with the small middle classes, also the local trade and merchant classes increased; during the time the merchants became the most important people (seen in local proportions) in the field of economics and politics. Their principal income was the interest on loans taken from the peasants to cover the ever growing taxes, interest which was an important source of accumulating small-trade capital and which brought the growth of domestic credit

institutions in the last decades of the 19th century.

One of the principal reasons for not being able to develop the larger artisan enterprises was due to the existing competition of cheaper industrial commodities which were transported, after the construction of a railway line, from other parts of the Monarchy. When looking at the tables given below, it becomes clear that those who flourished were the small craftsmen having two or three workers or apprentices:

TABLE 4 Artisan-industrial enterprises and workers in Croatia-Slavonia from 1890 - 1910

A. Enterprises

Year	Category of enterprises according to the number of workers										Total	%
	without workers	%	1 - 2	%	3 - 5	%	6-20	%	over 20	%		
1890	22,645	67.34	8,836	26.28	1,640	4.87	396	1.18	109	0.33	33,626	100
1900	26,320	68.87	9,355	24.48	1,819	4.76	516	1.36	205	0.53	38,215	100
1910	31,806	67.93	11,209	23.94	2,713	5.79	841	1.80	255	0.54	46,824	100

B. Workers

Year	Category of enterprises according to the number of workers									Total	%
	without workers	1 - 2	%	3 - 5	%	6 - 20	%	over 20	%		
1890	-	11,360	37.07	5,799	18.92	3,633	11.85	9,855	32.16	30,647	100
1900	-	11,993	28.70	6,536	15.64	4,660	11.15	18,597	44.51	41,786	100
1910	-	14,536	26.32	9,753	17.66	7,791	14.10	23,151	41.92	55,231	100

When we compare - in the next table - the industrial workers with the artisans and the self-employed artisans (i.e., without help of other workers), we can see that between 1890 and 1910 the fastest growing ratio lies in the industrial workers. In fact, however, this is not correct because in those data were included the seasonal workers from the villages, employed particularly in cutting wood.

TABLE 5

	1890	1900	1910	increase in %
industrial workers	9,855	18,597	23,151	134.9
artisan workers	20,792	23,189	32,080	54.2
self-employed artisans	22,645	26,320	31,806	40.5

Source: Tables 4 and 5, Šidak, J.: Op.cit., pp. 321-322.

TABLE 6

Growth of banking institutions in Croatia-Slavonia from 1847 to 1913

Years	Banks	Saving Banks	Credit Banks	Total
1847-1865	-	2	-	2
1866-1870	2	8	4	14
1871-1875	6	32	23	61
1880	5	33	18	56
1885	6	39	49	94
1890	7	41	46	94
1895	12	50	61	123
1900	19	75	148	242
1905	33	97	642	772
1910	52	137	744	933
1913	61	146	832	1039

Source: Croatia-Slavonia. Zemaljski statistički ured: Statistički atlas kraljevina Hrvatske i Slavonije, 1875-1915. Priredio R. Signjar. (Zagreb, Kraljevska Zemaljska tiskara, 1915) p. 55.

In the above table we can see that the increase of banks in Croatia-Slavonia was stagnant up to 1890; the yearly average growth of the saving banks, between 1875 and 1895, was hardly one institution, while the credit banks grew on an average of two institutions per year.

The development of the domestic industry, nevertheless, did not keep up with the relative increase of the banks, even though the strengthening of industry was the basic reason for further economic progress of the domestic bourgeoisie. The domestic banks did not invest very much of

their capital in industry; the main cause for this was the high risk involved into this operation. In fact the Hungarian Government could have used at any time administrative measures and political pressure upon any enterprise or company which would have competed successfully with any Hungarian enterprise. Even if the situation had not been like this, the strong competition of foreign industry and its often cheap priced commodities - having in addition favourable tariffs regulations granted by Vienna or Budapest - was hard to endure for the domestic industry. To this we must add that the profit of those industries was smaller than the one of the banks. All of these facts were valid reasons, in the eyes of the domestic bank owners, not to invest their money in it.

TABLE 7

The banking capital in Croatia-Slavonia from
1880 to 1910

Type of banks	1890	1895	1900	1905	1910
	in million of crowns				
Banks	8,59	17,27	32,54	58,55	99,02
Saving banks	50,45	63,58	75,50	108,19	180,16
Credit banks	7,11	10,85	16,10	28,30	33,07
Total	66,15	91,70	124,14	195,04	312,25

Source: Šidak, J.: Op.cit., p. 325.

The small trade and the artisan bourgeoisie gave the political lead in the 1890's. They supported the "Party of Right" (Stranka Prava), a very influential political party in the Croatian provinces. The "political actors" were primarily recruited among the clergy - for they had, relatively speaking, a safe economic basis - and among the intelligentsia, generally lawyers.

In the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, economic conditions were not favourable for further development of the economic basis and the expansion of the middle classes in Croatia. At the end of 1907 a new economic crisis started in the western nations. The Austro-Hungarian situation got worse to the point of a possible war between the Great Powers, caused by the Dual Monarchy and its annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908). In the meantime in Croatia-Slavonia came a hard political pressure from the exponent of Hungarian interests, Ban Rauch (1908-1910). The general situation was hardly settled when the Balkan Wars broke out in 1912-1913. As a result of the foreign policy of the Monarchy, the military budget was constantly increasing and the cost of living rising. During such a war atmosphere the credit institutions suspended further investments in the building sector, the rate of interest increased, trade and business declined. A year later, in 1914, came the assassination in Sarajevo and the outbreak of World War I.

2. Dalmatia

A large part of Dalmatia was under the jurisdiction of the powerful city-state of Venice. After its defeat (in 1797) the jurisdiction over Dalmatia passed to Austria (1797-1805), then to France (1806-1814), then again to Austria (1814-1918), before being finally united with Croatia-Slavonia in 1918. On its area of 12,663 sq.km. lived (in 1857) 415,628 inhabitants.

The main characteristic of Dalmatian agriculture was its division into small parcels. On an average a parcel was one to two acres large. The peculiarity of the agricultural conditions in Dalmatia was also the "kolonat".⁽⁸⁾ The main income was obtained from viticulture which, however, was only planted along the sea coast and on the islands while the Dalmatian hinterland was forsaken. The export of wine covered the acquisition of commodities necessary for life, and due to the vine pest of the grape-vine in France, in the 1870's, Dalmatian wine was exported in large quantities. But in the 1880's, the French Government established tariff protection and with this ended the period of vine prosperity in Dalmatia, affecting almost all its social strata. This difficult situation was aggravated by the appearance, in 1894, of phylloxera in Dalmatia. All political means to change this or to obtain financial help from the Vienna Government, in order to replace their own grape-vines with the American ones which were stronger against phylloxera, were unsuccessful. Also the effort to diversify the basic economy of Dalmatia fell down.

Another hard problem for Dalmatia was the conversion of its sailing-vessels to steamship. This operation was conducted very slowly. The reason for it was the lack of greater domestic capital, on one hand, and unavailability of financial help from the Central Government in Vienna on the other hand.

The difficult economic conditions in Dalmatia reflected themselves in the slow growth of the population who, not being able to find their economic

existence at home, emigrated. In 1910 the urban population of Dalmatia was still 10.7%; there were only six towns (Split, Zadar, Šibenik, Dubrovnik, Korčula, Hvar) having over 5,000 citizens.

In such a situation, of course, we cannot talk about large accumulation of capital in native hands. The main capital came from foreign sources: Italian, Austro-German, and French. The stagnation of the development of the bourgeois class in Dalmatia originated, to a larger extent, in the same factors as in Croatia-Slavonia, i.e., the ruling society was either disinterested or deliberately opposed to the development of Dalmatia, so that the middle class was left alone; it was more or less occupied with small local business and craftsmanship. In a somewhat better position stood the entrepreneurs living in the huge territory of Split, for they had a railway and roads as a mean of communication to reach the cattle-breeding places and the agricultural islands.

As to education, in 1880 only 10.7% of the population were literate and in 1910, thus 30 years later, 22%.⁽⁹⁾

TABLE 8
Educational system in Dalmatia 1912/13

Type of school	No. of schools	No. of teachers	No. of students
Theology	5	30	121
Secondary schools:			
a) classical gymnasium	5	108	1,233
b) Real gymnasium	3	54	777
Professional schools	116	385	7,330

Source: Statistik der Unterrichtsanstalt in Österreich für das Jahr 1912/13. Bd. 14, Heft 3 (Wien, 1917), cited by D. Foretić, Op.cit., p. 227.

In 1910 there were 435 Elementary schools in Dalmatia with 60,158 pupils, but over 28,000 pupils did not attend any school, for there were none either in their village or in the neighbouring.

Having in mind that the principal problem of Dalmatia was lack of ploughland, we have to add to this fact that the existing economic and political factors even aggravated the already difficult situation. The development of seaports, for instance, was essentially dependent on the building of a railway which would have connected them with the natural resources and enabled them to export the economic products from the hinterland - Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia-Slavonia. Because the Hungarian export capital went through Rijeka (Fiume), the interested circles performed strong political pressure upon the Hungarian Government, and from there to Vienna, not to permit the construction of the railway system in Dalmatia, fearing the development of other seaports and their competition which would quite naturally affect their profits. It is, namely, important to keep in mind the fact that Hungary, just after the Croatian-Hungarian Agreement (1868), started to carry out its "railway policy". This has been described as: "Binding Croatia as strongly as possible to Budapest; to connect Budapest with the sea and not to connect Croatia with the sea. This policy was pursued through till 1918."⁽¹⁰⁾

The Austrian Government also impeded the connection of Dalmatia with its hinterlands (Croatia-Slavonia) and stopped investing financial capital for its development, fearing that the prosperous classes - nationally awaked - would look for political unity with the rest of the Croatian countries. Also the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1878) did not bring any benefits in this aspect to Dalmatia.⁽¹¹⁾

While we can say that for Croatia-Slavonia there had been, relatively speaking, some economic development by the end of the 19th century, this was not the case for Dalmatia; in essence it stagnated till the end of the existence of the Monarchy, a victim of Vienna's economic and political strategy.

3. Istria

Istria, like Dalmatia, was under the direct jurisdiction of Vienna. In the 1880's Istria was an agrarian country with about three-fourths of its population occupied in farming. The main branch of its production was viticulture. The three main towns of Istria (Trieste, Pula, Rijeka) marked its prosperity in those years. The Austrian Government devoted a special attention to Trieste, which became the principal seaport for the exports and imports of Austria, while Pula became the great naval seaport of the Monarchy.⁽¹²⁾ Pula was a town of clerks, naval personnel and government officials; a city of small trade bourgeoisie and free professions.

From the economic and communications' point of view, Rijeka (Fiume) was the great seaport of Croatia. However, in 1868, due exclusively to political reasons, it was artificially separated from Croatia and put under the direct jurisdiction of Budapest.⁽¹³⁾ Having its "special status" (Corpus separatum) Hungarian economic policy secured its export and import of goods "per mare" for several decades and with this its prosperity. The construction of its modern seaport and its railway line made of Rijeka an important seaport emporium in this part of Central Europe.

These several elements were quite favourable to development of industry and craftsmanship. However, the essential problem in Istria,

at that time, was the decline of sailing vessels. The town of Lošinj, for example, possessed in the 1870's 6 shipyards with ca. 2,000 workers, 84,000 tons sailing vessels on which navigated about 1,400 captains and sailors. In 1880 the Lošinj merchant fleet fell to 71,000 tons; in 1890 to 26,000 and at the end to 4,500 tons. The Lošinj merchants did not possess the necessary basic capital to reconvert the sailing vessels into steamships. The owners with small capital went to Trieste where they found better replacements. Through this step a great number of captains and sailors left also for Trieste, while the capital owners, in relation with the Lošinj merchant fleet, reconverted their activities to the local industry and wine trade.

According to the official census of 1910, the total population of Istria was 253,025 inhabitants, whereof we have the following ratio among the three nationalities: Croats 43.52%; Italians 38.14%; and Slovenians 14.27%.⁽¹⁴⁾ The Croats were absolutely predominant in the following districts: Krk (91.8%), Pazin (88.4%), and Volosko (56%).

In the 1880's Italian capital started to penetrate, especially in the Istrian villages, and in 1880 the peasants' households were encumbered up to 48% of their basic values.⁽¹⁵⁾ The expansion of foreign capital caused tension in the sphere of national relations, mainly between Croats and Italians. As a result of this situation, the Istrian-Croats formed a national movement on a large scale. This national wave was mainly directed by the Croatian Catholic priests, who were supported by the domestic merchant class. The reason for giving their support was, firstly to resist the further penetration of Italian stronger capital which jeopardized their own economic and political local pre-eminence;

and, secondly, because of national feelings.

Thus the struggle against the penetration of foreign capital in Istria had also a national significance, for by giving their support, the bourgeois class significantly helped in preserving the Croatian national characteristic of the Istrian peninsula against the intruders.

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina

The social relations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in the field of agriculture, were completely different from the ones in neighbouring Dalmatia, for they were as a whole under the influence of the Turkish form of feudalism. It is true that the feudal system was formally abolished in 1851, but serfdom remained until 1918.

With the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Habsburg Monarchy in 1878, a "new spirit" of life as well as capital started to penetrate in the social establishment which was centuries old. In 1907 there were already 10 "large" artisan factories with over 500 workers each, and 135 smaller ones with 20 or more workers each; while the exploitation of forestry - controlled by foreign capital - began in larger extent about 20 years after the occupation of the country, that means, following the construction of the main railway lines. -(In 1911 there were 2,554,979 hectares covered by forests, of them three-fourths belonged to the State. The wood manufacture rapidly developed; while for instance in 1875 only two saw-mills existed, and at the end of 1913 there were already 174. Corresponding to this, the export of wood also increased fast; on an average the wood export between 1898 and 1902 was 2,239,569 q.)⁽¹⁶⁾ The main income resulted from wood manufacture. In 1913, for instance, 3,629,853 cubic meters were disforested and 53,676 wagons of wood were

exported; from this, 44,183 wagons consisted in manufactured wood. According to the statistics in the period between 1907 and 1917 inclusive, 411,802 wagons of wood were exported from Bosnia and Herzegovina; to this, one has still to add 12,600 wagons of charcoal.⁽¹⁷⁾ In general the export of wood made 25% of the total export of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The development of coal-mining and mining industry also was rapidly under the way. From the following tables, we can see the production as well as the number of workers engaged in it:

TABLE 9

Year	1885	1890	1900	1910	1913
Produced tons	23,009	59,342	394,515	706,659	847,280
Number of workers	76	189	1,040	2,360	2,669

Source: Statistical data for Bosnia and Herzegovina were taken - unless otherwise indicated - from the Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, vol. 2, pp. 87-90. (Zagreb, Leksikografski zavod, FNRJ, 1960)

Bosnia and Herzegovina owned two of the larger ironworks, one situated at Varoš and the other at Zenica. The yearly production of them in tons was:

TABLE 10

Ironwork at Varoš:

Year	1890	1895	1900	1910	1913
Non-manufactured iron	231	25,688	38,960	48,842	53,587
Cast iron	-	1,039	1,622	5,091	6,417

Ironwork at Zenica:

Year	1893	1895	1900	1910	1913
Cast iron in tons	1,676	3,721	11,696	27,907	27,491

While trade was developing well, credit institutions came relatively late into existence. Exempli gratia, in 1883 the Vienna "Unionbank" opened its branch in Sarajevo primarily for mortgage activities. In 1895 was established the "Privileged District Bank" (Privilegirana zemaljska banka) which had its branch offices in towns throughout the country. While the domestic credit banks were constituted after 1903 in the form of co-operative and joint-stock companies, founded upon religious and/or national bases with a strong political connotation. Such a bank was, for instance, the "Croatian Central Bank" (Hrvatska centralna banka) established and opened in 1908.

After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Monarchy, the foreign capital, particularly French, was more and more invested there. The joint-stock companies had at their disposal, in 1912, the total sum of 201,3 millions of Kronen. Being included in 1879 into the Austrian-Hungarian tariff zone, in the span of 43 years time, i.e., from 1870 to 1913, the total export and import from Bosnia-Herzegovina - in millions of Kronen - may be seen from the following table:

TABLE 11

Year	1870	1888	1900	1903	1907	1911	1913
Export	21	18	26	91	110	122	138
Import	16	25	32	80	114	154	201

Hence with the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "spirit of change" was noticeable in Bosnian society. Applying to new methods of work and to means of production, new activities came into existence and so with the help of economic changes, social modifications were also gradually performed. As one might expect, these economic and social

transformation took place mostly in towns, while villages remained untouched.

According to the official census of 1879, Bosnia and Herzegovina had 1,158,440 inhabitants while in 1921 they reached already 1,890,440. In 1910 still 87.91% of the total population were peasants living in 283,141 households of which 111,093 were serf-households.

The question of abolition of serfdom in the country became crucial, for it was not only an economic, but also a political barrier. The Austrian Government did not want to give offense to the Bosnian "begs" -(the large landlords)- because of its relations with Turkey. For similar reasons also the Croatian political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not take any firm attitude towards the "begs' question", trying by this way to secure their favour. As the time went on, it was however necessary to solve the basic agrarian problem. Since they were against this, the Moslem leading men fought for the preservation of serfdom as their own economic basis, because in most cases they were coming from the same socio-economic level. On the other hand they harboured a hatred against the Austrian occupation as a danger for their privileged positions which they exercised in the Moslem state. At that time, the Moslem leading men saw - more or less - in the Serbian, as well as in the Croatian national idea, only useful or harmful factors for their own interests and, according to this, they co-operated with them or declined to do so. In later years, while the large landlords, begovi, fought for the "restauration of the past", only a small number of the Moslem intelligentsia fitted themselves in the Croatian or, to a lesser extent, to the Serbian national movements.

Thus, the specific political conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina on one hand, and the obsolete social and economic relations, feudalism, on the other, were a serious obstacle to the development and the strengthening of the middle class, as a bearer of the political and national aspirations. In addition also the complicated religious and national antagonisms in the mixed population of Bosnia and Herzegovina aggravated the already difficult situation.

Religious Conditions

While in the western part of the former Roman Empire the secular and the spiritual powers, after long struggles, were finally separated one from the other, in the eastern part of the Empire - which prolonged its state of life about one thousand years longer, till 1453, and where existed the power of the tsar - the relationship between the spiritual and the secular powers were resolved according to the formula "One soul in one body". The "soul" symbolized the Church and the "body" the State. Thus, from early centuries these two powers co-operated. During time, however, the spiritual power was pushed into a subordinate position and was often a service to the secular power, i.e., the state as a political formation. With the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire and its dismemberment into "national" groups of people, the Orthodox Church branched up off too and, in accordance with the above mentioned formula "One soul in one body", formed several national orthodox churches.

After settling themselves in their present territory (some time between 620 and 635 A.D.),⁽¹⁸⁾ the Croats received Christianity in the coming decades from Rome and through this act they have linked their fate

up to the Occident: religiously, culturally, and politically. Contrary to the Croats, the Serbs received Christianity from Constantinople and were so linked religiously and culturally with Byzantium. In 1210 Saint Sava, one of the member of the Serbian ruling house (Nemanjić), founded the Serbian National Orthodox Church with its headquarters at Peć and it became autonomous in 1345. This church was suppressed and even prohibited several times during the centuries of Turkish occupation. But in spite of it, by the very fact of its creation, the Serbian people, and later on the Serbian national thought, received a powerful help. Here we have to catch sight of the real basis upon which all the "Byzantine states", including the Serbian one, were founded. Namely, this whole state as well as its political aspirations were "based" upon religion, that means upon the essential influence of the "religious energies" as such, which were not limited by time or space, and which were not bounded by biological laws. For such a way of thinking nothing is impossible, as religious thought accepts only the reality which is suitable to her, while she closes her eyes to other forms of reality.⁽¹⁹⁾ Because religious thought - according to the Byzantine way of thinking - was in closest relation with state thought ("One soul in one body"), the latter found an almost unlimited fountain of energy in the former; which - religious thought - projected itself into an organized church that became the national church, and as such she closely co-operated with the state.

During the war between Turkey and Austria, the patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević (1674-1690) helped the Austrians. Because the Austrians could not withstand the Turkish counter-offensive, Arsenije III moved out from Serbia with several tens of thousand Serbian families into the area of

Hungary - present Vojvodina and also to a certain extent to Srijem and Slavonia - fearing the Turkish revenge.

The Austrian authorities called the followers of the Orthodox creed "the non-united ones of the Greek rite" (nesjedinjeni Grčkog obreda) and the Church "the Greek non-united church" (Grčka nesjedinjena crkva). By the ordinance of 26 November 1864, the title of this church was changed into "Greek Orthodox" and in 1875 into "Serbian Orthodox". This juridical state remained till 1918. Precisely in such a situation, Eugen Kvaternik (1825-1871), the representative of the Croatian Parliament, stressed to Ban Šokčević (3 December 1861) "the need for the establishment of a patriarchate of the Croatian Orthodox Church". However, this far-sighted plan was not accepted.

Regardless of the juridical state and changement of the Orthodox church nomenclature as indicated above, and thanks to the Serbian national clergy, the Orthodox masses in Croatia became more and more conscious of their "national spirit" till they felt Serbs, even though they had lived centuries-long in Croatia and one could assume that these masses would rather have become Croats in consciousness regardless of their religious belief. So the Croatian national idea with its, in essence, international catholicism, was confronted with the Serbian national idea and its people-and-national church in an attempt to solve the complicated problem which it had met in the territory of the Croatian countries: a Serbian Orthodox minority nationally conscious, particularly in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This aggravated situation made the third component even harder, i.e., the Croatian Moslems, those Croats who became Moslems during the long Turkish occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

(from 1463 to 1878 or till 1908). These Croats accepted the Moslem religion either in order to save their lives or their properties; or to get better opportunities in the advancement of their careers; or, finally, they chose Islam because of their religious belief and free will.

The development of awareness of national consciousness among the Moslems of Bosnia and Herzegovina was slow. This condition made the overall situation only harder because both sides, Croats and Serbs, fought against each other to receive the favour of the Moslem group as a whole. In fact the one who would have the Moslems on his side would also possess Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the "historic rights" upon which Croats based their claims to these two countries. (*)

One of the reasons for this slow proceeding of the national consciousness among the Bosnian Moslems was their centuries-long orientation toward the Arabic world. Being surrounded by the Catholic and the Orthodox faith on one side, their only link with the Moslem state being cut off, their country - which gave 53 Grand Viziers to the Turkish Empire - even being submerged by the foreign power (Austria-Hungary) which occupied and later on annexed them on the other side, all of these factors provoked a very difficult sensation for Bosnian Moslems to find their

(*) It is interesting to note that: "... When ... the outline of the new constitution was submitted to Parliament in Belgrade in 1920, the Muslim political party from Bosnia and Herzegovina sent twenty-four elected representatives to the Congress ... [of whom] twenty-two ... were officially registered as Croats. Only the president and the secretary of the official Parliament Club indicated their nationality as Yugoslav. ..." A fact which was stated by Svetozar Pribićević in his testamentary book Diktatura kralja Aleksandra (Dictatorship of King Alexander) written in 1932.
[Source: Mandić, Dominik: "Ethnic and Religious History of Bosnia and Herzegovina." In: Eterovich, Francis H.: Croatia: Land, People,..., Op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 380-381]

place in this new situation. The process of re-orientation, their inclusion in the socio-economic life, and in the cultural achievement on a European basis was understandably hard for the Moslem intelligentsia of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had made a noticeable contribution to the Arabic language, which was for them what Latin was for the Western people.

Because of the specific-political and religious - situation, the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina were divided according to the "religious formula". The censuses of 1878/79, 1910, and 1921 showed the following ratio of the three faiths:

TABLE 12

Year	Total population	Muslims	Catholics	Orthodox
1878	1,158,440	448,613	209,391	496,485
1910	1,898,044	612,137	434,061	825,418

Source: Ostović, Pavle: The Truth about Yugoslavia. (New York, Roy Publishers, 1952) p. 134.

TABLE 13

Census	Catholics	Muslims	Orthodox	Total population
1879	209,391 (18.1%)	448,613 (38.7%)	496,485 (42.9%)	1,158,440
1921	453,617 (24%)	588,173 (31.99%)	829,360 (43.9%)	1,890,440

Source: Mandić, Dominik: "The Ethnic and Religious History of Bosnia and Herzegovina". In: Francis H. Eterovich, ed.: Croatia: Land, People, Culture. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970) vol. 2, p. 390.

While the Serbian Orthodox church was an integral part of Serbian-dom and as such in the service of Serbian political thought, the Catholic church of Bosnia-Herzegovina - even though being in essence international,

but living in concrete conditions - nevertheless, tried to find out its place and role.

The leading man among the higher Catholic clergy was Josip Stadler (1843-1918), the archbishop of Sarajevo. In spite of his great merits for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stadler was far from understanding the delicate situation in which he lived. Primarily he was a Catholic who fought for the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia within the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy; his main interest being the preservation of Catholicism, which - unfortunately - he equalized with the notion of Croatiandom. By far the most sound viewpoint was that of the Bosnian Franciscans, who worked with much tact to win the unconscious Moslems for the Croatian national interests. Stadler's work, thus, was diametrically opposite to that of the Franciscans, especially after they proclaimed, in their press, that religion is a private matter. This public statement opened a deep division between Stadler's clericalism and the Franciscans' liberalism. In this way the controversy between the secular priests and the monks (Franciscans) came into existence.

That what Stadler had done for Bosnia and Herzegovina, bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905)⁽²⁰⁾ did in many a way for Croatia and Slavonia. The basic ideas of Strossmayer's work and activity were:

- a) in the religious field: the reconciliation of the Catholic and Orthodox churches and their unity with Rome;
- b) in the political field: the unity of all Southern Slavs in a common state;
- c) in the cultural field: to build a cultural unity among the Southern Slavs and in this purpose he founded the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb (founded in 1860 and opened in 1867), which very name "Yugoslav" (= South Slavs) spoke of its fundamental purpose.

Political Conditions

1. Croatia-Slavonia

As a reaction to Hungarian oppressions, the national movement appeared in Croatia in the thirties and forties of the 19th century. The movement was led by a young intelligentsia who came from bourgeois classes and was headed by Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72). The main goal of this movement was the unification of all Croatian countries, and more so, the unification of the other Southern Slavic countries into one cultural union, based upon literary language and common "Illyrian" consciousness. But this scientifically unsound thesis ignored the very cultural divergences among the Southern Slavs; the movement soon disintegrated because the Serbs and the Slovenians did not want to accept the "Illyrian name"⁽²¹⁾ and their program, the "Illyrian movement" was, therefore, restricted to the Croatian ethnic territories. Hence, it was transformed into a Croatian national revival, with the following principal duties: to develop the common consciousness of all Croatians and, thus, with a neutral "Illyrian" name to overcome the previous local particularism; to revive the love for the common past; to seek the union of all Croatian countries into one state, with Croatian as the official language in all public sectors of life, and with awakened common consciousness to prevent the penetration of Hungarian nationalistic oppressions into Croatia. With this program, the "Illyrian" national movement conflicted with the Hungarian one. The "Illyrian name" was prohibited (January 1843) as was the "Illyrian Newspaper" (Ilirske Novine), which now changed its name to "Narodne Novine" (The National Newspaper).

Up until 1840, there were no well developed political parties in the Croatian countries with marked political programs or organizations. The

first political groups in Croatia-Slavonia were created at the end of the feudal era - the "Illyrian" and the "Magyaron".

The "Illyrian Party" was established in 1841 and after the prohibition of the "Illyrian name" (1843), the Party changed its name to "Narodna stranka" (National Party). During this time two schools of ideas developed in the frame of this Party: the conservative school - seeking co-operation and compromise with Vienna, and the democratic left school - demanding extensive democratic reforms in Croatia, and having as a program the union of all the "Illyrians", that is, the Southern Slavic countries into one state. So the democratic left took up again in part the obsolete ideas of the Illyrian movement. In the national sense, both these "political wings" of the "Narodna stranka" were united in urging the end of the existing "real union" with Hungary. Being in office for thirty-three years (1873-1906), the left wing of the National Party bore the responsibility for the steady growth of Serbian influence in Croatia, which eventually ended up with the "Croatian-Serbian Coalition" in 1905.

On the other hand, the "Magyarons" (Madjaroni)- politically united in their party, the "Hrvatsko-ugarska stranka" (The Croatian-Hungarian Party), pursued the idea of closer co-operation with Hungary, accusing the "Narodna stranka" of bringing Croatia into the Austrian yoke. The Party had a threefold political program: 1) the abolition of the use of the "Illyrian" name - demanding its prohibition -, this being against the Hungarian aspirations and Magyarisation of the Croats. 2) The abrogation of the new Croatian orthography⁽²²⁾ and the "Wallachian Shtokavian" instead of Kajkavian which was introduced by the "Illyrian" leader Ljudevit Gaj. 3) That Croats unite themselves with the Hungarians in one single

Hungarian state -(because of this fact, the followers of this Party were also called "Unionists")- and that the Croats accept the Hungarian language not only as the official one, but also in their schools.

During Bach's absolutism in Croatia, political life, in the form of political parties, in fact ceased to exist and was reestablished with the "October Diploma" in 1861. Now two parties were created: again the "Narodna stranka" and the "Unionistička stranka" (The Unionist Party) - both as antagonistic political powers in the life of the Croatian nation.

On 5 March 1860, the Emperor convoked the Reinforced Federal Council (Verstaerkter Reichsrat) giving the representatives the duty to submit him a final report on the re-arrangement of the Monarchy. Each province was represented by one person: for Croatia the old "Illyrian" Ambroz Vraniczany; for Slavonia Josip Juraj Strossmayer; and for Dalmatia Conte Frano Borelli. The Federal Council was held from 31 May till 8 September 1860 - while at the same time in Croatia, after the fall of Bach's absolutism, the constitutional life renewed. Then on 19 June of the same year the Kaiser appointed Baron Josip Šokčević as Ban of Croatia, and permitted finally Croatian to be the official language of the country. (Till 23 October 1847, namely, Latin was, centuries-long, the official language in Croatian Parliament.)

In the name of historic rights, Vraniczany and Strossmayer demanded the territorial unity of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia into one Triune Kingdom. On this occasion Strossmayer said in his speech, made 12 September 1860:

"... Dalmatia was for a long time the center of Croatian political and national life. The Croats held many assemblies in Dalmatian towns. Just when Dalmatia was in political union with Croatia and

Slavonia, the Slavic [i.e., Croatian] cultural life and accomplishment flourished the most." (23)

This speech has a historic significance because it was the first time that Strossmayer raised the question of the unity of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia at the highest political forum of the Monarchy, where he opposed the centralistic tendencies of Vienna. Its significance lay also in the fact that through this speech Strossmayer founded the basis for the National Party in Dalmatia. However, even though Borelli did confirm the Slavic character of Dalmatia, he still recommended the postponement of its unity with Croatia to sometime in the future, demanding autonomy for Dalmatia. As a result of this, two political fractions appeared in Dalmatia: the "Annexationists" (Aneksionisti) and "Autonomists" (Autonomaši) - the genesis of the future political differentiations.

The Federal Council accepted the idea of federalism as the form of government for the Monarchy with the majority of votes (34:14), and recommended it to the Kaiser who, hereafter, issued the October Diploma. Meanwhile in Croatia, with the permission of the Emperor, the Ban convoked the Banian Assembly (Banska konferencija). He invited 55 prominent public workers, mostly former "Illyrians", among them the notable Ivan Mažuranić and Josip Juraj Strossmayer.

In the second half of the 19th century all politics in Croatia were profoundly involved in a search for how to solve the national question. The solution was sought in various directions: 1) Federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy; 2) Union with Hungary; 3) Creation of a separate Croatian state which would only be united with Austria-Hungary through the common king; and 4) Union of all Southern Slavic countries with a

future possibility of union with Serbia also. In essence, however, there were two possibilities: to play-off Budapest against Vienna or rely on their own strength. The power of Croatia, divided among opposing political parties, was too weak to accomplish this difficult task alone. Austria and Hungary were both against this union. Thus, in order to accomplish territorial and national union, radical deviation from this policy was bound to happen sooner or later.

The most important political parties of this time were:

1. The "Narodna stranka" which wanted, by means of an opportunistic policy, to secure the state-juridical position of Croatia within the Monarchy. For this reason, it was uncertain in its actions, at one time inclining towards Vienna and at another time towards Budapest. Its principal leaders were: Bishop Strossmayer (1815-1905), Franjo Rački (1825-94), Ivan Kukuljević (1816-89), and Ivan Mažuranić (1814-90).

Until 1873, the Party fought against the "Nagodba" (The Agreement) and the "Unionists' Government" in Croatia. In 1873, the Party came to power with Ivan Mažuranić and since then - after some minor modifications of the "Nagodba" - advanced an opportunistic policy. Dissatisfied with this policy, a group of Parliamentary deputies - led by Mrazović - established, together with a more liberal segment of the "Unionist Party", a new political party (1880), the "Neodvisna narodna stranka" (The Independent National Party), with its publication "Ozbor" (The Horizon) and thus the nickname "Obzoraši" for its followers. This Party united in 1903 with the "Party of Right" (Stranka prava) - whose nickname was "Domovinaši" - led by F. Folgenović, and in 1905 it joined the "Croatian-Serbian Coalition" (Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija)

led by Frano Supilo.

2. The "Unionistička stranka" achieved power in June 1867 in Croatia with the aid of Vienna and Budapest. This Party strictly followed the old "Magyarons' policy" of a close union of Croatia with Hungary. Its leader, Levin Rauch, who became "Ban", brought the "Magyaron majority" into the Parliament, thus creating the "Agreement" (Nagodba).

Namely, according to the "Agreement" (Ausgleich) of 1867 between Vienna and Budapest, the Habsburg Monarchy was now divided, from now on till its dismembering (1918), into two halves: Austro-German and Hungarian. To the "Austro-German half" belonged Istria with Trieste, and Dalmatia with the Adriatic islands, except two small islands in the upper Adriatic sea close to the "Hrvatsko Primorje"; to the "Hungarian half" belonged Croatia-Slavonia, Medjumurje, and Vojvodina. This "Hungarian half" was further divided into two "halves": Croatia and Hungary - namely according to the "historic state principle", while Bosnia and Herzegovina (after its occupation in 1878) was under the common jurisdiction of Austria and Hungary.

The agreement between Hungary and Croatia was made in 1868 and it is known as the "Hrvatsko-Ugarska Nagodba" (the Croatian-Hungarian Agreement), which, after some modification, was in power till 29 October 1918. The Nagodba from 1868 was a basic state-law - an act which regulated the relations between Hungary and Croatia. The period between 1868 and 1918 is known as the "Agreement period" (Nagodbenjačko razdoblje). Through all these long decades there was an intensive struggle of the opposition in the country against the Nagodba. The main aim of this struggle was due to the basic financial revision of

the regulations stated in it. These "revisions" followed one after the other (in 1873, 1880, 1881, 1889, 1891, and 1906) but all had a marginal character and never went further than this. The people looked at the Nagodba as a "lawful Hungarian hegemony over Croatia".

3. The "Stranka Prava" (The Party of Right) was founded by Eugen Kvaternik (1825-71) and Dr. Ante Starčević (1823-96) in 1861. The Party had a radical program: "Neither with Vienna nor with Budapest, but for the freedom and independence of Croatia." Its organizer and spiritual leader was Eugen Kvaternik, radical member of the Croatian Parliament. Kvaternik saw the union of the Croatian countries and their independence from Austria and Hungary as a goal of his actions. In his speech in the Parliament, on 18 June 1861, he affirmed that the policy of the union with Hungary was a fraud, the real intention of the Hungarians being to attain the Adriatic sea; therefore, this idea of union of Croatia with Hungary should be rejected. Nevertheless, in his opinion, an equal alliance with Hungary could be considered necessary in order to secure "social and political liberty" against every enemy "who might endanger it." For the endurance of this "alliance", Kvaternik demanded - as a precondition - "general recognition of the eternal and never obsolete rights to all nations in Hungary". But even fulfilling such an "alliance" with Hungary, Kvaternik looked far more to the idea of personal union with Austria within the boundaries of the Monarchy, with guarantees for the independence of Croatia. He was definitely against reliance on Russia, because for the Russians, Croatia was a "Southern Poland" and because Russian policy had not respected, in a real sense, the principle of nationality. In contrast, Kvaternik spoke

in favour of a close co-operation with the Slovenians. He stressed the historic rights of Croatia on Bosnia and Herzegovina while, regarding the internal policy of Croatia, Kvaternik stressed the importance of the creation of one united national political party which would be strong enough to resist the oppression of Vienna and Budapest. In the economic field, he wanted for Croatia co-operation and conciliation of the opposing interests of the social classes. In his report to the Foreign Minister of Austria, Rechberg, Kvaternik pointed out the far-reaching importance of the Croatian and South Slavs' question for the Monarchy.

By contrast, the standpoint of Dr. Ante Starčević did not coincide with the one of Dr. Eugen Kvaternik, even though they were both close collaborators. Starčević, at that time, resolutely followed the idea of personal union with Austria and Hungary. "The Croatian nation," wrote Starčević, "has obligation only towards the personality of their legitimate king." - ("Narod hrvatski ima deržanstvo [i.e., dužnosti] samo naprama osebi [osobi] svoga zakonita kralja.") - The main goal of Starčević's policy was an independent and united Croatia within the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy, which Monarchy would be organized as a "personal union" of three equally recognized parts: Austria, Hungary, and Croatia. With this idea Kvaternik and Starčević, as mentioned earlier, founded in 1861 the basis for one of the strongest political parties in the Croatian countries, the Party of Right.

We could ask ourselves, why Starčević and Kvaternik gave the name "Party of Right" and not something else. One of the reasons may be this:

"Starčević is a deep thinker, he lives his intellectual world through in an aspect of the ethico-juridical system of values..."

[Starčević] is deeply convinced that right is based upon the natural laws of human national and moral nature." (24)

Or, according to Radić's interpretation: "The idea of right by the Croats, in policy, always prevailed upon the idea of power." (25)

Starčević's uncompromising fight against the "Nagodba" and the opportunistic policy of the "Narodna stranka" resulted in the revival of the national consciousness of the Croatian people. Because of this move, the youth and small bourgeois classes were mainly attracted. In the autumn of 1892 the "Independent National Party", a branch of the "Narodna stranka", and the "Party of Right" united to form the so-called "United Opposition" (Sjedinjena Opozicija). But the union was more apparent than real. The only practical fruit of this temporary union was the revision of the Starčevićian program in 1894. Due to public pressure, Starčević and Strossmayer reconciled their life-long political differences; a meeting took place at Krapinske Toplice, near Zagreb, and there these two men drafted a common political program which was worked out in 1894, just shortly before Starčević's death.

This program stated: (26)

- "I - The Croatian united opposition, standing on the basis of the state-juridical and ethnic principle, will work with all legal means, in order that its people who inhabit Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, Rijeka (with its county) and Medjumurje, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Istria - unite in one state within the frame of the Habsburg Monarchy; we will equally support the endeavour of our brethren Slovenians in order that they may join us with their countries in this state-body.
- II - Equally so the united opposition will strive so that the Kingdom of Croatia, as a state, will be organized juridically, constitutionally, and freely, in order that the people - through the principles of parliamentary reign - will carry out in the Croatian Parliament legislative power in agreement with the crown.

- III - Those activities which belong to the Monarchy, according to the "Pragmatic Sanction", the Kingdom of Croatia will strive as an equal partner with the Kingdom of Hungary, together with the other countries of His Majesty.
- IV - Over all, the Croatian united opposition will strive so that the constitution, liberty, and lawfulness materialize in the Kingdom of Croatia and so that, particularly free elections, the right of assemblies, freedom of consciousness, of speech, and of press will be guaranteed with all constitutional means."

In 1895 the "Party of Right" experienced a political rupture. After the death of Ante Starčević (1896), two main diametrically-opposed political concepts became more apparent in the "Party of Right": the first was pro-monarchical (pro Austrian) and the second pro-South Slavs (pro Yugoslav). These opposing concepts brought at the end the division in the Party which split into two wings: one under the leadership of Dr. Frane Folgenović - (which joined Supilo's "Croatian-Serbian Coalition" in 1905), while the other wing was conducted by Josua Frank and was pro-Austrian in its orientation. After the death of J. Frank (1911), the leadership of the Party was taken over by V. Prebeg and A. Horvat, and was in their hands until 29 October 1918, when the Party ceased to exist.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the "Socijalnodemokratska stranka Hrvatske" (The Social-Democratic Party of Croatia) was formed, having as its political program the cultural autonomy of Croatia within Austria-Hungary, with an eventual independent state in the framework of the Monarchy. Its members were the small bourgeoisie (artisans, village semi-proletariat, etc.). Its social program sought voting rights for all and an eight-hour workday.

At the beginning of the twentieth century two further new political structures came into existence: the brothers' Radić "Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka" (The Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party), which, between the World Wars, became the strongest political party in Croatia, and Supilo's "Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija" (The Croato-Serbian Coalition).

Among the Serbs in the Croatian countries, two groups were very active: the "Srpska radikalna stranka" (The Serbian Radical Party), whose political activities were mainly concentrated among Serbs in Vojvodina; and the "Srpska samostalna stranka" (The Serbian Independent Party) which, after 1903, under the leadership of Svetozar Pribićević, proclaimed the "idea of union" between Serbs and Croats, an idea which was "realized" in 1905 through the "Croato-Serbian Coalition". (27)

2. Dalmatia

The national awakening in Dalmatia occurred two decades later than in Croatia-Slavonia. The "National Party" (Narodna stranka), which was also active in Dalmatia, concentrated its activity primarily in the "language question", that is, the restoration of the language in the administrative system and schools, for Italian was the official language in the judicature, administration, and in Dalmatian schools, while the language spoken was Croatian.

The national revival before 1867 was conducted, more or less, under the common Slavic name, while terms like "South Slavs", "Yugoslavs", "Croatian", and "Serbian" were used rather seldom. The undefined Slavic idea was, at that time, still accepted by Dalmatian-Croats as well as

by the minority group of Serbs in Dalmatia. But after the 1860's, the process of political differentiation between Croats and Serbs in Dalmatia was well under way. Exacting polemics and bitter discussions were conducted concerning Bosnia. The "Horizon" (Obzor), for instance, in its issue no. 218 (24 September 1877), brought out a number of arguments, showing that Bosnia belonged to Croatia:

"... IV: Our new Serbs should be obliged to think through that this country [i.e., Bosnia and Herzegovina] into which they crossed [from Serbia] centuries ago - because of the Turkish persecution - is nothing else than Croatian country and that in practical life the name of the country belongs to all its inhabitants..., that as settlers they are akin with us and living since one, two, three hundred years with us, grew in the same national and political sense with us, therefore they have the same history, the same customs, the same folk-songs, the equal rights and obligations..." (28)

Thus two different national ideas developed in Dalmatia and came into conflict. The penetration of Austrian forces into Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878), which was greeted by the "National Paper" (Narodni List) in Dalmatia, effected a definite break between Serbs and Croats, for the Serbs in Dalmatia wanted to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia. When the Dalmatian Diet was again opened on 3 July 1880, after having been closed for three years, the Serbs and Croats were no longer together:

"The Serbs established a separate club. An attempt to have a common club failed, when the Serbs definitely declared that they could not accept the union of Dalmatia with Croatia. ..." (29)

They wanted a union of Dalmatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, countries which Serbia aspired to.

The population ratio in Dalmatia, according to the official census in 1900, was the following: 82.6% Croats; 15.22% Serbs; 2.01% Italians, and 0.17% others.

The most prominent leaders of the national revival in Dalmatia were Miho Klaić (1829-96), Juraj Biankini,⁽³⁰⁾ and particularly Mihovil Pavlinović.⁽³¹⁾ Pavlinović identified the concept of nation with the concept of state. For this reason he saw, in emphasizing the Serbian national name, the tendency towards the creation of a Serbian state on Croatian territory. In his book, "Hrvatski razgovori" (The Croatian Dialogues), which was published in four editions in 1876-77, Pavlinović said:

"The Croats and the Serbs, yes, they are one people in the sense of having the same blood and language, but they are not the same by the spiritual life; they are not the same by their history and their desires; they are not the same in the nation-and-statehood sense; in one word, the Croats and the Serbs have not the one and the same national consciousness, neither the same desires." (32)

Pavlinović persisted until the end of his life, regarding the idea of one political nation on the historic territory of Croatia, while he saw, more or less, in the "Yugoslav idea" one loose confederation - "a group of brotherly nations" ("skup pobratinskih naroda"), to which would eventually belong all the South Slavs, including the Serbs and Bulgarians, but under the condition of being among themselves equal factors in every respect.

Because of its uncompromising struggle against the regime, the Party of Right gained strength and in 1901 it already had in its hands political life in Dalmatia.

At the beginning of the nineties, a new stream appeared in the concept of the "Party of Right" in Dalmatia. The stream was led by a young man from Dubrovnik, Frano Supilo (1870-1917) - (For more about Supilo see: Appendix I, p. 270)-, and a young lawyer from Split, Dr. Ante Trumbić (1864-1938). Both men were to be in the future, leading members of the

Yugoslav Committee. This new political stream originated from the foundation of the following three elements: a) Pavlinović's idea; b) the basic idea of the "Party of Right"; c) the strong tradition of the "Narodna stranka" which included various elements of Strossmayer's thought. The components created a new variant in the "pravaštvo". -[The word of this abstract noun is derived from "pravo", which means "right", and "Pravaši" were the followers of the "Party of Right".]- Such "pravaštvo" was determined by Supilo in the following form: the natural and ethnic rights were taken as the basis of the union of the Croatian countries. In other words, the new generation was opposed to the exclusivism of "state-juridical" (državno-pravne) policy, which the Party of Right led in Croatia-Slavonia, i.e., the policy based upon the principle of "historic rights" which also included legal rights of existence of the own state in its historic boundaries. (33)

3. Istria

With the defeat of Venice (1797), Austria occupied the Istrian portion, but was obliged to give it to Napoleon I in 1806 who united it with the rest and formed the "Illyrian Province". After the defeat of Napoleon (1814), Istria, together with Dalmatia, was under Austrian jurisdiction until 1918.

During the absolutism of Metternich (1815-1848), the Italians were favoured against the Slavs, even though - according to the statistics of 1846 - there were in Istria 134,455 Croatsians, 60,040 Italians, and 31,995 Slovenians. Italian became an official language in all public sectors - (law of 1815) - particularly in the judicature. For this reason, when in the seventies the process of the Croatian national wakening was

materializing, the struggle for the recognition and equality of the Croats with the Italians became a central problem in Istria.

After the fall of Bach's absolutism (1860), Istria became an autonomous region with its own Diet (Zemaljski sabor) and its executive organ, "Zemaljski odbor", located at Poreče. Up until the beginning of 1870, there was little or no feeling of national awakening there. With the publication of the bi-monthly newspaper, the "Naša sloga" (Our Concord) (1870-1915) - directed by a group of Croatian priests and led by the poet Matija Bastijan and the Bishop, Juraj Dobrila, and financially subsidized by Bishop Strossmayer - the situation changed and the Croatian national consciousness began to intensify. This particularly when the young generation, who were educated in Croatia and Dalmatia, upon their return to Istria, brought Starčević's idea and a new fighting spirit with them. They were liberal in spirit, were opponents of the dualism in the Monarchy, and were enthusiastic adherents of the idea of union of Istria with Croatia.

Oppressed by the same difficulties, Croats and Slovenians were activated to cooperate with each other. The Istrian "pravaši" recognized the Slovenian nationality and closely cooperated with their political parties in Istria during all of this time. Therefore, they left the essential element of Starčević's understanding - the principle of Croatian legal rights (princip hrvatskog državnog prava) and accepted the principle of natural rights (princip prirodnog prava). This was, thus, a specific variant of the Istrian "Pravaštvo". The advocates of this principle were: Matko Mandić, who became the main editor of the "Naša sloga" in 1883; Matko Laginja, the deputy of the Istrian Diet, and Vjekoslav Spinčić.

There were two main political parties in Istria: "Hrvatsko-slovenska narodna stranka" (The Croatian-Slovenian National Party), established in 1878, and the "Partito Nazionale Liberale Italiano". The main issues of the "Croatian-Slovenian National Party" concerned political equality among Croats and Slovenians with the Italians; reorganization of the electoral system which had favoured the Italians; the question of schools and equality of Croats and Slovenians with Italians in public works, and, particularly, a fair division of the country's revenues. For, until this time, four-fifths of the total revenues in Istria were spent for the needs of the Italian inhabitants and only one-fifth for the needs of Slavic inhabitants, that is, Croats and Slovenians.

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina

By article XXV of the Berlin Congress (1878), Austria-Hungary obtained the right of occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fighting lasted from 29 July until 20 October 1878. On 28 September 1878 the Croatian Parliament submitted an address to the King, asking him politely that - in addition to the union of the Military Frontier and Dalmatia - the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be established in such a manner that these two countries could later be united with the Triune Kingdom on the basis of their historic and state rights. But the Hungarians protested against this address.

In 1882 Count Benjamin Kallay (1839-1903), an Austrian statesman, diplomat, and first general-consul in Belgrade (1868-75), became the head of the Bosnian Government and remained in this capacity until his death. Kallay established the basis of the Austro-Hungarian reign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He politically favoured the economically strongest element,

the Moslems, in whose hands were the largest land-estates. Kallay was suspicious of both the Croatian and Serbian national idea; and, therefore, tried in vain to develop the local "Bosnian consciousness" into a national one. For example, while the Croatian language in Bosnia-Herzegovina was spoken by people of both faiths, Catholics and Moslems, he proclaimed it to be a "Bosnian language". For this idea he tried to win mainly the Moslems. The Croatian newspaper, "Glas Hercegovaca" (The Voice of Herzegovinians) fought principally against this idea. In the end Kallay's attempt failed, for it was completely against the nature of the things, as there has never been a "Bosnian nation", nor a "Bosnian language".

Kallay became ill in 1901 and died in 1903. In the very last years of his life, it became clear to him that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been marching to meet a great and dangerous situation and the mistakes which had been made became clear to him. He spoke of the importance of Croatia in the Monarchy, and, according to Seton-Watson, Count Kallay said in 1903, in a conversation with the Vienna Correspondent of "The Times": "My countrymen have treated Croatia badly, prevented its development, and exploited it financially; they will pay for this one day."⁽³⁴⁾

Kallay's successor was the Hungarian, Burian de Rajecz. Unlike Kallay, he decided to comply with the largest and most compact political power in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the Serbs, who wanted to have autonomy regarding church-and-school affairs. So, on 13 August 1905, after long negotiations, the "Serbian Church-and-School Autonomy" (Srpska crkveno-školska autonomija) was established. (This juridical act was comprised of twenty-one instructory articles and 264 paragraphs.) With this act, the Serbian dioceses in Bosnia-Herzegovina obtained the right independently to solve their matters in regard to Church questions, funds and estates, endowments, administration,

Serbian language, and Cyrillic script in schools; while paragraph 262 established the fixed financial assistance from the Bosnian Government.⁽³⁵⁾ All of these resulted in the strengthening of Serbianhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in a strong reaction from the Croatian side.

As early as 1898, the Bosnian Franciscans established their paper, "Osvit" (The Morning Twilight), which followed the line of Josua Frank's "Čista stranka prava" (The Pure Party of Right)-which Party was influential in Croatia-Slavonia, but showing a specific deviation from the latter, i.e., besides the legal rights by which the Franciscans claimed the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia within the framework of the Monarchy, they also followed the principle of natural and ethnic laws, cultivating a high level of religious tolerance. They believed, like the Frankists, that the interests of the Monarchy, in ultima linea, regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, were in essence identical with those of Croatia. The "Osvit", categorically and constantly, rejected the idea of identity of the Croatian national idea with Catholicism, stressing that the Moslems were also Croatians and that only "the historic circumstances" separated Bosnia-Herzegovina for a longer time from other parts of Croatia.

In 1903 a new liberal Croatian intelligentsia wanted to co-operate closely with the Franciscans, and fight along with united powers, against the stream of Catholic, national exclusivism led by Bishop Stadler (1843-1918). Stadler wanted to have an organized, Croatian, Catholic block in Bosnia-Herzegovina which would counter growing Serbian power, particularly after they acquired their "Church-and-School Autonomy".

The program was formulated and in 1906 submitted to Vienna for approval. But only when the ruling circles decided to transform the

occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into an annexation - for which Austria needed a strong and large, organized portion of the population, did Vienna give its sanction to the plan. In December 1907, the "Hrvatska narodna zajednica" (The Croatian National Association) was formed. Nominally, this "Association" had a cultural and economic sphere of action, but - according to instructions from the Government - its real duty lay in the political field. The head of the "Association", which soon numbered over 40,000 members, was Nikola Mandić - the main organizer of economic and, in particular, banking institutions. (Shortly after - in 1908 - he established the first "Croatian Central Bank" in Bosnia.)

After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908) and the enforcement of its constitutional life (1910) in the newly annexed territories, by which each of the three main confessions - (the Orthodox, the Moslem, and the Catholic) - received a fixed number of seats in the "Bosnian-Herzegovinian Diet" - distribution which was meaningful and logical -, Stadler wanted the "Hrvatska narodna zajednica" under his control. This attempt created a clash between Stadler and Mandić, and also a division into two groups within Mandić's Party: "pro-Mandić" (Mandićevci) and "pro-Stadler" (Štadlerovci). When Stadler failed in his attempt, he organized his own party, the "Hrvatska katolička udruga" (The Croatian Catholic Society), but in May 1911 the elections brought victory to Mandić's Party with eleven mandates against five for Stadler's party.

In contrast to Dalmatia, where, after all of the difficulties, political "co-operation" still resulted between the Croatian and Serbian political powers - Supilo's "Croatian-Serbian-Coalition" - this was not

the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina (except very brief cooperation between the Croatian parliamentary block and the Serbian block during the winter session of 1910/11). The reason for this is to be sought in the sphere of bitter strife between the Croatian national idea and the strong Serbian minority, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Serbian worked against the ideal. Even if the cooperation had been realized, it would have meant that the Croats had worked against the Monarchy, although their interests in this regard were identical with her. Consequently, this would have meant that the Croats had worked against their own interests, for the occupation as well as the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been significant moves towards the future union with the mother-country. This proved once more the assumption that, in this area and at this time, the interests of the Monarchy were in essence identical with the Croatian interests, as the Bosnian Franciscans, the Catholics, as well as the liberal intelligentsia rightly believed.

On the contrary, the Croatian political powers found cooperation with the Moslems who introduced the "Hrvatsko-muslimanski blok" (The Croatian-Moslem Block). Until the time of annexation, cooperation between the Serbs and the "Begs" - the Moslem land-estate aristocracy - was still conceivable, because both hated the Austrian power and because the situation concerning the final outcome of Bosnia and Herzegovina was still uncertain. But once the annexation was an accomplished fact, the situation became clear and the impact of the "new reality" became obvious to the leading class. From then on, the Serbs did not concentrate so much on political element, but on the agrarian question, that is, the abolition of the feudal system. Precisely regarding this point there was cooperation

between the Croatian political parties on the one hand, and the Moslem political leaders on the other hand. One of the principal reasons for this co-operation was the fact that the Croatian political parties had never expressed their radicalism concerning the "agrarian problem", and this was known to the Moslems, contrary to the Serbian bourgeoisie who did seek radical solutions in this matter. -(The main reason for the Serbian attitude vis-a-vis the "agrarian problem" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was determined by the fact that of all the serf-people, ca. 74% were of Orthodox faith, i.e., the Serbs.)- The result of all of this was the formation of the political "Croatian-Moslem Block". However, the Moslems did not accept the basic postulate of the Croatian policy - the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia. The Moslem political leaders did not want to relinquish the idea of autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the eventual reconstruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, thus keeping open for themselves the possibility of cooperation, either with the Serbian or the Croatian block. By means of this formula the specific "Moslem interests" would be most favourably protected, which would not have been the case if they would have come completely, as a group, into a larger Croatian state complex. This was also the main reason why the Moslems wished to remain as a separate group among the Croatian and Serbian blocks, founded upon the religious basis, while the Serbian or Croatian groups had their foundations on the national basis. An exception was the Serbian group in which religious energies were expressed through their own organized national Orthodox church, which almost completely equalized with the state-and-national idea.

On the other hand, such an attitude of the "Hrvatska narodna zajednica" regarding the question of serfdom, had as consequence that they could not pay all of the necessary attention for the "building" of the economico-educational basis in the villages, in spite of the fact that the political power depended upon the economic raising of the large strata of population.

In 1912 there was a reconciliation between Stadler's "Hrvatska katolička udruga", which ceased to exist in the same year, and Mandić's "Hrvatska narodna zajednica", founded on a mediation of the papal delegate who intervened between the secular priests and the Franciscans.

In February 1912 Burian left Bosnia. To his post came a Pole, Leo de Bilinski, who continued Burian's political line. In 1912 and 1913 the Balkan Wars started. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina joyously followed the Serbian victories, while the Bosnian-Moslems, sympathizing with the Turks, witnessed with heavy hearts the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. One year later Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, the heart of Bosnia, and thereafter political events rapidly followed till the point of the outbreak of World War I, indicating great changes on the political stage of Europe.

In the subsequent chapters we will examine the complex and complicated problems involved regarding Croatia and its political destiny, dictated by the interests of the Entente Powers during the war-years.

Chapter II

THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE (Jugoslavenski Odbor)

Until the outbreak of the First World War the essential question among the Croats was not yet settled, the essential question being: whether the Croatian nation as a whole wanted to unite with Serbia or not. Basically there were two main streams and a third vacillated between the first two. The first stream were the "frankovci"⁽¹⁾ who sought the solution of the Croatian problem within the Habsburg Monarchy and did not want to hear anything about Serbia. On the other hand, the "Croatian-Serbian Coalition" (Hrvatsko-srpska koalicija), headed by Svetozar Pribićević - a Serb from Croatia -, had its political program based on a full union or complete national merging with Serbia without restrictions. The Coalition, in its decisive majority, stayed by its program

"that in the new state only the principle of civic equality can be respected and not a collective, especially a historic principle which would support the national- and-the people's exclusivism." (2)

Naturally, such a way of thinking was bound to lead to a "centralism" with all the consequences that might result from it.

Between these two political programs there was Starčević's Party of Right which looked upon "liberation" as an enlargement of the already existing Croatian autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; that is to say, they wished and wanted to preserve the Croatian national individuality saying "that it is only possible to come to the full national union through a gradual evolution..."⁽³⁾

With the outbreak of the War (1914) came a great turn in the direction of Croatian political life.

In January 1913 Dr. Nikola Stojanović and Atanasije Šola, both Serbian representatives in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Diet, met Dr. Josip Smodlaka in Split who took the initiative in the meeting, as well as Dr. Ante Trumbić - former mayor of Split (Spalato) - both of them representatives in the Dalmatian Diet and in the Federal Council (Carevinsko vijeće) in Vienna. At this meeting the four politicians agreed that the Serbs and Croats would accept the idea of a Yugoslav union "as a leading idea of national policy and that Serbia as an independent state" - and as a victor in the Balkan Wars - "should represent this idea in the international policy, particularly if it comes to a war with Austria-Hungary."⁽⁴⁾

At this meeting they also agreed that Trumbić and Smodlaka would come into contact with the other Croatian politicians in order to establish a "common orientation in the basic thought of the Yugoslav union."⁽⁵⁾ There it was also decided that in the event of war between Austria and Serbia, they would go into exile at once; so, already at the beginning of 1913 it was decided what to do. This meeting would serve, once Trumbić was in exile, as the starting point of the gathering of the Croatian and Serbian politicians from the Dual Monarchy.

In the middle of 1914 Ivan Meštrović, a famous Croatian sculptor, warned Trumbić that Nikola Pašić, President of the Serbian Government, who was twice in Russia during 1913⁽⁶⁾, secretly told him that Austria

would very soon declare war on Serbia, and that in this case Pašić recommended that Trumbić be ready for exile.⁽⁷⁾ Trumbić told this news to Frano Supilo in Rijeka (Fiume) - a journalist with international connections and member of the Parliament in Budapest - and to Dr. Lorković in Zagreb.⁽⁸⁾

On 28 July 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia; on 1 August Germany declared war on Russia and on 2 August on France. On 4 August the German troops entered neutral Belgium which prompted Great Britain to declare war on Germany. After this followed a number of war declarations from other smaller powers ending by the war declaration of the U.S.A. on Germany (conclusion of the U.S.A. Congress on 6 April 1917) which, finally, led to the destruction of the German military power.

As soon as Austria gave the ultimatum to Serbia (22 July 1914) Trumbić, Supilo, Dr. Hinko Hinković from Zagreb - a former member of the Parliament in Budapest -, Mića Mičić from Dubrovnik and other Croatian politicians left the country for Venice, the point of meeting. Ivan Meštrović was already in Rome after his call, they went to Rome. There these politicians entered into relations with Ljuba Mihailović, the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, and through him with the Serbian Government. At this time the Serbian representatives in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Diet, Dr. Nikola Stojanović and Dušan Vasiljević, went to Serbia where they were soon joined by Jovo Bojanin, the Serbian representative in the Croatian Parliament, and Dr. Niko Županić, a Slovenian who had lived

before in Belgrade.⁽⁹⁾ In Serbia, Nikola Stojanović, Joca Jovanović, and Boža Marković came into contact with President Nikola Pašić; they agreed with the idea to go to the West and to form a committee which would work with the Entente Powers for the union of the South Slavs (i.e., in the Serbian concept - which we will mention later). After that, N. Stojanović and D. Vasiljević, who meanwhile came back from Switzerland, went to Italy⁽¹⁰⁾ where they contacted Trumbić, Supilo, Meštrović, Hinković and other.

Before the Croatian emigrés stood the question of their program and further actions. They were in agreement with the desire for liberation and union of the Southern Slavs from the Habsburg Monarchy, but this depended basically on the question of the existence or on the dismembering of Austria-Hungary. Trumbić, Supilo, and Meštrović were conscious that this great national program could only be achieved if the Entente Powers accepted the idea of destruction of the Dual Monarchy, but, at the beginning of the war, they had no intention of doing so. Thus, it was rather a political illusion, at this time, to bind such a political program of liberation and union of the Southern Slavs (the Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs) with Serbia in the Monarchy.⁽¹¹⁾

In their first meeting held in Rome on 27 September 1914, Supilo, Trumbić, Meštrović and others, as well as the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, Ljuba Mihailović, agreed "that, if after the war it comes to the dismembering of Austria-Hungary, there must be a demand of liberation from her for all our trinamed people, for we consider as very dangerous if our

people would be liberated in stages what could - particularly for the Croats and the Slovenians - make the situation worse than the present one in Austria-Hungary. We also agreed in this that for those of our countries which could not be liberated, it would be better to remain under Austria than to come under Italy,"⁽¹²⁾ because Italy, being a "homogeneous state", would try to "italianize" those Southern Slavs which would come under its jurisdiction.

The reason for those doubts, in regard to Italy as well as to the "union in stages", which will be discussed later, was the following. By article VII of the second Treaty of the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy of 1887, Italy had the right to territorial compensation in case Austria-Hungary expanded further in the Balkans.⁽¹³⁾ Because Austria-Hungary did not inform Italy about having sent the ultimatum to Serbia, Italian foreign minister wanted to take advantage of this and on 4 August 1914, declared their neutrality. In other words, "the Italian diplomacy judged ... the war declaration on Serbia as an expansion of Austro-Hungarian predominance in the Balkans,"⁽¹⁴⁾ and with this move - i.e., the proclamation of their neutrality - Italy brought itself to a position where it had to choose sides, thus giving her an opportunity to ask "compensations" for its support.

However, Italian public opinion was divided: one part asked neutrality for Italy while the other supported the war against Austria-Hungary. Both opinions were announced in the press, the first one in the "Corriere della Sera" and "Il Secolo", the second in "L'Idea Nazionale". The latter

openly demanded the annexation to Italy of: Trieste, Istria, Trento, Dalmatia and Boka Kotorska.⁽¹⁵⁾

Due to these reasons the Croatian political emigrés in Italy were deeply concerned. This was also the reason, since the very beginning, why the "Croatian problem" - known also as the "Adriatic question" - basically differed from the Czecho-Slovak or Polish one; because the Croats would have their main enemy in Italy - one of the future members of the Entente Powers which they would ask for help to realize their political program.

After their arrival in Rome, the Croatian emigrés formed the "Croatian Committee" (Hrvatski Odbor).⁽¹⁶⁾ In January 1915 this committee published their first official statement in the Italian press. It was a protest - (issued under the signature "Croatian Committee") - against the message - (not the "New Year's message" as Mamatey said - see footnote # 17) - of the Hungarian Premier, Stephen Tisza, in which he praised the loyalty and the prowess of the Croatian troops fighting against the Serbs. The Croatian statement in Rome answered that all Tisza's efforts "to separate the cause of the Croatian people and the Serb people" were futile and protested "energetically against the war unworthily declared against Serbia and Montenegro."⁽¹⁸⁾

Trumbić, Supilo, and Meštrović made their first diplomatic steps on 28 and 29 September 1914 when they were received, through the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, Ljuba Mihailović, by the Allied Ambassadors in the Italian capital: Messrs Barrère for France, Anatol Nikolaevich Krupenski for Russia, and Sir Rennell Rodd for Great Britain. The purpose

of the audience was: to elucidate "the idea of the people's union" (i.e., the Southern Slavs) in the Habsburg Monarchy and their wish to unite with Serbia and Montenegro. On this occasion they explained that:

"... When we wish to free ourselves from Austria-Hungary, we don't want at all to come under Italy, for to be under Italy would be for us worse than it is under the Habsburg Monarchy. It is not the question of changing the master, but of being liberated from the foreign tutelage in order to become independent. In Austria-Hungary we can, to a certain extent, develop as a nation; we enjoy - even though it is restricted - a certain juridical security; all that [was possible] because this state is multi-national and developed a system of government by which the people of secondary importance, like the Slavs in general and we in the South in particular, did not have at all the rights which the Germans and Hungarians had, but only some of those rights. Nevertheless, be that as it may, we have some rights and consider this to be a temporary situation in which we can live until the day of liberty arrives. It is somehow similar in an economic sense and by the fact that we live in a large entity of 50 millions [of people] and, moreover, in wealthy Central Europe; this also gives us some benefits for living and progressive development. But everything that we now have would be lost under Italy." (19)

Thus the Croatian politicians were among the very first to warn the Entente Powers about the "necessity" of dismembering Austria-Hungary and about creating an independent national state. In these audiences, Trumbić, Supilo, and Meštrović presented to the Allied Ambassadors memoranda on the Yugoslav or "Croatian question" in the Dual Monarchy. After these diplomatic audiences in Rome, Supilo received an invitation from a well-known French expert on the "Southern Slavs' problem", Charles Loiseau. Later Supilo described this talk - while writing to Dr. Ivo De Giulli, a member of the "Jugoslavenški Odbor" (Yugoslav Committee) - as follows:

"... After a long talk between the two of us [i.e., Supilo-Loiseau], from his many questions and answers, his great skepticism, as to whether or not the Yugoslav question can be solved in Serbia and with Serbia on the basis of the Serbs', Croatsians', and Slovenians'

unity, was quite noticeable. From all of this it was also clear that he thought it better and more sure about the success of the matter if our Western majorities gathered around Croatia and the Eastern ones gathered around Serbia. He especially, ... doubted this, ... that the Serbs were willing and mature enough to join with - and unite these two worlds of our people which the centuries, civilizations, and traditions had always kept separate until now. Judging from his questions, his idea was that we, Croatians, if we engage ourselves in these unions will not profit in any way... I disagreed with his assumption, better said with [my] answers I advocated our idea of co-operation and fusion with Serbia and the Serbs. Regarding his claim that all Croatians are not in agreement, I agreed that there are a good number of persons who would not accept this combination, but that such a basis must be found with the Serbs and Serbia, upon which all Croatians would feel themselves liberated and not absorbed; my opinion was that Serbia is willing and able to give such a basis, for it is better that we become one "big" [people] rather than two small peoples, a.s.o. We parted and I did not succeed in destroying his skepticism."

"That same evening", continues Supilo, "I informed Dr. A. Trumbić about the whole context of this talk. We discussed this thoroughly and concluded that we, as Croatians, have to resist against any separatist basis and have to work for the union with Serbia and the Serbs under the condition that they agree on the whole equality and on all that of which our Croatian individuality is composed; so that - when such a compromise and fusion with them is reached - they [i.e., the Serbs] will not do anything that would degrade and defeat the Croatians, nor absorb them by Serbian exclusivism. This was the conclusion of our discussion, ... I gave my hand as well as my word of honour to Trumbić that I will advocate our matter [program] in this direction and work for our jeopardized littoral with the English and French statesmen. He [i.e., Trumbić] gave me his word of honour too ..." (20)

After the audiences with the Allied Ambassadors and the meeting with Charles Loiseau, Supilo went to France and Great Britain in order to find out how the official circles looked upon the question of union of the Southern Slavs with Serbia and Montenegro, and the eventual demands of Italy which they feared. In Bordeaux, where the French Government was located, Izvol'ski,⁽²¹⁾ the Russian Ambassador, received Supilo in an audience. Supilo conveyed to him the idea of the necessity of dismembering Austria-Hungary and of creating one large Yugoslav state, pointing out the interests which Russia would have in it. Then Supilo asked Russian support to realize this program. Supilo wrote to Trumbić:

"... Yesterday I was with Izvol'ski. We talked for two hours. ... He said [to me] that he will fight with all the powers so that on the south-western Balkans and along the Adriatic sea there is created one big state, which would hold the task of a strong barrier for the future expansion of Germandom on the Adriatic..." (22)

Through Izvol'ski Supilo was received in an audience by Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. "... I also talked with Delcassé at some length", Supilo wrote to Ivan Meštrović. "He also supports our idea. If we conquer Germany, he says, there will still remain 80 million Germans and it will be necessary to fight. You, the Southern Slavs on the Adriatic, have to be the big wall of this defence!..." (23).

On 15 October Supilo went to London and here, through Robert William Seton-Watson (1879-1951), the well-known British historian and journalist, and through Henry Wickham Steed (1871-1956), political editor of the London "Times" and formerly for many years the "Times" correspondent in Vienna and Rome, Supilo came into contact with numerous British politicians

and journalists, but did not succeed, at this time, in contacting the leading political persons. Supilo was disappointed with the sympathies that he found there for the Italian demands for the Croatian coast. Now Supilo put all his hopes on Russia. He went to Paris, again visited Izvol'ski, and on his request composed a memorandum on the "Yugoslav question" for the Russian Government. He handed this memorandum over to Izvol'ski together with other memoranda: i.e., on the Italians in the "Yugoslav provinces" in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; on the Hungarian outlet on the Adriatic sea; and on the economic power of the future Yugoslav state.

In the memorandum on the "Solution of the Yugoslav Question" (Rješenje Jugoslavenkog Pitanja) (12 November 1914) Supilo wrote that

"... It would be natural that our people, in their defence against the Germanic invasion, come shoulder to shoulder with Italy. In addition, this would be beneficial for Italy. This alliance and the state agreement [i.e., between Yugoslavia and Italy] would open the door in the new state for its culture, trade, and industry with great benefits for both. It is known that Italy cultivates greatly unjust aspirations on the eastern coast of the Adriatic sea... An agreement can follow only upon a fair basis, taking into consideration the ethnic principle as the main regulator while fixing those boundaries..." (24)

Meanwhile Nikola Stojanović and Dušan Vasiljević, Serbian politicians, arrived in Italy from Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they were sent by Nikola Pašić in order to contact the Croatian politicians and, after an agreement, to constitute a formal political committee which would propagate the idea of union among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, and work in this direction with the Entente Powers - as has already been mentioned.

Trumbić called Supilo to go from Paris to Florence. Here gathered not only Trumbić and Supilo, the leading political figures on the Croatian side, but also Nikola Stojanović and Dušan Vasiljević on behalf of the Serbian side. The conference was held for three days (from 22 until 25 November 1914). They agreed on the main idea and formed a committee known as the "Yugoslav Committee" (Jugoslavenski Odbor). The political aim of this Committee was to:

"... [fight] for the creation of a united Yugoslav or eventual Serbo-Croatian state, rejecting the possibility of creation of an independent Croatian or Croato-Slovenian state under the Habsburg Monarchy." (25)

With such a program carried out by a few political emigrés in a very unfortunate association of war circumstances, the Croatian political idea got its basic turn of direction - a "swing to Serbia"; this program was not in fact asking for a union of the countries belonging to the Triune Kingdoms of Croatia-Slovenia-Dalmatia as it had been before, but was asking for the union of those countries outside the frames of the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as the union with Serbia. Therefore, such a political outline was a radical change in the historic-national development of the Croatian state idea. By its nature, this outline was profoundly revolutionary but in essence unwise and unsound, because, with its consequences, it deeply affected the new relations for which the spirit of the people from the Croatian nation as a whole was not ready, and even less ready than their "partner" - the Serbs with whom they sought to achieve this idealized "union" -, as later developments were to show. All endeavours to secure the right to an equal basis with Serbia in the

future common state were stalled by the Serbian Government led by Nikola Pašić.

However, the Jugoslavenski Odbor succeeded in its action of independence from the Serbian Government through all the years of war. This independence was already clearly stressed at the Florence-meeting between the Croatian and Serbian side:

"The Committee must remain autonomous and independent from anyone, even from the Serbian Government... Therefore, it was decided that the work of the Committee would be financed by voluntary contributions collected among emigrants, particularly [those] in North and South America." (26)

In Florence Trumbić informed Supilo confidentially about his serious doubts as to whether or not the Serbian Government foresaw that the union of the Southern Slavs in the Monarchy with Serbia could be classified as a hegemony. (27)

"... The Serbs understand the matter of union and unity as completely subjective, [and] exclusive, so that - according to their criteria - this would not be a liberation for our Croatian western part, but a new conquest in which the latter [i.e., the Croatian part] would feel enslaved in the Serbian-orthodox-exclusivism and would, therefore, be worth nothing ." (28)

In addition, Trumbić continues, the Serbs longed for "their absolute dominance." Trumbić and Supilo decided "that the matter had to be brought to the basis of an equilibrium, a compromise and regardfulness"; therefore, "a careful but intensive action on our Croatian side in Europe, particularly in Western Europe and especially in England is necessary," (29) where they thought to find most understanding.

Mamatey saw the principal differences between the two sides: i.e.,

Supilo-Trumbić and the Serbian Government in regard to the concept of union of the Southern Slavs in the Monarchy with Serbia, and which already had come out at the very beginning, in the diversities of the "historico-cultural traditions" and the "socio-economic development" of one side - Croatia - and on the other side - Serbia.

"There were very serious obstacles to the union of the Yugoslavs in the Monarchy, not to speak of the union of all the Yugoslavs, within and without the Empire. They stemmed from great differences in the historico-cultural traditions and socio-economic development of the three branches of the Yugoslav people: the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. While the Serbs and Croats shared a common language, they were sharply divided by religion and culture. The Serbs were Greek-Orthodox believers and their culture derived from eastern Byzantine and Ottoman sources. The Croats [on the other hand] were Catholics and their culture derived from the western Latin and Germanic worlds. ... while the Croats and the Slovenes shared a common religion and cultural tradition, they were separated by language: the Slovenes spoke a different tongue. ..." (30)

But in spite of all these differences, the participants at the conference in Florence agreed to form the "Yugoslav Committee" (Jugoslavenski Odbor) which, however, still did not emerge as an official organ before the Entente Powers. In order to establish itself and to be accepted by the Allied Powers, the Committee required a "legal ID-card", that is, to prove to the Alliance that it really represented and interpreted the wishes of the Croatian people, or those of the Southern Slavs in the Monarchy. Therefore, it was necessary to contact the politicians in the country itself. To do this, nevertheless, was very difficult and dangerous for those living in the country, because of strict censorship and persecution, since Austria was at war.

During one of the sessions which took place in Rome, Dr. Ljubo Leontić,

after returning from the conference in Florence, submitted a formal proposition to the Jugoslavenski Odbor:

- 1) To come forward with the organization of volunteers.
- 2) To carry out political organization among the "Yugoslav colonies" - the Croatians, (Slovenes and Serbs) in North and South America.

In accordance with this suggestion volunteers were to be recruited from among the war prisoners from the Croatian and Slovenian countries who fought reluctantly in Russia and Serbia; from among the youth who went over to Serbia, and from among the "economic emigrants" from the Southern Slavs in North and South America. After this the "Administrative Committee of the Adriatic League" (Upravni odbor Jadranske legije) was formed. The intention of the Yugoslav Committee was to mobilize "Yugoslav" volunteers for the war against Austria-Hungary with the purpose of receiving recognition and moral prestige from the Allied Powers. However, the real intention with regard to the question of volunteers was leading in another direction; namely, they intended to create one separate military unit with the volunteers, the so-called "Adriatic League", and - according to the concept of the "Committee" - "its purpose was to defend, in the first place, the Croatian-Dalmatian littoral, if the Italian invasion were to come."⁽³¹⁾

In the opinion of Leontić, the conduct of the political organization among hundreds of thousands of Croatian emigrants would benefit the Jugoslavenski Odbor in three ways:

Firstly, it would give the required support for its legal recognition in

the eyes of the Entente in order to lead the common actions for the liberation from Austria-Hungary, and for the union of the South Slavs with Serbia and Montenegro. Secondly, it would provide financial resource, and lastly the emigrant colonies would become the main fount for the gathering of volunteers.

Leontić's propositions were of great importance to the Yugoslav Committee because - through their realization - it received the needed "mandate of trust" from the people, which was now the most important problem facing the Committee, and also because its financial needs were met. The "Committee" entrusted (8 January 1915) Dr. Frank Potočnjak with the task of acquiring the "people's mandate"; he soon left for England and from Liverpool (on 24 January) for New York. Dr. Ljubo Leontić^(*) was entrusted with the organizational work among the Croatian colonies in South America; Frano Supilo went to St. Petersburg in order to determine how the Russian official circles thought about the "Yugoslav problem" and whether or not they undertook any actions there; Trumbić meanwhile endeavoured to contact the leading men of the political parties in Croatia.

(*) (Under his leadership was also the "Yugoslav United Youth" in Geneva. See Appendix IV, p. 312)

1. Trumbić's Connections with Homeland

At the end of December 1914, Trumbić contacted Dr. Josip Mandić, a lawyer in Trieste and former representative of the "Narodna Delalska Organizacija" Party in Trieste. Mandić, at that time, was in Rome on a business trip. Mandić, thus, became a "link" between "emigrés and homeland", However, this connection was severed by Italy's entry into the war. Trumbić asked Mandić that at least several prominent Croatian and Slovenian politicians be allowed to leave the country in order to join the Yugoslav Committee, for Trumbić was lacked evidence of popular backing:

"men whose authority stems from their previous work in public life; men who will convince with their personality the Entente that the work of the emigrés is not an individual work but an expression of will of the people as a whole." (32)

Regarding Mandić's question about the internal arrangement of the future state, Trumbić answered that this question was not of relevance now, but he had no doubt that this would be solved when the proper time arrived, - solved in such a way that all concerned will be satisfied, and in the interests of all three nations and the state itself. As long as Austria-Hungary is here, Trumbić said, "... the emigrés must lead exclusively foreign policy." (33)

After his return to Trieste, J. Mandić came in contact with various people: Dr. Otokar Rybar, the people's representative for the Trieste district in Vienna, Professor Matko Mandić and Dr. Gustav Gregorin - Slovenian politician and delegate at Vienna's Parliament - and with other representatives. For the first time on 29 March, for the second time on

18 April 1915, and somewhat later for the third time in Opatija, the political leaders gathered for consultation. Sixteen politicians participated at this meeting.⁽³⁴⁾ They expressed their consent regarding the formation of the Jugoslavenski Odbor as "representative of the people's wishes",⁽³⁵⁾ and decided:⁽³⁶⁾ to send a letter to Dr. Ante Trumbić in which acknowledgement for all of his previous work and solidarity would be solemnly expressed; that the politicians in the country should occasionally convene, and that everyone should establish a number of trusted persons in his region; to send to Dr. A. Trumbić two politicians in exile from the homeland. (On the next meeting - 18 April- it was decided that Dr. Dinko Trinajstić and Dr. Gustav Gregorin would go abroad.) Shortly after this, Dr. Josip Mandić went to Rome and handed the letter to Trumbić with a solemn declaration from the mentioned politicians.

However, Trumbić was not sure what would be the attitude of the Croatian and Slovenian clerical political parties in regard to the idea of union with Orthodox Serbia. It was thus necessary to contact the clergy of Croatia and Slovenia. At this time don Herulan Luger, a Catholic priest in Split (Spalato) who accompanied his sister to Genoa where she was leaving for South America, sent a letter to Trumbić. Luger was offering him his eventual services.⁽³⁷⁾ Trumbić replied at once. A few days later they met in Florence where long discussions followed (from 19 until 25 January 1915). While parting, Trumbić gave him a message from the Yugoslav Committee for Dr. Janez Krek, a priest and leader of the strong Slovenian political party, as well as another message for Professor Antun Jagić, secretary of the archbishop in Split. Not

long after, Trumbić received a postcard with a note saying "that the snow fell and that the weather was nice," which meant - according to Ante Mandić - that Krek and his colleagues accepted Trumbić propositions,"⁽³⁸⁾ while in accordance with Paulova's explanation it indicated that "Dr. Krek promised his help".⁽³⁹⁾ But from the message sent to Professor A. Jagić, Trumbić did not receive an answer.

Poggenpol, a member of the Russian Embassy in Rome, reporting to Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the talks Trumbić had with Sviatkovski, a Russian journalist in Rome, said that:

"... On 11 April/29 March⁽⁴⁰⁾ the first official meeting of 16 Slovenian and Croatian delegates of the strongest parties from Trieste, Istria, Gorica, Carniola, Croatia, and Slavonia took place in Trieste. The political program of Supilo, approved by some politicians before, was unanimously accepted, among others, by the Catholic clergy. It was found that the aim of the Slovenians and the Croats was to accomplish the autonomy and union of the three Yugoslav peoples with the Serbian state. It was decided to make a proclamation at a suitable time, as well as for the Slovenians and Croats to agree never to change the present slavery, which they consider as temporary, for death under the Italian dominance. Putting their faith in the Allies and in the protection from Russia, they will - if necessary - resist with force against their perpetrator - Italy..."⁽⁴¹⁾

During the month of April 1915, Trumbić also received news from the Croatian Catholic clergy about their political attitude towards the union with Orthodox Serbia, as well as about the attitudes of the Dalmatian-Croatian Franciscans. In the middle of that month Milošević, head of the Franciscans in Dalmatia, and Škrivanić, a Franciscan from Trieste and nephew of the head of the Franciscans in Croatia, came to Rome. They brought news that during the month of March there had been a confer-

ence of the clerical leaders in Rijeka (Fiume) where it was decided:

"... that the Croatian and Slovenian countries must - in each combination of union - remain together as one and indivisible whole [and that] they look upon Italy as their main enemy, for it wants to divide the Southern Slavs." (42)

Mrs. Andjela Milčino^ć, a Croatian writer whose family was on very good terms with Ivan Meštrovi^ć, the sculptor, brought a message from the members of the "Croatian-Serbian Coalition" - (Dr. Djuro Šurmin, Dr. B. Mažurani^ć, Dr. Pero Magdi^ć, Dr. Edo Lukini^ć, Dr. Rojca, Dr. Roko Jokovi^ć and others) - to Trumbi^ć in Rome. In this message it was stated that the "Coalition" "agrees with the action of the emigrés and joins in spirit with it." (43) This statement, however, was only the opinion of a few members of the "Croatian-Serbian Coalition", for the "Coalition" - in which the Serbs from Croatia led by Svetozar Pribi^ćevi^ć had absolute predominance - was very suspicious about the action of the Yugoslav Committee where Frano Supilo was the leading spirit. Namely, Supilo stood in sharp conflict with S. Pribi^ćevi^ć and had even a deep split with him; also between Dr. Hinko Hinkovi^ć and Dr. Frank Potočnjak - (both members of the Yugoslav Committee) - existed a strong tension with S. Pribi^ćevi^ć. As Paulova writes, "The Serbs in the "Coalition" looked towards the Serbian Government and judged the action of the emigrés with suspicion." (44)

On 14 April, 1915, Milan Marjanovi^ć, Croatian and member of the "Coalition", went abroad under the name of "Nicoló Bassi" and as an Italian citizen, joining the Jugoslaven^{ski} Odbor.

Thus at the end of that month Trumbić['] had some mandatory powers from the representatives of the main political parties in Croatia and Slovenia. But another main problem still remained unsolved: "... How are we going to prove the fact that we Slovenians, Croatians, and Serbs, are one people and thus justify our claim for a people's union. The world knows us under so many names: Serbs, Croatians, Slovenians, Bosnians, Dalmatians, and so on, each of these names meaning a nation"⁽⁴⁵⁾ - for the foreign people - said Potočnjak.

From earlier time, however, there was no decision nor proclamation in that regard, nor was there a single general claim from the people that they really wanted the union with Serbia outside the frames of the Monarchy; and because of the difficult political situation in the country it was impossible to discover this, so the Yugoslav Committee decided that they had to go to "the United States of America and inform [our] people living there what the matter entails and ask their consent and decision in this respect."⁽⁴⁶⁾ This duty was assigned, as has been mentioned, to Dr. Frank Potočnjak.

2. The Role of the Croatian Emigrants in North America

On 24 January 1915, Frank Potočnjak arrived in New York and was accompanied by Luka Smodlaka, a student at Oxford. The purpose of this trip⁽⁴⁷⁾ was to acquire from the Croatian emigrants the necessary sanction for the Jugoslavenski Odbor in order to lead its people's policy in the direction of the liberation of the Southern Slavs from the Dual Monarchy, and to work out their union with Serbia as well as to gather funds. However, it was hard to accomplish this task because in no other region of the world were Serbs and Croatians less ready for that union than in the United States.⁽⁴⁸⁾ According to Paulova's information, at that time there lived in the U.S. around 90,000 Serbs from the Croatian countries - only a few thousand were from Serbia - plus around 200,000 Slovenians and about 400,000 Croatians. Of this total number of emigrants in the United States, approximately 20,000 lived in Canada.

"Almost all of these emigrants were workers and coal miners, ... some businessmen, hostlers, and a small number of farmers... Most of these inhabitants were without any political sense; their national consciousness was not developed; [general] education was low... some colonies were 90% Austrophiles..." (49)

F. Potočnjak, in analyzing the political conditions among the Croatians, Slovenians, and Serbs in North America, said:

"... In one word, ... our situation in America was a living reflection of the conditions in the old country. ... Among the Croatians some understood the Yugoslav idea, but these were rare; among the Slovenians they were almost non existent, while among the Serbs, there were none. The Serbian element was educated in a national Serbian sense and was conscious [of the political situation]; they knew well their duty towards Serbdom and Serbia, and would not move an inch further from that. They [i.e., the Serbian element] listened with pleasure to the

national union and expansion towards Croatiandom or Sloveniandom, but for them this meant à tout prix and exclusively Serbiandom, which they eo ipso identified with a powerful Great Serbia." (50)

Comparing, in Croatia, the idea of "union and unity" of the Southern Slavs with Serbia with the one in America, Potočnjak stated:

"Neither here [i.e., in Croatia] nor there [i.e., in America] the full and strong idea of union and unity governed, neither here nor there did [people] think or yearn for the creation of this and such a state [i.e., Yugoslavia]... Yet, there was something...: devotedness and faithfulness towards the Habsburg dynasty and the Monarchy, as well as readiness for any sacrifice for them." (51)

Even though under such conditions it was difficult to achieve the conferred task, on the other hand it was easily possible to mislead the unenlightened and uncritical mass of primitive people in a cunning way and, thus, to get from them the needed "consent" for the formula or, better said, for the political belief of "unity".

After his arrival in New York, Potočnjak contacted the Serbian consul general, Mihailov J. Pupin, who was also a Professor at Columbia University in New York. Pupin promised Potočnjak that if he won over the Croats and the Slovenians, the Serbs would also participate in his actions. In Chicago Potočnjak got in touch with Dr. Anton Biankini, a dentist, while in Cleveland he met don Niko Gršković, a Croatian priest who published the New York daily newspaper, "Hrvatski Svijet" (The Croatian World). Gršković started to write a series of articles, at first introducing Dr. Frank Potočnjak as an old and courageous fighter against the Hungarian exponent and hated Khuen and his crimes in Croatia. With suitable tactics, Gršković attracted a considerable number of credulous

emigrants from Croatia and some from Slovenia. On 10 and 11 March 1915, a general congress was held in Chicago; there were 564 participants and among them three-fourth represented various Croatian clubs and societies, while the rest were individual guests. The Congress was also attended by some Slovenian delegates as well as a few Serbian representatives.

The main idea evoked during the speeches at the Congress was: If it is true that all people are equal and are children of God, ... why should we be slaves of the Germans or Hungarians ? Our duty - it was said - is to destroy all the ties which bound us to them, without questioning whether this is against the interests of the Monarchy or not... Thus, our aim is... to watch ourselves, our interests, and the necessity which [now] dictates that we - upon the principle of unity of the people - ask for our union and liberty. (52)

The delegates came to the following conclusions: (53)

- 1) That the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenians are one nation;
- 2) That the Yugoslavs in the Monarchy break all ties with Austria-Hungary;
- 3) That they demand one state with Serbia.

The delegates also officially acknowledged the Yugoslav Committee as the legitimate representative of the Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs of the Monarchy in exile. Furthermore, the "Yugoslav National Council" (Jugoslavensko Narodno Vijeće) was established in Washington D.C. Its organ was the "Jugoslavenski Svijet" (The Yugoslav World) - formerly known as the "Hrvatski Svijet" (The Croatian World). Dr. Ante Biankini became

President of this Council and don Niko Gršković became the Secretary.

As to the future actions of the Jugoslavenko Narodno Vijeće, they will be examined later; meanwhile we will be concerned with the role of the Croatian colonies in South America.

3. The Role of the Croatian Emigrants in South America

The conditions in South America, as one might expect, were considerably different from those in the North and, therefore, the role of the relatively few Croatian colonies was also diverse.

As opposed to North America where there were large colonies of Southern Slavs, mainly Croatians, there were few such colonies in South America. On the side of the Atlantic Ocean - mostly in Argentina - there were about 25,000 Croatian emigrants scattered on the pampas, while on the Pacific side - in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia - there were about 15,000. The greatest majority of them were Dalmatian-Croatians - (mostly from the Dubrovnik-middle Dalmatian regions); although there were also smaller groups from Herzegovina. According to this data all of the Croatian colonies in South America had close to 40,000 people.⁽⁵⁴⁾

Regarding their social structure, the emigrants in Argentina engaged in agriculture, but in the western parts of the continent they were engaged in business-industrial and civil servant occupations and activities. While the agricultural element in Argentina was rather poor, immobile, and conservative, because of its social strata, the emigrants in Chile and Bolivia were well-off, very agile, and, in terms of age, predominantly young; their chief characteristic was a high level of national consciousness. There is little wonder, then, that the initiative and leadership in the national propaganda belonged to the western colonies.

In February 1915 the Yugoslav Committee made a public proclamation to all the emigrants from the Croatian and Slovenian countries, request-

ing financial help for further work and activities:

"... There is a need for money since there is none. Therefore, the Committee solicits all the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians who are scattered around the world to help if they can." (55)

A few days after the outbreak of the war in 1914, the Croatians in Buenos Aires convened on 3 August, on half a page of the "Hrvatska straža" (The Croatian Guard), a meeting at which they also invited several Serbs. At this meeting they reached the following conclusions: (56)

- 1) To call upon all Slavs from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for the purpose of throwing off the 400 year-old yoke;
- 2) To organize units of volunteers who would be transported to Europe as soon as the occasion arrived, and there - either in the Serbian or French lines - to fight against the Power which had prevented their liberty until then;
- 3) To undertake an action in order to acquire the means for realizing that decision;
- 4) To establish a close contact with the Serbian, Russian, French, and English colonies in South America;
- 5) To form a permanent committee for collecting the money, ... for the "Serbian Red Cross"; and
- 6) To inform at once the other Slavic colonies in North and South America about these conclusions and to invite them to join in the movement.

The importance of this meeting led to the fact that the Croatian emigrants, thousands of miles away from their homeland, expressed - in a matter of days after the outbreak of the war - their political wishes, which amounted to the destruction of Austria-Hungary; this "political

manifestation" was expressing clearly their agility, willingness for co-operation, and readiness for sacrifices. All those facts also indicate a high degree of political maturity and national consciousness.

Soon after the "Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana" (The Yugoslav National Defence) was semi-officially formed, including all those individuals who were willing to help the Yugoslav Committee to quickly become a political organ with its branches spread throughout South America. Its official publication was "Jugoslavia", a newspaper which later changed its name to "Jugoslavenska država" (The Yugoslav State).⁽⁵⁷⁾ The "Jugoslavenska država", a newspaper for the Croatian colony in Chile, was the result of a merger of two other newspapers: the "Jugoslavia" and the "Pokret" (The Action) which started publication in Antofagasta (Chile) on 12 November 1914. In addition to the "Jugoslavenska država" there were other publications like the "Jugoslavenska domovina" (The Yugoslav Homeland) at Punta Arenas (Chile), the "Jadran" (The Adria) in Buenos Aires, and the "Slavenska misao" (The Slavic Thought) at Rosario de Santa Fé (Argentina).⁽⁵⁸⁾ The purpose of these organs was to inform the Croatian colonies in South America about the events and work of the Jugoslavenski Odbor, and to divulgate the idea of "national liberty and union" of the Southern Slavs.

On 1 August 1915 a large people's meeting was held in Antofagasta - the center of the national movement among the Croatian colonies in South America. At this meeting the break of the ties with Austria-Hungary was formally proclaimed and an official identification made with the work of the Yugoslav Committee in Europe and its work for the union

of all Southern Slavs in the Monarchy with Serbia and Montenegro in one "free state-unit".⁽⁵⁹⁾ The resolution of this Congress was sent to all the Allied governments, the Serbian Government, and the Yugoslav Committee; when Dr. Ljubo Leontić arrived (in Antofagasta) in October 1915 and soon after him Dr. Miće Mičić, they found that the national movement of the colonies had already begun.

The first general congress of the Croats in South America was again held in Antofagasta from 20 until 25 January 1916, with "over 200 delegates ... from all the South American colonies participating."⁽⁶⁰⁾ The Congress officially carried out the organization of the "Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana" (The Yugoslav National Defence) and drew up a common work program. The Congress also formed a resolution, composed by Leontić, expressing:⁽⁶¹⁾

- 1) The desire for the union of "all the Yugoslav countries in one inseparable state";
- 2) Its "full solidarity with the Nish Declaration"^(*);
- 3) Further stress in the cutting of all ties with Austria-Hungary and the Habsburg dynasty;
- 4) Its readiness for close co-operation with the Serbian Government;^(**)
- 5) Full trust in the Yugoslav Committee, now located in London.^(***)

Paško Baburica was elected President of the "Yugoslav National Defence".⁽⁶²⁾

This organization possessed three printing-houses which were very useful in propagating the national idea. Its headquarters were at Valparaíso (Chile) in the province of Aconcagua and there were three branches, one at Punta Arenas, one at Antofagasta, and another at Buenos Aires.

The Yugoslav National Defence assumed the tasks of financing the expenses of the Yugoslav Committee, whose sums were very high:

"The J.N.O. [i.e., Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana] sends monthly to the Yugoslav Committee 10,000 francs in gold (120,000 francs in gold per year); ... contributions were substantially increased later, that is for the Yugoslav Committee [from 120,000] to 400,000 francs in gold per year as well as larger sums for the war orphans and refugees." (63)

Aid was also sent to the Serbian-Montenegrin "Red-Cross", and in addition to all of this, there were separate actions of support for the Jugoslavenski Odbor also. Throughout the war-years every colony in South America regularly contributed its share. For instance, the Croatian emigrants at Antofagasta collected among themselves for the Committee in London until 31 December 1917 a sum of about 300,000 francs.⁽⁶⁴⁾ In addition, there were expenses for the propaganda.

"When we add up all the sums which the J.N.O. collected and sent to the Yugoslav Committee and to other institutions, we can see that the sum exceeded that of 10,000,000 francs for the whole period of the war." (65)

Therefore, we can say that the consciousness and patriotism of the Dalmatian-Croatians in the countries of South America secured complete financial independence for the Yugoslav Committee and through this helped it greatly in its action for independence.

The Yugoslav Committee, being financially secured, now possessed the "mandate of trust" which was necessary to have vis-à-vis the Allied Powers and which was secured to it by the emigrants in the USA; in addition Trumbić also received letters of "recognition and entrust" for

his work from the political leaders in the country and those of the political parties, as well as a positive opinion from the Catholic clergy in Croatia and Slovenia. Because of the changed political situation in Italy, the members of the "Committee" went to Paris where they officially constituted the Jugoslavenski Odbor on 30 April 1915 with its headquarters in London.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Dr. Ante Trumbić was elected President.⁽⁶⁷⁾

From then on the Yugoslav Committee acted under its official name against the Allied Powers, working for its complex goals:

- 1) Creation of the inner union among the three nations: Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia which - union- had not yet existed;
- 2) Fight for the annihilation of the Habsburg Monarchy and liberation of the Southern Slavs;
- 3) Work for the foundation of the new state.

4. Supilo's Journey to Russia

After the three-day conference in Florence (22 - 25 November 1914) between Trumbić-Supilo and the Serbian politicians Stojanović-Vasiljević, Frano Supilo first went to Rome and then back to France and England. Here Supilo carefully studied the opinions of the politicians and statesmen regarding the "South Slavs' problem".

As a result of having contacted Seton-Watson and Steed, Supilo was received in London by Sir Edward Grey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain, and by Herbert Henry Asquith, Premier of the British Government (1908-1916). On 7 January 1915 Supilo gave Grey an exhaustive promemoria regarding the essential points of his concept of union, stressing that the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenians were:⁽⁶⁸⁾

"... three designations for a single ethnic unit. They speak the same language but have hitherto been divided, partly by differences of historical development and tradition, and partly by differences of creed. The Serbs are of the Orthodox faith, while the Croats and the Slovenes are Catholic, if no account be taken of a small Protestant fraction. Thus among the 12,700,000 Southern Slavs, 7,000,000 are Orthodox, 5,000,000 Catholic, and ... 700,000 Southern Slavs Musulmans (in Bosnia-Herzegovina) whose political consciousness is still governed by religious rather than by racial influences. ..."

Furthermore, Supilo stated in this promemoria that the Italian aspirations on the Adriatic extended past their ethnical boundaries and that the British Government should mediate between Italy and the Southern Slavs:

"On the other hand, the very necessity of things and the exigencies of our respective geographical positions, ought to lead Italy to form with the Southern Slavs of the Adriatic, ... an alliance which would greatly strengthen both her and us in our joint defence against the German menace. Unluckily, few Italians perceive and fewer still feel our common need.

They regard us mostly as "barbarians", unworthy to treat with them, although we have shown, and when free and united will show still better, that the best sons of our people are able duly to bear their part in the work of civilization. But there remain prejudices and antipathies against which the two parties in question may, if unaided, contend in vain.

In this difficult position the only influence that could be brought to bear with unquestioned authority and likelihood of success, is that of England. The work for urging the Southern Slavs and Italians along the road towards a broad understanding, deserves British attention even when it is viewed exclusively in the light of British interests."

Supilo also asked the British Government for its "moral and political aid" in this difficult road of the "fusion of the different Southern Slav elements." Part of this interesting promemoria reads:

"... As has been observed, our adversaries have long striven with forces greatly superior to our own, to apply against us the system "Divide et Impera" and to sow among our people hatred and division. ... Yet, our very diversities may be fruitful of good if they are rightly dealt with. Since nearly one-half of the Southern Slavs are Western and other half Eastern in civilization, they might prove a new and useful factor in the relationship between East and West, between Roman Catholicism and Greek Oriental Orthodoxy. It is in this work of fusing minds and civilizations that England could lend us moral and political aid, supplying impulse or restraint as need might arise. Such British influence upon our people is greatly to be desired. It might prevent much evil and do great good; it would be greatfully welcomed by the over [w]helming majority of our cultivated men. This is a matter of vital importance for the future of our nation. ..."

Finally Supilo expressed one - in our opinion - doubtful idea, namely that the national problem in the Habsburg Monarchy could not be solved on the ground of national autonomies for the Southern Slavs, but only through their full liberation and union with Serbia. But, if we keep in mind that the main enemy of Croatia was not Austria-Hungary but Italy, which wanted to annex its vital territories and against whose

aspirations Supilo fought by suggesting the idea of the union of all Southern Slavs with Serbia, then the picture will be somewhat different. Still one can most seriously question whether Supilo's way was the only or the best possible way to protect the national interests of the people, the more so, since Supilo and Trumbić were seriously concerned with the Serbian exclusivism about which we have already spoken. The following is what Supilo stated in the same promemoria regarding this point:

"The fusion of the different elements of our national spirit would, however, be much impeded, were districts and provinces to be sacrificed - and condemned to definitive denationalization - in which the great majority of the population is unquestionably Slav. Our adversaries would immediately make capital out of such a sacrifice and use it to weaken the position of Serbia in regard to the Catholic Croats and Slovenes, and the position of the latter in regard to Serbia. Austria-Hungary, it is true, holds us in bondage: but, composed, as is the Habsburg Monarchy, of peoples of so many tongues and races, it has not hitherto been able to efface our ethnic individuality. We have been in bondage but have remained alive. Were a part of our own race to be cut away and handed over to a State [i.e., to Italy] racially unified, it would not only be condemned to death but the dying [dying?] fragment would serve our enemies as a potent means of impeding the moral unification of the remainder."

"But, in order to promote complete union, it is above all necessary," continues Supilo, "that the Allied Great Powers and Serbia should make every effort to vindicate the principle in the eyes of even the lowest and least educated strata of our rural population that this war is not a war of conquest but of redemption and liberation. ..." Furthermore, Supilo said:

"... The palliative of Slav "autonomies" under the German yoke, suggested by Austria-Hungary in agreement with Germany, cannot remedy the evil but can only prolong it and render it finally

incurable. The Germans with patient and diligent tenacity will quickly recover from their defeats now suffered, ... For all these reasons the complete liberation of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary and Germany becomes indispensable to the peace of non-militarist Europe; and, above all, the liberation and the union of the Southern Slavs, and the creation of an understanding between them and Italy. This union and this understanding would mean the definitive closing of the gate of the East to the great dream of the world-conquest cherished by German Imperialism. Herein lies the great and reciprocal interest of us Southern Slavs and of England who, by ensuring the redemption of our people, would assure ... her own weal." ...

In this long promemoria, to which was also given an addendum, the essential problem of the inner structure and the national relations in the future new state were not discussed. Through the British Premier, H. Asquith, Supilo learned that the British Government was discussing the concessions to be made to Italy (Gorica, Trieste, and Istria) "as the price" for its entrance into the war on the side of the Entente Powers. Alarmed by this news, Supilo hurried to St. Petersburg and asked for protection from "Slavic Russia". On his way through Paris, (on 19 January 1915) Supilo visited Izvol'ski and submitted him a promemoria somewhat similar to the one presented to Grey. Izvol'ski tried, through Supilo, to influence Pašić to give up Macedonia to Bulgaria "as the price" for Bulgaria's leaning towards the Entente and against the Central Powers - Germany and Austria-Hungary. Izvol'ski's attempt was, however, unsuccessful.

Passing through Rome (21 - 25 January 1915) Supilo visited Mihailo Nikolaevich Giers - (formerly Minister in Montenegro; Ambassador in Constantinople, 1912-14; and Ambassador in Rome, 1915-1917) - asking him whether, should the Croats and Serbs disagree regarding the political

union among them, Russia would impose its own solution.⁽⁶⁹⁾ From there Supilo travelled to Nish (Serbia) to inform and consult Pašić, and then went to St. Petersburg. On his way he became acquainted with the Duke (Knez) and major-general of the Russian Army, Yusupov, "who is a close friend and relative of the [Russian] Czar... and is considered, after the Czar, to be the richest person in Russia," wrote Supilo to Trumbić.⁽⁷⁰⁾

Supilo's first letter from St. Petersburg to Trumbić was full of optimism:

"... My almost blind and unlimited faith in Russia and its final victory, impressed all of them very pleasantly. ... Yes, Russia has a great future, only it would be necessary to have somewhat more discipline and co-ordination between the spiritual and the state life. Something alla [French: à la] Czechs. ... Here the war is almost unnoticed... Also not in Moscow... Russia is big and Russian people are great!" (71)

Nevertheless, this naive idealism would quickly evaporate in front of Supilo, because in Russia for: "... Croats and Slovenians there was no ... understanding at all; ... Even the men of culture only knew this about the Croats and Slovenians, that they are enemies - "The Austrians" ("Austriaki") - fighting against the Russian Army."⁽⁷²⁾ Count S.J. Witte (1849-1915), head of the Russian Government, while once conversing with the French Ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, said in September 1914 about the Balkan Slavs:

"... Vous faites sans doute allusion à notre prestige dans les Balkans, à notre pieux devoir de protéger nos frères de race, à notre mission historique et sacrée en Orient ? ... Mais c'est une chimère romantique et démodée. Personne ici, personne de sérieux ne s'intéresse plus à ces Balkaniens agités et vaniteux, qui n'ont rien de slave, qui ne sont que des Turcs mal baptisés. Il fallait laisser les Serbes recevoir la correction qu'ils ont méritée. ..." (73)

However, Sazonov's opinion about Serbia, upon which he looked from the Orthodox point of view, was completely different. Supilo discovered this quite soon. Sazonov expressed his serious doubts that a union among Southern Slavs would be possible because of the religious differences existing among the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats and Slovenians; furthermore, Sazonov said that Serbia would considerably expand his territories. On 25 March 1915 Supilo succeeded in obtaining from Sazonov the news about the negotiations between Italy and the Entente Powers, and also the first promises which Italy received. Supilo informed at once Pašić and Trumbić regarding all these facts and asked for urgent intervention of the Serbian Government and of Trumbić; on his side, Supilo undertook actions in court-and-political circles, also sending personal appeals to Grey, Izvol'ski, and Delcassé which read:

"Arrivé à Pétrograd, ... je viens d'apprendre... qu'il est sérieusement question qu'une grande partie du littoral adriatique, où depuis des siècles les Slaves du Sud forment une immense et compacte majorité, soit attribuée à l'Italie... et ainsi condamnée à une nouvelle servitude et à une dénationalisation imminente. ... Le pays qui a le moins de droits de ravir nos possessions nationales, c'est assurément l'Italie... des expériences aussi injustes devraient être tentées à l'occasion de la guerre actuelle qui se fait pour l'émancipation de l'Europe... et non pour la substitution d'une nouvelle forme d'esclavage national à l'ancienne, comme le voudrait l'Italie à l'égard de nos côtes adriatiques. ... le soussigné s'adresse à Votre Excellence en sollicitant, dans cette circonstance si grave et critique pour notre nation, la protection de la part de l'Angleterre du principe des nationalités lequel est menacé d'être foulé à notre détriment sur nos côtes nationales de la mer adriatique. ..." (74)

That same day Supilo sent a telegram to the Serbian Ambassador in Paris, to the attention of Izvol'ski. The telegram said:

"From longer talks with Mr. Sazonov, I became convinced of his complete unfamiliarity with our Adriatic conditions. For

example he did not know that a republic of Dubrovnik existed, but affirmed that my Dubrovnik was a Venetian city. When I explained him the history of this city, he replied that this was the first time he heard about it. Furthermore, he stubbornly - and with conviction - insisted that the Dalmatian islands, towns and coasts were Italian and only the hinterland Slavic and that in Istria, where we are the great majority, no Slavs dwell. This affirmation shows the best about the total unfamiliarity with the countries by a man who speaks one of the most decisive words on our destiny. ..." (75)

In his telegram to Delcassé, Supilo requested protection for the Southern Slavs' coastal countries from the unjust Italian pretentions, on which "territory we Slavs constitute either the greatest majority of over 90%, or we are mostly in a ratio of 100% for, besides the Slavs, there are no other elements." (76) Therefore Supilo asked Delcassé not to permit the division of those territories where compact Slavic masses lived, but asked also to apply for them the "principle of liberation."

On 6 April 1915 the Serbian Government strongly protested the Allied Government, expressing the idea that giving the "Southern Slavic territories" to Italy would inevitably bring about a conflict between the South Slavs and Italy, and demanded, therefore, "not to conduct business" with them. Why did Serbia react in such an energetic way? In our opinion the main reason for this lies in Serbia's fear of the Italian possibility of having a strong foothold in southeast Dalmatia; also Serbia had its aspirations on the same territories and in addition, Italy might acquire parts of Albania and Montenegro - (as Italy tried unsuccessfully through the support of the Montenegrin czar, Nicholas II, at the end of the war in 1918)-. (77) If this possibility were to be realized, Italy would then have its foothold there and could easily advance further into the Balkans;

and along Serbia's boundaries would sit a hungry Power, being far more dangerous for Serbia than Austria had been. The Serbian interests, thus, dictated strongly to go hand-in-hand with the Croatians in their protest against the Italian aspirations on the eastern Adriatic coasts. From this time on Serbian policies were directed in an attempt to eliminate this danger through a compromise with Italy, leaving Croatian vital interests in the lurch.⁽⁷⁸⁾ This caused a very serious crisis between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government.

In the letter which Supilo wrote to Trumbić from St. Petersburg (on 9 April 1915), he stated that Pašić's note of protest - sent a few days earlier to the Entente Powers against eventually giving the South Slavs' territory to Italy for her entrance into the war on the side of the Allied Powers, is such "that it cannot be better and more energetic". However, Supilo did not know that N. Pašić, head of the Serbian Government, was secretly negotiating with Italy, in September 1914, and was willing to give to Italy: Trieste, Gorizia, and Istria, if Italy would intervene in time with arms against the Central Powers. Squitti, a special delegate and Italian plenipotentiary Minister in Belgrade, reported - namely - to Di Sangiuliano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy, that the idea of the Serbs was that Trieste, Gorizia, and Istria would be annexed to Italy if Italy would intervene in time with arms but not remain neutral, for in this case these three regions would be claimed by the Slavs. Furthermore, Squitti continues that apart from these four provinces [i.e., Trento, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria] which are mentioned in this document, according to the Serbs, Valona would also belong to Italy, for all are

convinced - said Squitti - that it will not be possible to form one vital Albanian state, therefore this region would be divided between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece. (79)

All the alarming actions taken by Supilo from St. Petersburg, however, did not help, particularly when the military situation in Russia became worse. The Russian Supreme Command began now - besides France - also to press Sazonov in order to conclude the Treaty with Italy as, through this, Italy would tie down considerably military power from Austria-Hungary and, therefore, take away a new pressure. Thus Sazonov yielded to the further Italian demands, at the end accepting almost all of them and signing the Treaty known under the name of "Treaty of London". (80)

Before leaving St. Petersburg, Supilo once more visited Sazonov and had a long discussion with him about the "South Slavs' Question". Sazonov expressed again his serious doubts regarding the union of Croatia with Serbia. Disappointed by the official Russian circles and particularly by Sazonov, Supilo left St. Petersburg and went to Nish (Serbia). There he informed Pašić about all of these facts:

"... Sazonov spoke at some length about our religious question. Because I was warned that he was very religious, I was cautious, for my own liberal views were not involved, but rather the national interest. Regarding our Catholic people, I said that in terms of my thinking, it was sufficient that the new Serbian Concordat with the Vatican extend to them, permitting the long-desired Old Slavonic Church divine service, as well as allowing the Catholics to move towards the Slavic direction to undertake a gradual approach to the Greek Orthodox and [thus] to create a better situation. ... Sazonov waved a hand contemptuously and answered that the Concordat, the Old Slavonic Church service, and all these combinations are nothing as long as the Pope is recognized as the supreme head of the Church. ... Sazonov repeatedly expressed his doubts about the success of our common ideal and categorically said that Serbia would receive an agreeable compensation and get access to the sea, but that our great national program would not be realized. Sazonov did not believe in its attainment and [said that] Russia could not engage herself so far. It is possible that

these two matters, which I kept secret, have a connection between themselves. ... Duke Yusupov, whom I accidentally met ... was with the Czar and talked with him; he was also with Sazonov twice, ... he [Yusupov] told me what follows: I will tell you quite frankly what the others will not tell you. The whole misfortune in this is that your five million [i.e., the Croats] are Catholics. If they were Greek Orthodox, how differently all would go! But you listen to the Pope, consequently to the head of an outside state. ..." (81)

As you can see, further said Supilo, these are Middle Aged understanding and views; I met only skepsis, objections, reproaches, and distrust, mainly by Sazonov and Schilling^(*), while as soon as I went out of these spheres and came into the independent national Russian Intelligentsia, I found - wrote Supilo - a warm understanding and enthusiasm. In Nish Supilo organized a public meeting (on 7 May 1915) and sent telegrams to Sazonov and Grey. In the telegram to Grey Supilo wrote:

"... As a delegate of these people I was in London when Your Excellency stated that the aim of the British Government is to solve our question on the basis of the principle of nationality. I was also given such an expression and promise by His Excellency Premier Asquith. The rumour runs that our coast is to be sacrificed for Italy and that the matter depends very much upon London, even that there is the decisive word, ... [therefore, Supilo begs Grey] not to permit such a new and historic crime to happen to our people, ... [because Italy does not enter this war in order] to liberate but to plunder and to rob the countries and towns of our people." (82)

Then Trumbić asked Supilo to come as soon as possible to London. Supilo went from Nish to London (on 10 May 1915) through Athens, where he was hindered for a short time because of illness. From there Supilo wrote a letter to Sazonov as a reaction to one of his declarations; in this letter he explained the question of Dalmatia and of the Croatian rights:

"... Su questo proposito Vostra Eccellenza avrebbe dichiarato: 'Les bruits que les droits serbes en Dalmatie auraient été méconus [sic] par l'Entente au profit de l'Italie sont faux. La Russie n'accomplirait pas sa mission, si elle ne réussissait pas à obtenir en faveur de la Serbie des concessions du côté de l'Adriatique!'

Non so se la dichiarazione sia fedelmente riprodotta. ... La Dalmazia, ... conta 3% [d']Italiani o meglio [di] Slavi italianizzati, 14% [di] Serbi e 83% [di] Croati. Di 83 comuni che conta [la] Dalmazia uno è italiano, 10 serbi e 72 [sono] croati. Di 11 deputati dalmati eletti a base di suffragio universale, al parl[amento] di Vienna, 9 sono croati, 2 serbi e nessun italiano. ...

La Serbia, come Serbia, non ha diritti su questa terra dell'Adriatico che è di popolazione e sentimenti croata. Ma noi Croati abbiamo diritto di invocare in nome della giustizia di non essere sacrificati, strozzati e ripartiti. Noi abbiamo una vecchia, secolare coltura e una forte coscienza nazionale. E siccome noi formiamo coi Serbi una completa unità etnica e linguistica, così domandiamo di essere uniti alla Serbia.

... a base di questa nostra volontà nazionale croata, ... unità [è] che la Serbia ha tutti i diritti morali, nazionali e politici sulla Dalmazia, mentre l'Italia non ne ha nessuno... E atroce ed è ingiusto di sgozzare i Croati e Sloveni, donarli ai nuovi e peggiori padroni, mentre non domandano che di unirsi coi fratelli Serbi e conservarsi nel mondo slavo. ... La prego, come Slavo, patriota e rappresentante di quel popolo, ardentemente La prego di fermarsi su questi problemi tanto semplici e tanto giusti e di scusare la mia dolorosa ma doverosa insistenza." (83)

In his telegram from Athens Supilo said to Trumbić that:

"... Maybe it is also convenient for English policy that the Slavs on the Adriatic sea do not become stronger, ... But the combination with Italy in regard to the Adriatic is, more or less, the matter of the Russian Government and Diplomacy. These foundations were determined long before in Petersburg... And the plan (osnova) of a separate Croatia germinated in the flirt between Rome and Petersburg. ..." (84)

Supilo intuitively understood this political idea about which he gives more details in his long letter to Trumbić stating that: "A long time ago the Russian diplomacy broke a stick upon Istria and Dalmatia and decided to give them to Italy if Italy joined the Alliance. At the beginning of the war the flirt started upon this basis," wrote Supilo to Trumbić. "Serbia had to receive the commercial (85) outlet on the sea, while all the rest [would belong] to Italy." In Supilo's understanding, "this went into account, particularly to England," for, "besides the good help, she [i.e., England] closed mainly with Italy the entrance to

the Mediterranean Sea to Russia." But this was quite acceptable to the Russian strategists, thought Supilo, for they were convinced that Italy would be in the Russian service.

"Sazonov wants a beautiful Serbia, a great Serbia (with a com[mercial] "outlet" on the sea), but an Orthodox Serbia," said Supilo, "which would have to enter into a [future] confederation (or at least an alliance) with the Orthodox states in the Balkans ... under the command of Russia - the queen of Constantinople. ... Thus, as you can see" - wrote Supilo to Trumbić - this is "a grandiose conception: Instead of the Holy Roman Empire, a Holy Byzantine Empire - united in the national, as well as in the political sense and Church organization and discipline." In addition, "Italy in these combinations," as Supilo envisaged, "has put herself in the fight against Germandom and has [thus] become an ally. ... I feel," continued Supilo, "that should the Entente conquer Austria-Germany and should our program (naša stvar) fall, and our coasts come under Italy, then the Russian diplomacy will be responsible for this..."(86)

Supilo arrived in London on 24 June 1915 where he submitted the report of his work in St. Petersburg and at Nish to the Yugoslav Committee, bitterly complaining of the Russian Government about the "South Slavs' Question". With the disappointment of Supilo in Slavic Russia ended one period of his political work and another period began. From then on he placed all of his trust in Serbia, trying to gloss over the divergences which became stronger and stronger, and which, at the end, brought him to break with Serbia as well as with the Yugoslav Committee, as we shall see later.

Chapter III

PAŠIĆ VERSUS TRUMBIĆ IN REGARD TO THE IDEA OF UNION AND THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT

1. Program of the Serbian Political Parties

At the beginning of the war the Radical Party, headed by Nikola Pašić, was the strongest in Serbia. The last elections were in 1912 when the Party (Radikalna stranka) got a majority of 16 mandates as opposed to the united opposition with 75 mandates, of which 39 came from the Serbian Independent Party (Srpska samostalna stranka). Therefore, at the outbreak of the war, in 1914, the Radical Party was in governmental power. Even though the new elections had already been announced, they could not be held due to the war situation. The political program of this Party lead distinctly towards "Great Serbia".

As long as Austria-Hungary possessed Bosnia and Herzegovina - through the annexation of 1908 - the expansion of Serbia was oriented more towards the south-east rather than the north-west, particularly behind Bosnia-Herzegovina. But Pašić and the Serbian Government did not give up the drive towards the south-east, even after the war had begun. This can be seen, for instance, in Pašić's statement (in October 1916) to an American observer with the Serbian Government on the island of Corfu, which reported to Robert Lansing, U.S. Secretary of State, that "the Serbian Government demands Salonica as an outlet on the sea and that he [i.e., Pašić] believes that she [i.e., Serbia] deserved that town."⁽⁸⁷⁾

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to think that the Serbian ruling circle had not shown a distinctive aspiration for the territories on the western boundaries where there had lived a large number of Serbian minorities in the Croatian lands. After the successful Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and Serbia's encroachment on a larger part of Macedonia, these

aspirations concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia were much stronger than during the previous years.

At the beginning of October 1914, the Serbian Government was informed of Italian and French ideas of the creation of an independent state of Croatia with Slovenia, Dalmatia, and part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁽⁸⁸⁾ From London came news that Hungary wanted to secede from Austria, under the condition that its integrity be preserved, including the integrity of Rijeka (Fiume); at this time news from Great Britain indicated that London inclined towards Italy and Hungary. In addition, Sidney Sonnino conducted secret negotiations (in the spring of 1915) through Professor Bossia, a personal friend, with Count Stephen Tisza, the Hungarian Minister-President, as well as with the opposition:

"... The Hungarian interests were, are, and always will be identical with the Italian ones: i.e., ... that the Germans and the Slavs do not become too strong in Europe. ... It is well known that a strong Hungary, the queen of the Danubian basin (Podunavlje), is the strongest wall of fortress against the invasion of the Slavs who threaten Italy's sphere of interest. Therefore, a friendship between Italy and Hungary is the result of a political need." ⁽⁸⁹⁾

When Pašić received these news he gave the following order: begin with the work "in the Great Serbian sense."⁽⁹⁰⁾ On the basis of this order (on 27 October 1914) he held a conference in Nish with J. Jovanović and B. Marković, who represented one side, and N. Stojanović and D. Vasiljević, who were the Serbian emigrés from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and represented the other side. At this conference the following was decided: the "Creation of a united Yugoslav, eventual Serbo-Croatian state" in which would be preserved "the national characteristics of each people without separate organization. ..."⁽⁹¹⁾ It was also decided which eventual "concessions" could be made to the Croats: in the title of

the new state the Croatian name could be mentioned; if necessary, the Serbian King Karadjordjević could be crowned with the Croatian crown; the Croatian emblems could be preserved; ... and in the very last resort negotiations of a separate Croatian diet could begin. Therefore, it was not at all decided to preserve the Croatian national individuality in a real sense, except some external pro forma symbols.⁽⁹²⁾ "Similar concessions could be given to the Slovenians with an extra guarantee for their present language."⁽⁹³⁾

These conclusions at the Nish Conference of the 27th of October were brought by N. Stojanović and D. Vasiljević, with the instructions of Pašić, to the Croatian emigrés - Trumbić and Supilo - with whom they had a meeting in Florence; as a result of this meeting, the Jugoslavenski Odbor was formed:

"It is understandable that they [i.e., Trumbić and Supilo] could not have been enthusiastic about such concessions by the Serbian Government about the union; and it is understandable that these conclusions regarding 'Serbian Orthodox exclusivism' made them anxious but in which situation also, it was - before everything else - most important to defend the Yugoslav right regarding Dalmatia and Istria together with Serbia; they did not find the time opportune to openly expose their doubts and fear." (94)

Meanwhile, the war with the Monarchy quickly exhausted the Serbian military power, and Pašić was afraid to further assume - with the Radical Party - the whole responsibility of leading the war, and the almost inevitable defeat of Serbia. He, therefore, invited the Serbian opposition into the Government and with this entrance the Serbian "war aim" was "changed." While the Radical Party had fought against Austria-Hungary in order to defend the country, the "new government" proclaimed the Serbian "war aims", namely: the union of all South Slavs in one state,⁽⁹⁵⁾ organized in the sense seen by the Serbs.

Thus on 20 November 1914, Pašić summonsed the leaders of the opposing parties - (S. Novaković, P. Marinković, S. Ribarac, V. Veljković, M. Drašković) - and explained the political situation to them. He asked M. Drašković and Lj. Davidović, the leaders of the strongest opposition party - the Serbian Independent Party - to join the Government. On December 6, 1914, the present Radical cabinet council was changed into a coalition. The new coalition government was composed of representatives of the: Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka), Serbian Independent Party (Srpska neovisna stranka), and Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka).

The next day (7 December 1914) the new government proclaimed a declaration of the Serbian "war aims" to the Parliament: liberation of all the South Slavs in the Monarchy and their union with Serbia. This declaration was known as the Nish Declaration. In its first draft the Declaration did not take the Slovenians into account, for there was "vacillation among the Radicals in the Slovenian question."⁽⁹⁶⁾ Contrary to D. Janković's opinion - who thought that this "vacillation" or "certain attitude" of the Radicals towards the Slovenians was not conditioned by the Serbian's attitude towards the Italian aspirations on the Slovenian territories, but that such an attitude had already existed before the war between the Serbian Radicals, - our opinion is that the Serbian attitude concerning the Slovenians was conditioned precisely by the Italians with whom Serbia did not want to come in conflict in the north-western part of the Adriatic; as we have already seen, even Serbia negotiated with Italy (in October of 1914) about Gorizia, Trieste, and Istria. This deficiency was "at the last moment"⁽⁹⁷⁾ corrected by the intervention of some politicians (N. Županić, ...). Except for the protest from the two

representatives of the Social-Democratic Party, who objected because the suggested declaration had not been discussed in the Parliament,⁽⁹⁸⁾ the Declaration was accepted almost unanimously. This Declaration reads as follows:

"... The Government of the Kingdom [of Serbia] considers as its main, and in these decisive moments, as its only duty to secure a successful end to this great warfare, which at the moment of its beginning became at the same time the fight for the liberation and union of all our liberated brothers: Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians..." (99)

This Declaration was signed on 7 December 1914 at Nish and officially notified to the Allied governments (French, English, and Russian). It was an act of the Serbian coalition government, composed of the three above mentioned political parties, and later also accepted by the fourth Serbian party: the National Party (Nacionalna stranka) led by S. Ribarac. The Serbian Social-Democratic Party (Srpska socijaldemokratska stranka) was the only Serbian political party which, rejecting the Declaration's expansive tendencies, did not accept the Nish Declaration. This Party was against the "imperialistic war", as well as against the "liberation and union of the Yugoslav people. Both of these events, it was felt, would result from the victory in the war." The Party was for a real union brought about by the free will and action of the people after the war; its political program was "the creation of a federate Balkan republic."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

With the Nish Declaration, Serbia declared publicly and officially its political aims in the war: "the liberation and union" of all Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy. But in spite of this, the Croatian emigrés were very suspicious. As Janković writes, this was "not without cause and ground", for they feared that, "behind the aim of unity which the Declaration was expressing, stood a tendency of the

Serbian bourgeoisie to ... the annexation of all the Yugoslav territories under Austria-Hungary and their absorption by Serbia." (101)

That this was true in spite of the external façade of the Serbian Government was certainly the view of the Italian Minister at Belgrade, Squitti:

"... as to the Serbian aspirations for a future Balkan settlement, these [i.e., aspirations] extend to all the regions of the Serbian language, i.e., to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia. Officially, however, the Serbian Government have not yet fixed a definite program of [its] territorial enlargement letting it depend from the results of the war and the advice of Russia." (102)

The realization of the political program of the Serbian Government depended essentially on the final outcome of the war. Their demands were basically twofold: (103)

- a) The major program which Serbia wanted to realize, should the Central Powers be completely defeated, consisted in the claims of the so-called "great solution" (veliko rešenje): annexation to Serbia - (that is no "union" even though it may be called likewise) - of all Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian territories.
- b) The minor program would come in question in case the Entente Powers concluded a separate peace treaty with Austria-Hungary; annexation of Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Lika, Krbava, Slavonia, and a larger part of Srijem, Bačka, and Baranja.

As already mentioned, the Yugoslav Committee sent Frano Supilo to Russia to win her to the "Yugoslav idea". During March and April 1915 Supilo submitted a memorandum on the "Solution of the Yugoslav Question" (Memorandum: Rješenje jugoslavenskog pitanja) to the Russian Government. The memorandum defined the structure of the new state, based upon the

federative conception: but, as we know, Supilo came back disappointed.

However, in April 1915 Pašić sent Ljubomir Stojanović⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ and Alexander Belić⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ to St. Petersburg. Both men were prominent, Serbian public and scientific workers, and went to St. Petersburg in order to express the views of the Serbian Government regarding the boundaries of post-war Serbia to the Russian Government. There Stojanović and Belić gave Sazonov a memorandum on: "The Contemporary Serbian National Question" (Memorandum:"Savremeno srpsko nacionalno pitanje"); the essential ideas of this memorandum were the following:⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

- 1) The Serbian national question consists not only of the matter of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of getting an outlet on the sea in Dalmatia, but also of the complete liberation and annexation to Serbia of other Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian territories;
- 2) Serbs and Croats are one people (narod);
- 3) The cultural union between Serbs and Croats started by accepting the Serbian literary language, which conditioned their political union and expressed their common national consciousness;
- 4) The Slovenian question is not identical with the Serbo-Croatian question for only through a union with the Serbo-Croats can the Slovenians be preserved for Slavdom and Russia;
- 5) Having groups of our people under the Italians, Austrians, or Hungarians, could have fatal consequences;
- 6) It is in the interests of the Allied Powers, mainly Russia, that the Southern Slavs unite to Serbia [not: "with Serbia"] and thus create a strong Slavic state as a barrier against future Austro-German expansion in the Balkans.

Belić and Stojanović added a geographical map to this memorandum, the map having the title: "Geographic situation of the Serbo-Croatians and Slovenians under the Domination of Austria-Hungary." (Geografski položaj Srbo-Hrvata i Slovenaca pod vlašću Austro-Ugarske) (*)

"In accordance with the given theses, there [i.e., on the geographic map] was indicated a plan of the spreading of the Serbs (Orthodox, Moslems, and Catholics), the Croatsians, and the Slovenians from which plan it followed that the Croatian inhabitants only lived north of [the river] Kupa and in the narrow coastal strip." (107)

Such was the "scientific objectivity" of the Serbian Academicians, Ljubomir Stojanović and Alexander Belić.

On one occasion Sazonov said that he was willing to give Serbia, from the Croatian territories, "about as much as the Serbian state could absorb." (108) As to the idea of federation, advocated by Supilo to Russia, this was external and remote to her, Russia being more in favour of centralism; and since the Serbian program was based upon centralism, as well as on religious and cultural affinities, this program was more understandable and meaningful to Russia. In accordance with his annotation, Belić published one of Sazonov's declarations in the "New Paper" (Novi List) in 1923 (no. 224-226), saying:

"Gentlemen, you will not take offense at me if before everything else I am first a Russian and if the Russian interests are the closest to me; but I assure you that right after that I am a Serb and the interests of the Serbian people are the closest to me. ... The Serbs showed bravery, ... The Serbian merits will be rewarded hundredfold. After the war it [i.e., Serbia] will be several times larger than it is today!..." (109)

From these talks with Sazonov, Belić and Stojanović learned: 1) which territories were given from the Croatian countries to Italy through the Treaty of London; 2) "that the Russian ministry [of Foreign Affairs] is

(*) See map no. 3.

guided in the South Slavs' problem only by the interests of the Serbian people;"⁽¹¹⁰⁾ 3) that Montenegro will unite with Serbia - ("This I will carry out by all means,"⁽¹¹¹⁾ affirmed Sazonov); 4) that Sazonov was reserved and indifferent towards the Croats; and 5) almost hostile towards the Slovenians; "Were it necessary for the Russians to fight with the arms only half a day in order for the Slovenians to become free, I would not give my consent."⁽¹¹²⁾ Professor Belić and Stojanović composed a long promemoria of twenty-eight pages; they gave three copies to Sazonov: one was for the Czar, one was for Sazonov, and the third was for the President of the Cabinet Council.

At about the same time Meštrović and Trumbić sent congratulations to Czar Nicholas II of Russia on the occasion of the "St. Nicholas-day" (6 December 1914). These congratulations were conveyed in the name of the Yugoslav Committee to Count Anatolii Nikolaevich Krupenski, the Russian diplomat and Ambassador in Rome (1912-1915). Krupenski sent them to Sazonov who replied (on 30 May 1915) with a telegram which read:

"The memorandum sent to His Majesty from some representatives of the Yugoslav Committee cannot be taken into consideration until the view of the Serbian Government in this matter is known. It is important to mention that this memorandum absolutely does not correspond to the memorandum given by Mr. Lj. Stojanović, a member of the Academy of Sciences in Belgrade; the memorandum is considered here as including the pretensions of the Serbian nation." (113)

On 2 and 3 May 1915 Trumbić had an audience with Izvol'ski, who wanted to know from Trumbić, in detail, which were all the Dalmatian regions where the Serbs lived. At the end of his audience Izvol'ski told him calmly and frankly:

"... that the basis of the Russian state policy is Orthodoxy and that Russia, because of the basis of this policy, cannot permit the Croats and Slovenians, as Catholics, to unite with the

Orthodox Serbs in one state. The Catholics are civilized, while the Orthodox are primitive and the element with higher culture would come to supremacy in this common state; Russia had complete trust in Orthodox Serbia and could not permit a common state upon which she could not count. ..." (114)

Izvol'ski was even more explicit in his conversation with Steed, who then said to Masaryk (1915): "We cannot unite the Catholics with the Orthodox. Let the Croats remain by themselves." (115)

Besides the spiritual and religio-cultural affinities, Russia also had a politico-strategic reason to help Serbia in regard to its desires for territorial expansion; namely, czarist Russia did not want a strong Slavic state in the Balkans, fearing that such a state would not like to be a "tool". (116) Lederer came to a similar conclusion saying that the Russian Government had:

"good strategic and political reasons to protect Serbian interests. The two countries were also dynastically and culturally linked. After 1903, Serbia had become the main outpost of Russian influence in the Balkans, a fact that greatly influenced the czarist decision to go to war in 1914. Thus, in the spring of 1915 Foreign Minister Sergei D. Sazonov could not lightly abandon Serbian interests and risk forfeiting Russia's future position in the Balkans. ..." (117)

Hence, here was the real power of Serbia and also of Nikola Pašić. Obviously, such an attitude on part of the Serbian as well as the Russian Government regarding the idea of union necessarily brought disappointments to the Croatian members of the Yugoslav Committee, but it still did not bring disillusion regarding the main direction of their political thought.

2. The Differences in the Conceptions of Union

During his sojourn in St. Petersburg Supilo had an audience with Alexander Stolypin, President of the well-known "Society for Slavic Reciprocity" (Obshchestvo slavianskoi vzaimnosti). This meeting was also attended by Marko Cemović, the Serbian Ambassador in St. Petersburg and later the general consul in Odessa. On 15/2 March 1915 Cemović talked about this discussion to Pašić:

"... Among others Stolypin directed the following question to Supilo: 'What state form (zajednica) do you want ?' Supilo replied: 'Even though it seems paradoxal, we want a centralistic federation.' When to this I added," [continued Cemović] "that I knew for sure and from reliable sources that the Croatians and Slovenians - in all their addresses received by the Russian Minister at the Foreign Office - took particular care of their future autonomous rights, it is completely understandable that we already have to take care of this and impede it;" [otherwise] "our hands will be bound for a long time with such essential questions for our future interior policy, which - by all means - must aim to the national and state unification." (118)

Thus, at the beginning of the war the high Serbian officials already had a centralistic conception regarding the union of the Austrian South Slavs with Serbia. The above telegram also reflected keen interest in the decentralistic tendencies of the Croatian (and Slovenian) politicians, whose ideas were reported in the pages of the "Southern Slav Bulletin", the official organ of the Jugoslavenski Odbor in London. In fact, after its constitution, the Yugoslav Committee started to publish the Bulletin in English in London, and in French in Paris. Through this journal, the Committee, throughout the war-years, advocated its conceptions and interpreted events. Professor Seton-Watson had written a letter in the first issue, in which he clearly and without any ambiguity supported the creation of Southern Slavs' state outside the frames of the Habsburg Monarchy. In this letter he wrote:

"The union of the South Slavs is one of the living problems of this war and the creation of one strong Southern Slavic state - based upon the equality of all the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians - will perform the most certain guarantee for peace in Southeastern Europe. The Southern Slavs are our natural allies against the Germanic attack and, therefore, it is the interest and the duty of Great Britain to extend its help for the realization of their aspirations." (119)

The principles of the Yugoslav Committee, which Seton-Watson held throughout the war-years, were discussed from 1 until 10 May 1915. The principles intended:⁽¹²⁰⁾ to defend the territories against the Italian aspirations and actions; to lead a loyal policy towards the Allied Powers; to advocate the Yugoslav union; to keep unknown to the general public the inner conflicts between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee, but to give the impression that the South Slavs in the Monarchy were united in mind and heart with Serbia; to stress once more that the Yugoslav Committee had to preserve its independency, financially and otherwise, from the Serbian Government as well as from the Allies.

This third point carried in itself twofold duties: a) that the Allied Powers accept the program of the "South Slavs' union" and as such include it in their war-aims; this - in ultima linæ - meant either a complete destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy or an "amputation" of its southern territories; b) that European political public opinion accept the "Yugoslav concept", advocated by the Committee against the "Serbian concept" followed by the Serbian Government. But this crucial phase was asking for a complicated and delicate working formula, for the Committee wanted to "connect" that "idea" - in which it saw "a synthesis of its national ideals" - with Serbia, which possessed its state, reputation,

diplomacy, and, even more, which had its own views and its own concept of that "union", which was quite different from the one the Committee had advocated at the same time.

The following case shows clearly the main difference between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government in the understanding of the idea of union: (121)

After the constitution of the Committee in Paris, Trumbić gave a memorandum to Delcassé for the French Government, and to Izvol'ski for the Russian. He wanted to do the same for the British Government in London, but Mata Bošković, the Serbian Minister there (1914-1916), did not want to officially introduce to Grey the members of the Yugoslav Committee, unless they changed for him two points in the memorandum: Firstly, that the term "Yugoslavia" and "the Yugoslav territories", which terms were used for the name of the future state and all the countries together; secondly, that the historical paragraph which stated that Dalmatia constitutes an indivisible part of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-(Slavonia-Dalmatia). Through the stubborn insistence of M. Bošković, a deep gap arose between the Jugoslavenski Odbor and the Serbian Government at the very beginning of its formal existence. The conflict was of importance, it comprised two basic different conceptions: 1) the Jugoslavenski Odbor based its work of union on the "Yugoslav idea" which required a sacrifice of the historic names: "Croatian", "Slovenian", and "Serbian"; that is to say, surrender the historic individuality for the benefit of a joint "Yugoslav nationalism", common to all three components. In reality it meant that Croatian nationalism would not give up its individuality and embrace Serbianhood, but that all had to make their concessions for the new common creation - Yugoslavia. 2) the Serbian Government had its

conception of "Serbian exclusivism". Minister President Pašić saw in Yugoslavia an enlarged Serbia, and this "Serbian state according to his understanding had to expand its authority and power upon the Croatian and Slovenian countries and to liberate them."⁽¹²²⁾ Such an understanding, by which the Croats and Slovenians would enter the new state as a subordinate factor, was logically unacceptable to them. Although Serbia had contributed its part in the process of union, it could not be understood that she was considered the "liberator" for the "new creation", which had been mostly built by Croats and Slovenians" through their own volition.

Therefore, according to Pašić the Croats were an "object", while in the view of the Yugoslav Committee they were a "subject" to whom belonged the right of self-determination and who, by an act of free will, decided to unite with Serbia. Here lies the whole tragedy and whole essence of the conflict between Croats and Serbs. The cause of this conflict was a moral/ethical element - a clash of the opposing forces: ethical versus material. The first force had its root in a "material mentality", while the second had its power in a "spiritual mentality". Thus, on the one side there was the idea of equality and justice for all the nations involved with their followers, and on the other side there was the conception of supremacy, at any cost, of the nation against the other nations involved. Any attempt to merge these two views - with their followers -, was bound to bring strong antagonism with various consequent results. At this point, it is à propos to state that as long as one side watched the other in a "subject-object" relationship, "Yugoslavism" (jugoslavenstvo) was a dead phrase; and what remained was expansionism and exclusivism by the one at the expense of the others,

regardless of non-genuine dialogue, "formally signed agreements," etc.
- as will be seen later.

Regarding the other complaint of the Serbian Ambassador, Mata Bošković, about Dalmatia, the Yugoslav Committee said further in this memorandum that, "from time immemorial Dalmatia had been an integral part of the Croatian state" and, by existing Austro-Hungarian laws, was an "indivisible part of the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia-Croatia and Slavonia." (123)

The main reason why Bošković stubbornly objected to the given statements was the fear that eventually the union might not be realized. In such a case, Serbia would not be able to claim Dalmatia for herself unless she had some specific rights to do so; therefore, Bošković wanted to have a formula from which it was clear that Serbia also had its "rights" on this region. Because Pašić, from whom the members of the Jugoslavenski Odbor asked help, did not want to discuss the question, Bošković also adopted Pašić's position in this regard. Finally, the conflict was "solved" in this way: the notion "Yugoslavia" in the sense of "state and nation" was changed into the meaning of a "geographical term", signifying the Southern Slavic countries as a whole, while the paragraph dealing with Dalmatia was redefined in a general context, so that it stated "that our people in Dalmatia find themselves united with the whole Yugoslav body." (124)

In order to understand the Serbian state-idea and its national exclusivism we have to keep in mind that:

"... Serbia [further] extended what had already been built - this constituted the Serbian state. It was a nucleus which should, according to the Serbian sense, become a fire place [a home] for the future new big state, if the victory in the World War would permit, and should new countries begin to join. Therefore, the

politicians of the Radical Party considered their first duty to secure what they already had, and what was entrusted to them, namely Serbia and the Serbian interests; they were ready to take care of the Yugoslavs, but only at the second place - as occasion might demand!..." (125) (*)

When we take into consideration the fact that the idea of a new Yugoslavian state was already, as a conception, bringing into question the realization of the "Great Serbian plans", then there is no wonder that the Serbian politicians - led by Pašić - were decisively against the Yugoslav Committee and its understanding of the "Yugoslav idea". We can, therefore, say that such different conceptions in the creation of a common state, inevitably led - at the very beginning and between the two sides - to serious conflicts in regard to the notion of Yugoslavism: a) for the Jugoslavenski Odbor it meant: the principle of self-determination, voluntary-and-equal union of all Yugoslav countries into a new state; - these were the very principles, the foundation upon which the Committee was building the national politic of Croatia; b) for the Serbian Government the notion "jugoslavenstvo" meant: realization of the unitaristic and Great-Serbian conception for the gradual creation of a Great-Serbian Kingdom. In the formation of this plan, "Pašić's Government accepted the postulate which firmly admitted that only the Serbs had to be the founders of a common state, created through the expansion of the power of the Serbian state upon the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian territories," and this time through the formula of "liberation." (126)

3. The Unsolved Question of the Internal Organization of the Future State as a Cause for Confrontation: Supilo-Pašić and Supilo-Trumbić.

After his return from Russia, where Supilo learned in a fairly detailed way, what the Entente Powers were promising to Italy for her entrance into the war against the Central Powers; in London he learned that Italy was even asking a protectorate over Croatia: "I was told," Supilo wrote to Pašić, "that at the beginning Italy asked a protectorate over Croatia, but was content with the obligation that Croatia would be separated from Serbia." (127)

The situation was grave: on one side, the Allies were "paying" with complete territories inhabited by the Slovenian and Croatian people, on the other side, Russia rejected the idea of union between the Catholic Croats and Slovenians with the Orthodox Serbians; at the same time new and more serious conflicts were appearing between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government because of the differences in understanding the "Yugoslav idea". In view of this situation Supilo eagerly wrote to Pašić, and asked him via telegram that the Serbian Government decisively step up the program of an integral union of all Southern Slavs by the Entente Powers, but that Serbia work more resolutely to prevent the decision of the Allies to keep Croatia separate from Serbia after the war. (128)

"The convention between the Triple Alliance and Italy is a finished matter. ... With this convention the Triple Alliance greatly violated the principle of nationality. Italy broke the moral grounds upon which she had built its union and liberation, ..." (129)

Pašić did not answer Supilo's telegrams and letters. As a result, Supilo questioned the sincerity of the Serbian Government. He could not wait longer; he wanted to bring the affair to the surface, so he wrote

another very important letter to Pašić and said:

"I learned that in the convention - which Russia draw up with Italy in the name of the Triple Alliance regarding the Adriatic littoral - there was a stipulating clause in which - in case of victory - it was guaranteed to restore a separate Croatia with the Slovenians who would not come under Italy. Thus, it is [now] not a question of inclination or disinclination of the individual Great Powers that Croatia and Serbia become a united state, but of the achieved and fixed treaty between the Triple Alliance and Italy, through which our separation is already decided. It is certain that Italy was motivated by the Austrian motto "Divide et impera" in order to better secure eventual possession of our coasts and make further plans in the Balkans tomorrow. The conservative Russian statesmen were either jealous of the relatively strong Serbian expansion and feared some kind of emancipation, or were concerned that Orthodox Serbia would only obtain as many Croats, Catholics, and Heterodox [i.e., Moslems], as it could absorb. So only these diverging motives could meet."

"This clause of stipulation changes our situation... what should we do about this decision which has already been accepted by the Great Powers," Supilo quessed, "so that it would not have been realized, and what should we do if - by the victory of the Allies - it [i.e., the decision] will be realized ? The matter is - for all of us - of the first order of importance." Therefore, he said:

"... an imperative duty intrudes to us Croats, that in this completely new situation we endeavour that we, as Croatia, survive at least somehow and that in this name we do [the work towards the union] what can be done. ... It is now necessary, before anything else, that we know in this matter the attitude of Serbia and of the Serbian Government and particularly, whether and which obligations Serbia is ready to assure in order to block this attempt upon the people's and state union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians. In this purpose I am turning to you, Mister President." (130)

Pašić did not answer this letter either.

At the same time the Allies tried to convince Serbia to consent to give a part of Macedonia to Bulgaria as a "price" for its entrance on the side of the Entente Powers. As compensation for it Serbia would receive some Croatian territories, which - upon Grey's proposition which

was finally accepted by Sonnino too - were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srijem, Bačka, part of Slavonia, and the Dalmatian coast from Cap Planka to Cavtat. Concerning a decision of the rest of Croatia including Rijeka, this would be left until the peace conference, or as Supilo said "that serves as a basis for eventual combinations with the Hungarians as an outlet on the sea." (131)

The repartition of the Croatian territories was thus prepared. Trumbić and Supilo were desperate and because Pašić still had not given any answer to all of the letters and telegrams, Supilo made a move on his own. He visited Grey and suggested a counter plan regarding Croatia: the Yugoslav countries should not be divided and given in parts to Serbia "as compensation for its sacrifices", but all territories should be understood as a whole and should unite with Serbia after the "liberation". After considerable thought Grey evolved the following formula: "At the end of the war Bosnia, Herzegovina, Southern Dalmatia, Slavonia, and Croatia will be free. They will decide their own destiny." Supilo informed Pašić regarding all of this with the comment: "He [i.e., Grey] said categorically that England as well as its Allies will accept at once this statement under the condition that Serbia accepts this statement also." (132)

The essential point in this plan was the acceptance of the principle of self-determination of the people and through that Supilo hoped to undermine the Treaty of London. However, Pašić rejected this proposition as "hazardous" and as making it "from certain to uncertain"; that is to say, that Macedonia is in possession of Serbia while the South Slavic countries are still a part of Austria-Hungary with whom exists a possibility of signing a separate peace treaty. Supilo was greatly dis-

appointed with Pašić's attitude and from then on Pašić tried to lessen Supilo's influence with the British Foreign Office.

On 1 September 1915 the Serbian Government answered with an official note of eight points to the Entente Powers - their collective note to Serbia regarding Macedonia and the compensation for it. In this official note Serbia demanded - among other things - that:

- a) Croatia with Rijeka (Fiume) will "unite" with Serbia;
- b) the Slovenians will be liberated and receive the right of self-determination.

(The literal text of point eight of this note reads:)

"That the Serbian Government, besides the given promise, receives in the shortest period of time a formal assurance from the Quadruple Alliance [i.e., England, France, Russia, and Italy], that Croatia with Rijeka will unite with Serbia, that the Slovenian countries will be liberated, and that they will receive the right of self-determination; ... The Serbian Government begs the [Entente] Powers to keep all of this under most strict secrecy." (133)

With this demand the Serbian Government renounced de facto the "Yugoslav program" and cancelled the note of 6 May 1915 in which it asked pro forma the union of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, as well as its earlier statement. With this formal note of 1 September 1915, Serbia publicly brought out its "Great Serbian Program" before the Allied governments. Hence, the principle of nationality - or national self-determination - and the principle of equality - or equal union, by which - according to the understanding of the Yugoslav Committee - they wanted to form a new state, were thus destroyed; instead of them, the principle of compensation became the "public measure" of the Allies.

Having been informed privately about the Serbian demands, Supilo caustically condemned the Serbian Government in not having asked for Croatia as an equal factor, but as a recompensation of the ceded territories in Macedonia, and because Serbia put the question of "union" on a compensational basis. Supilo was convinced that this way was extremely dangerous for the Croatian interests; he therefore demanded the Yugoslav Committee clear up the question of union with Serbia. To both sides the fact was known that two opposing concepts existed. Therefore, it was only the question of seeing whether the principle of "self-determination" or of "compensation" would prevail. Concerned with all of these events, Supilo once more made a move on his own: he gave his known promemoria of "seven points" to Grey, for which step he was sharply attacked at the plenary session (on 16 February 1916) of the Yugoslav Committee by the Serbian members who reproached him to leading a separatist Croatian policy. In this promemoria Supilo said:

- "I. Croatsians, Serbs, and Slovenians are one genetic people with three names, different historical, state-juridical, and cultural traditions, but with one language, and one people's race.
- II. Among these people in the Habsburg Monarchy, a leading political role belongs to Croatia, as prima inter pares. Outside the Habsburg Monarchy this role belongs in the same sense to Serbia. In any case a complete equality of the different names, as well as a complete freedom and equality of the religious beliefs have to be maintained (vriedi) among the national elements.
- III. Croatia is with Zagreb as the capital in a limited sense of this word, the "head and heart" of Croatiandom for all Croatsians wherever they live, as Serbia is the "head and heart" of Serbiandom in a more narrow sense with Belgrade as capital. To the Croatsians Croatia is with Zagreb an integral part of their national and state-juridical being, of their individuality, while the other Croatian territories are limbs of this being. ..."

Nevertheless, the process of the people's union and fusion "cannot be successfully carried out if Croatia will not participate with all its

politico-national capital [and] with Zagreb as the real representative of the Croats and Croatiandom," said Supilo. He finished his pro-memoria with the main point that Serbia must necessarily achieve its "transformation of spirit" in the "politico-national, constitutional, and cultural" field in order to be able to live harmoniously with the other nations. "In other words, it is necessary that Serbia reform itself internally so that she becomes and remains the only standard-bearer of union of the Yugoslavs." But if it appears that Serbia is not able to do likewise, then it is "the duty of all the Croats to work in such a way that all the Yugoslav countries in which the majority of the people would, through their free will, declare themselves for Croatia, would be united with her."(134)

On 26 March 1916 Supilo went to Italy, hoping to come into direct contact with the Italian public workers as well as with governmental circles. He wanted to find out whether there existed a possibility that the Italian Government might cease to be opposed to the Yugoslav union. In Rome he met Leonida Bergamaschi (1857-1920), an Italian politician, founder of the Italian Reformist Socialist Party (1912), and Minister without Portfolio (1916-1917); Sonnino did not want to receive Supilo even though he had recommendations from Steed. Against the attacks of the Italian press, particularly "L'Idea Nazionale", Supilo sent an open letter in which he explained the aims of his visit to Italy and among things said:

"... più volte venni in Italia ... a perorare fra gli amici e conoscenti la politica di accordo italo-slavo contro i nostri comuni e mortali nemici, che sono: Vienna e "Drang nach Osten". ... convinto che l'intimità di questi rapporti potrà moltissimo giovare all'intimità di futuri e nuovi rapporti fra gli Jugoslavi e l'Italia. ... E sono stati appunto i migliori spiriti

politici inglesi e francesi che mi hanno incoraggiato, posso dire spinto, in questa missione, piena di difficoltà, ma buona, giusta e necessaria. ..." (135)

At about the same time Pašić, accompanied by Jovan M. Jovanović (Pižon), a Serbian diplomat - (assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1914-1916, and Ambassador in London, 1916-1919) - went to Russia. At the beginning of May he made grave statements in front of the representatives of the Russian press in St. Petersburg. Renzo Larco, a representative of the leading Italian press, Corriere della Sera, reported on the sixth of May in this newspaper that:

Pašić gave an interview to the representatives of the Russian press. ... Regarding the Italo-Serbian relations he expressed: "Several times in the press were pointed out some kind of dissensions between Serbia and Italy. I have the possibility to confute these rumours and categorically affirm that there is no serious misunderstanding between these countries; but if there is a cause for an exchange of thoughts between Serbia and Italy, they are not of such a nature that they could ... cause any disturbance.

We Serbian have to recognize the unquestionable right of Italy on the hegemony upon the coasts of the Adriatic Sea. We are also longing to the sea, but in any case we do not ask war-harbours and the right to block [our] fleet there. We exclusively strive for receiving one economic outlet. Italy has no objection to this and if one may speak of the opposite and different views, those exist only in relation to the number of bases [which are] necessary to Italy for the defence of her military supremacy in the Adriatic. This dispute is not exactly of such an eminent importance. Serbia and Italy have rather enough common interests [therefore] serious difficulties could not arise in solving similar problems. ..." (136)

The Italian press welcomed Pašić's statement with enthusiasm. So the

"Tribuna di Roma" wrote:

"... Serbia's expansion on the Adriatic and the establishment of an independent Kingdom under King Peter, these are the pillars of our Balkan policy, ..." (137)

These public statements made by Pašić profoundly shocked Supilo. The resistance of the Serbian Government to the "Yugoslav idea" finally caused the following reaction on the part of Supilo: if Serbia does not want to

renounce its individuality, why should Croatia renounce ? Hitherto the conflict between the two conceptions, namely centralism and Serbian hegemony versus federalism, and the Croatian request for equality of all the national components in the future new state, appeared from these bases and assumed a distinct and substantial new character in Supilo's thinking. His new attitude now was: "Yugoslavism" (jugoslavenstvo) versus Croatiandom (hrvatstvo). Because Trumbić continued in the original line of "Yugoslavism", this new attitude of Supilo created a new and conflicting relation with Trumbić. Supilo was coming back to Dr. Ante Starčević's conception of "pure Croatianhood" (čisto hrvatstvo): "Neither with Vienna nor with Budapest, but for the freedom and independence of Croatia."

Pašić's declarations to the Russian press in St. Petersburg were the acknowledgement of Italian supremacy in the Adriatic and the possibility of a harmonious incorporation of the Serbian interests in it; this caused a serious crisis in the Yugoslav Committee. A plenary session was called on 27 May 1916, at which time the Committee were to state its attitude against those declarations. At this session the Serbian members decisively attacked Supilo's separatistic politics, particularly his promemoria composed of "seven points". Supilo explained his attitude and energetically demanded that the Committee clear up the "problem of union" with the Serbian Government. The majority of the members were, however, against this proposition, fearing the consequences of an eventual split with the Serbian Government with whom they still hoped to find a "common language" of comprehension. Thereafter Supilo resigned (on 5 June 1916) from the Jugoslavenski Odbor, giving as explanation that he was unsatisfied with the attitude of the Serbian Government

against the "Croatian- or Yugoslav question" and the impossibility of his working through the Committee for the right solution of this problem.

At the same occasion Supilo stated that the Serbian Government "made many omissions and great principal mistakes in this program. This I can prove with many examples and facts. It [i.e., the Serbian Government] particularly made omissions and mistakes in the handling of the Croatian question, ..." (138) He unconditionally asked that the "Triune Kingdom" of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, ... "is and must be an equal factor with Serbia and with the Eastern part of our people, for only in this way can the Yugoslav question be solved on a just national basis." (139)

But the most serious mistakes which the Serbian Government made and which caused Supilo's break with it, were Pašić's demands of "compensations" from the Croatian territories for the part of Macedonia which the Allies asked Serbia to give to Bulgaria. In relation to this point, Supilo wrote:

"... The gravest mistake, in my opinion, [that] it [the Serbian Government] has made by its attitude ... lies in the fact of the division of Slavonia along the Catholic and Orthodox lines, then in its standpoint regarding Croatia which the Serbian Government was asking in its note, not as another equal factor in the conception of our people's union, but on the contrary as a compensation for the sacrifices which Serbia will make conceding Macedonia. Measure up, gentlemen, a consequence of this criterion, ..." (140)

Since the Yugoslav Committee did not prefer the solution of the union with the Serbian Government, Supilo considered the Jugoslavenki Odbor practically as a "tool" in the hands of the Serbian Government and its politics, and Trumbić as the person mainly responsible for this; Supilo was embittered at Trumbić, for he did not want to defend his statements at the mentioned session.

"The result of my [separatistic] actions were the known Seven Points of my promemoria, ... All our friends in London and Paris who know and support our cause, approved those points as justful, far-reaching, European-like, modern, and indispensable for the right solution of our question. Among all the Croatian members of the Committee whom I showed [the promemoria which they approved] only the Serbian exclusivists and Dr. Trumbić did not agree with them. He [i.e., Trumbić] ... swims in their [i.e., Serbian] waters, even though I am convinced he thinks differently. But he has no courage, no [supporting] energy for his personal standpoint. Also Meštrović (*) told me this, he who always encouraged me to hold out and to persist, for Trumbić is a feeble person." (141)

Even though Supilo - with his dynamic nature - accused Trumbić of "feebleness", Trumbić was conscious of the importance of an eventual split with the Serbian Government. Nevertheless, he pursued the work for the South Slavs' union with Serbia, hoping in this way to protect the Croatian territories from the Italian pretensions, leaving for future times the fight for equality in the future new state. On the contrary, Supilo wanted to solve this matter now, not later, as he wrote to De Giulli:

"... We Croats have to accept the matter as it is, and then work accordingly. Mine is the deepest conviction that Serbia can expand only with the help of Russia, but the Yugoslav question will not and cannot be solved with Russia's help alone, but in agreement and with a compromise between Russia and the West, in the first place England, ..." (142)

Thus, we may say that the character of the conflict between Supilo and Pašić was, in principle, a clash between two diametrically-opposed conceptions; while the conflict between Supilo (**) and Trumbić was a question of political priorities and not so much a disagreement in the principles.

(*) About Ivan Meštrović see: Appendix II, p. 291.

(**) About Frano Supilo see: Appendix I, p.270.

4. Views of the Serbian Government upon the Catholic and Moslem Religions

A very important question in regard to the creation of the future common state was the problem of difference in the creeds among Croatians, Slovenians, and Serbs. The Serbian Government was ready for tolerance towards the Catholic faith - at least in theory. In March of 1916 the heir apparent to the throne, Alexander Karadjordjević, and Pašić visited the Allied capitals. In London Pašić gave an interview to the correspondent of the "Daily Chronicle" in which he declared, among other things, that "religion" of the Catholic Croatians would be tolerated. In his letter to De Giulli Supilo made a commentary on this point:

"The declarations made by the Representative of the Serbian Government [Pašić] in the previous [month] April in London concede to the Croatian Catholics, who will come into the perimeter with Serbia - religious tolerance! When we think what position the Catholics and Croatians as such enjoy in Austria-Hungary, [and] when we take into consideration the fact that Catholicism is - apart from the religious dogmas in which one can believe or not believe - such a colossal cultural and humanitarian institution that no other religion can even from afar draw a parallel with her, and that the whole Orthodoxy is but a faded picture [in comparison] with her, ... [then] we can imagine how our people could have been impressed by the message that their creed will be tolerated in the new [state] organization! I do not say that as a Catholic, and the less so as a clericalist, but as a real free thinker who is at the same time a politician and who, by such important changes, must take into account the feelings and emotions of the people whose well-being is the case, ... When we, at the end, bear in mind that this [Pašić's] declaration of "tolerance" was conceded after [a] struggle and vacillation, as I was told from reliable sources, then this is the best sign which indicates how far we still are from the right criteria of the people's interests for the union of the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians." (143)

Among the Croatian political emigres who were less critical and less intuitively gifted than Frano Supilo, there was a general belief in the Serbian religious tolerance and leadership of the Serbians, at least at the beginning of the war. So, for instance, Pavle D. Ostović - (Secretary

of the Yugoslav Committee in London from 1916 until 1918, and private secretary to Dr. Ante Trumbić, and who later on became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs and delegate to the Peace-Conference) - wrote:

"When, in the autumn of 1918, a Catholic paper in London expressed concern regarding the future of the Roman Catholic Church in the proposed Yugoslav state, the author had the privilege of discussing the matter with His Eminence, Cardinal Bourne. The author [i.e., Pavle D. Ostović] explained that the rights and privileges of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia would be in no danger, since he was sure that the Serbians and the Serbian Orthodox Church were liberal. His Eminence had his doubts and the author now admits the insufficiency of his own knowledge and experience at that time. The Serbians are not great Church goers nor are they very devout. The Church is a part of their national life, like the village fair. ... But behind this liberal surface there is intolerance. The Serbian Orthodox Church, being identified with the Serbian State and Serbian people, is intolerant of other creeds and peoples in "her" state, ... This explains why all Muslims, to the very last, were driven out of Serbia. ..." (144)

However, the belief in the Orthodox tolerance of Serbia, particularly regarding the Moslem creed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, soon began to change. Pursuant to Meštrović's writing, the opinions concerning the difference of creeds in the future common state were - in some measure - divided in the Yugoslav Committee. One group was of the opinion that all religions had to be free and also free from the state as the state should be free from them, but there were two state-like religions: the Orthodox and the Catholic. The other group thought that there were three religions professed by "our people": the Orthodox, the Catholic, and the Moslem, and that all three had to be acknowledged as the people's creed.

In his "Memoirs" Meštrović wrote about this divergence in connection with one case as follows:

"... The meetings were held either in Nice, where Protić was living - [Stojan Protić was Vice-President in the Serbian Government during the war-years] - or in Cannes where we were living, Trumbić and I. ... The conference was in my house. Besides Trumbić and

Protić, there were Dr. Trinajstić, Dr. Gazzari, and myself. As usual Trumbić was the chairman. There was a word about the religions and the countries. Trumbić expressed, in regard to the religions, that we had already discussed [this subject] in a more limited circle of the [Yugoslav] Committee and that there were opinions like the one of Hinković where all religions are free from the state and it [the state] from them and that there are two [religions] as state-like, the Orthodox and the Catholic. The other opinion was, [Trumbić] mentioned myself [Meštrović], that there are three religions which our people confess, the Orthodox, the Catholic, and the Moslem [and which are] recognized as the people's. Protić only said that [it] is logical that the same rights should be guaranteed to the Catholic religion as are guaranteed to the Orthodox, even though the head of the first religion is outside of the country."

"When we talked about the countries, Trumbić asserted that it is most convenient that, for the time being, the countries should be left as they are and that one will see later on, for the common life will teach us how it is best to arrange at the end. Protić did not have anything against, he only said that this situation, which Austria created in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot remain because the Serbs do not want to tolerate it, particularly in these countries. Trumbić answered that this is the most delicate question in our whole complexity and that it will be an examination for our political maturity - how we will treat the matter regarding Bosnia." For Trumbić said:

"... Bosnia is one of the most important countries in the sense of a good or bad common life and in the previous clashes [Bosnia] was the main cause of discord between the Serbs and Croats; therefore, it will be necessary to find a way in which Bosnia unites us [and] does not divide us.

On this Protić replied:

- Leave it to us, We have a solution for Bosnia.
- Which Mister Protić ? - questioned Trumbić inquisitively.
- When our army comes across [the river] Drina, we will give the Turks [i.e., the Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina] twenty-four hours, or even forty-eight - time to come back [to convert] to the great-grandfather's religion, and those who will not accept this, [would be] cut down as we did in earlier times in Serbia. ...
- [And after that, Trumbić asked Protić] Do you speak this seriously, Mister Protić ? - Most seriously, Mr. Trumbić, [answered Protić].

It will not be possible in Bosnia to deal with the Turks in an European way [i.e., to do it slowly, gradually], but through our way (nego po našem) [i.e., through killing] ..., [said Vice-President Protić]." (145)

That this was not a single case and that there existed a frightful continuity in the Serbian national and state idea in the above mentioned problem, i.e., in Bosnia and Herzegovina, concerning the Moslems, is clear from the political program of the former colonel of the Yugoslav Army, Draža Mihajlović, and leader of the Serbian Chetnik movement which began in Serbia immediately after the capitulation of Yugoslavia in 1941 and spread among the Serbian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Points 4 and 5 of this program of 20 December 1941 - (in fact 25 years after the mentioned declaration of Protić) - which colonel D. Mihajlović sent to Djordje Lasić and Paul Djurišić, read:

"4. Clearing from the state territory of all the national minorities and non-national [i.e., non-Serbian] element.

5. Create a direct-common boundary between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as between Serbia and Slovenia [through] clearing of Sandjak of the Moslem inhabitants and of Bosnia of the Moslem and Croatian inhabitants." (146)

In his Memoirs Ivan Meštrović also attested to the above given program in the following excerpts:

"Shortly before I succeeded in going to Switzerland [1943], Archbishop Stepinac stayed for very short time in Rome. He arrived by aeroplane and entrusted me with the reason for his arrival; this was that he was bringing to the Pope all of the documents about the crimes committed by the Nazis and Fascists on our territory, including occupied Dalmatia. He also secretly sent the message to all priests so that they could also confidentially send him the facts. Eighty-five percent of them replied; he [Stepinac] put all these reports in [his] small leathercase [which he used for official papers], and flew to Rome in order to turn them over to the Pope. ...

This time Stepinac was quite nervous and told me how the Nazis had gunned down his brother german eight days before because he had collaborated with the partisans [guerilla-warfare]. He expressed

the sentiment that the conquerors were more and more cruel and that the conditions in Croatia were more and more deplorable. The fighting between Tchetniks [the followers of Draža Mihajlović] and Ustashe [the followers of Ante Pavelić](*) were most responsible for what had resulted in the not yet apparent hatred between Croats and Serbs. He expressed the fact that the hatred is generalized on both sides. As proof that this [statement] is not correct, [i.e., that all Serbs hate Croats], he related a recent experience with one of the Serbian officers. This officer came to the Capitol [the residence of the Archbishop of Zagreb] and told him the following:

- 'I was sent by General Mihajlović to give a letter to an Italian general. Mihajlović's people escorted me to Belgrade and led me into the hands of Nedić's people -[General Nedić was the head of the pro-German puppet government of Serbia during World War II, that also collaborated with the Tchetniks]- and they led me to Germans, who escorted me as far as Sarajevo; from Sarajevo to Zagreb [I was escorted by] the Italians. In Zagreb the Italians assigned me to a room at the Hotel Esplanada and told me to wait until they come for me and escort me to the general. I waited and today is [already] the fourth day. I was bored, outside it was raining, and I carefully opened the letter and, when I saw what was [written] in it, I was ashamed and decided that I would not hand the letter over [to the Italian general], regardless of what might happen to me. Your Eminence, I am a Serb from Serbia, I swore on loyalty to the Yugoslav state, and this letter is treason against this state. I will not, alive, deliver it, but I brought it to you so that you might save it for history. Whatever happens to me will happen, for I do not care for [my] life after so many afflictions and so much shame. The man left and the letter is with me,' finished Stepinac.
- And do you remember its contents, [Your] Eminence? - I asked.
- 'Of course, I remember every word, ... He [i.e., Draža Mihajlović] began [the letter] addressing [himself] to "[Your] Excellency" and "Colleague", and then Mihajlović went on into the matter, expressing how the relations between Italy and Serbia had not only been good but had also been friendly

(*) ("Dr. Ante Pavelić (d. 1960), the founder and leader of the Ustasha Movement among the Croats, was of the view that the injustice and violence that the Croats suffered at the hands of the Serbs [between two World Wars] should be retaliated against by force." Source: Eterovich, Francis H.: Croatia: Land, People, ..., Op.cit., vol. 1, p. 196, note 7.)

until [the time] when Croatsians had entered the composition of the Serbian state. Since that time [these relations] deteriorated and became more and more difficult. Meanwhile, now Serbs as well as Italians knew Croatsians and the time has come for a close collaboration, for

- "our aims are the same: yours - to eliminate Croatsians from Dalmatia, and ours - to eliminate them from Bosnia and Herzegovina." ...'"

After that Meštrović proposed to give "one copy [of this letter] to Roosevelt's delegate to the Vatican, Mr. Miron Taylor."

- "Stepinac agreed with this and Mr. Taylor informed me, in New York, ... that he received the thing [i.e., the copy of the letter]" - said Meštrović. (146-a)

Chapter IV

THE QUESTION OF VOLUNTEERS

Knowing about the Italian pretensions in Istria and Dalmatia, the Yugoslav Committee decided to form voluntary troops from among the war-prisoners in Russia.

"It was known that there were [i.e., in Russia] several hundred thousand war-prisoners: Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, from whom some were taken as lege artis prisoners, who can be said to be real prisoners after the war, while the others surrendered voluntarily. From these elements it was endeavoured to create legions which would have the duty to liberate [the homeland] ..." (147)

Even though there were discussions among the Yugoslav Committee in December 1914, the formal conclusion - regarding this question - was not settled. At the meeting of 11 January 1915 in Rome the Committee decided that the "Adriatic League" should be formed from those volunteers in Russia.

"The League was called "Adriatic" because our Adriatic Sea symbolizes a synthesis of the ideals of all Yugoslavs who live along its shores or long for it, and because of the fact that the League could eventually develop [i.e., engage] itself in our territories along the Adriatic Sea. ... The Legion would in any case come under command which the Serbian Government would provide." (148)

Because the purpose of the "Adriatic League" (Jadranska legija) was proclaimed in Rome, its purpose, i.e., to defend the Croatian coasts against the Italian aspirations - was, naturally, not mentioned, but it was only said that this purpose was directed against the Austro-Hungarian oppression. The further character of the "League" was devoted to helping the Serbian Army. However, even though the chief aim of the "League" was at the end evident from its name, the Italian sensitive press quickly felt this, understanding the real purpose and therefore reacting quite sharply against it. The role of the voluntary troops became of even more

importance after the signing of the "Treaty of London".

"In one word: the voluntary troops had to execute one great, eminent national role; all their powers had to be consecrated solely for our national cause, regardless of anybody, including even the Allies. ... When the war ends, it will be necessary to drive out the German and Hungarian [military] units from our territories ... [this will be] our tribute for the sacrifice of the liberty shedding blood." (149)

A few months later the members of the Committee decided that the name "Adriatic" was not the most suitable: therefore, they chose another one for the "Adriatic League" namely, "The Yugoslav League", as they thought that this name clearly expressed all three South Slavic people as a totality.

The Serbian Government did not like the idea of "volunteer troops", and their formation because it did not serve the purpose of its intentions, and thus its position in front of it was completely negative.

"Keeping always till the end of the war the attitude that Serbia is the only factor 'which liberates', it [i.e., the Serbian Government] jealously preserved the Serbian character of the Army and of all those actions. Even though its organs, when necessary, readily used the phrases about Yugoslavism in the frame of its propaganda to enter into the corps [of volunteers], [even then] the Serbian Government was asking that the Army remain Serbian and exclusively Serbian by name as well as in reality, while the officers were asked 'to imbue the volunteers with the sound Serbian spirit' and to inspire them for the Serbian cause. ... the Serbian Government became afraid of the republican and federalistic streams ... did not want to permit the formation of one large unit which later on - under specific conditions - might serve as a supporting base to the federalists like an army, which could eventually escape to its control." (150)

While the real intention of the "League" was to defend the Adriatic coast from the Italians - as previously mentioned - this design was against Pašić's political intentions regarding Italy:

"The Adriatic League was objectionable to Pašić personally and [also] to the Radical majority in the government, and only for this reason did they constantly think about a treaty with Italy. ..."(151)

The Serbian Government stubbornly adhered to the idea that the volunteers had to be included anonymously in the Serbian Army, "for the Serbian Government as well as the Serbian military authorities were against the creation of a separate unit."⁽¹⁵²⁾ All of these facts created tensions and grave difficulties between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee, thus postponing the negotiations regarding the forming of the "Yugoslav League" - which should have been incorporated separately into the Serbian Army. In the meantime the volunteers, after their arrival from South America and Russia at the given destinations, were further included anonymously among the Serbian troops. As a result of these policies, "the number of volunteers fighting anonymously in the Serbian Army remained unknown till the present day."⁽¹⁵³⁾

At the same session (on 11 January 1915) the Jugoslavenski Odbor also decided to send Dr. Franko Potočnjak, a member of it, to Russia, after finishing his assigned duty in the U.S.A. His main purpose would be: to lead an "action and propaganda in order to win the influential Russian circles - as many as possible and as complete as possible - for our national cause ... and to make our national problem better known in Russia."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ This duty became even more important due to Supilo's failure in his mission there. (After his arrival in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1916, Potočnjak became interested in Supilo's previous actions there: "I was told", said Potočnjak, "that [Supilo] was met with distrust, to which contributed in great part his ... many visits to the Italian Embassy..."⁽¹⁵⁵⁾

1. The Volunteers in Russia

After Dr. Frank Potočnjak's departure to Russia, the Yugoslav Committee entrusted, in the middle of July 1915, Dr. Ante Mandić - who since the beginning was already in Russia - with the branch-office of the Committee in St. Petersburg and of the creation of a legion of volunteers. Mandić began to work in this sense and when he came to the Serbian Embassy in St. Petersburg, he found a full array of letters ("... over 20,000 mostly very touching letters and requests from war-prisoners...")⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ through which they asked for help from the Serbian Ambassador. Those prisoners who designated themselves as volunteers were sent by Mandić to Serbia,

"leaving to the Jugoslavenski Odbor and the Serbian Government the task of organizing a legion, as they wished, in Serbia. This work was continued until the autumn of 1915 when Serbia - attacked by all sides - underwent the break which [then] ... cut off also the connections across the Danube and impeded the further sending of volunteers." ⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

In Serbia the volunteers were already anonymously put into the Serbian Army while on one side the Serbian Government was postponing the negotiations with the Committee in regard to the "Adriatic League" - later known as the "Yugoslav League" -, on the other side it negotiated with the Russian Government through Dr. Miroslav Spalajković - (the Serbian Ambassador in Russia from 1913 to 1918) - in connection with the formation of Serbian troops in Russia taken from the Slavic war-prisoners of Austria-Hungary. Among them it was decided to create a troop of volunteers in Odessa, in which a Serbian consulate was established. The Russian Supreme Command announced a decree that, from then on, all officers and soldiers, war-prisoners from Austria-Hungary [i.e., Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians] who reported themselves as volunteers had to be forwarded

to Odessa to the Serbian consulate - Marko Cemović - who lead, as was his duty, a natio-political organization of this Corps. The military command was conferred on Major Z. Pejović;⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ thus the "Corps of Volunteers" (Dobrovoljački Odred) was created.

The Russian Command began to send all these prisoners to Odessa from the South of the Dual Monarchy, regardless of whether or not they were volunteers. "In about two months [ca.] 19,700 soldiers gathered... there for whom neither the necessary accomodations, nor food, nor clothing, nor officer cadre were ready, in general nothing."⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ In Odessa a selection was then made from among them and the heterogeneous elements - often Hungarian or German soldiers - were sent back. But this selection was also made very superficially:

"So many of our people extradited to the [Serbian] consul in Odessa were saying that they did not report themselves voluntarily, but were driven to Odessa by force [while] wanting to remain faithful to their czar [i.e., Franz Joseph I] and wished [rather] to return to Siberia." ⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

Commenting on these cases Potočnjak said:

"They are clear proof that we were not yet nationally and politically mature for the work we undertook. ..." ⁽¹⁶¹⁾

By the spring of 1916 two regiments of soldiers and over 300 officers had been assembled: among the soldiers the Serbian element predominated, while the opposite was true among the officers; Croatian and Slovenian officers ⁽¹³⁷⁾ exceeded the number of Serbian officers ⁽¹¹⁶⁾; in addition there were 36 Czech officers and a few others. ⁽¹⁶²⁾ Potočnjak saw the reason for the inadequate response of Croatian and Slovenian soldiers in the fact that the tradition and religious categories of the lower social strata prevailed upon the Yugoslav idea and union with Orthodox Serbia,

which was something strange to them. The people, said Potočnjak, wanted the union of the South Slavs but within the framework of the Monarchy, so that through it they became important, in other words, trialism; while the more educated circles looked at the national and political question in a broader sense. The officers of the "Corps of Volunteers" saw in the Yugoslav idea an equal union with Serbia, and in addition:

"... to the poor response of Croats and Slovenians contributed also this [fact], that from the official side [it] was emphasized to assemble the Orthodox Serbs, while the Croats and Slovenians were joining with difficulties." (163)

At the beginning the "Corps of Volunteers" in Odessa was called "Serbian", an expression which was completely against the understanding of the Yugoslav Committee. Therefore, discussions began among the Croatian and Slovenian officers and they reached the conclusion:

"that the Corps, because of its composition of three nations as an entity should be called "Yugoslav". This [however] was not approved nor accepted..." (164)

Furthermore, "this idea among Serbian circles was seen as heretical", Marko Cemović wrote later, ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ and in this way disharmony, hatred and disdain originated in the "Serbian Corps of Volunteers" in Odessa.

"When there was something trustworthy to say in a separate group or cluster, it was asked: is there any Croatian, Slovenian, or Serb present - as occasion serves - depending on those who wanted to talk and to come to an understanding." (166)

With the arrival in April 1916 of the Serbian officers - led by colonel Stevan Hadžić - from Corfu, where the Serbian Government had its headquarters after its defeat by the Central Powers, the conditions at the Corps became much worse. For instance the officers from Corfu received a war-allowance of 8 rubles per day, while the volunteer-officers

only got 2 1/2 rubles per day, being put - by this fact - into a second category vis-à-vis the Corfu's officers; they were also treated inequally in comparison with the Serbian officers in the leading of operative units. The Serbian officers did not grasp the fact: "that the Corps is one political formation with a military organization, that the political idea bore it and determined its aim and purpose, and that the military organization is only an instrument to that." They looked at the "idea of the people's union" from the exclusive Serbian point of view. "From here [germinates] a disgust for the names Yugoslav, Croatian, and Slovenian, and the threats that anyone who will speak about that, 'the darkness will eat him up', or he will be ... shot down."⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ Mandić said that:

"The Russian Government skilfully used this hostile condition with the intention of provoking a clash in the Corps of Volunteers among the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians on its political basis, for the benefit of the idea of a federation between Croatsians, Slovenians, Czechs, Hungarians, and eventually the Austro-Germans to prevent - in this manner - the union of the Catholic Yugoslavs with [Orthodox] Serbia." (168)

Franko Potočnjak arrived in St. Petersburg just before Easter 1916. Spalajković, the Serbian Ambassador in Russia (1913-1918), informed him about the situation there and about "our situation" in particular. He asked an audience for Potočnjak with Sazonov, but due to the Easter holidays, it was necessary to wait several days. In the meantime Mandić received a letter from Dr. Gjuro Kolumbatović who was in Odessa; in the letter was a description of the terrible situation in the "Serbian Corps" in Odessa, a situation which was in serious danger of disintegration:

"The matter is sharpened until the culmination; therefore, it is necessary that somebody from the Yugoslav Committee come here at once and bring the situation under control." (169)

Spalajković, Mandić, and Potočnjak agreed that the planned audience by

Sazonov should be postponed and that Potočnjak should promptly go to Odessa and settle the chaotic situation. Mandić sent Trumbić Kolumbatović's letter together with earlier ones in order that the members of the Committee might see the overall situation in Russia regarding the question of volunteers.

Coming to Odessa "I [saw that] the conditions in the Corps ... were worse than I [myself] could imagine,"⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ wrote Potočnjak. The volunteers reasoned in this way, he continued:

"The name Serb ... designates one part of our people as do the names Croatian, ... and Slovenian... None of these names designates the whole people. And the [Serbian] Corps forms neither a part of it, nor has to form a Serbian part alone. It [the Corps] has to include all three together: the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenians, and precisely all three seek that the common work and powers create a common, united, consolidated, and liberated homeland. ... Unfortunately such reasoning was not considered as a feeling and as a result of the understanding of the young people, but [it was considered] as an opposition against Serbianhood. Those who conducted the Corps, which included several Serbian officers, ... were one-sided and unable to understand the ideas which directed those who began the movement for the legions and those [also] who responded to it. They still agreed completely with the Serbian exclusivism and looked with an evil eye upon all who only dared to speak a word against the name of the [Serbian] Corps." (171)

In order to somehow correct this situation, Potočnjak started to publish a paper known as the "Slavic South" (Slovenski Jug). The purpose of it was: to inform "the scattered brothers through all the Russian country" about the political and military affairs, and to bring the news from the homeland. The financial expenses were borne by the Yugoslav Committee in London "and if it had not been able to pay them in full, the Serbian Government would have done this instead,"⁽¹⁷²⁾ as Potočnjak had arranged with Pašić.

Pašić, as well as the heir to the throne Alexander, were informed

in written form of the whole situation concerning the tensions in the Corps in Odessa, said Potočnjak. Besides the "inner factors", there was also an "outside influence" which too interfered in the Corps' situation. Such was the case, for example, of Krunoslav Heruc (or Geruc). Heruc, who had lived in Russia for thirty years, presented himself as a Croatian representative and as such was accepted in Russian circles. Heruc also had connections with the Russian secret police. He and Ivan Garapić established the Russian-Croatian Society, "Križanić", in Moscow in 1915 which was pro-Frankist - (see footnote # 1, ch.II, p.329) - oriented, while the "Yugoslavia" Society - established in the spring of 1916 - followed the concept of the settlement of Yugoslavia upon the federalistic principle which also comprised Bulgaria.

Heruc, in relation with the Russian authorities, worked to establish a separate "Russian-Croatian Corps", similar to the "Russian-Czech Corps" but against the union of the Croats and Slovenians with Serbia.⁽¹⁷³⁾ Heruc had his people in the Serbian Corps in Odessa, whose work - among the already highly dissatisfied Croatian and Slovenian officers - contributed even more to aggravate the situation there. Only by the intervention of Potočnjak, Mandić, and Spalajković was Heruc's influence on the Corps to a certain extent resisted.

While more and more volunteers were coming to Odessa, the Russian Supreme Military Command, by its decree of 10 October 1916 (no. 12,158), officially formed the "Serbian Corps of Volunteers" (Srpski dobrovolajčki korpus) - which was split into two divisions: "The First Serbian Division of Volunteers" (Prva srpska dobrovoljačka divizija) and "The Second Serbian Division of Volunteers" (Druga srpska dobrovoljačka divizija).

The chief command passed - in September 1916 - from the Serbian colonel in Corfu, Hadžić, to the General of the Serbian Army, Mihajlo (Michael) Živković. All the administrative work and action was taken over by the First Division, apart from some troops who were kept under the name of the "Serbian Corps", while the Second Division still had to be completed.

When Rumania entered the war in the autumn of 1916 on the side of the Entente Powers, the First Division of Volunteers was hastily sent to Dobrudja to stop the Bulgarian advance. The plan of the Division was, in the event of success, to ferry over the Danube, to join, and to enter the Serbian Army. The men fought magnificently and earned, with their courage and persistence, a famous name. According to Ante Mandić's information⁽¹⁷⁴⁾, the Division started the battle with 18,510 soldiers, receiving during the combat some 4,500 men for its reinforcement. The Division consisted of the central front; on its left wing were about 30,000 Russians, and on the right wing five Rumanian divisions. The battle lasted from 24 August until 12 October 1916. The Division succeeded in breaking down the Bulgarian-Turkish center, in capturing four batteries, and in seizing a considerable amount of military and war material. The loss of the Division was extremely high: 42 officers dead and 208 wounded; 2,039 dead-and-missing soldiers, and 6,047 wounded. According to the information of the Bulgarian generals, Toshev and Kantardžhii, the Bulgarian loss was 14,800 soldiers and officers. In agreement with Paulova's data⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ the First Division's losses were as follows: from 500 volunteer officers who fought in these battles fell 32 - (15 Serbs, 8 Croatians, 7 Czechs, and 2 Slovenians); in addition 7 regular officers from Serbia and a total of 300 wounded officers. From

the volunteer soldiers fell 1,939 - (1,810 Serbs, 41 Slovenians, 32 Croatians, 27 Russian, 26 Czechs, and 2 others - making a total of 1,938 and not 1,939 as indicated by Paulova) - and over 8,000 wounded. Czar Nicholas was so satisfied with their performance that he ordered the immediate completion of the Second Division.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾ But no one cared very much about the welfare of the wounded. Only a few weeks after the catastrophe, Mandić said:

"... Fifteen days after Dobriča (Bazardžhika - [one of the places where the battle was fought]) - I saw them in Odessa: muddy, dirty, ripped, neglected, the officers lay in their bloody shirts, without dresses, without underwear to change their clothes, without a broken penny in their pocket. They lay waiting ...for the English lazarets, and ... for receiving their payments - since July [of 1916] on; and then to transport them into the interior of Russia, and - la commedia è finita! Nobody thinks more about them, nobody cares for them, ..." (177)

On 1 October 1916 a forced mobilization began among the war prisoners in the Odessa region. By the end of the month about 20,000 "Volunteers" had been transported to Odessa, among them: 9,000 Croatians, 7,000 Serbs, and 4,000 Slovenians "from whom the majority were included in the legion against their own will."⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ With these volunteers was completed the Second Division. It is held that this mobilization was carried out by the Serbian captain Majstorović against the wish of the Russian authorities who, this time, wanted to select them. The treatment imparted to these "volunteers" was the same as before. As the soldiers did not want to put on uniforms, they were tortured through hunger, with the end result being a rebellion (on 23 October 1916) "with 13 dead and 18 wounded."⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ It even reached the point where troops ran away from the Corps, shouting: "Long life to Franz Joseph" (Živio Franjo Josip!).⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ Up to 20 November 1916 44% deserted from the Second Division - (3,000

ran away, and about 6,000 returned to Russian war captivity. From about 20,000 soldiers forming this Division, there remained only 11,169 men.⁽¹⁸¹⁾ This desertion led General Živković to the conclusion of sending on 17 December 1916 a proposition to the Serbian Government declaring that the hated "Serbian name" of the Corps should be abolished among the Croatian and Slovenian deserters, and replaced by the name "Yugoslav Corps of Volunteers."⁽¹⁸²⁾

However, apprehending that the Second Division could be misused as the First one against its real intentions, Potočnjak sent a code-letter on 1 December 1916 to the heir to the throne Alexander saying:

"... The First Division of the Serbian Corps is completely broken, it can be said that it barely exists. There is also a danger that the Second Division, hardly gathered but not yet trained and not at all ready, could have been used in the same way and brought to the same results. The wounded are greatly embittered [and] among the volunteer-officers and soldiers [there is] a general discontentment because they were employed in the previous battles which did not solve [our] matter [and] on foreign territory; since they were gathered and responded to the call to fight for their national ideals and [national] interests for which they are yet and always ready to sacrifice all, wishing to combat for positive results. ... [There exists] a voice of general discontentment, embitterness, and cursing at the command of the First Division. It is highly urgent to take steps which, possibly, will correct the first and prevent the second. ..." (183)

When Potočnjak came back from Russia, he went to Corfu where he reported the whole situation concerning the volunteers in Odessa orally and in a written form, giving the notes in person to Alexander on 30 May 1916. In this report were cited facts of the bad treatment from the Serbian officers, particularly in regard to the Croatian and Slovenian volunteer soldiers; it was also stated that the Serbian officers beat them with "the kourbash, fists, and kicking" and "cursing [their] father and mother - and yet in addition 'Croatian' or 'Slovenian', ... calling

[them] herd of cattle, ... and the Austrian swine, etc. ..."(184)

In the meantime Russia was rapidly moving towards great internal changes. In March 1917 the czar and dynasty of the Romanov was overthrown and the Russian Government took over the cabinet council headed by Prince Lvov (1861-1925), while the Foreign Office came under the control of Professor Miliukov who was positively inclined to the idea of "Yugoslav union". In those stormy days the spreading of liberal ideas also reached the Corps of Volunteers in Odessa; through these events a larger group of officers, almost exclusively Croatians and Slovenians, expressed their wishes to the Command of the Corps asking namely that: (185)

1) hitherto the name of the Corps - "The Serbian Corps of Volunteers" - be changed to the "Yugoslav Corps of Volunteers"; 2) the political and juridical constitution of the future common state organization has to be defined precisely in advance, based upon the federalistic principle of equality; 3) the Corps of Volunteers has to be preserved for the purpose for which it was created, namely, the liberation of the homeland; 4) the juridical and material status of the volunteer-officers and-soldiers have to be clearly defined; 5) among the Corps' command a special elected committee has to be formed, composed of the volunteer officers and chosen therein, and which [Committee] - like the Russian military units - will work together with General Živković and take care of the political, juridical, and agitational side of the Corps' work; that is, the formation of the "political commissariat".

The same group of officers forwarded one declaration to the new Russian authorities. The declaration read:

"...[We want] Yugoslavia based upon the principle of democracy and equality for all three nations. We consider any other platform for our union impossible and harmful for each of the three nationalities. ... A federation of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian countries - after the pattern of Switzerland or the United States of America - can only be realized through a strict conduct of the principle of equality. Our ideal, thus, is: a federative Yugoslavia.

... Longing for the creation of Yugoslavia, we wish that it will be at the same time an element of peace in the Balkans, ... We wish liberty and union so that our unhappy and exhausted nations can devote all their capacities in a peaceful common life, in working for the promotion of the material and spiritual cultures, ... The 'Great Serbia' - this is the result of a jingoistic and natural mania. Following our deep conviction, the 'Great Serbian' idea is not suitable to the Serbian people and is a product of fantasies and state of mentality of the military group which wishes to clash with arms in the Balkans and which, under the name (firma) of democratism, forced all Yugoslavs to serve the idol of rough power. 'Great Serbia' is against our ideal of work and peaceful development; it [i.e., the 'Great Serbian' idea] means parasitism which is in connection with expansionism, and is an eternal threat in relation to all its neighbours." (186)

In its reply to the demands of the Croatian and Slovenian officers to the Command of the Corps - which sent these demands to the Serbian Government -, the latter accepted the proposition regarding the salaries and status of the volunteer-officers, while it remained obdurate in its attitude in connection with the changing of the Corps' name. The only deviation, however, in this aspect was the change of the hitherto name into the "Corps of Volunteers of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians" (Dobrovoljački korpus Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca). The other points remained completely unsolved.

As there was no solution from the side of the Serbian Government, one group of volunteer-officers sent a memorandum to the Russian Military Command in which they requested their acceptance into the regular Russian Army, stating why they had joined the Corps and why they wanted to leave it:

"[The desire to] yearn for the liberation and union of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians in one independent state, in which each of the named elements will enjoy complete equality in every aspect, brought us in the lines of the "Serbian Corps of Volunteers". We have not and will not recognize any hegemony or supremacy of one nation over another, ... No Great Serbia, no Great Croatia, or Great Slovenia! Our ideal was and will remain: a federative Yugoslavia. From the very beginning of the existence of the Volunteer-troops, we have endeavoured to conduct our political program through [it], as the only possible and justifiable basis in order that the three hitherto separate nationalities come closer together in the geographical, political, cultural, religious, and historical sense. Our endeavours have been futile. Deceived from the beginning with various promises, ... we are at the end convinced that we do not serve our ideal but the imperialistic and conquering aims of the Serbian megalomania.

This is the first reason why we cannot stay any longer in the Serbian Corps of Volunteers. This megalomania did not remain in the frame of the ideological and principal differences; it has also been reflected upon the relation against us and our soldiers and has assumed a concrete form of animosity, ... tyrannies and crimes have been performed: robberies, beatings, tortures, even killings the perpetrators of which have remained unpunished. ... With regard to us, the volunteer-officers, our stay in the Corps is filled with humiliation and insult from the side of the so-called "right Serbs", that is, the officers who came from Serbia. ... All these [facts] led to the existence of crises in the Corps. ... [Therefore] we have come to the conclusion that it is better that we shed blood... in the ranks of the Great Russian Army for the Russian liberty - which we consider as a guarantee for our liberty - and for the just, than for the new enslavement of our people and the unjust. For this reason, we request our transfer to the Russian service." (187)

Further it was said that "it is necessary to undertake the proper steps" for a free declaration of the soldiers and officers already in the Corps, "whether they are [really] volunteers of the Serbian Corps or not...."

During the months of March and April 1917 the dissident process was in full swing. Once again there arose a serious threat of the Corps' disintegration. General Živković, Commander of the Corps, urgently asked Dr. Mandić and Dr. Jambrišak, both members of the Yugoslav Committee in London, to come from St. Petersburg to Odessa in order to try to arrange matter in the Corps. They arrived around Easter. On their advice and on the pressure of the local Russian military authorities, the Command of

the Corps finally accepted the idea of dividing the "faithful" from the "dissenters". At that time 12,741 soldiers left the Corps - (7,352 Serbs, 3,787 Croatsians, 1,241 Slovenians, and 361 others) - and 149 officers - (4 Serbs, 98 Croatsians, 42 Slovenians, and 5 others - again Paulova indicates: "7 others"). This constituted 38% of the soldiers and officers from the total number of the whole Corps. Thus by the end of May 1917 in the Corps - the First and Second Division, and the Supplementary Battalion - remained totally: 19,472 soldiers and 779 officers. (188)

After the Russian Supreme Military Command permitted the Croatian and Slovenian volunteer-officers to enter the regular Russian Army - with the same rights as the Russian officers and soldiers - (as a result of their petition) - much of the dissident element among the officers and soldiers left the Corps and went into the Russian Army, forming a separate battalion in Kiev, while the others were lost in the Russian Army.

The First Division of the Corps, after having been completed by the Second One - following the dissident process - was sent to the Rumanian Front together with the First Brigade comprising: 482 officers, 1,355 non-commissioned officers, and 12,095 soldiers. After the disintegration of the front, the Serbian Government succeeded in transferring the First Division -(except the Second Brigade)- to the Salonica front in order to join the Serbian Army.

The Second Division (184 officers and 2,875 soldiers) received permission (on 16 August 1917) to leave Odessa for Murmansk from where they were brought to England by ship through the Arctic Ocean, and from there through France and the Mediterranean Sea to Salonica.

The Second Brigade of the First Division was the last to leave (in November 1917) the Odessa region for Archangel. On the way there they met the Bolshevik military units, which wanted them to return to the Rumanian front, but because of the intervention of Leon Trotsky they let them proceed. They reached Manchuria by means of the Siberian railroad, and from there went south to the town of Dalnyi (not far from Port Arthur), where they were transported by British and French ships across the Suez Canal, arriving in Salonica in the middle of April 1918.

2. The Volunteers of South and North America

Even though the volunteers of North and South America did not have all the suffering which the volunteers had to endure in Russia, and apart from their inner problems, both sides - the American (North and South) and the Russian - showed great similarities in spite of the geographical distances and the complete different local conditions. This indicates that the governing spirit of the whole matter was emanating from the same center.

In December 1915 Pašić's attempt to win the Entente Powers over to the idea of volunteers did not materialize because of the question of their transportation from South and North America to Europe. In July 1916 Pašić undertook a new action in this direction and on 18 October 1916 the French Government granted a loan of 2 million francs to Serbia, promising further loans⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ in order to cover the transportation expenses, sustenance, and training of volunteers. Bizerta (Tunisia) was chosen as the "concentration point" for them. The Serbian Government also sent two military missions to diffuse the idea of voluntary military service, counting much on the patriotic feeling among the emigrants from the Southern Slavic countries. The mission for South America was entrusted to captain Spiro Poznanović, a personal and family friend of Nikola Pašić; while the mission for North America was given to Milan Pribićević - colonel of the Serbian Army and brother of Svetozar Pribićević who - at that time - was the chief of the political party in governmental power during the war-years - the Croatian-Serbian-Coalition.

The Yugoslav Committee was not informed of all the actions undertaken by Pašić, nor of the convention between the Serbian Government and the

Entente Powers (France). Thus once again the question of volunteers and of the formation of the "Yugoslav League" came to the surface, especially when the volunteers began to arrive in Bizerta and were anonymously incorporated into the Serbian Army, as had been the case for those in Russia, and mainly coming to Serbia, before Rumania entered the war. Before Trumbić stood an imperative question: to solve once and for all the matter of the "Yugoslav League" with the Serbian Government. Unfortunately Trumbić's intention was prevented by illness so that he went to Cannes for convalescence, while Dr. Hinko Hinković and Dr. Josip Jedlovski acted on his behalf in the Committee in London. Upon this occasion, Hinković, who stood closer to the Serbian Government than did Trumbić, sent a proclamation in November 1916 to the colonies - in the name of the Yugoslav Committee but without Trumbić's knowledge, without consulting Dr. Jedlovski or other members of the Committee. In this proclamation Hinković asked that all emigrant volunteers should put themselves "under the Serbian banner".⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ When Trumbić and the other members learned of this step, a very critical clash issued in the Committee; in fact, this proclamation was not only in contrast with the opinion of the majority, but also was in direct opposition to its intentions.

Hinković's manifesto also arrived in South America at the beginning of January 1917. The central organization of the Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana - (The Yugoslav National Defense) - submitted it for publication in the press - "Jugoslavenska država" and "Domovina" - calling for the mobilization of all the volunteers and designating Antofagasta as the main "concentration point", while the towns of Chile and Punta Arenas - [Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p.256] - acted as temporal branch-centers. Until

the end of January 1917, 475 reported themselves as volunteers in the Republic of Chile.⁽¹⁹¹⁾ This is a relatively small number, but in a state which counted only five to six thousand Croatian colonists, it meant almost 10% of the inhabitants. On 7 January 1917, Hinković's manifesto was sent to Argentina (Buenos Aires). Feverish work began in the colonies and in the middle of February the South American contingent of volunteers was ready. On 25 February the volunteers should have left Antofagasta for Bizerta but, in the midst of the general enthusiasm among the colonists, there suddenly arrived at the Yugoslav National Defense an energetic telegram from Trumbić, sent from Cannes, on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee, saying not to go to Bizerta and to stop the whole movement concerning the mobilization. On receipt of the telegram the Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana replied with a telegram asking for the reasons. The Committee replied with another telegram, declaring that the reasons could not be cabled and that the Yugoslav National Defense had to wait for written instructions.

At the same time the Serbian captain, Poznanović, was giving opposite instructions, urging the contingent of volunteers to leave Antofagasta. The situation became muddled; many volunteers had left their working posts; some even sold their properties and came from distant regions to the meeting places where they waited for further transportation. The central office of the Yugoslav National Defense did not know "that it had come to a conflict between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government in Europe, since they considered that the Committee and the Government worked in accord."⁽¹⁹²⁾ Pašić held that the Committee had no right to stop the mobilization's movement of the volunteers, even though they were mostly the Croats of the Committee's concern, as Pašić had his

obligations towards the Entente Powers - mainly towards France - which had granted the loan to Serbia for this purpose. On this point, then, arose the whole affair, about which the Yugoslav Committee had not been informed. (193)

Once again Trumbić expressed the point of view of the Committee in regard to this stating:

"The standpoint of our Committee was - since the beginning of the war - that our volunteers have to fight as a separate unit under the Supreme [Serbian] Command, and not anonymously as we have several times informed the [Serbian] Government. It is the right and benefit of the whole cause that one knows where they are from and why they fight. This [attitude] we retained until today..." (194)

Pašić answered with a letter dated 18 March 1917, referring to the telegram from Antofagasta (of 23 January 1916). In this telegram the delegates of the Congress sent their greetings to the old Serbian King, Peter. The sentence to which Pašić referred reads as follows:

"... [the participants of the Congress] ... are greeting with enthusiasm their king and their government, putting at his disposal their property and their lives." (195)

Contrary to Pašić, Trumbić's viewpoint was that it is necessary to consider the understanding expressed in the resolution of the same Congress as their authentic conception; this resolution read:

"... We put ourselves at unconditional disposal of the Serbian Government, expressing our complete trust in the Yugoslav Committee in London, which we consider our lawful representative of all Southern Slavic countries under the rule of Austria-Hungary..." (196)

At about this time there started in Russia the dissident process among the "volunteers" in the Corps, while the tragedy of Dobrudja had already passed. All those facts in the end brought the Yugoslav Committee to the conclusion to act decisively against the opposition of the Serbian Government concerning the already wearisome question of volunteers, and of the creation of the "Yugoslav League".

On 23 March 1917 Trumbić convened a plenary session where it was unanimously decided that the Committee would remain by the principles accepted in 1915, apart from the following new points:

- 1) that the mobilization of the volunteers will only be done among the emigrants from the Southern Slavic countries under Austria-Hungary, forming the already mentioned "Yugoslav League";
- 2) that the Serbian Government will not accept in its Army those volunteers who do not want to join the "League" but are from the Southern Slavic countries.

Trumbić sent the minutes of the session together with a long private letter to Pašić, in which at the end he said:

"... But it is necessary to ascertain that from the Serbian side, in spite of all propositions by our Committee, nothing was positively done to realize the Yugoslav volunteer unit..." (197)

After receiving the telegram sent by Trumbić, further work concerning the mobilization in South America was stopped and everyone waited impatiently for receiving the promised letter from the Yugoslav Committee. This letter reached finally Antofagasta on 20 March 1917, signed in the name of the Committee by Dr. Mića Mičić, who was before among the people there, propagating the idea of volunteers. Again, in this letter, no reason was given for stopping the continuation of the mobilization of volunteers and for their transportation to Europe. This time the Yugoslav Committee asked the Yugoslav National Defense "if the Yugoslavs of South America could organize one aeronautic expedition of volunteers with at least six aeroplanes and comprising the necessary number of men." (198)

The expenses for this project were enormous, but not too long after the Yugoslav National Defense answered that it was ready to realize this project, also assuming, at this occasion, the entire expenses of the

Yugoslav Committee. (199) After receiving consent, Trumbić', on behalf of the Committee, wrote a letter to Pašić' (on 10 February 1917), asking the Serbian Government for its accord regarding the design of the aeronautic squadron. Pašić' did not answer. On 10 April, Trumbić' wrote again to him, saying:

"... If you think that you can agree in principal to this idea, the Committee will give instruction for the realization of this idea. The squadron would be the Aeronautic department of the Yugoslav League, ... under the guidance of the Serbian Supreme Command." (200)

Pašić' did not answer this letter either. Because of the Serbian Government and its official attitude, this intent never materialized. In spite of this, however, the great patriotic feeling of the relatively small Croatian colonies, even though they would not have succeeded in securing the complete financial independence of the Yugoslav Committee vis-à-vis the Serbian or any other government - which duty they had assumed -, would be sufficient for our sincere respect. As Madame Paulova writes:

"It can be said that in no other nation, nor in any other part of the world, nor any other political alliance was ever so [well] organized and ideally devoted like the Yugoslav National Defense in South America." (201)

However, the situation in the United States regarding this question of volunteers was quite different than the one in South America. There was, in fact, no serious attempt to gather volunteers in the U.S.A. until the coming of the Serbian military mission in November 1916, headed by the colonel Milan Pribićević'. One of the reasons for this lay in the neutrality of America in the war, particularly during the first years; nevertheless, the main reason was the political division and antagonism between the Croats and the Serbs. Milan Pribićević', personally quite popular and very agile, had marked success among the Serbs while among

the Croats and Slovenians his mission failed, so that at the end he asked to be discharged from his duty. Writing to the general M. Rašić, the Serbian military delegate by the French Supreme Command, M. Pribićević said:

"... It is known that I have a good reputation among them [i.e., the Croats, and Slovenians], yet I was not able to send more than 200 Croats and Slovenians among the 3,000 volunteers I sent. This small number is negligible. When one takes into consideration that there are three or four times more Croats and Slovenians than Serbs, then it means that I should have sent a minimum of 10,000. If this stays as it is, the volunteer-action will reach the same situation as ended the one in Russia; today this result with the Croats and Slovenians is already disgracing us, for it shows quite evidently that they are not with us in the movement." (202)

A similar report was also sent to Ljuba Mihailović, the Serbian Ambassador in Washington; in the report it was stated that the military mission of Milan Pribićević "was only restricted to the Serbian milieu," while "the Croato-Slovenian element remained indifferent and a large part also inimical." (203) Milenko Vesnić, the Serbian Ambassador in Paris for many years (1904-1921), reported later about this Serbian military action in North America to this government, saying:

"Our Yugoslav question in America - until the coming of the Serbian mission there - remained much worse than we thought in Europe. Except for the Serbs, whose patriotism remains without a doubt, our other two peoples [i.e., the Croats and the Slovenians] hold themselves in a great reserve, ... The Croatian and Slovenian priests, with the exception of several bright examples, were until a recent time opposed to this new [i.e., the Yugoslav] movement, ... [It is a pity that] at the very head of the Yugoslav movement in the United States, there is no union; it can be said that we meet there an open split..." (204)

From the side of the Yugoslav Committee in London there was no serious attempt at the mobilization of the volunteers in North America.

Due to the attitude of the Serbian Government, the question and formation of the Yugoslav League never materialized in the sense as the

Committee had envisaged, even though there were good conditions for doing so - (according to Ante Mandić's information, there were 100,000 to 120,000 soldiers who - mostly volunteers - surrendered to the Russians. All of them were Croatians, Slovenians, and Serbs from the Dual Monarchy.)⁽²⁰⁵⁾ Therefore, the political capital - which the Committee wanted to achieve in front of the Entente Powers - as had the Czechs, was lost; in addition, its highly military significance, which the League would have had, if created in the process of the liberation of Croatia and Slovenia, was permanently lost. But this was exactly what official Serbia wanted! When this danger was eliminated, the Yugoslav League or Division was formed.

Following the dissident process in the spring of 1917 in Odessa, all the discontented "Croatian federalists, ... were out." Those who remained were more or less devoted to the idea of "Great Serbia". When these volunteers reached Salonica, Regent Alexander, by his decree no. 21,717 from 29 December 1917, officially formed the "Yugoslav Division" (Jugoslavenska Divizija), dissolving the "Vardar Division", whose men were transferred to other divisions while its military material was taken over by the new "Division".

In this way the tiring question of the creation of the League which the Yugoslav Committee wanted to form at the beginning of 1915 was "solved".

According to contradictory statistical data, in relation with the total number of volunteers which official Serbia hid carefully, it can be said that the proportion of the number of the volunteers and the Serbian Army was about the same as at the time of the Salonica-front, where action began on 14. September 1918. In proportion to the data transmitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 30 / 17 September 1918

to the Minister of War, General M. Rašić, the total number of volunteers was 20,947. (206)

"But, if we take into consideration the fact that the Serbian Army on the Salonica front numbered a maximum of 55,000 officers and soldiers, and that in it [i.e., the number] were [also] included, besides the Montenegrin and other volunteers from America, the men from the "Corps of Volunteers of the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians" from Russia, which [number] consisted of 19,472 soldiers and 779 officers on 30 May 1917, and to which were added until 1 August 1917 2,008 more soldiers and 112 officers, [we] could rightly affirm that the liberation of the whole [Southern Slavic] territory, as well as of Serbia proper, was directed with the aid of the Allies." (207)

The data concerning the Yugoslav Committee was later also confirmed by the Serbian Duke, Mišić. Svetozar Pribićević, after his disappointment with Belgrade, and the dynasty of Karadjordjević, openly declared on 23 January 1918 in the public meeting in Zagreb the following:

"According to the information of the Serbian headquarters and given to me by Duke Mišić, there were on the Salonica front 28,000 Yugoslav volunteers, a number equal to the number of Serbian soldiers; [while] our total amount [of] military power consisted of one fifth of the total power on the Salonica front. And should there be discussion in Belgrade about Kajmakčalan (208), it is necessary to know that the Kajmakčalan-[victory] [is] as much ours as it is theirs." (209)

This declaration brought about strong protests in Belgrade as well as in the Serbian press. Regarding this problem, Dr. Ljubo Leontić said:

"From the emigrant colonies and war prisoners' camp, there were probably a total of ca. fifty thousand Yugoslav volunteers in World War I. (The Corps of Volunteers of the SHS [Serbs, Croatsians, Slovenians] in Russia alone numbered ca. 42,000 fighters!). Their number would [probably have been] increased until a whole army of a minimum of one hundred thousand first-class fighters [would have been assembled], if the human reason and feelings of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners and Yugoslav volunteers would be respected. [However], the Great Serbian officers (apart [from a few] exceptions...) forced the assembled volunteers into dissidences [through their] brutal treatment and the obligation of oath to the [Serbian] king, while they included the Yugoslav volunteers from the emigrant colonies into the Serbian troops in the same way [as the volunteers from Russia]...

From all of the "prečani" - ["prečani" = the Serbs on the other side of the river Drina - the Serbs in Croatia]-(without any

difference) they wanted to conceal the number and, for political reasons, they decreased the precise ratio and also for the main reason that the regular [Serbian] army with its reserves - [being active] in continuous battle (and [through] disease after the retreat across the narrow Albanian passes) - was reduced to some twenty thousand "effective guns"." (210)

In the same place Lj. Leontić stated:

"M. Vesnić, chief of the diplomatic-military mission of the Kingdom of Serbia, affirmed before the Executive Committee of the JNV [Yugoslav National Council] in Washington, that the Serbian army was reduced on the nineteen thousand fighters. With my own ears I then heard this declaration of his." (211)

But even though the "Yugoslav Division" was formed at the end from those elements which remained in the Corps after the dissident process, thus, to the elements - more or less - faithful to Serbia were prevented from victoriously returning to the liberated homeland.

"... through the plan of the [Serbian] Supreme Command ([i.e.] by the 'rochade' to the direction of the Albanian passes), ... [the Yugoslav regiments] were only permitted to enter through Albania - through the "back-door" - to Montenegro and Boka [Kotorska] where they were retained as long as possible. Also, through the unscrupulous treatment [during their] demobilization, they were almost completely blocked from influencing the political events immediately after the war." (212)

Chapter V

THE CORFU DECLARATION

1. The Situation in Russia

During 1916 there were neither basic changes in the diplomatic relations between the Great Powers, nor in the relations of the Yugoslav Committee with the individual Powers. However, during that year the inner socio-political contradictions became stronger as the war advanced - particularly in czarist Russia where, finally, during 1917 they created basic and drastic modifications in Russian society. The result of these changes prompted the Serbian Government to change its attitude towards the Yugoslav Committee, which led to the Corfu Declaration.

At the end, on 15 February/16 March 1917 the Romanov dynasty fell and Prince Lvov formed a government; foreign policy was directed by Professor Miliukov. To Pašić and the Serbian Government this drastic and sudden change in Russia was terrible since they had relied heavily upon czarist Russia, while at the same time it was a very positive affirmation for the idea of the Yugoslav Committee, since Miliukov was a firm supporter of South Slavs' union, converted by Supilo during his staying in St. Petersburg and later on in Paris. On 24 March 1917 Miliukov, as Foreign Minister of Russia, announced the "Declaration of the War-Aims of Russia", in which he emphasized Russia's fidelity towards its Allies as well as towards the creation of Yugoslavia.

"... The change of Government has not altered our aspirations; we want more so than ever [before] the possession of Constantinople which is indispensable for our economic liberty. We want liberation of the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary. Our Program is consistently occupied with the care of the realization of the legitimate aspirations of all the people. ... We intend to create Yugoslavia solidly organized ..." (213)

The Yugoslav Committee, through Ante Mandić, sent a telegram to Miliukov sincerely thanking him for the statement regarding the South Slavs'

union. Miliukov confirmed the receipt of the telegram with his own, dated 12 April 1917. This official declaration was the very first public acknowledgement of the idea of the "Southern-Slavic union" in Europe accomplished by one Great Power.

Since Lvov's Government was not inclined to a separate peace-treaty but, on the contrary, intended to prolong the war against the Central Powers, the left-wing skillfully opposed him. The Bolsheviks supported Alexander Kerensky whose indulgence was beneficial to them. Soon Lvov's Cabinet fell, the governmental power came into the hands of Kerensky. Chaos followed in Russia and the strong support which the Yugoslav Committee had found in Miliukov was, thus, irrecoverably lost.

2. The Motives which led the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee to the Declaration.

The events in Russia and Miliukov's official statement (on 24 March 1917) in which he said that the Russian war-aims were the "liberation of the subdued nations in Austria-Hungary" and Russia's intention to "create a solidly organized Yugoslavia", produced a turning-point in the relations between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee.

Before everyone, Miliukov's statement conflicted with the obligation of czarist Russia towards the Treaty of London. In addition, it was also officially and publicly proclaimed without any preliminary consultation with the Allies, including Italy. No wonder, thus, that among official Italian circles there arose consternation and fear that France and England would soon follow Russia and agree with the idea of the South Slavs' union which was against their interests in the Balkans. "But the statement caused by far the greatest consternation among the Great-Serbian circles, which looked upon it as they would upon a real national tragedy," wrote Mandić.⁽²¹⁴⁾ Serbia had lost by far its strongest supporter, Russian czarism and Orthodoxy, and "new" Russia - with its liberal ideas in power - would from then on support the republican and federalistic streams. Thus, for instance, until Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, Miliukov had felt that Macedonia definitely belonged to Bulgaria,⁽²¹⁵⁾ and was also much more favourably inclined towards the Croats and Bulgarians than towards the Serbs. "Our strongest hope for the realization of our national aspirations - the Czar, Nicholas [II], is no more on the post, from where one solves or greatly influences the solution [of our problems];..." wrote (on 8 March 1917) Ljuba Davidović, Minister and one of the most influential members of the Serbian Indepen-

dent Party, from Geneva to Nikola Pašić, asking to find out new connections "with those who are [now] on the top and work on behalf of Russia." (216)

All these events brought Pašić very serious warning: should the Central Powers gain the victory, it would mean grave danger of the disappearance of Serbia as an independent state into an "Austrian Yugoslavia", in which the republican or federalistic elements would prevail. Further, there was the menace of a separate peace-treaty between Austria-Hungary and the Entente Powers, its federalistic rearrangements, and eventually even its territorial enlargement upon Serbia proper. Finally, the entrance of the United States into the war and Wilson's proclamation of the "Fourteen Points" (January 1918) declaring that America would conduct the war "for the liberation of the subdued nations in Europe", worried Pašić, in view of his plan of creating a "Great Serbia". In all of these three basic cases:

"not only the dynasty and the present regime could come into danger, but also the real sovereignty of Serbia as such, and [also] the predominance of the Serbian element, which he [i.e., Pašić] wanted to extend regardless of the prince onto the other Yugoslav countries which would fall into Serbia's hands." (217)

It was, therefore, necessary to do something in order to prevent Serbia from further isolation. The most logical and realistic solution for Pašić and the Serbian political circles was to come closer to the Yugoslav Committee, which followed the new and liberal ideas of the coming time. Considering the differences of principle in political understanding between the Committee and the Government, it was difficult to conduct this approach.

As mentioned earlier, Serbian official policies persisted since the beginning of the war in the principle of "liberation", but meaning

"liberation in stages"; first the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy and later extending this principle to the Croats and Slovenians, identifying them as "Serbs" through the formula "one people with three different names".

"Royal Serbia was, thus, ... the basis... of the foreign-political line of Nikola Pašić and his Government, and there is true indication, also of the Regent Alexander." (218)

Contrary to this conception, the Yugoslav Committee decisively followed the national principle and the right of national self-determination; that is to say, that Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs in the Monarchy have the right to decide their own future and that, if they wish to join with Serbia, they may do so of their own free will.

Looking upon these two conceptions, we have to bear in mind - and to refer also to the Nish Declaration (see ch. 3, pt. 1, p.93) that the war-aims of Serbia were: "liberation and union" (oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje) where there was a real difference between the "outer façade" and the "inner real intentions"; the more so as "liberation and union" did not express the notion of "equality" in itself as "liberation and equal union" of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians was not specified. The "union" could have been achieved through the formal-and-technical side, that is to say, "in the letter", but not "in the spirit", as was de facto later the case.

After the defeat of Serbia and at the initiative, in the first place, of Professor R.W. Seton-Watson in London, on 23 August 1916, the "Serbian Society of Great Britain" was established. Lord Cromer was asked to become president by Evans; he agreed to do so. "Not only," he wrote, "do I sympathise with the Southern Slavs, but my personal opinion is, that it is in the interests of the whole of Europe to establish a strong Southern

Slav state in order that a barrier may be created against Teutonic aggression."⁽²¹⁹⁾ Or, as Seton-Watson said that "the creation of a united Southern Slav state is as essentially an European and a British interest, as the creation of United Italy nearly two generations ago. ... But quite apart from our programme ..., we need a strong Southern Slav state on the Eastern Adriatic as a bulwark against German aggression towards the East. ..." ⁽²²⁰⁾ This society actively engaged itself with the idea of the "inner arrangement" of the future new state and with the problem: how to solve the conflict among Croatsians and Serbs regarding the difference of religion, level of culture, and mentality. The public activity of this society had constantly "pressured" Serbia, but the Serbian Government was not able to rid itself of it.

Furthermore, apart from the defeat of Serbia's politics on the "outside line", the loss of its main supporter, czarist Russia, its capitulation as a state, the weakness of its defeated army, and the pressure through the work of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, there was also an "inner weakness" in the Serbian Government. Serbia, namely, lost its prestige among the Allies through the "process of Salonica" against the Serbian colonel, Dragutin (Charles) Dimitrijević, known under the code-name "Apis", and the group of Serbian officers, his supporters - who organized themselves, in the society "Unity or Dead" (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt), into a tight military organization known as "The Black Hand" (Crna ruka) and who were punished with death. Because of this process began the conflict between Serbian politicians, which resulted in the resignation of the coalition in the Cabinet-Council (on 10 June 1917). However, Pašić still received the mandate from Regent Alexander to compose an homogeneous government. From then on, Pašić and his new government -

formed exclusively by the Radical Party - in addition had to fight against a very strong Serbian opposition. The discontentment of the opposition became stronger and stronger, bringing at the end the new Radical Government into a minority in the Parliament. When the crucial question of the new budget came to the Parliament, only: "53 delegates out of 166 - as are [elected] by the Constitution, and out of 123 - who went out from the country" voted; therefore, the opposition concluded that" ... by such a government, ... [having on its side] less than one third of the total number of delegates, it then has no more right to call itself a parliamentary" government; therefore the united opposition sent a petition to the Regent Alexander expressing that: "our regime is parliamentary, while our government is non-parliamentary..."(220-a) The united Serbian parliamentary opposition demanded that Pašić strengthen relations with the Yugoslav Committee, and that he at once begin negotiations with it, in order to reach a common agreement on behalf of both sides, as "the situation absolutely requires that."

On the other side, the Yugoslav Committee also had its reasons for wanting to have a closer relationship with the Serbian Government. At first there existed a grave danger of the realization of the Treaty of London as soon as the opportunity would come; there further existed the possibility of a separate peace-treaty between the Allied Powers and Austria-Hungary - for which actively sought the secret mission of Sixte de Bourbon, brother-in-law of the Emperor and King of Austria-Hungary, Karl I. If these aims were realized, then there could not be the full liberation of Croatsians, Slovenians, and other Slavic nations aspired to by Trumbić and the Yugoslav Committee. The third danger was the "May Declaration" - proclaimed by the representatives from the South of the

Monarchy and assembled in the so-called "Yugoslav Club" in the Reichsrat (Federal Council) in Vienna. The essence of the May Declaration was that all Southern Slavic countries should be united in one state within the framework of the Monarchy, which had to be reorganized upon the federalistic principle. The Declaration did not embrace Serbia and Montenegro, while the politics of the Committee were to include them and to unite them upon an equal basis. Therefore, both sides - the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee - were motivated by the interests of their own political programs, gravitating at this time around each other.

Pressed from all sides, Pašić['] decided at the end to move on. At the end of April he sent a telegram to Trumbić['] and Stojan Protić['] - (delegated by the Serbian Government to the Yugoslav Committee - for the purpose of being a contact between these two sides, but in reality he wanted a first-hand report of all the Committee's activities) - to come to Corfu together with three other members of the Committee. These members had to be: one Croatian from Croatia and Slavonia, one Slovenian, and one Serb from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Committee chose: Dr. Hinković['] (for the Croatian side), Dr. Vošnjak (for the Slovenian), and Dr. Vasiljević['] (for Bosnia and Herzegovina). Besides this, Dr. Potočnjak - who returned from Odessa to Corfu in order to make a report of the events in Russia to Pašić['] and to the Regent Alexander - also attended the conference on Pašić[']'s insistence. From the Serbian side the whole Cabinet-council, except General Terzić['], Minister of War, and Ljuba Jovanović['], Minister of the Interior, who shortly after left for Salonica, participated in the debates of the conference. Moreover, A. Nikolić['], President of the Parliament, also took part in the debates. From the side of the opposition participated in the discussions the previous ministers: Milorad Drašković['],

Ljubo Davidović, and Voja Marinković. (221)

The conference at Corfu began on 15 June 1917 and lasted until 20 July, totalling 35 days with 28 plenary sessions.

At the beginning Pašić suggested that both sides only exchange views and outline a communiqué expressing the common agreement between them. But Trumbić asked that the conference bring a resolution "which would contain the program of settlement of the future state, which would also bind the Serbian Government to consult public opinion." (222) But since it was not possible to solve all the questions involved in such a short time, it was decided that the resolution would contain only the agreed questions, leaving the unsolved ones for settlement to the Constituent Assembly after the war. For this reason the Corfu Declaration comprised only the official statements of those topics where both sides, the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government, had found a common agreement.

Arriving at Corfu Trumbić did not know exactly what Pašić, Prime Minister of Serbia, had in mind and, owing to the fact that the Declaration would represent an important act which he had to sign, Trumbić first communicated via telegram the complete text of the Declaration to the members of the Committee in Europe and in America. All the Europeans gave their consent, while the reply from America came after Trumbić had already signed the act. During the months of November and December 1917 Trumbić reported in detail the whole conference to the Committee's members, who unanimously accepted it. The text of the Declaration was defined by a separate committee consisting of: Trumbić, Ljubo Davidović, Stojan Protić, Bogumil Vošnjak, and Vojislav Marinković; it was signed on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee by Dr. Ante Trumbić and on behalf of

the Serbian Government by Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, on 7/20 July 1917. The main text of the Declaration - (See: Appendix III, p.308) provided for: the idea of union for all of the South Slavic people into a single, independent, democratic state which would be a constitutional monarchy under the Serbian dynasty of Karadjordjević; the new state had to be called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians; freedom of religion would be guaranteed, with the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets being equally maintained. It also decreed that the future Constitution would be adopted in a Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of universal suffrage, by a qualified majority. The document embodied the general principles guaranteeing equality to all South Slavic peoples; it became the foundation on which the Yugoslav state was intended to be built. (223)

3. Analysis of the Conference

In theory the Declaration expressed the principles of democracy as the ground for the inner building of the new state which would be: "a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy". That meant, in other words, that Pašić was compelled by the circumstances to change - at least pro forma - his previous standpoint concerning the Great-Serbian program, ("the union in stages" without the Croats and Slovenians in entirety), into the program of "union" with them. But this still was not the main problem of the Corfu Declaration which did not lie in the relation "with or without" the Croats and Slovenians, but in the question of the method: how to bring about the Yugoslav state union; whether the Southern Slavic countries, after the dismembering of Austria-Hungary, would be annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia, or whether they would be united in the common state. Pašić asked a mandate for Serbia to act in regard to the question of the general Yugoslav liberation and union,

"which practically meant that the old [Serbian] state, should be preserved [and] to which would be added all the other, liberated Yugoslav territories. In other words, Pašić further tried to come to a Great Serbia, but only in other ways and by other means." (223-a)

Finally the idea of compromising national unitarism of the "trinamed people", Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs, was accepted. This signified that the Corfu Declaration neither formalized nor affirmed the existence of the "three Yugoslav nations" as one would have expected, but only of one, that is, a fictitious Yugoslav nation with "three names" defining the "trinamed people" as one. The basis for this notion was obviously taken in the sense of ethnical affinity and linking mainly the language similarities between the Croats and Serbs, while the cultural, historical, state-juridical, and religious components - which

are so different among these two nations in spite of the language similarities - had been overseen and neglected. Thus because the idea of national pluralism was abandoned, the idea of national unitarism was accepted instead, with the Yugoslav lands comprising only one nation. There was a serious attempt to preserve the "specific character" of the "Yugoslav countries", an attempt which, however, was not the original understanding followed by the Yugoslav Committee until that time, but an attenuated compromise, and even worse - a compromise of principle.

Therefore one may say that the Corfu Declaration pursued, in essence, the principle of unitarism by which - even by the real nature of the question - it later developed itself more towards the centralistic state-arrangement than towards the autonomous.

Regarding the form of government, there was no conflict of opinion since both sides had agreed that there would be a monarchical form, headed by the Karadjordjević dynasty. The conflict dealt with the name of the future new state. Trumbić proposed the name of "Kingdom of Yugoslavia", wishing with this to exclude Serbian hegemonism and, at the same time, to stress the newness and equality of all united South Slavic countries. Pašić suggested the name of: "United Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians," but Franko Potočnjak's proposition was accepted, that the future state name would be: "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians". (224)

One of the main disagreements between Trumbić and Pašić was in the inner arrangement of the new state - a question which Supilo had asked to be solved some time ago. Pašić stubbornly defended the idea of "state-continuity of Serbia" and decisively asked that the new state be monolithic" (jedinstvena), that is, a strong centralistic state.

Trumbić advocated with no less firmness the idea of a "composed state" that signified a federalistic arrangement; Trumbić affirmed that he favored the "state union" (državno jedinstvo) and "not a homogeneous state" (ali ne jedinstvenu državu).⁽²²⁵⁾ In other words, Trumbić advocated the creation of one common state which would embrace all the "Yugoslav countries", while he was definitely against a new state whose inner arrangements would become centralistic. He feared Serbian hegemonism in the future state. All of the delegates from the Committee supported Trumbić regarding this point and all asked for broad decentralization, or preservation of the historic and state-juridical "regionalism". Trumbić, for instance, insisted upon the preservation of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) for the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, for, he specified, "it is necessary to keep account of the specific characteristics" (državnopravni regionalizmi)⁽²²⁶⁾ of the Yugoslav countries. Also, Dušan Vasiljević, the Serb representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, agreed with the point of view of preserving the present status of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and gradual harmonization with the new state-juridical life.

Concerning the juridical system of the new common state, Pašić and the Serbian side suggested a "homogeneous legislation", i.e., a centralistic one. Furthermore, Pašić and Marinković proposed an extension of the Serbian Constitution of 1903 for the whole new state;⁽²²⁷⁾ and, moreover, the question of agrarian-reform caused a strong conflict between the two sides. Pašić demanded a quick, short, and decisive procedure in this field, and that the administrative authorities take the whole question in their hands; only the principle should be announced

in advance, namely "that [the peasant] is not a slave, but a master of the land". (228)

On the other side, Trumbić, Trinajstić, and Vošnjak replied "that the agrarian question cannot be solved in a short [administrative] procedure, ... but only in a legislative manner". (229)

Trumbić emphasized the necessity of examining the specific agrarian conditions in various "Yugoslav countries", and suggested that this sensitive question would be best solved by the legislative body of the respective country, and not by administrative measures established for the whole future new state.

The most difficult question at the Conference was how to define the voting formula for acceptance of the Constitution - the basic law of the state. Pašić, with his collaborators, asked that the Constitution be accepted with a "qualified majority" (kvalificiranom većinom), namely, with an "arithmetical" or "numerical majority" of the votes from the Constituent Assembly; while Trumbić, together with the majority of the Committee's delegates, proposed that the "Federal Constitution" be accepted through the so-called "national qualified majority". This meant that each nation of the Yugoslav state would first vote the "Federal Constitution" in its respective "autonomous state" and then - if accepted by the "national majorities of votes" - these would convene and again vote the acceptance of the Constitution, which would link the whole Yugoslav state through a "qualified majority". Through this formula Trumbić hoped to eliminate a simple majority so that each nation would have an opportunity to accept or reject the Constitution. Nevertheless, Potočnjak was against Trumbić's proposition. Finally it was decided that the Constitution, as a whole, had to be accepted at the Constituent Assembly

with the numerical qualified votes; as such it was included in the Corfu Declaration.

Summarizing what was discussed one can say that the fourteen points of the Corfu Declaration consisted of the following elements: (230)

1. The thesis for the necessity of the state union of all South Slavic countries regardless of their existing state or regional boundaries;
2. The necessity of creating this new state and abolishing the until now existing South Slavic state, as well as the Kingdom of Serbia and Kingdom of Montenegro which, both, will enter the new common state;
3. Further, the formation of the Kingdom which would consist of a "constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy" was defined;
4. The national unitarism was - de facto - preserved through the compromising formula of the "trinamed people of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians";
5. The conclusion concerning the undivided territory of the future state;
6. The future Constituent Assembly of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians would sanction this state arrangement.

Before the Allied Powers the Declaration represented a state-juridical act which was submitted to their governments, thereby receiving an international character.

"Through the Corfu Declaration the Yugoslav question was - thus - placed in the frame [i.e., on the level] of the international problem, which would be necessary to solve in relation with the post-war Europe." (231)

However, for the Serbian Government the Declaration was not at all what Trumbić and the members of the Yugoslav Committee expected; the Serbian Government saw it only as a "provisional solution", dictated to

Serbia by the unfavourable foreign and domestic political situations. Therefore, Trumbić¹ requested the Government to send an energetic and official note to the Allies, expressing their wish and demand to include "the liberation of the South Slavs in the Monarchy" in their war-aims, and requesting also that this note be supported by the Corfu Declaration. But the Serbian Government did not agree with Trumbić's request.

As soon as the political situation improved, Pašić² again alluded to his old conception: for him the Declaration was now only a "political manifesto" which did not oblige the Serbian Government in any way. (232) In addition Dr. Milenko Vesnić³, the Serbian Ambassador in Paris, expressed at one occasion (at the beginning of 1918) the opinion that the Corfu Declaration was more or less "piercing the hateful regime of the Habsburg." (233)

Lazar Marković⁴, a Serb, wrote in his work, "The Croatian Question" (Hrvatsko pitanje), about the Declaration, stressing that it was only a "kind of political manifestative act...", (234) regardless of Trumbić's very detailed explanations about it in the official journal "Bulletin Yougoslave", (235) where he mentioned the reasons why and how it came to it, as well as indicating its meaning, duties, and main principles. In 1925 in one of his articles Trumbić⁵ stated that, because of the Serbian Government, the Corfu Declaration "remained the dead-letter on paper". (236)

4. The Echo of the Corfu Declaration among the American Croatians and the Break-Off of the Yugoslav National Council with the Declaration and the Serbian Government.

Since the very beginning the Croatian masses in North America accepted the Corfu Declaration with suspicion, while the enemies of the "Yugoslav idea" at once began to work against it. It was stated that the Declaration came too late as the United States was already participating in the war and since everyone believed that the war would not last very long. Then the critics began to analyse the inner arrangement of the future state; various ideas circulated regarding it. Thus, for instance, the "Serbian Daily" (New York) turned into ridiculous statements the Croatians pretensions "about a rightful solution" concerning the basic questions of the internal arrangements of the new state through the Parliament, saying that Serbia alone will perform the "union" with its "victorious army", and will then "give the Croatians certain liberties." (237) It also attacked certain prominent Croatian politicians like Milan Marjanović among others. (The paper was considered to be the private organ of the Serbian consul-general, who at that time was a University Professor at Columbia University, New York.)

A feeling of republicanism developed among the American Slovenians - even though they were embraced by the Declaration. As an entity, the Slovenians in North America hardly responded to the "Yugoslav actions", while, for instance,

"in Chicago there began an action upon the initiative of the socialists, led by Etbin Kristan, through which all Slovenians should organize themselves on an anti-Austrian basis, namely a republican, federalistic [one], and ask for Bulgaria's admission into the "Federation". This action [was] supported [by] the representatives of almost all the larger Slovenian newspapers and organizations." (238)

Needless to say, monarchism, as a form of government, was not very popular among the people in liberal America; therefore, the socialists strongly attacked the Declaration on this point, and especially the statement specifying that the conclusions of the Constituent Assembly had firstly to be approved by the king.

As an outcome of all of these influences, the Croatian politicians, headed by Milan Marjanović and Dr. Ljubo Leontić, who in the meantime arrived in North America from South America, stated that it was necessary that the Yugoslav National Council in Washington once more must publish the entire text of the Corfu Declaration together with a specific part officially explaining the Declaration. By so doing, they sought to moderate its "unpopular paragraphs". On 18 August 1917 a conference of the Executive Board was held in Pittsburgh, where the draft of this text was composed, and then forwarded to all of the members who were absent during the signing. At the end of the same month, the text was published in all of the Yugoslav papers and signed by all of the members of the Executive Board, including the Serbian consul-general, Professor M. Pupin. This text consisted of thirty-four points and was composed of such themes of interest as: "The basis of our state politics"; "The basic principles for the inner arrangement of the state", etc. The text also reflected many of the ideas of Marjanović which he had already expressed in his political pamphlets published in New York, or in his correspondence with Leontić when he was in South America.

On 6 October 1917 Dr. Hinković arrived in New York and on 10, 11 and 12 of this same month the Executive Board held a general session in Washington, D.C., at which Hinković, as a member of the

Yugoslav Committee and active participant at the Corfu conference, gave his interpretation of the Corfu Declaration. Because his interpretation was considered personal, mainly for the repelling of its objections, considerable publicity was given to the South Slavic emigrants in the United States. The most contested point in Hinković's interpretation which caused, finally, the break with the Serbian Government and the rejection of the Declaration, was the side of the Yugoslav National Council which reads as follows:

"... the cardinal and fundamental point of the Declaration [is]: Convocation of [the] Constituent Assembly. The participants at the Corfu Declaration considered and [still] consider the mandate to speak on behalf of the people only temporarily - until the people can express themselves in their Constituent Assembly. And this Assembly has to be and will be [the] absolute sovereign. The Constituent Assembly will be in a position to create the constitution whenever it wishes. This constitution may not be the one which the Corfu Declaration foresaw. The Constituent [Assembly] (Konstituanta), namely the people whose will will be expressed there, can decide what form the state will take, can reign as they wish, and can choose the head and representative of the state."

"This interpretation of the Declaration," said Dr. Hinković, "is valid for the spirit in which the Corfu conferences were conducted; therefore, as one participant at these conferences, I can declare it authentic." (239)

While the "Serbian Daily" (New York) intensified its attacks against the Croats, ("... the Serbian gendarmes will teach the Croats and Slovenians to what degree it is necessary to obey the laws of Great Serbia...") (240) - the Yugoslav National Council "categorically demanded" (241) that the Serbian consul-general, Professor Pupin, "condemn the writing" of the "Serbian Daily", which he financed. However, Pupin did not want to do so and, on the contrary, submitted his letter of resignation of his membership to the Council. Pupin's main idea was that it is impossible to create a state against the traditions of the individual nations and,

even if such a state is created, chaos will result; and chaos is something which the Allies by no means wished, having seen the Russian experiment. Therefore, in addition, the Allies did not agree with the solution of the "Yugoslav question", thought Pupin, and will rely upon the "proved loyalty of Serbia and its dynasty."⁽²⁴²⁾ For this reason, also, Pupin wanted to destroy the "union" in North America between the Council and the Serbs, as well as between the Committee and the Serbian Government, creating a "Great Serbia". Hinković's declaration regarding the Corfu Declaration was a suitable moment for Pupin to intensify the already existent antagonism between Serbs and Croatsians.

Trumbić sent a telegram to the Council asking "... to stop all further polemics regarding the question of monarchy and republic, and not to write anything further about this matter in the public [i.e., in the press]. ..."⁽²⁴³⁾

The considerable publicity given by Hinković's declaration, nevertheless, turned the Serbian Government into an uproar. In January 1918 Pašić demanded of the Yugoslav Committee that Hinković revoke his declaration. Trumbić undertook the necessary steps in this regard, but at his session on 8 January 1918 the Yugoslav National Council evidenced its solidarity with Hinković. This decision was cabled to Trumbić via the Serbian attaché in London and reads:

"... We are in agreement with Hinković's explanation which has wrongly been understood in Europe. ... In relation with the matters, the distance, making good use of the situation here, and[due to the] unacquaintance of the conditions [here] from your side, [and] in the interest of further success, we consider [it] necessary to have our hands free in the tactics." ⁽²⁴⁴⁾

In order to remedy the break between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav National Council, Dr. Leontić suggested that Hinković's

declaration be revoked, but "don Niko Gršković and Dr. Hinković declined my suggestion to revoke their declaration publicly;..."⁽²⁴⁵⁾ Hinković still did not agree and submitted (on 28 January 1918) his letter of resignation to the Yugoslav Committee and the Yugoslav National Council. However, with this the problem was not solved, for Hinković's explanation of the Corfu Declaration was deeply affecting one of its main principles. The situation in the coming months became so negative that Trumbić again sent a telegram. It stated:

"... We hear that [i.e., in America] the relations have become strained regarding the form of reign of our future state. The Corfu Declaration is the basis upon which our people have to develop. It was created by the constitutional factors of Serbia and our Committee... President Wilson declared the principle of liberty and self-determination which was also accepted by the Corfu Declaration and [he] did not prescribe to any people the republican form. ..." ⁽²⁴⁶⁾

At about the same time the American Croats, pro-republic oriented, submitted to the American Government a memorandum in which they expressed "that they keep the basis of the Wilsonian principles and before it [i.e., the American Government] they condemn the Yugoslav Committee [which] ... wants to impose the [Serbian] monarchy and the [Serbian] dynasty [of Karadjordjević]...."⁽²⁴⁷⁾

In accordance with the understanding of the Committee, the Declaration presented a common program with official Serbia, whose main purpose was that the Allies acknowledge this program for the war-time of Serbia and accept it as such among their own war-aims.⁽²⁴⁸⁾ However, Pašić stubbornly refused to submit the note for formal request to the Entente Powers; his attitude was the more unusual as there existed ideal moments to do so. The basis of the Declaration consisted of the principles which

the Allies proclaimed for their war-aims; Serbia as a member of the Allied Powers did not sign the Treaty of London and had, thus, free hands; the proclamation of liberation of the South Slavs in the Monarchy would have been a powerful weapon against Austria-Hungary; in Russia the democratic principle came triumphally into existence, only strengthened by the entrance of liberal America into the war; and at the end, the Allied governments, having been informed of the Declaration's text, naturally expected further steps from them in this direction. All of these occasions were lost by Pašić's stubborn manner of conducting the Serbian politics of unitarism. Thus, the Declaration remained only:

"... the agreement between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government, which was - however - brought to notice of the Allies, but did not oblige the Great Powers in international diplomacy, and because it [i.e., the agreement] had not been submitted as an official request, it neither obliged Serbia itself - except as an honorable obligation." (249)

Through this the old distrust between the Committee and the Serbian Government regenerated once more.

While the Yugoslav Committee did not have the courage and power to sever its relations with the Serbian Government in spite of the favourable situation - in Zagreb the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) had already proclaimed its separation from Austria-Hungary - and made a pronounced change in the direction of its policies, the Yugoslav National Council in Washington did that. At its session during 7 and 8 August 1918, it presented an extensive Proclamation (Proglas) to all of the Southern Slavs' people in the United States of America. All of the members of the Council, except the Serb, Dr. Miloš Trivunac, voted this Proclamation which reads:

"... We expected from the Royal Serbian Government that it would advocate the Yugoslav problem in its totality by the Allies and decisively demand the union of our entire people's territory ... Unfortunately, our hopes were not fulfilled. ... [Contrary to it] the Royal Serbian Government, ... began to work once for the Enlarged - [and] once for the Great Serbia. ... Pašić's recent declarations, from which it follows that - according to his opinion - the union of the Yugoslavs should have been directed 'under the patronage of Serbia' (pod egidom Srbije [egida = Greek: aegis])... [which would have meant] that not only the Serbian group of people would have received the predominant position on account of the others, but would have imposed upon them à priori the monarchical constitution and [also] imposed the Serbian dynasty. This would have been a hard violation of the people's right for self-determination. ...

Today we quite easily renounce the Corfu Declaration and the Serbian Government, because the great world events have changed the South Slavs' position from the bottom. ... The United States of America acknowledged 'in full measure the justful aspirations of the Yugoslavs for the liberty'. ... We should not worry about the Corfu Declaration, as the well-known leader [i.e., President Wilson] of all mankind solemnly recognized not only the right of self-determination, but also the very state independency. This is a thousand times more than the Corfu Declaration. President Wilson's declaration of 19 October is the Magna Charta [libertatum] for the Yugoslavs. ...

... Let us trust the revolutionary Yugoslav Government in Zagreb, which is an obvious expression of the will of our entire nation, ... Let us stand - with soul and body - with it and for it. ..." (250)

The Proclamation was signed by don Niko Gršković and Dr. Hinko Hinković.

The importance of this Proclamation was in fact that the American Croats, led by the Yugoslav National Council, saw the situation through the insincerity and double-dealing of Serbian official politics. They understood the spirit of time, felt the danger coming from it, and had enough moral power to break with official Serbia and renounce the Corfu Declaration. As to the practical application, this political move came too late since the events went in the opposite direction of their wishes and expectations. Their faith in the National Government (Narodna Vlada) in Zagreb was naive too, for Svetozar Pribićević, a Serb from Croatia and a political collaborator of Nikola Pašić, was head of this government and chief of the political party - the "Serbo-Croatian Coalition".

Chapter VI

THE CONGRESS OF THE SUPPRESSED NATIONS IN ROME

1. Attempts of the Entente-Diplomacy to split the Central Powers. Attitudes of the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government in this new Situation.

As opposed to 1916, during 1917 there was a drastic change of the situation in the field of international diplomacy. With the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the situation was again transformed, not only in its governmental form and regime in the country, but also in the attitude towards its Allies. Contrary to the Government of Prince Lvov, Lenin did not wish to continue the war with Germany and Austria-Hungary. On 28 November 1917, Lenin sent a note to all governments engaged in the war, asking them to stop the war and to attend to peace negotiations: "... peace without annexation and indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples."⁽²⁵¹⁾ Germany and Austria-Hungary responded to this note and on 22 December started the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.

In England and France the opinion prevailed that the old Habsburg Monarchy should be preserved, even in smaller size, because of the European balance of power. It was simply necessary to reorganize it. Moreover, both diplomacies, English and French, saw Austria in the post-war period as a rampart against German as well as against Russian expansion in this region of the world, their main enemy being Germany. Only Italian diplomacy saw in Austria-Hungary its main enemy, as it aimed to secure its predominance on the Adriatic Sea and prevent Slav expansion.⁽²⁵²⁾ The maximum objective in regard to the Habsburg Monarchy was, thus, its territorial weakening, but not its destruction. At this point the Italian diplomacy parted from the Allies, - wishing "... to organize a block of

anti-Slavic states from the territorially weakened and reorganized Habsburg Monarchy ... [and] the Hungarians and Rumanians,"⁽²⁵³⁾ which would, in an alliance with Italy, keep the Balkans under control and at the same time facilitate Italy's penetration of these territories. With this move, if achieved, Italy would build a rampart against further Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean Sea; while, as just mentioned, France and England considered Germany as their main enemy. Thus the separation of Austria-Hungary from Germany now became the main aim of the Entente's diplomacy; the more so, as the young Emperor and King, Karl I, after the death of Franz Joseph (on 21 November 1916), undertook secret mission (of his own volition) with the Entente Powers through the Prince of Parma, Sixtus Bourbon, the brother of his wife, Zita. Unfortunately, this undertaking finished unsuccessfully.

Another attempt at a separate peace with Austria-Hungary was made by General Jan Smuts, member of the British Imperial War Cabinet, and Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly, the ex-Austrian Ambassador in London. The talks were held on 18 and 19 December 1917 in Geneva, on the initiative of Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister. General Smuts expressed to Mensdorff that Great Britain had decided to destroy Prussian militarism, but wished to preserve Austria-Hungary under the condition that the Monarchy separate itself from Germany and be reorganized into a federalistic state, which would give to its people the largest autonomies. After explaining his conception of the League of Nations and of the British Empire's destiny as an intermingling League, Smuts said to Mensdorff that a similar destiny awaited the Austro-Hungarian Empire, once it broke free from German domination.

"The best way to strengthen the bonds of sympathy between the British and Austro-Hungarian people was to liberalize as much as possible the local institutions of Austria-Hungary. We had no intention of interfering with her internal affairs, but we recognized that if Austria could become a really liberal Empire in which her subject peoples would, as far as possible, be satisfied and content, she would become for Central Europe very much what the British Empire had become for the rest of the world. She would become a League of Free Nations, very largely free from the taint of militarism, and she would have a mission in the future even greater than her mission in the past." (254)

Mensdorff excluded the possibility of a separate peace-treaty with Austria-Hungary, but - according to the Serbian Ambassador, Dr. Slavko Grujić, in his dispatch dated 3 November 1917 to Pašić - Mensdorff said:

"... that, in order to strengthen the positions of the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count O. Czernin, in his negotiations with Berlin, Great Britain should clearly declare its war-aims, including its benevolent attitude towards the Dual Monarchy." (255)

At the beginning of January 1918 Great Britain and the United States publicly declared and guaranteed that their war-aims were not the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but were only intended to secure considerable autonomies for their people. These were the well-known speeches of Lloyd-George (on 5 January) and Wilson's address to the Congress (on 8 January), where the latter declared his Program for World Peace in 14 Points. "... Division of Austria-Hungary is not our war-aim," said Lloyd-George, but "we consider that it is impossible to eliminate the cause in this part of Europe, ... until real autonomy, on evident democratic principles, is given to those Austro-Hungarian nations which they have been striving for a long time. ..." (256) A similar guarantee was also given to Austria-Hungary through the 14 points; hereafter, points ten and eleven, dealing with the destiny of the Southern

Slavic people in the Monarchy, declared that:

"X : The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI : Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined be friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into." (257)

These declarations by Lloyd-George and Wilson, were of great political importance. In fact the two Great Western Powers, namely Great Britain and the U.S.A., did not accept the principle of self-determination for the people, but did accept the federalistic principle. Through this attitude, America, as the strongest power, deeply interfered with the question of the form of the solution of the South Slavic problem. There is no doubt that America had this attitude primarily because of strategic reasons: to facilitate, in this way, the conclusion of a separate peace-treaty with Austria-Hungary and thereby to weaken Germany military power. In addition to this also came military reasons; namely, the American military experts advised, for instance, not to enter into war with Austria-Hungary in order to eliminate the spreading of military power across the European continent but, rather, to concentrate it only against Germany.

"Germany was the enemy. It has to be crushed first; all the rest will follow. ..." (258)

Besides these two reasons for the American approach to the Monarchy, there was, in ultima lineae, also an economic reason. The leading financial American circles "considered Austria-Hungary as an economic entity which

it was advised not to fragment." (259)

Concerning the Southern Slavic or Croatian question and Serbia, the American policies were governed by the idea that Serbia had no reason to create a strong "Yugoslav society" around herself based upon economic interests, because it is an agrarian country. Mr. Percival Dodge, the American representative with the Serbian Government at Corfu, reported to Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, the opinion of the Italian Ambassador with the Serbian Government. The opinion reads as follows:

"He lays considerable stress upon the differences between the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the two last being peoples of advanced civilization with prosperous industrial interests, while the Serbs, although a fine race, are extremely primitive and [are] exclusively peasant-farmers. He, as well as others who know all three races well, express doubt as to whether they could unite happily in a single state. ..." (260)

Furthermore, the idea of federation was in agreement with Wilson's understanding of the conception of state, particularly of a multinational state. Such a conception led him into a contradictory situation against the present principle of self-determination of the people, a principle which was strongly advocated at that time by the Bolshevik Government in Russia. Nevertheless, in Central Europe, due to its complicated complexity and mixed people, Wilson considered that, finally, it was not possible to realize the principle of self-determination. He thought "that, would the self-determination be consequently applied, it would lead to an international anarchy." (261) In other words, it would split Europe and of this fact Wilson was conscious. He was even more conscious about it before the proclamation of his 14-points, since he had consulted Dr. M. Vesnić, the Serbian Ambassador in Paris, who came to Washington in order to express to Wilson and Lansing the Serbian political aims.

Ljubo Mihajlović reported to Pašić about this meeting saying:

"... Vesnić ... had to speak in the [American] Senate. Unexpectedly, on the same day and before the speech of Vesnić, President Wilson proclaimed the known proclamation of the United States' war-aims, in which was also the discussion about Serbia and its reconstruction and outlet to the sea. And not only this, but at the eve of this day, Vesnić was convoked by colonel House, a close collaborator to President Wilson, who showed him the point about Serbia [i.e., point 11] and asked [him] his opinion, which Vesnić gave in the spirit of our claims. But still the next day, President Wilson in his proclamation before the Congress stuck to the reconstruction of Serbia and the outlet to the sea [only]...."(262)

"I sent for Vesnitch," House noted, "... I asked him to set forth concretely what he would suggest in preference to what I submitted him."

Vesnić did not propose a new statement. But, as far as Bulgaria was concerned, Vesnić said that Serbia stood firm on the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, saying that "Bulgarian treachery can and shall not be rewarded."

House regarded Vesnić's objections as little less than impudent. "...I advised," House noted, "the President not to change the paragraph in the slightest, and to go ahead as if no objection had been made, and this he did." (263)

Lj. Mihajlović, in the same report, tried to explain this fact of the American "not-understanding our question". Lloyd-George and Wilson's proclamations about the preservation of Austria-Hungary were, thus, in direct contradiction with the main idea advocated by the Yugoslav Committee since the very beginning of the war. So, how did the Committee react on one side, and the Serbian Government on the other ?

The Allied declarations made a very bad impression upon Pašić and the Serbian politicians, mainly because Wilson's declaration not only expressed the idea of the preservation of Austria-Hungary, but also stated - (Point eleven) - that the settlement of the boundaries among the Balkan states had to be conducted "according to historical lines of allegiance

and nationality". This meant that Serbia would not be in a position to realize its so-called "minor program" - (See ch. 3, pt. 1, p.97) - except perhaps to get an outlet on the sea, which Wilson promised.

On 9 January 1918, Robert Cecil, the British Minister of Blockade, told the Serbian Ambassador, Jovanović, that Lloyd-George's speech was at the moment "the minimum basis for negotiations about the European peace", and that should the Central Powers not accept it, "something which was already quite certain, then it [i.e., the propositions in the speech] would not be valid anymore."⁽²⁶⁴⁾ In regard to the "Yugoslav question" Robert Cecil further stated that "the Yugoslav union" is desirable, "but whether [it] is realizable" is another question.⁽²⁶⁵⁾

The old Pašić, who was generally slow in moving, this time, when he noticed that Serbian interests for a further expansion were concerned, acted promptly, writing to the Allies' governments in connection with Lloyd-George's speech, but still not giving the character of an official protest, saying:

"... The impression of this speech upon our public opinion and political leaders of all political parties, as well as upon the Army, is very unpleasant and disappointing. It concerned all without exception [because] of the future of the Serbian people. ... It is noticeable that the right of national self-determination was forsaken for the people in Austria-Hungary and mainly for the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, and for the Czechs and Slovaks. For the Italians living in Austria-Hungary it was expressly stated that the necessity of life requires that they be united with Italy; while for the Rumanians [it is said] that it will be endeavoured to give them justice for their aspirations. ... Did our Allies forsake the application into life of the principle of nationality equally for all the people, or did we wrongly understand the speech of Lloyd-George...? The Serbian Government still believes that our Allies will also insert among the peace conditions the realization of our national demands and that they will not agree to inflict the Serbian people [with] such an injustice as would be the case if the realization of their national demands would not have been inserted among the peace conditions. ..." (266)

At the same time Pašić undertook another action, highly confidential, in order to find out, through his Ambassadors, whether Serbia would receive at least Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his very confidential circular instructions to the Serbian Ambassadors with the Allies, he wrote:

"... If our Allies find that it is necessary to correct the mistake of Germany from 1871 in relation to Alsace and Lorraine, then a much stronger reason speaks for correcting or abolishing the act of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to give to the Serbian people the right of self-determination. ...

Our brothers [i.e., the Croats] adhere ... to the request 'all or nothing'. ... [They] do not work as a good father would have worked, when he cannot liberate all of his children [at one time], then he liberates as many as he can, watching for [a favourable moment] when he will be able to also make the rest free. ...

When you talk about that [i.e., the question whether Serbia would receive at least Bosnia and Herzegovina] with the competent persons, restrict yourselves and say that you speak about it in your personal opinion and in no way follow the instructions of your Government. And, please, pay attention to the smallest nuances in the responses and report precisely to me as soon as you can. If you have a trustworthy and loyal Bosnian, you can also instruct him to speak in this sense at the Foreign Office." (267)

In essence Pašić said that in order to get Bosnia and Herzegovina he was ready to accept the idea of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, sacrificing the principle of national self-determination, to which he refers in his official note to the Allied governments, dated Salonica 17/4 January 1918. In other words, when he saw that there was no chance of realizing the "major program", Pašić quickly shifted himself and started to work on the realization of - at least - the "minor program" which, if conceived, would still have meant the success of Serbia's expansion in stages in the eyes of the Serbian politicians.

This comparison of the relations "father-children", one nation towards the other, is not only repulsive - for it signified that the non-Serbian nations were treated as weak, immature - like children - who need father's protection, namely Serbia, who will "make them free" by annex-

ation, still waiting and watching for a favourable moment to "liberate" the rest of the South Slavic countries. All of this handling was nothing more than treason towards the Croatians and Slovenians, that is a treason to the spirit of the Corfu Declaration. In addition, to refer to the high principle of self-determination of the peoples when the interests of the Serbian people were involved, and at the same time to leave this identical principle when the non-Serbian interests were affected, such an attitude does not comprehend high value nor sincere respect.

Yet M. Stefanović, adviser at the Serbian Embassy in Paris, replacing at that time the Ambassadors M. Vesnić as well as J. Jovanović in London, and Ljuba Mihajlović in Washington, did not want to execute Pašić's directions since all three considered that this action - which the Allied diplomacy would quickly perceive - would only strengthen the positions of Lloyd-George and Wilson, bringing defeat to Serbian prestige and being harmful. Jovan Jovanović answered Pašić,

"... My opinion is, that it is most dangerous to show our Allies and our compatriots (saplemenicima), that we are ready to negotiate. We shall not abandon our program of union, ... The Corfu Declaration, based upon sound principles, as well as the Yugoslav movement represent our strongest weapons today. To forsake that would mean to be ruined. ..." (268)

For this disobedience Ljuba Mihajlović and Jovan Jovanović were punished by being retired early, while Stefanović was transferred from the active place in Paris to a remote post in Lisbon. (269)

In contrast to Pašić's hypocritical attitude, Trumbić remained loyal to the spirit of the Corfu Declaration. While the Allies, on 11 January, - just a few days after the speech of Lloyd-George and President Wilson's address to the Congress - announced a conference where they would definitely establish their war-aims, Trumbić directly referred

to the heir apparent, Alexander, as well as to Pašić demanding:

"... that the Serbian Government send without delay a note to the Allied Powers, in which would be stated [its] attitude in regard to the speeches of Lloyd-George and Wilson in the sense of the Corfu Declaration; to confute the idea of keeping our people in the frame of Austria-Hungary, and [also] to declare a formal request for the liberation and union upon the principle of national self-determination."

Furthermore, Trumbić mentioned that, should the Allies not be able to accept the demand of liberation and union because of a political or military reason,

"then it would be necessary to ask them at least that those peoples - particularly to our people - preserve the right of self-determination in an absolute sense and without restriction 'within the frame of Austria-Hungary'. ..." (270)

But the Serbian Government still did not submit that note, even though the Declaration had been signed five months ago (7/20 July, 1917).

Pašić informed Trumbić (on 18 January) that the "Royal Government did undertake all of the [necessary] steps" so that "our brothers do [not] remain in the slavery of Austria-Hungary," but that they would "receive the liberty and right of self-determination." (271) (Pašić referred to the note to the Allied governments, dated Salonica 17/4 January 1918.) Nevertheless, the "principle of self-determination", referred to in the above reply to Trumbić, was not expressed to the Allies, for the whole note was based on the ground of the Serbian aspirations, "demanding the territorial acquisitions for Serbia", (272) even though Pašić wrote likewise to Trumbić.

The other idea which was proposed by the Yugoslav Committee to the Serbian Government in this situation was the idea of the convocation of one large common congress, (273) formally opened by the heir apparent. Through this act Alexander would give a visible character of public mani-

festation, advocating the idea of the "union of peoples". Pašić tried to find out all kinds of excuses for refusing this idea; thereafter followed a tiring correspondence between the Committee and the Government.

The Serbian opposition was unsatisfied with the politics led by the Serbian Government: "... The leaders of our opposition parties hold conferences where they attack Mr. Pašić and the whole government due to the badly managed foreign politics,"⁽²⁷⁴⁾ wrote Aleksić, the head of the Cabinet Council, to the Minister of the Interior. Even though there was no contact between Trumbić and the Serbian opposition, the latter also came to the same idea of the necessity to convene a People's Assembly to be held in France, and which would officially be opened by Alexander:

"... Our national cause has come into a terrible crisis,... therefore, we demand that the government at once convoques a People's Assembly and this only in France... [which] has to be opened by His Majesty the heir apparent, whose presence would be very necessary and useful in these times. ..." (275)

The coincidence concerning this suggestion of one People's Assembly was suspicious to Pašić, thinking that the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian opposition cooperated closely. For this reason he was even more against this idea. And the Serbian social-democratic Party in France also demanded such an Assembly of a congress, which would send: "an energetic protest from the whole nation" against the speeches of Lloyd-George and Wilson, because the "principle of the right of the people" to decide their own destiny was forsaken.⁽²⁷⁶⁾ However, the Serbian Government consented only to forward individual protests from various persons, organizations and meetings, against the violation of this "principle", under the condition that these protests had a private character, while the Committee was suggesting:

"... a collective action of solidarity of all national factors, gathered in one general People's Assembly, as a representative of the national entity. ... Only a collective action can retain the attention of the Allied governments and the public opinion upon our firmness and mutual solidarity,..." (277)

Then Trumbić began to use pressure upon the Serbian Government; the next day he again sent a telegram to Regent Alexander, explaining to him that:

"... if the [Serbian] Government does not accept in principle the Committee's proposition, the [Yugoslav] Committee does not intend to stop its action, but contemplates to proceed further in [its own] way; besides the Government, loyally informing him in advance of [its actions]. Shall the Government not lead the people, it will find himself after them. ... I shall not hide from you the discontentment which reigns among the Committee on account of the methods by which the Government conducts the national politics. This system is ignoring the Corfu Declaration, which contemplates our national problem as an inseparable entity and rejects any partial solution. From this it follows that the national politics has to be conducted in agreement with the cooperation of all its national factors, representing our people as a whole today. Contrary, the [Royal] Government still follows [the line] of the cabinet politics which is obsolete,... our general politics and its action cannot be led successfully, by no means, either from Corfu or from Salonica - far from the world. It is advisable to transfer them in one world center, like Paris or London, where you and the members of the Government, should transfer yourselves [too],..." (278)

Besides the discontentment due to the refusal of the idea of one General People's Assembly from the Government, Trumbić was also dissatisfied because of the lack of one common plan and program to lead the national politics. "... It is necessary to do something energetically,..." wrote Trumbić two days later to Protić, the Vice-President of the Serbian Government. "It would be necessary to convoke one general Assembly of all the national factors and elements with the purpose of reaching the conclusions of our general national question, as well as of the further conduct of the national politics. ..." (279) The main reason for this pressure was that Trumbić wanted to achieve a reform in the method of leading the Serbian foreign policies. This aim is clearly visible in

his letter to Dr. Julius Gazzari in Geneva. The letter reads:

"... It is a matter of changing the method of conducting the national politics. ... During the three and a half years of the war, this politics has shown [to be] inappropriate and unsuccessful in [its] action, for it did not succeed in incorporating the national problem into the international politics... [This] bitter experience teaches us that we thereby cannot hope anything and [therefore] it becomes an unavoidable requirement to reform this work and its method, [to define it] so that the official politics of Serbia has to depend upon the collective action of the whole people becoming their expression. ... This is the main thought of the Committee's proposition. It [the Committee] wants a collective stand up of the people instead of the isolated governmental action, ... The new politics would have to operate among the public opinion of our people and of the Allied countries. ... It is a great mistake to think that our future is only in the hands of the Great Allies. This is a fatalism, ... Our problem is firstly in the hands of our people. ..." (280)

The Serbian Government stubbornly refused Trumbić's suggestions.

All the attempts of the Yugoslav Committee in this direction remained without success.

2. The Changing of the Entente Policy in regard to Austria-Hungary and its Reflections.

During many months Allied diplomacy tried to separate Austria-Hungary from Germany and to conclude a separate peace. When all hopes were lost, as well as of finishing the war soon, no other alternative remained to the Entente Powers other than accepting the idea of Henry Wickham Steed, the foreign editor of the "London Times", namely, the necessity of destroying Austria-Hungary. Steed's thought was that the German-Austrian block of power could be destroyed not through the separation of the one from the other but through the destruction of Austria. This plan could be achieved:

"Firstly through an Italo-Yugoslavian agreement, and secondly with the Czech, Polish, and Rumanian question. The Yugoslav battalions would surrender on the Italian front too, as they had done on the Serbian and Russian [fronts, permitting] Italy to enter the war as a liberator." (281)

This was easy to imagine but hard to realize since, between Italy and the South Slavs there existed a deep division - the Treaty of London. This treaty, with its guaranteed promises of the Croatian and Slovenian territories, was the main reason why the Italians did not recognize the Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs in the Monarchy, nor their right of uniting with Serbia and Montenegro in a common state, regardless of whether or not this idea was sound.

The realization of the Yugoslav Committee's policies - the principle of self-determination and of territorial integrality - would have meant the annihilation of the Treaty of London, something which Italy did not want by any means. Consequently, the "Croatian question" - (known also under the less precise name: the "Southern Slavic" or "Adriatic question") -

was the main difficulty in approaching Italy on one side, and the Croats in the South of the Dual Monarchy on the other. The "key" to these approaches, on which depended the success or failure of Steed's whole conception, a conception which the Allies were about to accept, was, thus, in the hands of the leader of Committee - Trumbić.

Besides those difficulties, there was the question of principle for the Entente, namely, to move from the declared standpoint of "federalism" to the opposite point of "national self-determination". This was indeed hard. The first changes in this direction occurred in America. Washington was in no way bound by the Treaty of London, which facilitated the circumstances for American diplomacy under the existing conditions.

"In the first place we should be perfectly frank with ourselves and admit that as long as there was a chance of entering into a separate peace with Austria-Hungary it was wise and expedient to attempt to do so, even though it was contrary to the just claims of the nationalities within the Empire. [When these efforts failed, a] revision of policy became necessary. ... It is my judgment that, primarily as a war measure, and also because it is wise and just for the future, we should encourage in every possible way the national desires of these peoples. If need be, I would favor going so far as to promise them their independence... if that would induce them to revolt against German-owned Austria-Hungary." (282)

On 24 June 1918 Lansing, with Wilson's approval, informed the Serbian Ambassador, Ljuba Mihajlović, "that the position of the United States Government is that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule". (283) Lansing's statement did not involve recognition of the Yugoslav Committee, but - in effect - it sanctioned the Committee's program as an integral part of Allied war-aims and as such "it marked a significant turning point". However, "the United States was now committed to the Yugoslav project". (284)

The turn in American policies was definitely done and on 29 June

1918 the statement liquidating the Austrian Empire was already declared. However, this was not done because of the national aspirations and their "just claims", as Lansing said, but due to strategic reasons: to end the war sooner. The idea was to beat Germany with the same weapons with which it beat Russia. Therefore, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, wrote to Wilson at the beginning of May 1918, saying:

"... I do not think that it would be wise to ignore the lesson which has to be learned from the German policies towards the Russian people." (285)

The events in the international field, as well as in Italy itself, during the second half of 1917 and at the beginning of 1918, caused modification in Italian policies too. At first the military defeat at Caporetto (in October 1917) awoke Italian public opinion against their Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sidney Sonnino (1915-1919); Italy - it was said - cannot defeat Austria, whose oppressed nations back her up as Italy's policies go against their interests. The defeat of Russia and its emergence from the circle of the Allied Powers, and the defeat of Rumania, caused even more problems in Italian political circles. The speeches of Lloyd-George and Wilson, even though they favoured Italian interests, were received with less enthusiasm by public opinion. The preservation of Austria-Hungary meant that the Treaty of London would not be realized. In addition the Dual Monarchy - which Italy considered as its main enemy - would remain strong enough and its inner structure modernized, while Italy's wish was to see her much weaker. Pašić wrote Trumbić:

"... The speeches of Mr. Lloyd-George and Mr. Wilson are only the echoes of this new real situation, which has arrived, ... as a result of Russian removal from the battle-field, ... Italy - after the catastrophe in Russia, Rumania, and by herself [i.e., Caporetto], and after the speeches of Lloyd-George and Wilson - decided to

change her attitude towards the Yugoslav question. It is true [that] she did not completely accept our view, but left, more or less, that [view] by which she stood when creating the treaty with the Allied Powers on our account. ..." (286)

All of these facts indicated that the foreign policies of Italy should be transformed. The first contacts between Italy and the Committee started in Geneva, in July 1917, between Professor Borghese, the editor of "Corriere della Sera", and Marquis De Paterno, the former secretary at the Italian Legation in Cetinje (Montenegro) on one side, and Dr. Julius Gazzari, N. Stojanović, De Giulli, Professor Boža Marković, and M. Grol on the other. The main question was: How far could both sides reduce their claims from their maximum demands for the common interests, that is, the Italians from the Treaty of London and the Committee from the proclaimed principle of "self-determination of the people" - the core of negotiations being the question of territorial concessions. The Italians particularly insisted upon Istria, while the Yugoslav Committee insisted, until the end, on the "principle of nationality". Unfortunately, the conference did not bring any results, but it was felt that Italy did not count on Dalmatia. Gazzari reported about this point as follows:

"... From the discussion [one] could feel that Italians do not count on Dalmatia and that every claim on Dalmatia from today [on] will only act as tactical mean for our reduction on other points." (287)

Similarly, eminent individuals among French public opinion began to work towards attacking Austria-Hungary on the inner front, as well as towards policies which would assist the Czechs' and South Slavs' aspirations in the Monarchy. This idea was particularly advocated by the "French-Slavic Club", headed by Franklin Bouillon. The Club was composed of French and Slavic politicians and scholars; it took as its duty the organization of a congress of suppressed nations in Austria-Hungary; this would take place in Paris. This same notion was supported by Steed,

Seton-Watson, and Evans in London, backed by official circles in Great Britain. De Giulli, the chief of the Committee's branch office in Paris, wrote to Trumbić:

"... It endeavours to show the Allies - who are afraid to touch Austria[n affairs], thinking that after that [destruction] a chaos will result - that an alliance of nations replacing it [i.e., Austria] is possible, and at the same time trustworthy for the Entente." (288)

The conceptions of the French-Slavic Club also found its followers among Italian public opinion. But to accept this conception, the problem of relations between Italy and South Slavs - which did not exist with France - was hard to overcome. It was, therefore, necessary to perform a "new course", the so-called "policy of nationality" (politica della nazionalità) among Italian public opinion as well as in the Parliament. Especially enthusiastic in this were Professor Amendola, an influential and well-known established authority and correspondent in Rome of "Corriere della Sera"; Senator Albertini, the editor and chief of the political column in the same newspaper; Professor Borghese; a delegate, Andrea Torre, one of the prominent persons in the Italian Parliament and previous correspondent of "Corriere della Sera".

Supporters inclined to the conception of co-operation between Italians and South Slavs included persons whose opinions favoured the paper "Il Secolo" in Milan. They were: Pontremoli, the chief of the political column of this paper; Professor Schinetti, its main editor; Mario Borsa, the editor of the external information column; University Professor Guglielmo Ferrero from Florence - a close friend of Frano Supilo; from the parliamentary circles only Senator Della Torre, a close friend of the Minister B.L. Bissolati, supported this notion. Besides "Corriere della Sera" and

"Il Secolo", there was also "L'Unità", which advocated an approach between Italy and the South Slavs, proving decisively with facts the "unjustice of Italian aspirations on Dalmatia." (289)

Hoping to repel this movement, Sonnino defined his program during a speech in the Parliament, on 25 October 1917, where, among others, he said:

"Tra i nostri fini di guerra non ci sono smembramenti di Stati nemici, nè ciambiamenti [sic] degli altrui ordinamenti interni." (290)

Meanwhile, a few days later, the Italian armies being defeated at Caporetto, among public opinion there began to prevail a feeling of depression and political circles feared best Italy had to sign a separate peace-treaty with the Central Powers. In such a situation, the notion of a "new course" found a prolific ground, expanded quickly, and the protagonists of "Delenda Austria" and of the Italo-South Slavic approach, in London - Henry Wickham Steed, Professor Robert William Seton-Watson, and Sir Arthur John Evans, a professor of Archeology - met at the "Serbian Society of Great Britain". They tried to bring the two sides closer - the Yugoslav Committee and Italy on the basis of the so-called "Adriatic compromise." With it Italy would renounce Dalmatia, while the Committee would acknowledge Italian rights of annexation of Trieste, Istria to the river Raša, as well as the islands of Cres and Lošinj. This represented the "Evans' line", because this "separating line" had been suggested by Professor Evans. On Steed's initiative the representatives from both sides met (on 14 December 1917) in his apartment "over a cup of tea".

There the Jugoslavenski Odbor was represented by Trumbić, Ivan Meštrović, Julije Gazzari, Jovo Banjanin, Gustav Gregorin, and Dinko

Trinajstić; the Italian side was represented by General Mola, the Italian Military Attaché in London, and his assistant, Captain Vicino Pallavicino; Major Filippo De Filippi, the head of the Italian propaganda Bureau in London; and Signor Guglielmo Emanuel, the London correspondent of "Corriere della Sera". From the British side, Steed, Evans, and Seton-Watson attended the conference. Steed explained the purpose of his initiative in the following words:

"Italy and Yugoslavia are bound by the fact that the Adriatic Sea has to be Italian and Yugoslavian, otherwise [there] arises a danger that it becomes German. It is sufficient to determine a principal line, the territorial details not being needed, [they] could be left for a conference for arbitration - for instance, by Wilson." (291)

In other words: "Between the official basis of the Italian policy [the Treaty of London of April 1915], and the official basis of Southern Slav policy, [the Declaration of Corfu], it should be possible to find a middle term," (292) said Steed. On 18 December, when the debate was summarized, General Mola said that Pola, as a war harbour, and Trieste, as a mercantile harbour, "that these two points could not be [successfully] kept without [any] connection with Italy and the hinterland," therefore Mola "demanded all of Istria, Trieste and [its] surroundings, southwestern Carniola, and the whole country of Gradiška [Burgerland] - Gorizia [Gorlitz]."(293)

However, Sir Arthur Evans declared himself as being against giving Istria as a "hinterland", on the grounds that historic Istria only extended to the river Raša. Trumbić wanted to know "whether the Italian Government still pinned its faith to the Treaty of London. If so, the prospects of an Italo-Yugoslav understanding would be small." (294) Trumbić asked to revise the Treaty of London, according to the principle of self-

determination of the peoples, and that the principle of nationality should serve as a basis between these two countries. He supported his statement with the suggestion that should Austria-Hungary be destroyed and Czechoslovakia be created, then Italy would not pose a danger on the Adriatic.

Finally, General Mola, summarizing, declared that the Convention, i.e., the Treaty of London, had to be revised as a secret treaty; that the principle of nationality had to be considered towards the Dual Monarchy; that Dalmatia had to belong to the Yugoslavian state, while in regard to the "mixed zones" (zone grigie) it had not only to consider the principle of nationality, but also other points which were worthy of consideration between the two states in order to establish better relations; that those national minorities which would remain either in Italy or in Yugoslavia had to enjoy their national rights.⁽²⁹⁵⁾ To this Trumbić added that besides the "principle of nationality", Italy also had to accept the "principle of self-determination" agreed by General Mola. The conflict, however, came in connection with the fact that Mola - while acknowledged the pure Slavic character of Dalmatia - the whole territory of Istria with Trieste and Gorizia, including Julijske Alpe, he regarded as nationally "mixed zones" to which should be applied the principle of strategic boundaries, cultural zones, historic lines, etc., and not exclusively the principle of nationality and self-determination.

According to Trumbić's letter to Milada Paulova (on 20 September 1924), he defended therein these ethnically and nationally "mixed zones" as countries which are:

"... in largest part pure Slovenian, while they [i.e., Trumbić and the other members of the Committee who participated at the conference]

acknowledged only this, that Italian is spoken partially in the towns of western Istria [and] in Trieste, and Gorizia. They stayed on the basis - regarding these countries - of the principle of nationality and national self-determination." (296)

Since they could not find a compromising solution on this point, the conference failed.

Amendola started the campaign for a "new policy" in "Corriere della Sera" (on 12 January 1918) with his article, "The Problems of Italy". There Amendola, contrary to Lloyd-George and Wilson's speeches, asked the destruction of Austria-Hungary; he accepted "not only the principle of nationality, but also the other principle: of full independence of small states", (297) and demanded also that these principles should be honestly represented among Italian policies. The second article of this series (which appeared the next day) was dedicated to the Czecho-Slovakian question, permitting their volunteer troops to come on Italian ground - (because of the visit of the Czecho-Slovakian political leaders, Hlavacek and Beneš, to Italy).

As a result of the common effort from "Corriere della Sera", "Il Secolo", and "L'Unità", the ultra-nationalistic and anti-Yugoslav circles, directed by Senator Esterela, were soon compelled to accept the "new reality" in politics. Senator Esterela declared:

"It seems to us, that the Italian aspirations, to obtain Dalmatia after the war... are bare fantasies. The declarations of England and America call us to reality, and it [the reality] demands an agreement with the Yugoslavs besides the Czechs and other revolutionary Austrian people, and [also] a common fight." (298)

At the end of February the situation was already so bad that it was necessary to create a committee, which would organize and convoke one congress of the suppressed nations in the Dual Monarchy. The latter would be held in Rome, not in Paris. The protagonists of the "policy of nation-

ality" (politica della nazionalità) did not want the leadership of this movement to remain in the hands of French politicians. "Italy wished to secure the political and moral benefits [which would result] from this leadership for leading the war, as well as at the occasion of the conclusion of peace,"⁽²⁹⁹⁾ as this was explained by Giovanni Amendola, one of the originators of the movement - the sole and main worker for the congress.

Yet the congress could not take place without the consent of the Yugoslav Committee which represented the South Slavs; this was a condition sine qua non. In order to solve this problem, there existed, basically, two streams among the Italian political circles. One stream was for negotiating with the Committee and the other with Pašić' and the Serbian Government.

In the middle of 1917 the Serbian politicians met in Berne. They reached the conclusion that it was necessary to form an Italo-Serbian society, which would elaborate a solution of the problem existing between Italy and the South Slavs. Pašić' approved this decision; the committee should formally constitute itself in Rome in February 1918 under the name: "The Serbo-Italian Society". But Trumbić' was decisively against this for he did not want that one work on a treaty with the Italians by passing the Committee. So he intervened with Pašić'.⁽³⁰⁰⁾ He was also decisively against the attempts of Dr. Beneš to mediate between the South Slavs and Italy:

"... When Beneš comes to Italy, he wants to 'represent' us. You have to tell him expressly that we do not give him this mandate under any form; that we do not wish that he interfere into our affairs, and [also] let him know that we are not satisfied with his work in Italy as far as our question is concerned. Let him concern himself with his [own] question where we never interfere,

... It does not affect us what he declared to you, privately, [namely] that he agrees with the Corfu Declaration, [but] which he did not want [even] to bring as an announcement in the "Nation Tchèque" - [the organ of the Czecho-Slovakian "National Assembly" in Paris] - until he realized that he could do [that] after a few months without taking a risk. ..." (301)

With the persistence of the press - at the end - a favourable situation was created with Italian public opinion. In the second half of January 1918, Orlando, Premier of the Italian Government, went to London to seek information from the Allies in regard to the Treaty of London. In an official communiqué, issued at that time, it was stated that the Allies remained bound by the Treaty; but privately they demanded that Orlando meet Trumbić so that these two sides could reach an agreement. The meeting again took place because of a mediation by Steed. Trumbić supported the Corfu Declaration, for it was founded, he stressed, upon the sound principle of nationality and of territorial integrity, while the Treaty of London was a work of diplomacy which bargained with the people living there, as if they were "an object"; moreover, they were not even consulted. These two acts - said Trumbić - are incompatible since they contain two main different principles. Again, nothing happened at this conference. But without solving the "Adriatic question", the envisaged congress in Rome did not take place. Thus, the "Croatian question" rose to the international stage:

"... The question of our relations with Italians was profitable to us, and brought out our cause so that the political and journalistic circles here [i.e., in England], in Italy, and in France, were interested in it. They gladly would meet [the fact] here that an agreement between us and Italy is found, as well as with France. Italian public opinion is divided into two camps: pro or contra the action concerning Austria-Hungary. The factor of this is the question of [an] agreement with us and it pays attention, more than ever until now, to the Yugoslav question. I did not ask for the audience with Orlando, but he arranged it with Steed. ..." (302)

Also at that time the course of the British basic policies was in the process of changing. Thus Lord Northcliffe presented the British Government - according to Steed's outlines - two alternatives for the politics towards Austria-Hungary:

- a) to pursue the task for a separate peace-treaty with Austria-Hungary;
- b) to work on the destruction of Austria-Hungary by backing the resistance of her non-Germanic peoples.

Northcliffe favoured plan (b) and suggested that the Allies publicly declare themselves in favour of the right of self-determination of the people in the Habsburg Monarchy, and that - in this sense - they exploit the Czecho-Slovakian National Assembly, the Yugoslav Committee, the Polish National Assembly, and the Rumanian emigrant organizations; as well as try to convince the Italian Government to renounce the Treaty of London. The ultimate aim of this policy would have been the creation of a confederation of non-Germanic nations in Central Europe.⁽³⁰³⁾ Because of all these actions, the fixed meeting of Torre-Trumbić at the beginning of March 1918 was very important. Steed expressed the thought that the responsibility for its eventual failure and with this the Northcliffe-plan (b) would be borne by the Yugoslav Committee.⁽³⁰⁴⁾ The members of the Committee saw in this meeting another opportunity to inflict a "powerful blow" against the London Treaty. Trumbić was also concerned that, after the successful meeting with Torre, the public opinion of the Western European countries might think that "everything is now all right" and that there exist no more problems between Italy and the South Slavs; the more so, as at the meeting no boundaries would be drawn. Trumbić considered that from this standpoint the Committee could go out if it was

clearly defined that

"... the fundamental principle of the territorial conflicts between the two peoples have to be solved in the sense of the principle of nationality and the right of self-determination of the people. This is a general principle, which might cover us in regard to the responsibilities before our people, and [also] towards our conscience, [for] it is a difficult matter of today's talks. We will not enter into any concrete territorial disputes because we cannot venture until recognizing the foreign people the right for even one village of our nation. ..." (305)

Finally, the meeting took place in London. Trumbić was officially delegated from the side of the Committee, while Italy was represented by Andrea Torre, delegated with the consent of the Italian Government, and also the supported by the main Italian press. (306) There was pressure upon Trumbić from all sides. The maximum burden on him was on the 6th of March. The Serbian Ambassador, Jovanović, wrote about that day in his daily-book, as follows:

"From 3:30 until 7:15 at the Savoy Hotel - talks about the Italy-Yugoslav agreement. There were [present]: Sir Arthur Evans, [Seton-] Watson, Steed, Emanuel, Torre, and Trumbić... Because Trumbić kept his previous [attitude] about the Yugoslav state on the basis of the Corfu Declaration, all of them employed big arguments, almost 'moyens de pression'. Torre said that he would not wait longer - [than] until tomorrow before noon. ... Steed declared: Trumbić will destroy the whole affair with the Allies. The British Government (that is, the War Cabinet) already gave [its] consent to the plan of Lord Northcliff [sic!] for the work against Austria... Steed, personally, withdrew from everything... Trumbić and the whole Yugoslav Committee must leave London... S[ir] A. Evans said that, if [Trumbić] does not accept this agreement, he will commit the entire crime [and] alienate all of the sympathies of English men, while he personally thinks, that he will not be able to favour the cause he advocated. [Seton-] Watson also stated the same position; he will back out himself from the whole matter, he will not work against, but also not for it. ..." (307)

Under the same datum Jovanović wrote that Steed phoned him, saying that everything stopped in regard to the third article:

"Trumbić does not want to use the words: 'that the vital interests of both peoples will be preserved...', for this is a flexible word, and [therefore] it can be interpreted in this or that way." (308)

The next day before noon, at almost the very last minute, the agreement was reached. The text of the London Conclusions reads as follows:

"... The delegates of the peoples [who are] completely or partially suppressed by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, established with an accord these principles with the purpose of common actions:

- 1) Every nation, which strives to achieve its national and state union or to complete it, has an undeniable right for complete political and economic independence.
- 2) Every[one] among these nations agrees that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is a basic stumbling-block in their aspirations and rights.
- 3) Therefore, these nations pledge that they will aid each other in the struggle for their complete liberation from the common enemy in order to achieve a complete national union in their own free state."

"The delegates from the Italian and Yugoslavian people separately established what follows:

- 4) In regard to the relation between the Italian nation and the nation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians - known also under the common name Yugoslavia - the representatives of these two peoples agree that the union and independence of the Yugoslav nation is of vital interest to Italy; as well, the completion of the national union of Italy is of vital interest to the Yugoslav nation.

Therefore, the representatives of these two peoples pledge that they will supply all their activity in this, that - during war and peace - these supreme demands of their peoples will be completely realized.

- 5) [The delegates] declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defense from every foe, present or future, is of vital interest to their peoples.
- 6) [The delegates] oblige themselves to solve separate territorial disputes - in a peaceful manner and in the interest of future good and sincere relations between these two nations - on the basis of the principle of nationality and right of self-determination of the people, and so, that the vital interests, which will be defined at the moment of peace, are not violated by the one or the other nation.
- 7) [To the minority] groups (nuclei) of one nation, which have to be included in the boundaries of the other nation, will be recognized and guaranteed the right of respect of their language, culture, and moral and economic interests." (309)

During the meeting of Torre-Trumbić in London, Trumbić definitively demanded that the "Serbo-Italian Society" committee does not have to

attend the congress in Rome, for the relations between Pašić and Trumbić, at that moment, were very intense since Pašić would not accept to convoke a general People's Assembly.⁽³¹⁰⁾ A few days before the opening of the congress, Trumbić sent a dispatch to Torre (29 March), through the Embassy in Rome, indicating that "... On behalf of the Yugoslavs, only the members of the Yugoslav Committee which I will ... choose (označiti) have to attend the Congress."⁽³¹¹⁾

Pašić was officially informed by the Committee about Torre-Trumbić's talks and officially approved the "London Conclusions" also; in addition, all of the members of the Committee in France, Switzerland, and America, were informed regarding this and gave their consent. Then Torre sent a telegram of confirmation and approval of the "London Conclusions" on behalf of the Italian Government.

The most important point in these Conclusions was the third one which, in an indirect way, renounced the Treaty of London; because - according to the approved statement Italy would receive not what the Treaty guaranteed her, but what the Peace Conference would decide. In addition, the main stumbling-block on the way of the Congress of Rome was, thus, removed. It was decided that the Congress would be a task of the Italian people as a whole, and not of the Italian Government; the Government would only take over the moral obligation in the acceptance of the wishes of the people and in implementing them in its politics.

Thereby, the Congress of the Suppressed Nations in Austria-Hungary was officially opened in Rome, on 8 April 1918, with a large parade. The Congress was uniting three streams of public opinion in those days.⁽³¹²⁾ These groups were:

- 1) The group represented by Albertini, Amendola, and Ruffini - who wanted the Congress to achieve real results from an action against Austria-Hungary, and also that a strong and permanent working organization be created;
- 2) The group of nationalists who accepted the idea of the Congress as a temporary weapon in the war, but who did not wish that from it there originate an "organism" which would block their territorial aspirations;
- 3) The group which represented "L'Unità" which wanted to take the opportunity of clearing up the misunderstanding and of establishing the ground of compromise between the South Slavs and Italy.

Taken from a technical point of view,⁽³¹³⁾ the Congress worked in three commissions: one for politics, and two for propagandistic purposes. The aim of the political commission was to work on the recognition of the "Yugoslav, Czech-Slovakian, and Polish states, and on the union of the Rumanians; the duty of the second commission was to define coordinate work of the small nations among themselves and the Allies, consisting chiefly in the conduction of propaganda for the Allies within Austria-Hungary, as well as on the Austro-Italian front; the third commission had relatively the same duty, but with the difference that it would conduct the action among the Entente countries.

At the end of the Congress a resolution was composed and sent to the Italian Government; the records and conclusions concerning each commission had a strict confidential character. The general resolution was composed of two parts: the first part comprehended: the "Accord général entre les nationalités d'Autriche-Hongrie", which included all

nations. Its text was almost to the word the same as the one of Torre-Trumbić's agreement - (Points 1-3).⁽³¹⁴⁾ The second part of this resolution had a specific character - "Italo-Yugoslav" (Points 4-7) of Torre-Trumbić's pact which - after having been proclaimed at the Congress - became a part of the pact of the small nations. At the end of the Congress a special Executive Committee was formed, composed of representatives from all nations, headed by A. Torre. Thereafter, the Congress was dissolved.

Trumbić remained a few more days in Rome, where he opened a branch of the Yugoslav Committee, under the direction of Drs. Trinajstić and Gazzari.

The importance of this Congress lay in the fact that in it were made the first steps towards diplomatic recognition for the independence of the suppressed nations, their right to independence being proclaimed as the same as the Italian Government - a member of the Entente. The Congress also shed new light on the Habsburg Monarchy and openly demanded its destruction; this was important for the Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs since it proclaimed the principle of nationality and "union". Official Italy was, however, firstly concerned with applying the effect of the Congress in its military purposes against her main enemy - the Dual Monarchy. Soon actions started in this regard by dropping propaganda leaflets from aeroplanes on her fronts; this rapidly brought about "defeatism" among the Slavic soldiers and desertion began to expand rapidly.

3. The Situation after the Congress of Rome

According to the conclusions reached at the Congress of the Suppressed Nations in Austria-Hungary, in Rome, it was decided that all of the nations of the Habsburg Monarchy would send their delegates to Padova, the center of a special Italian Propaganda Commission for the actions on the Austrian front - ("La Commissione centrale per la propaganda sul nemico") - which was established by the Italian Supreme Military Command in April 1918. In this Commission the representative of the United Powers - one from each power - collaborated together with the Italian side, but had only an advising vote in the matter. The representatives of the Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, South Slavs (Croatians, Slovenians, and Serbs), and Rumanians were now also to join this commission. Dr. Milivoj Jambrišak, a Croatian, represented the Croatians; Dr. Stojan Lazić, a Serb, represented the Slovenians, and a Serb from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bogoljub Kujundžić, represented the Serbs from Croatia. The head of this commission was an Italian captain, Ugo Ojetti. (315)

The chief duty of this Commission was propaganda, that is, to prepare and disperse leaflets by aeroplanes on the Austro-Italian fronts. As a result of this systematic action, there rapidly began a dissident process among the Austrian units, which were composed mostly of Southern Slavs. These deserters transmitted information to Italian military officials - information regarding the locations of the enemy, its military strength, plans, and so on. For instance, on the eve of the battle on the river Piave, during the night of 14 to 15 June 1918, "one Bosnian Serb" (316) - (and according to Austrian military documents: "... a series of deserters...") (317) - went over to the Italian side and reported - at 9 o'clock

in the evening - to the Sixth Italian Army the exact hour of the Austrian offensive - which would begin at 2 o'clock the forthcoming night. Following this news, General Diaz, the Supreme Commander of the entire Italian front against Austria, who had his headquarters at Abano near Padova, gave the order to begin artillery-fire on the whole Italian-Austrian front at midnight - thus, two hours before the Austrian offensive would begin; in addition he gave the order for a general mobilization for counter-assault. Mostly because of these actions the Austrian military plan did not materialize.

The number of deserters grew rapidly; by the end of May there were over 20,000 soldiers - composed of Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs, while - during the battle at Piave - an additional 4,000 joined. In the war prisoners' camp at Nocera Umbra there were concentrated, for instance, over 200 reserve-officers, "almost exclusively Croats and Slovenians,"⁽³¹⁸⁾ whom Trumbić¹ visited at the end of June 1918. During that month the total number of deserters and military prisoners was around 25,000, most from the Southern Slavic countries but interspersed with Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Germans, and Hungarians.

At the beginning of May 1918 the Italian Government asked the Supreme Military Command to effectuate a registration of the Slovenian war-prisoners, and that "the Slovenians from Carniola (Kranjska), Carinthia (Koruška), and Styria (Štajerska) be separated from those who were born in the countries of Gorizia (Gorica), Gradišće, and in the districts of Trieste and Istria."⁽³¹⁹⁾

After the Congress of Rome, the Yugoslav Committee started at once to work with the Italian Government in order to form a separate corps of

volunteers from among those deserters and military prisoners, and to send these units to the "Yugoslav Legion" in Salonica. Very rapidly there were several thousand soldier-volunteers. The Allied governments approved this idea, but the Italian Government acted because of other motives; it was ready to release only Orthodox Serbs, mostly those from Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina; these were sent in groups to Salonica, while at the same time Italy refused to operate in the same manner for the Croats and Slovenians, rejecting categorically the demand of the soldiers from those regions which were attributed to her by the Treaty of London. When this undertaking failed, the Yugoslav Committee tried to get permission to create separate "Yugoslav units", which would fight together with Italian troops against Austria and would be under the control of the Italian Army, as this was permitted to the Czecho-Slovaks. (The conventions of 21 April and 30 June 1918 acknowledged the Czecho-Slovak volunteer troops; these conventions were signed in the name of Italy by President Orlando.) However, this intention also "broke" upon the "territorial questions" of Italy, since such permission would have meant that the Italian Government consented to the wishes of the Southern Slavs' liberation from Austria-Hungary, consent which she hardly favoured. Vojislav Antonijević, the Serbian Ambassador in Rome, wrote:

"... Sonnino... told me, more or less, this: Your last note about the Yugoslav volunteers of Serbian nationality, in a narrower sense the [Serbian] inhabitants from Banat, Srijem [Syrmium], Bosnia and ... [text interrupted in original] we will release... The Italian Government [however] cannot release the war-prisoners from the other countries since this involves discussions about the territorial questions which have to be delayed for later. ... Also, the status of a Yugoslav corps on the Italian front remains in connection with the territorial question... At the end he told me that it is pleasant for him to inform me about the very cordial relations between the Serbian and Italian troops at the Salonica front. ..." (320)

Besides this difficulty, another appeared and it also was necessary to solve: the question of sovereignty of the eventual Yugoslav Legion on the Italian front. From the Serbian side it was demanded that the volunteers take an oath of allegiance to the Serbian King, which official Italy opposed, as - according to its reasoning - the Southern Slavic volunteers were the subject of the Austrian Emperor, paying no attention to the fact that she had already given such permission to the Czechoslovakian volunteers. Colonel M.M. Jovanović wrote to the Serbian Supreme Command: "... In order that [the volunteers] become Serbian soldiers in a real sense of the word, it is necessary that they also take an oath of allegiance to the Serbian King. Only then can they be equal to their Yugoslav brothers on the Salonica front. With this, two [things] could have been accomplished, 1) To have proved to the men that there was somebody who took strict care of them; their organization would have been conducted through and by it taken away from the Italian influence and brought to ours'; and 2) These men could have become the advocates of the Serbian, that is, the Yugoslav idea -there where it is really most important for us. ... Those very same reasons which lead Minister Sonnino to be against the oath, lead us to be for it. ..."(321)

The Serbian Government accepted this idea, which was rejected by the Italian Government; therefore, there was created a "juridical justification" for not accepting the notion of forming a separate Yugoslav Legion in Northern Italy, something about which the Serbian Government was never "too enthusiastic". Pašić wrote the Serbian Ambassadors:

"... On the latest ministerial session Sonnino was not against the Yugoslav Legion concerning the fight on the Italian front, but he was so reserved that Bissolati concluded that Sonnino was against the Legion as well as Orlando (since he returned from the front)

who vacillated because among the Yugoslavs there is much communism; regarding the question of oath, neither Sonnino nor Orlando agreed in any case that the oath [of allegiance] be given to King Peter. ... The Corfu Declaration acknowledges a union of the trinamed people [Croatians, Slovenians, and Serbs] and Serbia represents all the Yugoslavs and, therefore, we cannot deviate from the Corfu Declaration which recognizes King Peter as their ruler; thus, they [the volunteers] have to give him oath when our brothers enter into the battle for liberation. ... Italy remains firm that the Croatians have to form their own separate state and that the rest of Slovenians join them. ..." (322)

Minister Bissolati, however, favoured the idea of a Yugoslav Legion in Italy, but his influence alone could still not bring about a change of attitude by the Italian Government. In his talks with Trumbić, Bissolati accepted Trumbić's request to separate the Croatian, Slovenian, and Serb war-prisoners from the German and Hungarians; this was realized. Thus, the Slavic war-prisoners were placed in a separate prisoners' camp; in fact, the general atmosphere among them and the German-Hungarians on the other side was one of bitterness. From these separate camps the prisoners were led to various manual jobs, but were not moved further.

Thus, the notion of creating a Yugoslav legion among thousands of Croatians and Slovenians in Italy failed. It failed because of the attitude of the Italian Government, on the one side, which was directed with the purpose of weakening and destroying any resistance in the territories of Istria and Dalmatia, which she intended to occupy; and, on the other side, because of the Serbian Government and its insistence upon the oath of allegiance to the Serbian King, when Croatians and Slovenians wanted to enter the volunteer-lines but, "strangely enough", found a "workable solution" with the Italian Government when it was the case of the Orthodox Serbs from Vojvodina, Bosnia, etc., so that the latter Serbian troops were transported in groups to Salonica.

Chapter VII

THE GENEVA AGREEMENT

1. The Struggle for the Diplomatic Recognition of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Accepting the conception of destruction of Austria-Hungary by the Allied Powers, meant in essence freeing the national components of which the old multi-national Habsburg Monarchy was composed. This further meant, on one side, the beginning of the struggle for the diplomatic recognition of the "national bodies" as representatives of these nations in exile; and the beginning of the whole diplomatic and secret fight among the Great Powers about the "destiny" of the "Habsburg's lands", on the other side. French support to the Serbian Government was extensive. France gave, exempli causa, a loan of two million francs in connection with the transportation of the volunteers from North and South America, and "as soon as this credit is exhausted, a new one will be sent [granted]...", telegraphed the Serbian Ambassador, Vesnić, from Paris (18 October 1916) to Pašić.⁽³²³⁾ In addition, the French Government allowed numerous scholarships to Serbian students in exile, spreading and securing its post-war influence in Serbia, namely Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Yugoslav Committee found more understanding and support among influential British circles for its conception not of an enlarged Serbia - an idea which was advocated by Pašić -, but of creating a new state of South Slavs who had to be united on an equal basis. Thus, the interest in the "destiny" of the "Habsburg's lands" was simple: who will get the main post-war influence in the new state, London or Paris ?

In the struggle for recognition of the Yugoslav Committee as a lawful representative of the South Slavs in the Monarchy, from the side of the governments of the Allied Powers, the Serbian Government would do every-

thing to block this recognition. Contrary to it, the Serbian Government would ask the Allies to give her the "mandate" in order to conduct through this "union", as we will see it later.

As mentioned, an executive committee was elected at the Congress of Rome, headed by Andrea Torre. In this committee there were representatives from all the suppressed nations of Austria-Hungary and the committee's aim was to achieve the realization of the principles comprised in the Congress resolutions. This practically meant that the Great Powers engaged themselves - and in the first place the United States of America - to liberate those suppressed nations, in the sense that they would accord diplomatic recognition to Poland, Yugoslavia, Czecho-Slovakia, and recognize Rumanian rights in Transylvania (Erdelj). Even though Italy was a member of the Entente Powers, her object was, in the first place, to weaken Austria-Hungary in order to be able to obtain the Treaty of London; in the second place, to block the union of the South Slavs so that the Croatian countries, through this policy, would be divided successfully among Italy, Serbia, Hungary, and Austria. Obviously, this committee did not function since its aims were divided and particularly because of the conflicting opinions from the side of the suppressed nations and official Italy which did not want to destroy the Habsburg Monarchy.

Nevertheless, the first results of the Congress of Rome were manifest. Lansing, the Secretary of State, made the following declaration on 29 May 1918:

"Secretary of State wishes to declare that the Government of the United States of America pursued with great interest the Congress of the Suppressed Nations of Austria-Hungary, held in Rome during the month of April, and that the national aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugoslavs have found sincere sympathies in this Government." (324)

A few days later England, France, and Italy declared their own statement in regard to the Polish, Czecho-Slovakian, and Yugoslav national question which reads:

"At the meeting in Versailles on 3 June of this year, the representatives of the Triple Entente - France, Italy, and England - have agreed to give the following two declarations:

The Poles - The creation of a united and independent Polish state with a free outlet on the sea is one of the conditions of a solid and justful peace and a rule of right in Europe.

The Czecho-Slovaks and Yugoslavs - The Entente Government acknowledged with pleasure the declaration of the Secretary of State of the United States of America and wishes to join it, expressing most cordial sympathies for the national aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and to the Yugoslav nation for [its] liberty." (325)

The Serbian Embassy in Paris reacted negatively to the Versailles note of 3 June. In his memorandum of 12 June to Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, Jovanović stated that the Versailles note was de facto a "return to the situation of January 1918",⁽³²⁶⁾ a situation which had been created by Lloyd-George and Wilson's speeches. Moreover, he stated that he feared that this declaration would create similar depression among the Serbian Army and the people, as had been the case after the mentioned allocutions in January 1918. In a similar manner the Serbian Embassy in Washington undertook actions on 14 June regarding the difference in treatment made in the Versailles statement for the "independence of Poland" on one side, and for the "independence of the other nations" on the other. In fact, while independence was given to the Poles - "to the movement of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugoslavs only sympathies were given;⁽³²⁷⁾ upon this the American Government was asked to use its influence with the Allied governments to obtain similar recognition of Yugoslav independence.

Following the advice of Steed and Seton-Watson, the Yugoslav Committee gave, on 15 June, its extensive memorandum to Balfour in which was asked the "security of an equal recognition on the part of the Allied governments" as well as "their rights and aspirations"; likewise, it had already been accorded to the Poles.⁽³²⁸⁾ On 28 June the U.S. Government declared:

"... that the viewpoint which the Government of the United States of America advocated is such that all branches of the Slavic nations have to be completely liberated from the German and Austrian lordship." (329)

On 29 June 1918 France acknowledged the National Council of the Czecho-Slovaks, a step which lead to the foundations of the Czecho-Slovakian state. This move by the French Government brought about a crushing impact upon the Yugoslav Committee which, at the Congress of Rome, played the main role, and where all the suppressed nations of the Monarchy were placed on the same level, while in Versailles the "Yugoslavs" and Czecho-Slovaks were excluded, contrary to the Poles who had all three Entente Powers on their side. With the recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks, the "Croatian question" came to the last place as the Croatians, Slovenians, and Serbs had only acknowledgement from the American Government. Nevertheless, while recognizing the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks, the Entente Powers accepted the principle of destroying Austria-Hungary.

The reason for the Committee's lack of success lay in Sonnino's opposition since he wanted to save the Monarchy, making it only smaller and weaker. ("A noi conviene" - ripeteva (Sonnino) - "una Serbia ingrandita e un'Austria diminuita,"⁽³³⁰⁾ was a well-known slogan of Sonnino.) (See also Steed's account on Orlando: Appendix VII, p. 323) The creation of an

independent Polish state was, thus, in the interest of Italy as the secession of Galicia fitted into its plan of a "reduced Austria"; an independent and Catholic Poland - in the eyes of the Italian strategy - would have been directed against Bolshevik Russia.

The politics of the Congress of Rome, regarding the "Croatian question" witnessed at Versailles its defeat. But at Versailles it was also decided, even before the acknowledgement of the Czecho-Slovaks, that in the future it would not be necessary to reach an unanimous accord among the Allies, but that each one might take an independent attitude in relation to the political demands of the other nations in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Besides the resistance of official Italy, the Committee met another and more difficult problem on its road for recognition than Italy's opposition: the problem of the Serbian Government which did not want - under this aspect - to give its consent to the Yugoslav Committee, but required the "mandate" for itself. The conception of the Committee was that the Allied Powers admit:

- a) the South Slavic people in the Monarchy as allied people;
- b) the Yugoslav Committee as a representative of the national aspirations - and as a mandatory for the South Slavic people in the Monarchy;
- c) the Yugoslav volunteers as Allied troops.

The aspirations of the Croats and Slovenians to obtain their acknowledgement based on the Corfu Declaration from the Allied Powers was the more important, as they would have become the juridical possessor of international recognition, and, through this, the Italian danger would have been lessened. Serbia, on the contrary and as previously mentioned, stuck to the basis of its political conception of "compensation".

"... It is necessary to recognize to Serbia the right to represent all the Yugoslavs, namely Serbo-Croatians and Slovenians which [right has already been] acknowledged [??] to her [by] our Allies in Europe, ... Therefore, it is necessary to be careful for the step and word which would follow after that as if there would be no Serbia and as if it would have been necessary for her to look for a certain organization representing the Serbo-Croatians and Slovenians. ..." (331)

The national recognition by the victorious Powers would have protected the South Slavs, not only from Italian imperialism, but also from Pašić's conception of the same "war-merits" as Italy was stressing. But the Serbian Government, deliberately, neglected the moment to do what the essential national interest demanded from her; the more so, as France and England were ready to recognize the Yugoslav Committee, but could not do it until the relations between the Serbian Government and the Committee were proper. Trumbić wrote to Jovanović on 26 July:

"I was with Pichon [on 19 July 1918] who is ready to accord to us also, as [already accorded] to the Czechs, a declaration for recognizing our independence from A[ustria-]Hungary and for acknowledging our people [as well as] the [Yugoslav] Committee as the representative of the people under A[ustria-]Hungary, ..." (332)

In spite of the Serbian objection to this task, Trumbić consulted Pašić before undertaking official measures with the French Government:

... During those days I was talking with Minister Pichon ... and he answered that he is ready to do for the Yugoslavs what he did for the others and suggested that I prepare a declaration, such as we wish, ... I added that the English Government is completely in agreement with the French on the question of Austria-Hungary, in the sense of complete liberation of her suppressed nations with the right on their state independency. Before submitting a draft of the declaration to Pichon, our Committee wishes to come to an understanding with the Royal Government, thinking that in the declaration the two [following] thoughts have to be expressed: the one regarding the right of our people under Austria-Hungary on the full liberation and separation from her and the union with Serbia and Montenegro in one independent state; and the other concerning the recognition of the Yugoslav Committee as the representative of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian people under Austria-Hungary. ... (333)

In this regard Pašić answered:

"Serbia ... internationally represents our trinamed Serbo-Croato-Slovenian people and speaks in its name in the international relations. Therefore, it would have been a sort of duality if our Allies would have placed their representatives by the Yugoslav Committee. ..." (334)

When Trumbić received this answer, he wrote on Vesnić's telegram instead of Pašić's - (most probably by mistake) - the following sentence:

"The nations of A.H. [Austria-Hungary] are liberated in the name of their right on life, and not with the design to be annexed to another state...." (335)

In his reply to Pašić, at the end of September, Trumbić wrote:

"... Neither I nor any of us did deny, or will deny, Serbia the right to represent our people internationally. ... But here it concerns something else, namely the fact whether Serbia has the exclusive right to represent our entire national problem in the international life today, or whether there are other components from our [people ?] representing [also] our people with Serbia and speaking in their name and working for their interests. ... Serbia represents only roughly one-third of our whole people - by [its] territory and inhabitants. Outside it [i.e., Serbia] there is Montenegro, which is a state, and there is an entire people in A.H. representing about two-thirds of all our nation. ... My thought is this, ... that our people have to be represented by the Royal Government and by the Yugoslav Committee and then they can speak together with competence and authority in the name of our people in Austria-Hungary and in Serbia, opening widely the door to Montenegro as a part of the same people to find itself place in the Yugoslav community. ..." (336)

However, all of these moves did not help to any significant extent and, therefore, Trumbić's English friends, Steed and Seton-Watson, tried, in the name of the Committee, to contact Regent Alexander directly with the view that he take into his hands the question of recognition of the Committee. That telegram reads:

"... We are sorry that the President of the Ministry does not show even a trace of interest in reaching this agreement [between the Serbian Government and the Committee]. This attitude of the Serbian Government renders impossible every initiative in the interest of an approach and union of the Serbs with the Serbs, Croatsians, and

Slovenians from Austria-Hungary. We write to His Majesty as to the highest guardian of the Yugoslav and Serbian interests requesting that He personally take into his hands this question. The time is precious and each new delay from the side of the Serbian Government might result in serious consequences." (337)

In answer to this telegram, Regent Alexander replied that the difficulties between those two parties were of a "tactical nature" and would soon disappear:

"... I admit that it is unknown to me that these disagreements were caused on account of the difference in the standpoints on a certain basic principle, which would have been necessary to maintain. Contrary, ... if there are some differences, they can only be related to tactical details. I believe that these differences too, if they exist, will soon disappear. ..." (338)

In July 1918 Pašić was in Rome and conferred with Italian statesmen, particularly with Sonnino. At the end of these talks, the "Agenzia Stefani" published a communiqué in which sentiment was expressed "that between Sonnino's views and those of Minister President, Pašić, there did not exist any conflict." (339) This statement caused the Yugoslav Committee as well as Steed, Seton-Watson, and others to revolt. The Committee was convinced that all of the necessary conditions existed for it to receive official acknowledgement from the English, French, and American governments, regardless of Italian resistance, and that only the Serbian Government was blocking this step. Trumbić was almost ready to begin a fight against the Serbian Government when, suddenly, Seton-Watson "cut through the knot" of Trumbić's hesitation. On 22 August 1918, Professor Watson published an editorial in his highly-respected review "New Europe" (No. 97), under the title: "Serbia's Choice", in which he brought out, for the first time de facto, the state of relations between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee. The article caused a sensation, the more so as British and French public opinion believed that everything was in order

between these two sides.

Seton-Watson hoped that the Western democracies - England, France, America - would help the cause of the Committee in its struggle with the Government, moreover, he thought that "Yugoslavism" was in a certain sense based upon a conception of the League of Nations. (340) In his article he

"... accused Pašić of ruling by illegal methods, of refusing to convene the Skupština [Parliament], of suppressing all political opposition, ... 'Only a knave or a fool would call his patriotism in question; but his outlook and standards are those of a vanishing era, and he is too old to shake off altogether the semi-Turkish traditions of his youth.' He then asked Pašić to form a coalition cabinet, to restore union among the Serbian ranks, and to dedicate his energies to supporting the national cause." (341)

The Serbian Ambassador in London, Jovanović, sent this article to Pašić by means of a special courier; he also sent an accompanying letter in which he said:

"... It is necessary to show in a quite clear way from your side that you did not leave the program of the Corfu Declaration, because the Englishmen, who have until now worked for our union, have the impression that the Government has a new program which can be defined in this way: 'Great Serbia with an outlet on the sea' and fear that this has been done in agreement with B. [Baron] Sonnino. ... The discord among the Serbs and the disagreement with the Yugoslav Committee, is this not a sign of [their] incapability for the union and [a sign] of weakness, they [i.e., the Englishmen] asked themselves?" (342)

Pašić rebelled from the instructions of his Ambassador and he answered Jovanović with a telegram in which he declared:

"Every Ambassador, in such a condition, has to know his duty [what to do], ... When I come to London, if at all I decide to come to the country which tries to interfere in the internal legislation of its Ally, I will do ... what the interests of the Crown, of the Serbian people, and of the Serbian Government ask from me. - I plan to reply [to Watson's article] through some Serb or Yugoslav, for I think that it would be improper for me to step out personally...." (343)

"La Grande Serbie", Pašić's newspaper published in Geneva and edited by L. Marković, first began a campaign against Seton-Watson, while S. Protić, the Vice-President of the Serbian Government, answered Watson with his article: "A Serbian Protest", sending it to him for publication. This article appeared in "New Europe" (No. 102) on 26 September 1918 with the Editor's commentary under the title, "The Allies and Serbia". Protić's protest was sharp and irritable, with traces of hypocrisy and - as such - evoked distrust and missed its purpose. On 22 August Protić replied - as mentioned above - to Seton-Watson with the following answer, approved by his associates in the Cabinet:

"... You are, dear friend, mystified and not little. ... Surely, Pašić is old by years, but not rarely younger in spirit and in views than many gentlemen of the Opposition. He is our national treasure, and no prudent man and no prudent group will throw him off. ... In Pašić's youth there are no half-Turkish traditions, on the contrary, in it there are revolutionary and western traditions as [well as] by others of us - "conservative powers". In Karadjordjević's Serbia there was never a place, either for half-Turkish or half-Austrian traditions. And proof of this is the very history of the Serbian rulers. Therefore, Serbia was and is [the] standard-bearer of the national liberation and union. She is [the] protagonist and bearer of greatness, as you wish again of a revolutionary principle, of which you were also afraid several years ago ... It seems to me that it is necessary to be afraid that there, closer to you - dear friend - than here, there are half-Turkish and half-Austrian traditions which are a hindrance to the realization of the liberation and union of our people based upon the Corfu Declaration, upon which Serbia views and works only to make it wider and deeper, and not to narrow and weaken it. ... Serbia has its own difficulties as everyone else ... Is it [too] much to ask from its convinced friends, as you are, not to multiply them to her with such a groundless criticism ? ..." (344)

In the indicated article, "The Allies and Serbia", Professor Seton-Watson wrote this commentary following Protić's reply:

"Serbia has to choose: whether she wants to lead the movement for national union of the Southern Slavs, or whether to remain a small Balkan Kingdom ...?" (345)

L. Marković answered Professor Watson - who always spoke about the union of the South Slavs in one state on the basis, not of "annexation" or "compensation", but of equality and justice - in a way that "... with the help of free translation and obvious twisting of Watson's text he tried by all possible means to represent him [Seton-Watson] as an enemy of Serbia and of the Serbian people ..."(346) Due to all of these circumstances, the conflict between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee became apparent to public opinion.

Having overcome the two obstacles - Italy and Serbia - Trumbić thought that if he could press the Italian Government to change its attitude towards the question of recognition of the Committee through the elements which were loyal to the policy of an approach between the South Slavs and Italy, then all of the Entente Powers would be on the side of the Committee and would pressure the Serbian Government to give up its present way of thinking. With this conception in mind, Trumbić left for Italy where he talked with Bissolati. According to Bissolati's day-book, Trumbić said that the "Yugoslavs" consider the Evans' line "more or less acceptable"(347) as a division-line between Italy and future Yugoslavia. Bissolati favoured closer cooperation between Italy and the South Slavs and was thus against Sonnino's policy. As a member of the Italian Cabinet, even though he was a socialist, Bissolati had a good reputation; his idea was that the Italian Government should initiate again the policies of the Congress of Rome which she had abandoned. Therefore, he began to urge this in June 1918 and from then until August a new journalist campaign was organized, begun by the "Corriere della Sera", and helped by "Il Secolo". In the opposite camp were: "Il Giornale d'Italia", Sonnino's

personal organ, and "Il Mattino", a pro-Austrian oriented paper; "La Sera"; "Il Resto del Carlino", and others. There was also another group against Bissolati, about which Albertini wrote:

"The mass of the so-called 'good-minded citizens' were permeated with an ancient- and primitive aversion towards the 'Croato' and believed that Austria could not be destroyed, whose [destruction] neither the aristocrats, conservatives, diplomats [nor] the Church and clergy wanted - [all] were against us." (348)

The standpoint of the "Corriere" was that Sonnino tried to save Austria-Hungary in a "reduced form". The Monarchy would be removed from the Adriatic Sea and from the maritime-states; Serbia and Montenegro would be enlarged from Austria-Hungary - (that is with Croatia) -, while Galicia would be in Polish hands. Thus Austria-Hungary would remain weak and become a second-class power which - together with Rumania and Poland - would be strong enough to hold the danger from Russia, while at the end the Habsburg throne would be preserved. Through these moves Italy would be left alone to govern through its occupation the territories of Istria and Dalmatia. Furthermore, the policy of friendship with post-war Germany would be renewed, as well as the "Triple Alliance" where Italy would play a second role and not a third one, as had been the case before the outbreak of the war in 1914. (349)

The "Corriere" was convinced that such a policy was dangerous for Italian interests, since the most powerful state in the world - America - was governed by the liberal ideas of President Wilson, who had rejected the Treaty of London, as well as Italian imperialistic aspirations on the Adriatic littoral - because they were not based upon the principle of self-determination. Therefore, the "Corriere" and other papers advocated the destruction of the Dual Monarchy and the liberation of the suppressed

nations. They were sure that Sonnino would not change his political conception due to his personal prestige and they thus tried to demand his resignation.

After a few months of this "newspaper battle", Bissolati thought that it was time to act. He presented the entire conflict to the Cabinet, supporting his demand with the threat of his resignation. At the same time he submitted an official note to the Italian Government concerning the acknowledgement of the South Slavs and their movement for independence, a note which he had previously worked out with Trumbić. Having strong support in the Italian Parliament, Bissolati's resignation would have caused a crisis in the Cabinet as well as in foreign and interior policies. Therefore, being aware of this state, he rested the entire matter on the following point: either he or Sonnino had to leave the Cabinet, since all were convinced that Sonnino would not yield. But against all expectations Sonnino yielded and made a compromise. This compromise was stated in the form of a general conclusion which was submitted to the Allied governments on 8 September 1918. This conclusion reads:

"The Ministerial Council decided to inform the Allied Governments that the Italian Government considered the movement of Yugoslav peoples for the realization of independence and for their constitution into a free state, corresponding to the principles for which the Allies fought as well as to the aims of just and lasting peace." (350)

Italy accepted in principle the destruction of Austria-Hungary, the union, and the creation of the South Slavs' state. This was a great success for the Congress of Rome, and the success was due to the efforts of Bissolati. Submitting the official memorandum to the Allies, Italy placed itself on the side of France and England. Finally, all three

Allied Powers were, in principle in agreement with that idea. Now it was once more Pašić's turn to undertake the same move, but he still maintained his attitude.

Ten days before Italy had forwarded its memorandum to the Allied governments, Pašić had sent his note to the Serbian Ambassadors in Paris, London, and Washington, asking them to submit this note officially to the governments to which they were accredited. This notice was against the acknowledgement of the Yugoslav Committee as the representative of the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians, and it reads:

"... The Czechs and Poles do not possess their free states and governments which would represent them ..., while the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians have Serbia which leads the war because of their liberation and union with Serbia. ... Serbia declared as its war-aims: to liberate and unite the Serbo-Croatsians with Serbia and Montenegro in one strong independent state ... [By] the recognition of the Yugoslav Committee as a representative and an advocate of the Yugoslavs in Austria-Hungary ... the two political centers, which will absolutely cause misunderstanding, are created ... We beg our Allies to take this, our request, into consideration ..."(351)

At this time Pašić lived on Lake Geneva, at Evian-les-Bains, but left shortly after for Paris from where he sent M. Trifunović, a public delegate of the Radical Party, and P. Marinković, the Serbian Ambassador in Rumania, to London in order to negotiate with the Committee and to convince its members to renounce their present policies. According to Pašić's suggestion, two members of the Committee should enter into the Cabinet, but Trumbić rejected this proposition. Then suddenly, on 26 September 1918, Pašić gave his declaration to the Paris "Le Temps" (which appeared in the evening edition dated 27 September) declaring:

"... we have no reason to doubt that they [the Allies] - acknowledging the loyalty and the sacrifices of their Ally, Serbia - will not recognize her the right, and will not help her to liberate all her brothers, and unite with them in one free and indepen-

dent state.

A declaration in this sense coming from the side of our Great Allies would be very important; ... Yugoslavia, which Serbia would create - helped and backed up from the side of our Great Allies and based on the principles constituting the Corfu Declaration - would be and remain ... an ally to the Entente Powers, ... We expect a declaration in this sense from the side of all of our Allies; ... "(352)

In a second declaration which Pašić gave during the same day to the "Journal des Débats" (dated 27 September 1918) he again expressed his wish to form an "independent Southern Slavic state under the patronage of Serbia, in accordance with the Corfu Declaration; he also stressed that he was "against the recognition of the Yugoslav volunteers as allied and belligerent troops", and that "he did not wish the Yugoslav Committee to be acknowledged as the representative of the Yugoslav subjects of Austria-Hungary." (353)

After these declarations, anxiety prevailed again among the members of the Committee, for Pašić deliberately passed over in silence the work of the latter and its contributions in the struggle for the liberation of the Southern Slavic people in the Monarchy and in North and South America, through its numerous political organizations there. Madame Paulova mentions that on that same morning, Trumbić arrived accidentally in Paris and, while at the railway station, bought "Le Temps" in which he read Pašić's declarations with great consternation. Thus he immediately went to the Hotel "Continental" where Pašić lived. There both men entered into a sharp conflict, for such an assumption of "liberation" as seen by Pašić was fundamental to the Corfu Declaration. Trumbić said that he felt obliged to submit a memorandum to the French Government presenting a different point of view, where upon Pašić replied: "Do as you wish" - (Činite, kako znate). (354)

Thus on behalf of the Committee Trumbić submitted in the coming days a memorandum to Minister Pichon, proposing to the French Government the following formula of recognition:

"Since the beginning of the war, the Yugoslav people [composed] of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians in Austria-Hungary have resisted the common enemy with all the means at their disposal. Many Yugoslav volunteers joined the Allied troops, ... Taking into account these efforts, France considers the Yugoslav people as an allied nation, acknowledging their right to dissolve the state-links with Austria-Hungary and the right of independence, and - on the basis of the principle of nationality and people's self-determination - the right of union with "same-blood-brothers" in Serbia and Montenegro in one independent state, and considers the Yugoslav troops of volunteers in the Serbian Army, ... as allied troops ... Furthermore, France recognizes the Yugoslav Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Ante Trumbić, as the representative and organ of the people's interests in the Yugoslav nation of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians subjected to Austria-Hungary and as its [the "Yugoslav" nation] mandatory, and acknowledges the declaration of the Yugoslav Committee that it will continue its political work in a solitary agreement with the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia in the sense of the Corfu Declaration of 20 July 1917." (355)

In the talks which Trumbić had with Pichon, the latter agreed that he was willing to give an official declaration in the name of France and that he, personally, agreed with the proposed declaration of the Committee but, he added, "... la Serbie ne veut pas et nous ne pouvons rien faire contre un Alliée, c'est un gouvernement, un peuple alliée." (356) This meant that: if one wished to obtain recognition from the Allies, it was first necessary to receive the consent of Serbia. Pichon also said that he, personally, agreed with Trumbić's note and not with the one submitted by the Serbian Government, and that Trumbić could say this to Balfour: which signified that now the gravity of the problem was transferred to London.

After these talks, Trumbić went to London where he convoked a session submitting a report of his talks with Pašić and Pichon to the members of the Committee, as well as the memorandum presented to the French

Government. All the members agreed and approved the step taken by Trumbić; they also accepted a memorandum, already composed, to the British Government, which was to be presented to Balfour on 7 October 1918. In this long pro-memoria - (See Appendix VI, p.320) - which Paulova cites in extenso, Trumbić said that the recognition of the right of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak people from the side of the Allies, includes logically the further recognition of the right of the "Yugoslav people", but that in this matter arose conflict in the views between Pašić and the Yugoslav Committee. Trumbić gave the view of Pašić and the view of the Committee, demanding for the South Slavs in the Monarchy the right on state independence and union based upon the national principle and the principle of self-determination; he further demanded that the Yugoslav volunteers be recognized as allied and belligerent troops; and that the Yugoslav Committee will be acknowledged as the representative and an organ of the South Slavs subject to the Monarchy. At the end of the pro-memoria, Trumbić gave an extensive commentary.

The private secretary of Lord Cecil acknowledged receipt of this memorandum on 21 October. This same day Trumbić submitted the following documents to Lord Robert Cecil - (with the request to present them to Balfour): 1) the conclusions of the Yugoslav Congress in Antofagasta (held on 22-25 January 1916); 2) the resolution of the Congress in Pittsburg (held on 29-30 November 1916); 3) the memorandum of the chairmanship of the National Defence in South America handed to the British Ambassador, de Bunsen, in South America; and 4) the Declaration given by Dr. Korošec to the Austrian Parliament on behalf of the Yugoslav Club and the National Council in Zagreb; etc.

"All of these facts and documents can only illustrate more completely the justification and necessity of recognition of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians for a belligerent ally, their right to liberate themselves from the Austro-Hungarian yoke and unite themselves with their free brothers from Serbia and Montenegro in one national and independent state, as well as the acknowledgement of the Yugoslav Committee as their lawful representative." (357)

Trumbić's note dated 29 October 1918 stated that Steed told him confidentially that Balfour and Drummond - (Sir Eric Drummond was Balfour's private secretary) - were ready on Friday to recognize the South Slavs as an allied people, when a despatch came unexpectedly from Pichon, asking London not to undertake anything before London had agreed in this matter with Paris. Thus, because of this reason, everything was postponed. (358)

Around the same time Pašić arrived in London with the intention of operating through the British Government so that Serbia and not the Yugoslav Committee received the mandate of trust. Although Pašić had asked some time in advance - from Paris - for an audience with Balfour, he had to wait for several days before being received by him. Nevertheless, the Greek Premier, Venizelos, who came on the same day to London as Pašić, had dinner with Lloyd-George that day. Pašić, not having been invited and in order to get out of this unpleasant situation, gave a gala-supper at Claridge's Hotel, inviting private individuals and the members of the Committee; but this was an improper move, since he should have been a guest and not the host.

On 8 October Pašić gave his interview to the "Evening Standard" on the occasion of the banquet. That same afternoon he should have had his interview with Balfour, but just before noon Steed convened Pašić for a talk, while in that morning's issue of "The Times" (8 October 1918) there

was an article praising Regent Alexander for his military merits and the Corfu Pact, condemning the narrow imperialistic aspirations of Serbia. Even though the real purpose of this article was to put pressure upon Pašić so that he would retreat from the Serbian conception of exclusivism, Steed's praising of Regent Alexander was, nevertheless, illusory, since the

"... best proof that the Court and Government were one and the same is shown by the fact that Alexander has sustained Pašić's homogeneous Radical Government in power, when it was obvious that it [i.e., the Serbian Government] does not enjoy a trust of the National Assembly, in which the Oppositional parties had majority ..." (359)

Pašić received Steed in an audience at eleven o'clock a.m.; the discussion was intense and polemic. After this audience Steed wrote down the discussion in which he said:

"M. Pashitch began by saying that he wished to remove certain misapprehensions into which I had been led by inaccurate information as to the policy of the Serbian Government. He had always wished to form a Coalition Cabinet in order that all parties might bear the responsibility ...

I said that I was much less interested in these somewhat ancient details than in seeing Serbia adopt a policy that would help to place Serbo-Yugoslav unity on a firm basis and thus to contribute to a lasting peace settlement in Europe. The friends of Serbia in Great Britain had greatly regretted that the Serbian Government should not have taken action, in accordance with the Declaration of Corfu, to secure for the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs the same recognition from the Allies as had been granted to the Czecho-Slovaks. M. Pashitch answered that ... it has always been the idea of Serbia to liberate them from the Habsburg yoke and Serbia alone was qualified to do so. The Yugoslav Committee had been created by him and was his creature. Therefore he could not regard it as a qualified representative of Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs. The Czechoslovak National Council had a mandate from its own people whereas the Yugoslav Committee had none.

I reminded M. Pashitch that he was mis-stating the facts and suggested that it was imprudent on his part to mis-state them to me, who had, from the outset, been connected with the formation of the Yugoslav Committee in London and with the placing of its funds (furnished by the Yugoslavs of South America) at Lloyds Bank. The mandate of the Yugoslav Committee was exactly of the same nature as that of the Czechoslovak National Council. ... Moreover, it was strange that he,

M. Pashitch, should have negotiated and signed the Declaration of Corfu with the President of a Yugoslav Committee devoid of a mandate.

M. Pashitch answered, somewhat angrily, that the Declaration of Corfu had merely been issued by him in order to make an impression upon European public opinion. ... The Yugoslav people were very mixed. There were, for instance, a large number of Serbs in Slavonia and Croatia, all of whom were determined to belong to Serbia and cared nothing for what the Croats might do. Serbia had a right to liberate these people - and, if the Croats and Slovenes wished to belong elsewhere, they might do as they liked.

I asked M. Pashitch not to forget that I, too, knew something about the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary who were deeply attached to their historical provinces and to whom the old Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia represented a reality. These provinces desired unity with Serbia on a basis of complete religious and political equality; ... But, much as they desire unity, they were determined not to be Balkanized by any Serbian policy of conquest or annexation. I did not think that the Allied peoples or the people of the United States would sanction a mere policy of territorial acquisition on the part of Serbia. ... I warned him that a Serbian Government, animated by such a spirit, would find difficulty in getting from the Allied governments ... a mandate of the kind he suggested. I assured him that the proceedings of the Serbian authorities in Macedonia after the Balkan wars of 1912-13 were too well known for it to be likely that Allied opinion would tolerate the adoption of any similar methods towards the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary. ...

M. Pashitch said that he was willing to observe the Declaration of Corfu, but that the dominant policy must be his policy and that officials who did not obey his orders must be removed. He alone was entitled to determine what policy should be followed; and those whom he employed had to obey orders.

'Your Excellency speaks like a Sultan,' I return and I warn you that the Allied peoples are in no mood to respect Sultans. ... And since your Excellency talks of dismissing officials, allow me to point out that the Serbian Government has done itself much harm at Washington by the dismissal of the Serbian Minister, M. Mihailovitch, on account of his Southern Slavic sympathies; ...' 'That is for me to decide,' answered Pashitch. 'I have given orders and my employees have to obey;' ...

On returning to Crewe House I dictated a memorandum of this conversation and sent it to Mr. Balfour, ... Mr. Balfour expressed approval of my frankness with the Serbian Prime Minister and used my memorandum as a brief for his own interview with M. Pashitch. ..." (360)

The audience for Pašić with Balfour was arranged for 3 p.m., but shortly before it was postponed because "Mr. Balfour was sick". The next day, however, at 9 a.m. Balfour received Trumbić and had with him long

and exhaustive talks. He told Trumbić that the English Government accepted the Yugoslav idea of union as well as the formula of the Yugoslav Committee, but that the difficulty lay in the fact of declaring the recognition as long as Serbia was against it; but as soon as the relations between these two parts were settled, the British Government would give its acknowledgement to the union and creation of Yugoslavia.

On 10 October Pašić made another declaration to the "Morning Post", expressing - obviously for opportunistic reasons - the importance of the basic elements stated in the Corfu Declaration. That same day he also received the deputation of the Yugoslav Working Union, headed by Professor S. Šećer, P. Ostojić, and M. Todorević. At this occasion Pašić declared that:

"... The Allies and Serbia are fighting for the right of self-determination and liberation of the oppressed peoples. The Croats and Slovenes can therefore exert their right of self-determination in our favour (that is, in favour of Serbia) or in favour of their own independence. ..." (361)

By its quality this statement was a new thought expressed by Pašić, i.e., the recognition of the free decision of Croats and Slovenians. At the same time this was the highest point reached by him in his understanding of the "Yugoslav problem", presuming that Pašić's statement was based upon an honest basis and not spoken as opportunism. Or, as referred by Pavle Ostović who personally heard it in that audience from Pašić:

"His [Pašić's] statement regarding the rights of self-determination has a ringing democratic sound but no meaning." (362) (Nevertheless, in the next interview given a week later, on 18 October, to "The Daily Mail", Pašić spoke again only of the Serbs and Serbia.) Finally, on 10 October he anew met with Balfour. At this time, because of the Corfu Declaration,

both men differed markedly in their positions. Pašić considered it as an act of political opportunism, while for Balfour - showing him his signature on the document -, it was a state act which bound Serbia. For this reason Balfour refused to confer to Pašić the declaration of recognition which the latter tried in vain to obtain from the Allies, recommending that he cooperate with the Yugoslav Committee. The result of these discussions were Pašić's defeat and the moral victory of the Committee, but both sides did not get the needed recognition they sought. (363)

On 10 October Trumbić also sent a telegram to Regent Alexander informing him about the conflict with the Serbian Government - (see Trumbić's memorandum to Balfour dated 7 October 1918, Appendix VI, p. 320). In his telegram Trumbić said:

"... the Committee stays compactly and decisively on its standpoint and it cannot yield [in this] due to its responsibility to the people, since it fears that such an understanding by Mr. Pašić - who wishes to centralize in his hands the right of decision of the destiny of the whole people - could not but bring prejudice to a happy solution of the entire national problem. ..." (364)

Furthermore, Trumbić declared to Regent Alexander that:

"... Because of his political conception, Pašić had a cool reception in Paris and in London. Neither Pichon nor anyone else in Paris, where he stayed for three weeks, invited him for dinner or otherwise, and [the situation is] the same in London. ..." (365)

On 10 October Pročić sent a telegram to Pašić in London, asking that "... for orientation in the Ministry [of Serbia] and in the works, it is indispensably necessary to know the results of your work with Trumbić. ..." (366) In this regard Pašić replied as follows:

"I talked with Trumbić ... We could not agree. ... With Steed I spoke at length and we quarreled intensely. He considers that we conduct an imperialistic policy; that we wish to suppress the Yugoslavs to Serbia and to dominate them; that we renounced the Corfu Declaration; ... that we want to treat future Yugoslavia as we treated Macedonia. ... We have been placed in a difficult si-

tuation, and we have to accept (predstoji nam) that they [i.e., the Allies] recognize the Yugoslav Committee as a political factor, which represents and speaks on behalf of Yugoslavia: of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, and which - in this case - would have its representative at the conference dealing with peace ..." (367)

The Yugoslav National Council in Washington, after having been informed by Trumbić⁽³⁶⁸⁾ about the situation concerning the recognition of the Yugoslav Committee and the resistance of the Serbian Government to give its consent, tried by itself to receive the acknowledgement for Yugoslavia and for itself to become like a representative of the "provisional Yugoslav Government". Professor Pupin, in his capacity as consul-general in New York, sent a despatch to Corfu on 25 September 1918. The despatch reads:

"The Yugoslav National Council in Washington intrigues, representing itself to the Government of the United States of America as a delegate of the Yugoslav people in America, demanding from the Government of the United States of America recognition of Yugoslavia with them as representatives of a provisional Yugoslav Government, from which the Serbian Government will be excluded as a factor in the Yugoslav movement ..." (369)

Professor Mihailo Pupin further asked the Serbian Government to immediately take the necessary step against "these intrigues".

The war was coming to an end and the Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs in the Monarchy still had not been recognized as an allied people; there arose here a great danger - the danger that Italy would occupy the Istrian and Dalmatian territories as enemy land. Due to this motive, Trumbić, Evans, and Steed sent a telegram to the Yugoslav National Council in Washington, asking them to work rapidly, and with all of their influence, to have the American Government send troops to occupy the conflicting territories between the South Slavs and Italy, in order to protect them from the Italian danger, since England and France could not do that being

bound by the London Treaty. With these measures, they also wanted to exclude the entrance of the Serbian troops into the Croatian territories; in other words, to exclude both interested partners from the possibility of occupation. That telegram was forwarded through the British War Mission in New York, thus avoiding censorship⁽³⁷⁰⁾ and delay of delivery by the Serbian Embassy; these were two usual practices of the Serbian Embassy. The telegram reads:

"... We urgently call on you that, without postponement, you use all the influence [you have] in order to secure the service of the American troops for the occupation of all the conflicting towns or territories in Austria-Hungary. ... Because Great Britain and France, as partners in ... the Treaty of London ... cannot intervene in this matter; the Government of the United States is not a partner and has never recognized this Treaty. The American troops would be greeted everywhere and welcomed. Fifty thousand [even] untrained soldiers would be probably sufficient. We recommend, therefore, that they occupy the main points in Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola, and in Croatia and Slavonia. It is important that neither Italian nor the Serbian troops be used, and this can be avoided only through the intimation of the United States." (371)

During an audience, Mr. William Phillips, the American Assistant Secretary of State, asked Dr. Hinko Hinković to explain him: why the Yugoslav Committee is suspicious about the Serbian occupation of our territories? Hinković answered:

"... that for certain there is proof of Great Serbian ambitions of official Serbia which would be realized by the occupation through the Serbian Army. We, Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs, said [that] we will not by any means [want] Great Serbia, that is, the hegemony of the Serbian nation on the other two, but [want] a united state with complete equality for all three nations. Great Serbia would have meant for us a bankruptcy of our ideals, a great tragedy for us and for the Serbs, it would carry in itself an origin of civil war among us and a danger of a world war." (372)

Phillips then answered Hinković that he shared his opinion.

Informing Trumbić about this audience, Gršković said that:

"... The Secretary of State ad interim Phillips heard with visible inclination our explanation and particularly the suggestion that the American troops should occupy our territory if the armistice is concluded with Austria. ... On our remark that the main difference between the views of the present Serbian Government and the Yugoslavs from Austria-Hungary lay in the fact that the former wishes a Great Serbia ..., while the latter advocates a united Yugoslavia with equal rights for all, the Secretary of State spontaneously interrupted, saying that this is also our (American) view. We explained that the Serbian Government wants to impose the monarchy and dynasty during the time of the provisional interregnum, while we wish to secure (to reserve) the absolute freedom of decision to the people themselves. We added that the sympathies of the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs for the Monarchy and dynasty are weakened to a large extent, because of the many blunders of the Serbian Government.

It seems that Phillips is extremely well informed [about the whole matter]. ... Please do not say anything important to Masaryk. You know for sure his pro-Italian inclinations." (373)

2. The Road to the Geneva Agreement and its Abandonment

The First World War was nearly over. Austria-Hungary was already in the process of dismemberment; the Italian troops were ready to enter Istria and Dalmatia, while the creation of Yugoslavia was still not accepted officially by the Allies. During those days of general hurriedness and extreme commotion, Trumbić sent a memorandum (on 11 October 1918) to Pašić who still lived in London, suggesting that he convoke a conference in Paris of all the members who signed the Corfu Declaration with - in addition - the representatives of the Montenegrin Committee, for the purpose of solving, finally, all of the conflicting points between the Committee and the Government. The conference should assemble at the latest on 25 October; otherwise the Committee would take its own steps. However, Pašić did not answer this memorandum, nor did he contact the members of the Committee. He left London and arrived in Paris on 20 October.

But once again, Trumbić did not take the radical measures he had spoken about, but directed rather once more another urgent letter to Pašić - (About this letter see Appendix V, p.318). In this letter Trumbić says that England, France, and America are ready to give the declaration by which they will recognize to the South Slavs in the Monarchy their rights as they already did recognize them to others, but they need Serbia's consent. Therefore Trumbić urges Pašić to give his "unlimited consent to the [Corfu] Declaration by which will be recognized to our people in Austria-Hungary: the right of an independence and the status of an allied nation; to the troops of volunteers the character of belligerents, and to the Yugoslav Committee the character of the representative of the national interests of our people in Austria-Hungary. ..." For, if this recognition

is not obtained, the consequences, said Trumbić, are very hard: "Our people are [a] component part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and, if the Allied troops enter it, they will enter into an enemy territory. Italy will occupy this land in the sense of the Treaty of London.^(*) It will try to capture the fleet ... The only way to prevent this terrible danger is that our people, in Austria-Hungary, are recognized as an allied nation in the name of their absolute right on independence. As an allied nation our people become a new juridical individuality ..."⁽³⁷⁴⁾ Nevertheless, Pašić did not reply to this appeal either.

In the meantime the Serbian Opposition realized that it was necessary to harmonize the relations between the Committee and the Government. Because this was impossible to achieve through Pašić, the Opposition wanted at first to reach an agreement with the Committee. They had in mind the notion of "national concentration", that is, to create a common cabinet composed of the representatives in the Serbian Government (the Radicals and the Opposition) and in the Committee, as well as the representatives of the outstanding Serbian public workers outside Parliament.

On 20 October 1918, when Pašić left London for Paris, M. Drašković and M. Trifković - on behalf of the Opposition - submitted to him a memorandum which said:

"... we, the representatives of the block of Opposition and all main workers on our national question, consider the formation of the cabinet of national concentration as essentially necessary and to be conceived without delay. We also understand this concentration as an expression of all the groups in the Parliament and as an expression of the opinion of the most prominent representatives of the national work in Serbia and [finally] as an expression of what represents the Yugoslav Committee. ..." ⁽³⁷⁵⁾

Pašić responded to this proposal with the notion of a government of coalition between the Radical Party and the block of Opposition. The

^(*) See Map no. 4.

talks in this sense began, but after three days the negotiations failed since the Opposition rejected Pašić's idea, coming back to the union of "national concentration" in a somewhat different form. But at the end, this idea was rejected too as it did not solve the main problem: the acknowledgement of the Committee as an equal factor with the Serbian Government. Trumbić, who in the meantime arrived in Paris (on 25 October) accompanied by the members of the Committee, did not want to participate in it, considering this notion as an internal Serbian matter which had no importance on the international level. So again, the Opposition returned to Pašić's original suggestion and accepted a government of coalition. Pašić then asked Protić, at Corfu, as well as Regent Alexander for their approval.

In the meantime the events in Croatia strongly influenced Pašić and the further development of the conference. On 29 October the supreme National Council in Zagreb declared the termination of all centuries-old ties with Vienna and Budapest, and the creation of a new state consisting of "Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs", with all of the state sovereignty being transferred to the National Council. The new state "SHS" (Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba) comprised all the South Slavic countries in the Monarchy: the Triune Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Istria, Slovenia and Vojvodina. Dr. Antun Korošec, a Slovenian priest and public worker, was elected president of this Council. On 31 October the Council directed an official note in French to the Governments of England, France, Italy, America, and Serbia, on behalf of the new constituted state. The note reads:

"The state of Slovenians, Croatians, and Serbs, constituted on the territory of the Southern Slavs, which until now belonged to the framework of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, ... officially declares that it does not remain in a state of war with the Allied states; ... that the navy which until the present time was in possession of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, is from today on in the hands of the National Council of Slovenians, Croatians, and Serbs. It [i.e., the navy] displays the national Croatian flag." (376)

Furthermore, in its note dated 1 November 1918, the Council informed the Committee "... that it authorized the Yugoslav Committee in London to represent the interests of the State of Slovenians-Croatians-and Serbs by other states,"⁽³⁷⁷⁾ as well as by the Serbian Government.

On 2 November Pašić received permission from Regent Alexander for the idea of forming a government of coalition.⁽³⁷⁸⁾ A few days later, when Drašković and Trifković came to Pašić asking him whether the permission had arrived, Pašić answered that a positive reply was under way asking, on his side, that the question of a government of coalition should be solved not here, in Paris, but in Skopje (Macedonia) where the Serbian Narodna Skupština (Parliament) would be convoked, and that for this he needed about three weeks time.

Drašković made threats in the name of the Opposition and - as Pašić reported to Regent Alexander - stated as follows:

"Events do not wait; they evolve with such speed demanding that this question has to be solved in the shortest possible time. If we were to wait until Parliament convokes, it will be too long, it would need a minimum of 20 days, and perhaps more. ... If the matter is postponed, and if the Yugoslav Committee is separated from the Government because it has not been recognized by the Serbian Government, and if it [the Committee] has declared itself against us and the attitude of the Serbian Government and against its politics - then we will join the Yugoslav Committee, and it seems to me, they said, they will form a committee which will work against the Serbian Government and [but] with the Yugoslav Committee." (379)

Pašić yielded and on that same day he composed a cabinet of coalition in Paris, soliciting Alexander's consent.

In the meantime, on 3 and 4 November 1918 the Great Powers accepted Austria-Hungary's proposal of armistice which was thus signed. Through this act the South Slavic "cause" failed, but because of official Serbia the Croatian and Slovenian countries were now juridically considered as inimical territories of the Habsburg Monarchy. Now Serbia wanted "to liberate" them with Allied troops, particularly the Italians. In addition the Serbian Ambassador, Vesnić, accepted, at Versailles, the following points about which Trumbić was informed and which later Vesnić could not deny. These points were that: 1) the Italians occupy the Croatian and Slovenian countries assigned to her by the Treaty of London; 2) the Allies (Italy) take all the mercantile marine - thus also the Croatian fleet - which before was under the Austrian flag, even though the entire fleet was officially in the hands of the National Council. Thus the latter notified, on 31 October, the Allied governments about this change, who required that all vessels had to reach Corfu under the white flag and surrender there; 3) the Allied Powers had the right to occupy the railways and, if necessary, any other point in the Southern Slavic countries, namely Rijeka (Fiume), Pula (Pola), and Trst (Trieste). Trumbić protested vehemently against Pašić's policies and the sordid attitude of Vesnić, who happened to come to Paris from Versailles. Therefore, Trumbić now directed an appeal to the Serbian Opposition, asking that at least now they work together in order to reach the acknowledgement of creating Yugoslavia and not a Great Serbia.

The battle was now lost, leaving the dominant question between the

Committee and the Government of "union" and "creation of a common government".

Consistent with his conception of the state, Pašić now asked that only one government be formed which would represent internationally all the South Slavic countries; but this government, according to him, would have a Serbian leadership, i.e., headed by himself. He also proposed only one War Cabinet with a Serbian Minister as chairman, to which would belong an "advisory body" composed of the persons "from across", i.e., from across the rivers Drina and Sava, the boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, in other words, from Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs of the former Habsburg Monarchy.

Contrary to this proposition, Trumbić's desire ⁽³⁸⁰⁾ was now primarily to obtain the acknowledgement of the National Council in Zagreb and the new state of the "SHS", and no longer the recognition of the Yugoslav Committee, since the latter was now already authorized by the Council to represent it and the new state. As a result the Committee lost its original character of representative and interpreter of the national wishes in the former Dual Monarchy. Trumbić agreed with the notion that there should be one common foreign policy which, however, did not have to be exclusively Serbian. His idea was that the National Council must not give the power in the country to Belgrade until internal relations were resolved by the constitution, meaning that this state power in Zagreb had to remain in Zagreb and become the factor in solving the external and internal problems.

On 9 November 1918 the vice-president, Protić, reported from Corfu to Regent Alexander in Salonica. Protić said that Trumbić:

"... rejected the proposal that the Yugoslavs also enter the Government of coalition, but that he wants the Yugoslav Committee to remain independent from the Government. He [Trumbić] proposes that the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee - as two equal and independent factors - delegate [each] two members into one common committee which will lead the foreign policies also of Serbia and Yugoslavia. The Opposition has agreed with him and does not want to enter the government. Therefore, Pašić and the present government do not agree in this with the Yugoslav Committee. ..." (381)

At the end of October Dr. Antun Korošec, the President of the National Council in Zagreb; Dr. Melko Čingrija, and Dr. Gregor Žerjav, the "secretary and soul" of the war-years politics of the "Yugoslav Club" in the Vienna Parliament; went abroad in order to obtain correct information regarding the situation. However, they did not have the mandate from the Council to undertake independent actions or to make agreements, but had a mandate from the "Yugoslav Club" which cooperated closely with the Council. They left with Austrian passports since, at that time, no separation had been proclaimed from the Monarchy of the Southern Slavs. Upon arriving in Geneva, Korošec at once sent a message to Trumbić and Pašić, announcing his visit there and asking them to inform him about the situation and requested that they should also come to Geneva. Trumbić could not come immediately, but did arrive after a few days, at which time he reported to Korošec the difficult conflicts with the Serbian Government. Trumbić suggested to Korošec what he should do in the meantime. Meanwhile, Pašić was ill and could not join in the discussions.

On 3 November Korošec and his colleagues decided to send a memorandum to the governments of the Allied Powers asking for recognition on behalf of the National Council in Zagreb. The recognition wanted:

- a) to acknowledge the "Government" of the National Council in Zagreb as the regular government of the Slovenians, Croatians, and Serbs in

former Austria-Hungary;

b) to acknowledge the Yugoslav people in the former Monarchy as an allied nation;

c) to acknowledge the Yugoslav volunteers as a belligerent side;

with the restriction that the aim of this government was the union with Serbia and Montenegro in one state, on the basis of the principle of nationality and the right of the people's self-determination. In this note was also expressed the sentiment that Korošec and his colleagues went abroad with the purpose

"... of creating one common and united organ for the whole Yugoslav nation to which will be given the duty of diplomatic action. ... Until this organ is created, we give the mandate to Dr. Ante Trumbić, as president of the Yugoslav Committee in London, to represent the Yugoslav National Council in Zagreb with the Allied governments and the Government of the United States, and particularly at the conference for an armistice [in Versailles]. ..." (382)

On 4 November Trumbić informed Pichon, Balfour, Sonnino, and Colonel Edward Mandel House, Wilson's advisor, of this appointment, demanding, thus, that the representatives of the Great Powers acknowledge this fact and that they permit him to participate at the conferences. Colonel House answered the letter immediately, expressing his regret to Trumbić that the letter arrived too late; for the Allied Powers

"... already held the final session (before noon) and before he received Trumbić's letter, while in the afternoon the plenary session will only be of a ceremonial nature. For this reason, unfortunately, it is impossible to fulfill Trumbić's request. ..." (383)

Pašić arrived in Geneva on 5 November with the members of the Opposition as well as Trumbić accompanied by the members of the Committee. After consulting with Trumbić, Dr. Korošec and his colleagues visited Pašić who brought out his program which stated that: (384)

- 1) Serbia should represent all of the people concerning external affairs;
- 2) The National Council in Zagreb appoints delegates to a commission for external matters which will be formed by the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since its members will be composed of the "Yugoslavs" and Serbs, and they will be an advisory body for foreign matters.

This commission will also prepare the material for the peace conference. But Trumbić wanted before anything else recognition from Serbia, and only when Serbia officially undertook the steps required by the Allied Powers, would he be ready to consider the second point dealing with the internal arrangement. Trumbić adhered firmly to this point.

The conference in Geneva was officially opened on 6 November and held at the Hotel "National", lasting until 9 November.⁽³⁸⁵⁾ On behalf of the Serbian side participated: Pašić - in the name of the Serbian Government; Drašković, Trifković, and Marinković - on behalf of the Serbian Opposition; for the National Council in Zagreb: Korošec, Žerjav, and Čingrija; for the Yugoslav Committee: Trumbić, Gregorin, and Vasiljević, and from 8 November also Jovo Banjanin and N. Stojanović. The agenda of the conference included:⁽³⁸⁶⁾

- 1) Recognition of the National Council in Zagreb as the representative and the government of Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs in the former Monarchy;
- 2) Creation of the common organs of the state of "SHS";
- 3) Protest against the occupation of our territories from the side of the Italian troops;
- 4) Relations with Montenegro.

Pašić' spoke first and proposed the idea of the creation of a coalition government, as he had previously advocated in Paris, and of a commission for external matters. Korošec expressed the necessity of international recognition of the Croats, Slovenians, and Serbs in former Austria-Hungary, and for this reason it was at first indispensable to recognize the National Council in Zagreb. Pašić' also favoured this idea, for, as he said, the Council is a real representative of this people while the Committee is not. But the real reason for his new attitude was a completely different reason as will be evident later.

Drašković' presented the proposal of creating a common government as suggested in Paris shortly before leaving for Geneva; while Marinković stressed the necessity of proclaiming the common state, that is, the "union" of the "SHS" with Serbia, not waiting for the peace conference which would simply put before a fait accompli. Pašić's proposal concerning one common organ for leading the foreign politics - an organ which would later also have the character of a central government - was accepted by Trumbić' under the condition that both sides, the Serbian Government in Belgrade and the National Council in Zagreb, would preserve their own hitherto functions. Drašković' protested energetically against this idea, giving his counter-proposal of forming a single common government consisting of 17 members for Serbia and the state of "SHS", which would govern with the entire united country and replace the present governments in Belgrade for Serbia and in Zagreb for the "SHS".

Thus, while Pašić's and Trumbić's suggestions carried in themselves wishes for the preservation of the national division and coincided with each other, Drašković's suggestion sustained a radical move in the

"solution" of the national problem. Pašić, who primarily agreed with Drašković's idea in principle, now rejected it. Madame Paulova stated that Milorad Drašković informed her on 12 February 1921 regarding this affair as follows. "Mr. Pašić gave me his word in Paris before our departure to Geneva, that he accepts my proposal. But he desisted [from it] in Geneva." On the question, what attitude did the Committee take, Drašković replied, said Paulova: "Trumbić kept silent and then Pašić said that it (the plan) cannot be accepted." (387) Regarding this, Trumbić said a day later that Drašković's notion was "too early" because it evidenced in itself the conception of centralism,

"... which for the Serbs is a natural thing, while for the Austrian Slavs it could easily bring about a reaction because of it and for this, it is necessary to go out of the way. Therefore, he suggested that for the first time 'let us be satisfied with less', that is, with a common organ (the Government) for external and common matters." (388)

In the middle of the Geneva conference France decided to submit Pašić to pressure. On 7 November Vesnić sent a telegram from Paris. The telegram reads:

"Today I met the President of the Republic and our more important friends. His sincere and vivid wish is that the entire Yugoslav people manifest themselves as one soul, without any and the smallest division. More than ever, our vital interests now demand this." (389)

One day later Professor Seton-Watson sent to Trumbić the following characteristic communication through the British Ambassador in Geneva, Mr. Edwards:

"1. L[loyd-]George and Balfour, leaving Paris, send word that we stand up and create one front so that we may strengthen their position in our matter. The same communicates Clemenceau: also Orlando wishes it, in order to be stronger in regard to Sonnino. (*)

(*) For Orlando's double dealing see Steed's account in Appendix VII, p. 323.

2. As a final combination of the common stand of the Yugoslavs in Paris, a possibility of one common ministry was proposed with 8 [members from] the SHS and 8 from Serbia; from this ministry one war-cabinet would be composed, but Pašić should not be a member because he is not trusted.
3. L[loyd-]George said, we will recognize such a cabinet and it will have representation at the negotiations of peace as the Czechs [have]. ..." (390)

Besides Seton-Watson's telegram, Steed also sent one to Trumbić through E. Lagarde, the Director of the French Bureau in Geneva. That telegram reads as follows:

"... it is necessary to hurry with the formation of the new Serbo-Yugoslav government. All in Paris - including the French and American representatives - impatiently expect news about that ... In the USA the National Council has already directed a manifest where ... they reject the monarchical solution outlined in the Corfu Declaration and declare the termination of all relations with Pašić. ..." (391)

All of these events and mainly the pressure from France in which Serbia now placed its trust - after the fall of czarist Russia - caused Pašić to yield. On 8 November 1918 Pašić officially sent a note to Korošec. The note said:

"... I have the honour of informing you that I received the decision (resolution) which you submitted with your letter of 3 November 1918 ... On behalf of the Royal Serbian Government, I have the honour of informing you that it [the Royal Serbian Government] recognizes the National Council in Zagreb as the lawful government of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, who live on the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that I forwarded today the notice to the governments of France, England, Italy, and the Northern United States of America, asking them that they also recognize - from their side - the National Council in Zagreb as the lawful government of the Yugoslav countries of the former Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, as well as that they acknowledge the troops of volunteers of these countries as having the character of a belligerent party. ... At the same time the Royal Government acknowledges [the fact] that the National Council entrusted Mr. Trumbić, President of the Yugoslav Committee in London, with a mandate to represent it by the Allies during such time until a common organ for diplomatic action is created. ... The Serbian Royal Government acknowledges the declaration of the National Council in Zagreb by which it considers that its

aims is to liberate the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians from the former Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, from every foreign domination, and that it unites them with their brothers from the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro in one united and independent state. ..." (392)

On 8 November all Serbian Embassies were instructed to make with the governments to which they were accredited, arrangements for this recognition on their side. Following the positive solution of recognition, Trumbić composed a proposal which - after some minor changes - was accepted and signed on 9 November, thus becoming the official text of the "Geneva Declaration", as well as the final act of the conference - the protocol. The text of the Declaration reads as follows:

"With the common effort of the Allied peoples and the United States of Northern America, with the power of the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians, all tyrannical barriers to their union are broken on the battlefields and on the sea. The representatives of the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Parliamentary political groups, the representatives of the National Council in Zagreb, [and] the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee in London, gathered in Geneva, the town of liberty, [where] they are happy that with one agreement they can affirm solemnly and before the entire world their union in the state of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians. Undoubtedly, the people of Montenegro, to whom our brotherly embrace is open, will hasten to greet and to join this act, which was all the time their highest ideal. ...

In all the external manifestations of rights, might, and will, this state community will represent a common ministry of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians through regular organs, created for this [purpose] ... [Also] the composition of the government was announced. Later on the further sphere of action of its work will be communicated, for ... the Government of Serbia and the National Council in Zagreb will continue to function, each in its own internal juridical and territorial sphere, in a regular way as it exists, until the General [Constitutional] Assembly of the united Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians (Konstituanta) is elected through the universal, equal, direct, and secret voting of all the citizens, with the constitution describing a definite arrangement of the state. This constitution will be the basis of all state life, the "fountain and mouth of the river" of all powers and rights, and through it all state life will be governed in a democratic spirit. The state boundaries against the neighbouring nations will be drawn by the principle of national rights and rights of self-determination of each people. In the unbroken trust and faith of our people in their right, principles of justice declared by our Allies, accepted by the public consciousness

of all the enlightened peoples - [there] lays the guarantee for it. Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians! - Our centuries-old dream is reality. We are united in freedom. Let us celebrate these great days ..." (393)

The conclusions of the conference signified a type of compromise. The "common"- or central - government" was created and consisted of 12 portfolios, and not of a "common cabinet" as Pašić had suggested. The Serbian Government and the National Council appointed its members, while one place was left for Montenegro. This "central government" had to constitute itself independently, that is, its members had to freely choose the president and divide the portfolios among themselves; they also had to solve the problem of who would conduct the foreign policy of the new common state. It was decided that its headquarters should be outside the state - in Paris. According to the Geneva agreement, this central government would have authority over: foreign policy, the navy, the matters of the Constitutional Assembly, and of economic-financial nature - (transportation, national economics, social politics, and common finances). The members of the common government, appointed by the Serbian Government, had to take an oath of allegiance to King Peter, while the members of the National Council had to take an oath of allegiance to its president.

The main characteristic of the Geneva agreement was that - besides the central government - there also existed the government in Belgrade and the Council in Zagreb. In Geneva practically three governments were created; each would retain de facto its power and would continue in the same manner of governing as before in its respective territory, and each would have its own function until the Constitutional Assembly created a common constitution through a vote.

The basis of this agreement was the creation of a "central government"

from then on, representing the state of "Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians" in regard to the rest of the world. Because this government had the exclusive competence of conducting foreign policy, it also represented exclusively the state in its international diplomacy as a "common sovereignty". However, this was only an appearance regarding external affairs since the common representation, or "central government", concerning internal affairs had not yet been created. De facto still remained two sovereignties: the Kingdom of Serbia and "the Kingdom" of SHS: "Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca" in former Austria-Hungary, also since two separate oaths of allegiance existed, but both parts were under one king. This was the fundamental weakness of the Geneva agreement as well as the point that the vice-president of the Serbian Government, Stevan Protić, destroyed it as soon as the agreement was signed and the Serbian Government was informed.

When the Geneva Declaration was proclaimed, Professor Seton-Watson welcomed it because, firstly, it was an important step in the process of forming the common Yugoslav state; secondly, it contained the "element of federation", indicating that the state would not be constituted centralistically; thirdly, it left to the constitutional Assembly the task of making the final decision about the future internal arrangement. (394)

On 9 November Pašić notified Protić and the other members of the Government about the results of the negotiations in Geneva. From the beginning Protić and the other members in the cabinet accepted the conclusion that:

"... The solution on which you agreed, by the proposal of Trumbić, ... also I and the other colleagues accepted, not because it is good by itself, but because you could not agree on anything better, since it [the union] is more dear to us in this form than in no form, ..." (395)

Therefore, with both sides having agreed, one could now expect better relations would proceed smoothly, but this was not to be the case. When the time came for a practical solution of the problems in connection with the formation of the "common government", the old conflicts came to life: Pašić wanted to continue as chairman of the Serbian Government as well as minister of foreign affairs in the "common government". Trumbić firmly opposed this, explaining that this would mean, de facto, the continuation of the old Serbian policies, and advised, therefore, the members of the National Council not to give their consent to it. The conflict was solved by the rule that the chiefs of the Serbian political parties on one side and the chief of the Yugoslav Committee on the other side could not enter the "central government". After long negotiations, it was decided that the "common government" should be composed, on the Serbian side, by: Ljuba Davidović, M. Gavrilović, and D. Pavlović; and on the side of the National Council by: Janko Brejc, Dr. M. Čingrija, and Dušan Vasiljević. The other positions would be occupied later. (396)

After that Pašić left Geneva and returned to Paris, where he arrived on 11 November, and sent a despatch to Corfu informing the members of the Government about the creation of the "common government", as well as who would compose it. On 12 November Pašić received a telegram from Protić who informed him of his resignation; after that Pašić dismissed the whole Cabinet. On 13 Dr. Korošec and the members of the Committee arrived in Paris, where they went to Minister Pichon and asked him for recognition. But Pichon told them that he had met Pašić and Vesnić, just before, and that they informed him that the whole Geneva agreement "has come into question" - (mis en cause) - signifying that the agreement has failed. (397)

Protić's sudden shift was basically brought about by two reasons. Firstly, Pašić's information came from Paris, where he said that the "common government" had to constitute itself, namely to choose among themselves the foreign minister; that the oaths of allegiance had to be given separately - to the King and to the President of the National Council - and that the heads of the political parties could not enter this "common government", meaning that Pašić would not be among them. Secondly, Protić hoped for a better solution for Serbian interests than specified in the Geneva agreement. In fact, Dr. Tresić-Pavičić came to Corfu with his colleagues in regard to the fleet which had to navigate under a white flag and which had to surrender there to the Allied Powers. Tresić-Pavičić spoke with Protić, expressing his admiration for Serbia and also telling him, "... that Korošec is in Zagreb in the provisional government but without any great significance and that the whole power is de facto in the hands of Svetozar Privićević and Dušan Popović, [the Serbs from Croatia], of the [Croatian-Serbian] Coalition and their followers." (398)

"... When I sent you a telegram yesterday by which I gave my consent upon Trumbić's proposal about the common ministry, I thought that From the despatch which arrived tonight, I see, [however] that I was wrong. ... We find ... improper that the ministers, besides our King - who is our common King, have yet to make an oath to someone [else]. Therefore, I have to tell you that we resolutely reject such combinations and request that you accept our resignations, ... Please ... permit us to express to you our opinion that in such a situation, also, for you there is no more place in such a government, since it is obvious that through this way it has been expressing distrust of you. ..." (399)

However, Protić's real meaning can be seen more clearly from his next telegram to Pašić:

"Even though we are resigning, I consider [it] my friendly duty to tell you how we see our political situation here. ... we have to come into direct contact with them [i.e., with the National Council, where Svetozar Pribićević and Dušan Popović have de facto power

in their hands]. Hence, we do not want Trumbić to be mediator, nor those two [Dr. Korošec and Dr. Čingrija] who came to Geneva. The Yugoslav Committee no longer exists for us as an independent factor. We have reason to believe that there are those in Zagreb who do not think like Trumbić, ..."

Hereafter, Protić recommended to Pašić what for him was opportune, saying:

"... it is necessary to convene the Opposition by this [present] composition of the coalition cabinet, which you fixed together and to which the Crown and we agreed, and then with them you should go from here [Paris] to Skopje, where it will be essential at once to convoke the Parliament. From there or from Belgrade, it is requisite to get in contact (dogovoriti se) with Zagreb and Sarajevo, ... [But] if the representatives of the Opposition do not accept that, it is necessary that you return alone [to Serbia], and submit to the Crown the cabinet question with this proposal: If the Crown agrees with our work, then it should authorize to address an appeal to the people, and thereafter to act according to the result. ... In the contrary case, it is unavoidable to see back and leave it; the Crown and the Opposition should then look for the solution. We are decisively against the way in which the matters were directed in Geneva, and will fight against them with all the power, ..." (400)

Pašić answered on 13 November, explaining why he consented to the Geneva agreement. In this significant telegram Pašić stated: "... I considered that it is wiser and more proper to accept the solution which does not correspond with our feeling and views, than not to agree with and part on two different ways and [so] create the break and split, ..."; while in connection with the "common ministry" or the "central government", Pašić said to Protić that "in the worst case all this would have ceased after the conclusion of peace, which would be soon, ..." (401) From this document it is evident how far the idea of equality and justice for all stood in Serbian political thought.

On 16 November Pašić formed a new coalition cabinet with a greater number of ministerial portfolios. That same day he sent a proposal to Regent Alexander to form one more "concentrated ministry" and to cancel the Geneva "common-or-central government", which would take its place so

that the Allies could say that the Geneva "central government" was replaced with the new "concentrated ministry", and not that it was abrogated. We can see from Pašić's following proposal, which he sent to Protic' on 18 November, the way in which he envisaged the composition of this "concentrated ministry":

"It would be useful to work on this, that the National Council in Zagreb, in agreement with the National Council in Sarajevo and Ljubljana, appoints the candidates able to enter our concentrated ministry. In my opinion, it would be opportune to take the candidates from each country and these, the most capable men. I consider that the National Council in Zagreb should candidate three of its delegates: from Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia. The Council in Sarajevo should candidate two delegates, one Orthodox and one Moslem. The Council in Ljubljana should candidate two, of whom one has to be an expert of those settlements from the ethnographic point of view. Vojvodina should candidate one. In this way eight more members would still enter the cabinet, and thus a composed concentrated cabinet would represent all of our trinamed people. It would lead our national foreign politics as well as our internal politics until the Constitutional Assembly [is created], and after we will proceed in a regular manner. Try to contact these councils. ..."(402)

The basis of this proposal was that: Serbia alone should remain the only internationally recognized factor before the external world, and following the entrance of the members of the SHS of former Austria-Hungary in this new ministry, Serbia would then easily extend its power throughout the entire South Slavic territories. However, this move would be impossible to realize if the National Council in Zagreb would stand on an equal level with the Serbian Government in the international diplomatic field.

Pašić did not inform Trumbić, Korošec, and Čingrija until 18 November of the "answer" from Corfu, in which it was declared that the agreements reached in Geneva were not sanctioned by the Government, which meant that the Regent had not approved them, and thus for this reason, as Pašić said, he resigned from the Cabinet. The members and delegates from the

Yugoslav Committee were somehow desperate because of their futile endeavours in these last efforts. Trumbić's understanding of those times can be seen from the following report which he sent one day later (19 November) to Dr. Mičić in London. This report reads:

"... We are not pleased with the change in policy of Mr. Pašić, nor with the political constellation of Serbia, since with it Pašić's power is being prolonged and strengthened, and we are not pleased with his management of the Yugoslav politics [which comes more and more under his influence]; this is something fatal. Unfortunately, the Allies also will not grant the Yugoslavs the right of an ally until the armistice is signed. We still adhere to the view that this right of alliance is [to be] acknowledged to the SHS from the former Monarchy; to their volunteers the right of belligerence; to their Council in Zagreb the right of government, and we ask that in the preliminary and definitive negotiations for peace this Council has to be represented through its delegate. ... In a few words, we will energetically defend the standpoint of President Wilson [made] in the latest reply to Austria-Hungary, that is, that the Yugoslavs have the right of self-determination and that no one has the right to work out their destiny without them. ..." (403)

On the same day Trumbić extensively reported to the Yugoslav National Council in Washington, saying among other things that:

"... Since the month of June we have energetically worked so that our people, like the Czechs, have ceased to be treated as a part of Austria-Hungary and are recognized as an ally. ... Mr. Pašić has not agreed with our action, ... He has not even considered seriously the formation of a united government in Serbia, not to speak of the creation of a common Yugoslav government. Pašić has tried all of the time to have the Serbian Government remain master of the situation; in other words, he has worked at having all of the power remain in his hands and [those of] his colleagues. It sees, from all events, that Pašić does not want to come into conflict with Italy, since he has been continuously emphasizing the correction of the boundaries against Bulgaria. Because one may see [that] what Italy wants [is the realization of the Treaty of London] on the Adriatic Sea; the attitude of Pašić has alarmed us so much that in no way we can permit that he disposes of our destiny. Pašić's tendency is that with his [associates] he represents Serbia on the [peace] congress ... and at the same time also all our other countries. ...

Mr. Pašić has already mentioned in Geneva that we may not be able to save the islands and Istria from the Italians. ..." (404)

Hoping to emerge somehow from this crisis, Trumbić, Korošec, and Čingrija visited Vesnić (on 26 November 1918) and tried to find a solution. Vesnić answered them, according to the report which he sent the next day, that he saw two possibilities: "either to create here [in Paris] an agreement with all the competent factors and a complete government, ...; or, if this would not be possible [then] to leave it to the Crown to form a government ... from the men from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and-so-on ..."(405) Contrary to this Pašić proposed the following to Trumbić and his colleagues: either that the members of the National Council enter the Serbian Cabinet - (Pašić's idea of a concentrated Cabinet), or that they form one special committee with the candidates of the Serbian Government and the National Council, which would put itself into the service of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War, and would function as an "advisory body".

On 22 November a new crisis arose in the newly formed coalition government of Serbia. Drašković declared that the Opposition would enter the new Cabinet with a view to aiding the realization of the Geneva agreement⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾ and not of destroying it. At the end the Opposition split; Vojislav Marković and Marko Trifković joined Pašić, while Drašković left the Cabinet.

"Our connections with the homeland [i.e., Zagreb] are very difficult, if not impossible," said Trumbić to Mičić in his report dated 19 November 1918.⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾ It was difficult in these times to influence the stream of events and the conduct of policy which lay in the hands of Svetozar Pribićević and Dušan Popović. At the conference of the National Council in Zagreb, held on 23 November, Svetozar Pribićević stated the fact that

"... our delegates abroad [i.e., Dr. Korošec and the colleagues] have no right to make binding agreements with the Entente Powers on behalf of the National Council of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians in Zagreb. They only have the right to inform themselves about the external situation." (408)

The Serbian Government was informed at once about this, namely that the National Council had not given the mandate to Korošec to negotiate for the composition of the government. This telegram came via Protić in Paris on 26 November, strengthening Pašić's position very much. Dr. Čingrija gave a statement in his name and also on behalf of his colleagues, declaring that they do not ask any more questions in regard to the Geneva agreement, (409) because it is superfluous to do so, as well as the statement that they stretched the given authority in good faith, even though juridically they did not have the necessary permission to do so. Thus the Geneva agreement was dissolved, while the weight of the decision now passed to Zagreb and Belgrade.

On 27 November Trumbić received a telegram from Dr. Ivan Gmajer, a public worker at the Geneva-branch of the Yugoslav Committee, sent from Zagreb through Mr. Turić in Zürich, that he immediately come to Zagreb, stating that a "proper way" would be found of reaching Zagreb. The delegates of the National Council - among which also he was chosen - would leave Zagreb on 27 November for Belgrade in order to

"conduct through the fusion with Serbia under the united government and with [Regent] Alexander as chief. ..." (410)

However, it was too late to undertake anything to stop this step in time. At the end, we can say that the Geneva agreement established the foundation for a federal state of Yugoslavia,

"... which would assure full equality of the Croats and other Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs with the Serbs. Had the Serbian Government stuck to the bargain, most of the subsequent difficulties of Yugoslavia would have been avoided, and the Croatian problem would not have arisen at all." (411)

Since there have been long standing, essential differences between these two peoples, one may raise the question: was the search for political union between Croats and Serbs at all conceivable in the first place ? Finally it can be said that after more than fifty years since the creation of Yugoslavia, the problem of Croatia still remains unsolved, as one can discern from the current political situation (1971/72). This was also recently stated by a leading member of the well-known cultural institution, "Matica Hrvatska" in Zagreb, who said to the Vienna correspondent of the "Journal de Genève":

...we certainly are for the Yugoslav union, but this union can exist only if there is justice in relations between Serbs and Croats. Otherwise, this man said, one will have to consider another solution. And he added: "Before Yugoslavia, there is Croatia".

(... "nous sommes naturellement pour l'unité yougoslave, mais que cette unité ne saurait exister que si justice existe dans les relations entre Serbes et Croates. Si non, précisait cet homme, il faudra considérer une autre solution. Et il ajoutait: 'avant la Yougoslavie, il y a la Croatie'."

[Source: Hartig, Henri: "'Avant la Yougoslavie, il y a la Croatie,' dit-on à Zagreb." In: "Journal de Genève" (December 1, 1971)]

CONCLUSION

Throughout the previous pages it has been seen that from the time of the Agreement between Austria and Hungary, in 1867, until the outbreak of the First World War, the Croatian politicians were consistently confronted with two main problems. These problems were: how to achieve the national unification of all Croatian countries and how to secure financial independence from Hungary. In solving these problems there were in essence two possibilities: either to "play-off" Budapest against Vienna or for Croatia to rely on its own strength. However, Croatian power was too weak and divided among the opposing political parties to accomplish the difficult task of national union alone, as Austria and Hungary were both against it, thus causing a spirit of political radicalism among some politicians in the South of the Monarchy. In order to realize these just aims, a radical deviation from the established policy was bound to occur sooner or later. And this was exactly what happened.

Due to the differences in the conditions and interests among South Slavs as a whole, two opposing political conceptions developed regarding the creation of the common state. One sought the solution among the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary within the Monarchy, envisaging Croatia and Zagreb as their political and cultural gravity-center; while the second sought the solution among the leading politicians in the kingdom of Serbia with Belgrade as a gravity-center.

It is also true that the "Yugoslav idea" was conceived by some Croatian intellectuals a considerable time before. According to the understanding of the advocates of this idea, the new state should be organized either on a federalistic or a centralistic basis, but in both

cases the principle of full equality for all nations involved had to be preserved. There were a number of reasons why these intellectuals did not accept the idea of solving the national question of Croatia "within" the Monarchy but sought to solve it "out of" the Monarchy. It may be stated that the main reasons for this radical deviation were - no doubt - : the stubborn refusal of the repeated wishes and petitions for the union of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia on the part of Vienna and Budapest, and the recognition that Croatia - with its own power - could not liberate itself from the oppression and economic exploitation, particularly from Hungary, but only with the help of other Slavic nations. The other reasons also contributed to it. They were: the Pan Slavonic movement and the romantic dream of "union" of the Slavs; the erroneous belief that modern nations are built on the basis of linguistic similarities; and the presence of a large Orthodox population in the Croatian countries, who - under propaganda from Serbia - began to see themselves as Serbs.

Thus, to those intellectuals and also to some politicians, the "Yugoslav idea" was a possibility for "shaking off" the much-hated foreign oppression, and not critically questioning this idea; while the Serbs saw in it a rare opportunity for expanding their territories. The victory in the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913 only helped Serbia's prestige in their eyes.

At the time of the outbreak of the war in 1914, there were already two clearly formed political, opposing streams in Croatia: the "Pure" or "Croatian Party of Right" (Frankists) who hoped to solve the political and economic problems of Croatia within the Habsburg Monarchy through the idea of trialism; and the "Croatian-Serbian Coalition", the party in governmental power before and during the war-years, which secretly sought

a complete merging of Croatia with Serbia without restrictions and favoured the centralistic arrangement of the new state. The third political stream was Starčević's "Party of Right" (Milinovci), which also vacillated between the previous, but was strongly in favour of the preservation of Croatian national individuality.

When the First World War began, Frano Supilo, Dr. Ante Trumbić, and other politicians were in Italy. Thus, the pre-war political advocates from Dalmatia (particularly Supilo) of the union between the South Slavs in the Monarchy with Serbia, even though on an equal level for all of the components of the future new state, took over the "helm of Croatia" and started to work with the Serbian Government. While living in Italy, they formed the Yugoslav Committee which, however, officially constituted itself in Paris on 30 April 1915 with its headquarters in London. Its complex goals were: (1) the creation of the inner union among the three nations - Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia - a union which had not yet existed; (2) the struggle for the annihilation of the Habsburg Monarchy and liberation of the South Slavs - an idea which the Entente Powers were not ready to accept until the spring of 1918; and (3) the undertaking for the foundation of the new state.

The Committee based its aims upon an assumption which proved to be too short: namely, that Croatians, Slovenians, and Serbs were one, "tri-named people". The basis of this notion was linguistico-ethnological similarities, omitting the essential differences, namely, the historico-cultural and state-juridical differences, which were of a more permanent nature than the already-mentioned similarities of language or ethos.

While the Yugoslav Committee adhered to its conception of the principle

of nationality, or national self-determination; the principle of equality, or equal union; and the principle of national pluralism, by which - according to its understanding - the Committee wanted to form a new state; the Serbian Government, on the contrary, followed, regardless of its pro forma saying, the conception of "liberation in stages" of the South Slavs gathered around Serbia which, in other words, meant annexation of the non-Serbian countries to Serbia; the principle of compensation (for example the case of Macedonia) and war-merits; and the principle of unitarism and centralism. And because both sides did not deviate from their own conception, the struggle between the Committee and the Serbian Government was thus inevitable.

Convinced of the insincerity of the Serbian Government's policy regarding the question of the arrangement of the future new state and the question of equal union among all its people, and hoping to secure the integrity of Croatian lands from being dismembered between Italy, Serbia, and Hungary, Supilo - the leading spirit of the Committee - therefore started to pressure Trumbić, demanding that he draw the conclusion from such a policy. Knowing that he would not be able to work through this program - because of the present composition of the Committee in which Pašić had his people among the Serbian members - Supilo suggested that Trumbić create a new committee, namely a Croatian committee. The proposition was rejected. Not having the majority support in the Committee, and wanting to avoid a split in it as well as in the public opinion of the emigrés, Supilo left the Committee at the end of May 1916.

Supilo's conception of union became particularly important in the period after his departure, for he was now completely free in his poli-

tical actions. From this period his letter to Sazonov of 2 July 1916 was essential. In it Supilo expressed the idea of an alternative to Russian diplomacy, that is, that the South Slavs in the Monarchy ought to decide whether they want to align themselves with Croatia or with Serbia. He considered that in this case all lands, except Bačka and Banat, would vote for Zagreb. The outcome was as follows: Croatians, Slovenians, and Moslems on one side; Serbs on the other; both groups being about equal in numerical strength (6.5 million). Supilo thought that the "union and fusion" of the South Slavs could be achieved only "on the grounds of just and modern criteria;" otherwise deviant powers would become manifest among them.

To British diplomacy, his memorandum to Grey - ("The Basic Criterion and the Principles ...") - expressed another idea, the idea of division of the future state into four compact zones: the zone of Serbian-Orthodox majority; the zone of Croatian-western majority; the Slovenian zone; and the Bosnian-Herzegovinian zone. This corresponded to the idea of a federation.

From these two memoranda to Sazonov and Grey, it may be said that Supilo's central idea was: either Croatians and Slovenians will be united on a real basis of equality with Serbia, or, if this is not possible, they will create their independent state - with Zagreb as the cultural and political center of the South Slavs - out of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Supilo tried in vain to eliminate the Italian "veto" for the creation of the Yugoslav state, as Sonnino did not want to accept the idea of union and the Italo-Yugoslav agreement on the basis of an "Adriatic compromise".

Supilo was also concerned about the secret abandonment of the idea of liberation of the Central European Slavs from the side of Russia, which she proclaimed at the beginning of the war, for Supilo believed that Stürmer's Government in Petersburg was secretly working on a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. This meant that the Slavs of western culture were abandoned to Germano-Hungarian domination.

In addition, the idea of separation of Austria-Hungary from Germany was unwelcome to Supilo, because giving eventual autonomies to the Slavs in the Monarchy would not have solved the "Croatian problem" on the one hand; and on the other hand, in this case, the South Slavs would not have become a "bulwark" against further eastward expansion of Germany in the future, but would remain longer in her service.

Expressing these views to Bissolati (in a letter of 18 December 1916), Supilo said that clericalism would further remain in service to Pangermanic interests, and that either German or Russian domination in the Adriatic-Ionian-Danubian basin was against the interests of Italy, France, England, and West Europe. Therefore, Supilo stressed the importance of paying attention to the wishes of the small Slavic nations in Middle Europe, since this was in the interest of all of them.

Supilo's primary concern was to secure the territorial integrity of Croatia through the union with Serbia, simply as a political necessity even though there had never been a common national consciousness between Croats and Serbs. For these reasons Supilo strongly rejected Pašić's idea of the "liberation" of the South Slavs in the Habsburg Monarchy and of "union in stages". His genuine love was for his country - Croatia, which he wanted and wished to see free; to see Croatia united and to see

its national individuality preserved. For this reason he thus tried to conceive the idea for an arrangement of the future new state, as well as for the relation among its nations. This new state had to be ordered on a federalistic principle with a somewhat stronger central government - a "centralistic federalism" as Supilo expressed it. When, in July 1917, at Corfu, Serbia "agreed" to the program of union of all South Slavs - at least pro forma - with her, with this "renouncing" the idea of "union in stages", Supilo, even though nearly dead, welcomed the news, believing that the idea of union on an equal basis had been finally accepted by the Serbian Government. His death (on 25 September 1917) saved him from bitter disappointments regarding this and other matters.

When Supilo quit the Yugoslav Committee, Trumbić temporarily disregarded this internal question of arrangement of the new state, and continued with actions in regard to external politics with the Entente diplomacy, namely, the creation of future "Yugoslavia". But when the two sides, the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government met in 1917 at Corfu, the internal question became crucial. Here the essential beliefs were confronted and it soon became obvious that the opposing political philosophies were decidedly incompatible. In fact, the political situation was such that both sides wanted to discover a common basis, but the question was: which views of the engaged parties would take priority. The Serbian Government accepted the union of all South Slavs with Serbia, renouncing the idea of "union in stages", but rejected the principle of national pluralism while accepting the principle of national unitarism, based upon the so-called theory of one "trinamed people". As to the idea of the preservation of the "specific characteristics" of various nation-

al components, this proved to be unsuccessful in the eyes of the Serbian politicians. Thus the principle of unitarism was successful and in the following years it evolved - as one could have expected - into centralism. The policy of "strong hand" continued until Croatian political leaders, Dr. Stjepan Radić and several others, - being opposed to this Serbian policy - were assassinated in the Federal Parliament in Belgrade in 1928, and in 1929, King Alexander proclaimed a dictatorship. Serbia, thus, succeeded in securing its state-continuity, monolitism, and centralism. Even though the Corfu Declaration existed, as well as the agreement signed some fifteen months later in Geneva (the Geneva Declaration), in both cases, the Serbian Government violated the good faith and rejected them, trying through more favourable political conditions to impose its total political conception upon the non-Serbian peoples.

When the real intentions of the Serbian Government became obvious, why did Trumbić, unlike Supilo, deal with it until the end ? Before answering this question, one has to keep in mind that two permanent dangers existed concerning the vital interests of Croatia, from the Italian and Serbian side. Trumbić and Supilo - as central leading persons in the Committee - fought unsuccessfully until the end, on one side against Italian pretensions on Istria and Dalmatia, Sonnino's obsession with "security" in the Adriatic basin and his fanatical adherence to the Treaty of London; and, on the other side, against Serbian's spirit of exclusivism and expansionism, led by the Premier, Nikola Pašić, and his associates. Both Trumbić and Supilo wanted to eliminate these dangers from the Croatian lands; they were united in spirit and goal, but differed in methods and tactics as regarded the achieving of the task.

In order to eliminate the danger of the realization of the Treaty of London, the Yugoslav Committee wanted recognition by the Allied governments as being the sole representative of the South Slavs in the Monarchy, so that it would have become "a new juridical individuality" in the international sense, like the Czecho-Slovak "National Assembly" (Narodno Vijeće) in Paris. The English and French Governments were ready to give this recognition but under the condition that the Serbian Government give its consent. This meant that it was necessary to have an "open line" of communication with the Serbian Government and not to completely sever relations with it. Nevertheless, this attempt failed because of Pašić's objection. Naturally, Trumbić could not be aware of this result in advance. Thus the way of realization of the Treaty of London remained open.

Was the Yugoslav Committee, in ultima linea, successful? Our answer is: No, for the Committee failed in its main attempts, viz.:

- 1) The recognition from the Allied governments for the South Slavs as an allied people; for the Yugoslav volunteers as allied and belligerent troops, and for itself as the sole representative and organ of the South Slavs subject to the Monarchy, was not obtained.
- 2) The realization of the Treaty of London.
- 3) The success of the Serbian Government in imposing its political conception upon the non-Serbian nation of the South Slavs.

Who should be blamed for these failures of the Yugoslav Committee: Trumbić, the Serbian Government, or the Allied diplomacy?

From the beginning of the war (1914) until the end, Trumbić wanted the union of Croatia (and Slovenia) with Serbia, but a union on an equal

basis, and he honestly and diligently worked in this regard. Through such union Trumbić positively wanted to secure the further existence of Croatian individuality. When he repeatedly tried to get recognition from the Allies, for the Committee as the sole representative of Croats (and Slovenians), and as equal to the Serbian Government, he failed in this attempt, because official Serbia did not want to give its consent. Therefore, we cannot blame Trumbić for his failure, for he had done what he could. The blame rests with those who objected to the idea, namely, the Serbian Government.

Trumbić eventually contributed indirectly to this failure in the sense that he rejected the idea of solving in advance the internal question of the arrangement of the future new state with official Serbia for about two years, an idea which Supilo repeatedly demanded since the spring of 1915. This was, thus, a political mistake. This mistake cannot be "justified" with the one-sided explanation that it was first necessary to destroy, as Trumbić said, Austria-Hungary and - until this was not done - it was premature to want to solve the matters with regard to the internal policy.

Trumbić also lacked the spirit for radical moves when the situation, behind any doubt, demanded so.

The Treaty of London was created by Allied diplomacy and when they adhered to it, the Yugoslav Committee could not interfere to any great extent, even though it fought against it throughout the war-years. Therefore, the blame for the realization of this unjust treaty rests with the signatory Powers.

As has already been stated, Trumbić, like Supilo, wanted to elimin-

ate the danger from Serbia through the idea of the union of the South Slavs in the Monarchy with Serbia on an equal basis. For, if Serbia would have accepted this idea, they thought that she could not demand from the Allies Croatian territories as a "compensation" or for her "war-merits". But Serbia accepted this idea, only in letter and not in spirit. And precisely through this move she realized her "large program" - a program which the Serbian politicians stated at the beginning of the war.

It is true that Premier Pašić faithfully adhered to his political idea. The idea, however, was unfortunately based upon an unjust foundation of oppression and domination of Serbia over the other nations, even though Pašić was fully aware that Croats (and Slovenians) definitively wanted to preserve their state-and-national identity. Thus, his faithful adherence to his political beliefs cannot "justify" him, for: what one follows [namely, the quality of an idea] is much more important than how one follows.

It is also true that Serbia renounced its pre-war name - "The Kingdom of Serbia" - and accepted a new one - "The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians", but this change was purely a technical one, for the new state was in essence a continuation of the old Serbian state, only now being several times larger. In this matter the essential help came from the "Croatian-Serbian Coalition", the party in governmental power of Croatia during the war-years, whose leaders, Svetozar Pribićević and Dušan Popović, the Serbs from Croatia, worked in accordance with the interests of Serbia.

But even this "success" of Serbian policy was not a genuine one, for it carried in itself the "seed of division". The new state was "ill in spirit" from the beginning. Materialized through shrewdness and

based upon inequality of its peoples, governed by course methods, brutality and primitivism, the state hardly survived twenty-three years, passing from one crisis to another, and being destroyed in eight days by the first "outside blow"; the civil war between Croats and Serbs broke out and lasted from 1941 until 1945. Over one million people were killed. This indicates that the "great success" of Serbia in 1918 resulted in a great failure, as through such "political manipulation" by its politicians, there only resulted the destruction of a good faith in herself by the non-Serbian nations, and "moving apart" the two nations of our concern, Croatia and Serbia, further from each other than they had ever been before. Thus, the essence of the "Yugoslav problem" as regards these two nations is ethical: lack of genuine respect for the national-and-state individuality of the other side, and both of these elements - as already mentioned - Croats wanted to preserve. In this aspect lies the "seed of death" of the "Yugoslav idea".

In regard to the Allied governments, it may be stated that British diplomacy failed in the point that it did not recognize the Yugoslav Committee, even though - according to Steed's information to Trumbić - the British Government had promised to do so; but - shortly before - accepted the French suggestion to wait until agreement had been reached between the Committee and the Serbian Government. But because the engaged parties never reached such an agreement, the British Government never recognized the Yugoslav Committee. By this move, it failed to secure its post-war influence in the western part of the new state, leaving to France a dominant influence there, which she achieved in supporting Serbia. The latter then created a centralist state.

With relation to the federalistic principle, as advocated by the Allies but then abandoned, accepting the principle of self-determination for the nations in the Habsburg Monarchy, here it may be stated that this was perhaps a great political mistake in World War I, as it "fractured" and weakened Central Europe. Having contacts with the strongest power in the world, and being rightly convinced that the federalistic principle would be the best solution for the small nations in Middle Europe, President Wilson should, at the end of the war once the German military machine was broken, have applied this great conception to the Habsburg Monarchy, revising its political structure thoroughly. Kaiser Karl I would almost certainly have accepted this restructuring: namely, in such a way, the centuries-old Monarchy would have been in a far better position to secure the vital interests of its small nations than through the political formula of self-determination. Unfortunately, Wilson failed in not doing this.

Appendix I

FRANO SUPILO (1870-1917)

In this part of the chapter we will try to describe the political ideas and development of one of the most dynamic personalities in recent Croatian history, Frano Supilo. This figure is especially important since he was politically active until his death and was the essential "component" in the problem discussed.

Frano Supilo was born on 30 November 1870 at Cavtat, near Dubrovnik, and was the son of a poor mason. On the occasion of the visit of the heir apparent to the throne, Rudolph Habsburg, to Dubrovnik, the barely thirteen-year-old schoolboy, together with his school-mates, hissed at the Habsburg, and because of this was expelled from all of the schools in Austria-Hungary.⁽¹⁾ Writing to the Ferrero family from London (in May of 1917), about four months before his death, Supilo, already very sick, said:

"... Mi raccomando per la correzione della lingua e ortografia, che, come sa, io sono in tutto autodidatta essendo stato scacciato come ragazzo di 14 anni da tutte le scuole austriache e per sempre 'per pericolosissimi sentimenti politici'." (2)

A few years later, when the authorities still permitted Supilo to continue with his schooling, he finished Trade School (4.razred gradjanske škole) and registered for the Nautical Academy, but because of poverty, he left. Some time later he graduated successfully from agricultural school, where he had specialized in viticulture. Because of these studies, he had the opportunity to travel the length and breadth of his district. Thus,

"... the most prudent [and] most able ... politician at the end of the nineteenth and in the first decades of the twentieth century,

was a self-educated person, without a university education ..."(3)

Nationally and politically Supilo supported the basis of the program of the Party of Right (Stranka Prava) and the spirit of Dr. Ante Starčević. Supilo's "outlook upon the world" (Weltanschauung) was liberal and anti-clerical. He fought courageously for the union of the Croatian countries and in 1891 started to publish the newspaper "Red Croatia" - which indicated South Croatia - (Crvena Hrvatska) at Dubrovnik, expounding Starčević's ideas. Therein he strongly condemned the collaboration of the Serbian political parties in the Banat Croatia with the Hungarian Khuen-Héderváry, and in Dalmatia with the opponents of the Croatian union - the Italian remnants (Talijanaši). In his political work Supilo did not so much follow the Croatian state-juridical principle as he did the principle of natural rights, through which the Croatian people, like all others, had the right of existence, liberty, and union, in the state. For him it was not so important whether the Croats and the Serbs were one or two peoples but "whether they go in the same or opposite political direction." (4) Nevertheless, in July 1896 Supilo wrote in his newspaper that the Croats and Serbs are "one [people] but two nationalities, [having] two histories, two politico-national aspirations, and perhaps, also, two cultures." (5)

Following his arrival in Rijeka (Fiume) in January 1900, Supilo began to publish at Sušak, near Rijeka, his daily paper, "Novi List" (The New Paper), but due to stringent censorship the issue of this paper was transferred to Rijeka in March 1901. The reason for this was that Rijeka - as a "corpus separatum" - was part of Hungary and that there the law of publication was not so rigid as in Banat Croatia. (6) When he began to

print the "Novi List", Supilo wrote to his political collaborator, Dr. Ante Trumbić, saying that the purpose of the paper was to spread the idea of liberty and union of the Croatian nation "completely independent from Vienna and Budapest," and that he looked for the cooperation of the other South Slavic peoples, having "as close as possible links with South Slavism, in which Croatia - united with the Slavic countries - had to be a factor equal to Serbia and Bulgaria." (7)

Supilo's political ideas can be seen most clearly after the national movement in 1903 and the fall of Khuen. His political creed was:

"... to unite, or better [expressed], to harmonize the Croatians with Serbs, with Hungarians and with Italians in one common ideal, which would make them remain united and agreeable against the growth of Germandom." (8)

Thus, in agreement with all the other nations facing the same danger, the Dual Monarchy could be destroyed and their "sure national, political, and economic death" be prevented. (9) Supilo thought in this manner. He spoke mainly in favour of an agreement between the South Slavs and the Italians, and honestly believed that it was possible to discover a compromise solution to the ethnical difficulties. Thus he said:

"Tutta la mia azione è contro la salvazione [sic] dell'Austria. Per conseguire questo scopo più solidamente e sicuramente non vedo niente di meglio che un'intesa lunga, forte, profonda fra gli unici possessori nazionali dell'Adriatico: gli italiani e noi slavi, a base nazionale e democratica. Altrimenti, non so come andrà. Le maggioranze nazionali, genetiche, storiche, esistenti, palpabili, compatte e continuate italiane a voi; le slave nello stesso ordine a noi. ... Le minoranze, che rimaranno [sic] nell'uno e nell'altro campo, dovrebbero avere una politica di reciprocità, con diversi rispetti e riguardi verso elementi di una nazione grande, civile e con una posizione nel mondo, alla quale noi non possiamo mai sperare. Questo [sic] sono cose eticamente giuste, e buone, e fanno "buon sangue". A patto però che tra noi deve essere esclusa ogni tentazione di denazionalizzazione [sic] a vicenda. ..." (10)

This attitude was also adopted by Guglielmo Ferrero, the Italian historian and journalist, whom Supilo greatly influenced at the end of 1903, during his personal contacts and discussions.

"Ferrero also accepted this attitude in his articles in 'Il Secolo' and would not deviate from it until the end of the First World War. Also, the British press, headed by Wickham Steed, soon accepted this attitude, [as well as] R.W. Seton-Watson, whom Supilo contacted very early." (11)

The new conception - that of uniting the powers of all those nations to whom there was a threat from the Monarchy, since it strengthened Germandom - brought Supilo to the reorganization of the Croatian national politics. For Supilo, cooperation "against the German danger" also included alliance with the Hungarian opposition, which was in conflict with Vienna. This was the so-called "new course" of Croatian politics. The first result was the "Rijeka Resolution"⁽¹²⁾ which was created on 3 October 1905. The opposing Serbian political parties readily saw the far-reaching importance of this idea, the more so since Khuen - to whom they could offer "their service" - was no longer in power in Croatia. Through the united powers, the Serbian opposition hoped again to attain power indirectly; for this reason they offered their cooperation and help to Supilo's "new direction". This willingness was proclaimed in the "Zadar Resolution"⁽¹³⁾ (17 October 1905), but the terms were stiff: official acknowledgement of the Serbian minorities in Croatia as a nation, which juridically meant "a nation within the nation" (narod u narodu) - a problem which had caused great polemics since earlier times.

In contrast to Supilo at this time, other politicians in Croatia who feared the German danger, tried to avoid it by applying different political ideas. For instance, Dr. Stjepan Radić (1871-1928) - the founder of the strongest political party in Croatia between the two World Wars, the

"Croatian Peasant Party" (Hrvatska seljačka stranka) - suggested a plan of federation for the Monarchy in 1905. It consisted of two ideas: to give full liberties to all the nations in the Monarchy and its fundamental democratization. Thus Supilo's idea was completely opposite to that of Stjepan Radić, to whom the concept of cooperation with the Hungarians, as advocated by Supilo, seemed strange. The fundamental weakness of Supilo in contrast to Radić, lay in the fact that he never "came down" to the people, never tried to understand them by being closer and making himself more understandable to them; he lacked the roots necessary to obtain considerable political support and permanent backing.

In the meantime Supilo engaged in various political associations and made an unstable agreement with the opposing parties with which he dealt in "fair play". While Radić's idea followed the qualitative change of the existing state of things and was, as such, much deeper, more peaceful, and more sure in its final outcome, Supilo's idea, on the other hand, advocated the destruction or "amputation" of the Southern Slavic countries from the Monarchy and their union with Serbia; Supilo's idea was thus more mechanical and doubtful in its final results, as many essential contradictions had existed in regard to Serbia but, after all, there had never before been any "state and political" union.

Different from both Supilo's idea of destruction of Austria-Hungary and Radić's idea of federation and fundamental democratisation, was the third political conception advocated by Dr. Josip Frank (1844-1911), the leader of the "Pure Party of Right" (Čista stranka prava). Frank explained his conception (in 1906) of trialism in the Monarchy, which would be

divided into three parts: the Austrian (Vienna), the Hungarian (Budapest), and the South Slavic (Zagreb). He thought that this conception could be realized by "playing off" the Hungarians and relying upon Vienna. Frank's idea appeared odd to Supilo, since Vienna hardly ever fulfilled her promises. Supilo agreed with the idea that Croatia would become the "center of gathering" among the South Slavs in the Monarchy. However, he considered this only as the first step on the way towards the "elimination" of the Monarchy. Therefore, at this time "Supilo led an irreconcilable fight against Frank ..." as well as "... against the clericalists as second main pillar of the Austrian reign." (14)

In his letter (in May 1917) to the Ferrero family, Supilo wrote:

"Today there is not a politician alive, not only among the Croats but also perhaps among all South Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, who is more hated, slandered [and] of whom they are afraid as is the case with myself. All accusations that I am: 1) a Serbian agent; 2) a Hungarian agent; 3) an Italian agent; 4) [and] even an Austrian agent, all of these accusations, including the last one, have a common source: [it either being] an Austrian official or their known agents. And why all of this against one single man? For they know very well that I was the one who brought about a spiritual and political revolution in the Croatian nation, ... Because I saw that clericalism is a most trusted servant of Austria, I undertook an anti-clerical struggle from the nebulous dogmatic and philosophical spheres into the practical evidences of national necessities. ... but when one comes from the people and has the courage to tell the people: stay away from clericalists led by the bishops and Jesuits - the servants of Vienna, who are the greatest enemies of your emancipation; and when one finds new youth who support him in this regard, that [i.e., person] becomes a dangerous fighter whom Austria is not inclined to tolerate among the people [who is] blindly faithful and clerical. ..." (15)

Winning the elections in 1906 and 1908 power in Croatia passed into the hands of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition Party. Every Croatian-Serbian political union meant a danger to Vienna's plans in its South, as well as in the Balkans as a whole. For this reason it was necessary to destroy

this bind. Soon the Coalition was accused of state-treason. But even though Supilo, as leader of the Coalition, came out of the Friedjung Process (in 1909)⁽¹⁶⁾ as victor, and even though his name became known in European political circles and in the press, he still lost the leadership of the Coalition. The Serbian members of the Coalition, led by Svetozar Pribićević, Supilo wrote,

"... did not want also to conduct with me such an intense fight against the government in Budapest, as well as against the system itself, but they resisted it with all their powers. [They sought] any kind of formula to be allowed to come to power. Here began our clashes. ..." (17)

Being unable to work with the Coalition, which to a certain extent feared the Friedjung Process but was in fact strongly opportunistic, Supilo gave his letter of resignation on 11 December 1909, as a member of the Coalition. When he left the hall, there was silence. Then Svetozar Pribićević interrupted this silence by saying:

"I am telling you, it is good that we got rid of this man. For with him we could never get the government in Croatia in our hands, because they above [i.e., Vienna] do not like him. ..." (18)

This fact was of decisive importance for the further course of Croatian politics and history. While Supilo wanted to realize the union between Croats and Serbs upon an equal basis into "one political nation", Svetozar Pribićević did not care for preserving the "specific traditions" and "national consciousness". He, together with other Serbian members of the Coalition, had as his main goal the final union with Serbia.

"The Government of Nikola Pašić was keeping the aspirations of the Serbian [political] parties in Croatia in countenance to agree with the Croatian opposition, and to create the Coalition, but [once the Coalition was created] trying to prevent the conflict of the Coalition with the Hungarian Government ... for it [i.e., (19) Serbia] did not want the [further] tension in the Slavic South."

In 1910 the Coalition concluded the pact with the pro-Hungarian oriented Ban, Nikola Tomašić; from that time on the Coalition followed a strictly opportunistic line. After the Balkan Wars (1912-1913),

"The Coalition at that time, with the permission of the Serbian Government, signed an agreement with the Hungarian Government and formed its [own] government, ready for the highest yielding, only to avoid sharpening relations with Budapest and Vienna which [tensions] were not useful to Serbia, exhausted from the recent wars." (20)

For Supilo the outbreak of war in 1914 was an historic opportunity which was to be exploited. Therefore, together with his political co-workers - Trumbić' and others - after leaving the country, he undertook political actions abroad. He expressed his political program by the words: "Yugoslavia or nothing!"⁽²¹⁾ But this meant the destruction of the centuries-old Monarchy, an idea which, at that time, was not supported by any of the Great Powers. On the other side, Serbia's concept of the union of Croats and Slovenians with the Serbs was an "enlargement of Serbia" - as well as the formation of a centralistic state. This Serbian attitude was backing up official Italy headed by Sonnino. Sonnino's standpoint was:

"A noi conviene una Serbia ingrandita e un'Austria diminuita".⁽²²⁾

Such an understanding between Serbia and Italy was precisely the combination feared by Supilo, because after this the protection of the integrity of the Croatian countries - for which he and Trumbić' were striving - was almost impossible to realize. Regarding this Supilo wrote to Guglielmo Ferrero:

"... Here in a few words is the substance of my humble work, which I perform, trying as it is. It is natural [that I try] to secure before everything else the integrity and existence of the

Croatian nation, [and] preferably, above all other considerations, an alliance and Yugoslavian fusion with our brethern in blood and language, the Serbs, and then an alliance with Italy for the mutual defense against the common enemy." (23)

When Italy entered the war, Italian public opinion was split into two main groups: ⁽²⁴⁾ the nationalists and the democratic anti-nationalists. The opinion of the first group was represented by "L'Idea Nazionale", led by Forges-Davanzati and Francesco Coppolo, and "Fronte Interno". Both papers, and particularly a lawyer, Guerrazzi, in the "Fronte Interno", directed a campaign against Supilo and his political idea. The second group was represented by well-known persons in Italian political circles: Ferrero, Salvemini, Mosca, Bissolati, Borghese and others - all, more or less, belonging to the liberal, socialist, and democratic element of Italy. Ferrero, a close friend of Supilo, was expressing his ideas in "Il Secolo", while the others, like Salvemini, wrote in "L'Unità", which became the chief advocate of Supilo's idea concerning the Slavic-Italian understanding, and led to the congress of the suppressed nations in Rome in 1918.

The original idea of Supilo was also later accepted by Steed who - when Italy entered the war - visited the Italian Ambassador in London, Imperiali, suggesting that the Italian Government secretly call Supilo to Rome and enter through him into negotiations regarding the Slavic-Italian problems. On 2 October 1914, Imperiali reported to Di Sangiuliano, the Foreign Minister:

"... Egli [i.e., Steed] consiglia molto di fare chiamare segretamente a Roma il noto Supilo attualmente a Venezia e venire con lui a trattative per stabilire di comune accordo soluzione intricatissimo problema. ..." (25)

But the Italian Government did not want to accept this idea, for it had already worked out its plan, which would formally result in the Treaty of London.

Disappointed, Supilo later wrote to the Ferrero:

"... Siamo lì dal settimo secolo. Abbiamo annientato, noi Croati, noi soli, a Grobničko Polje i Mongoli, che trionfanti, sconfitti i Magiari, marciavano verso l'Italia. Abbiamo arrestato tutte le invasioni turche, le quali tentarono per quattrocento anni di sfondare la Croazia per piombare sulle ricchezze venete! Questo si dimentica. Ma i Turchi erano 150 anni a Budapest, erano sotto Vienna, in Polonia; ma l'Italia fù salva, e Venezia soprattutto, perchè mai poterono sfondare la Croazia, mai i Turchi videro Zagabria! ..." (26)

Supilo was confronted on the one side with the Italian aspirations on the Croatian territories in Istria and Dalmatia - (the Treaty of London) - and on the other side with Serbia's pretensions and expansion upon Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia, and Southern Dalmatia - which pretensions were, in addition, backed by Orthodox Russia and Italy; he was faced, on the third side, with the possibility of the further existence of the Habsburg Monarchy. Even in a weakened form Supilo accepted in such a situation the difficult alternative: to work for the union with Serbia, but fully conscious of the arduous life with the latter and its spirit of national exclusivism and religious intollerance. As Professor Radica wrote,

"As a realist, Supilo knew that the life of the Croats with the Serbs would be more than hard, but facing the alternative that the Croatian countries would be divided in parts and become the spoils of their neighbours, mainly the Italians, he believed that even an equal alliance with Serbia, as he envisaged, was more worthy than the broken and small Croatia in a reduced Austria and enlarged Great Serbia." (27)

Supilo warned Professor Lazar Marković, the close collaborator of Pašić and editor of the newspaper "La Serbia" in Geneva, that the Croats

had their separate national ideology and that the Serbs would make a mistake if they did not take this into consideration and embarked on a policy of quick and enforced assimilation. Supilo also told him that the Croatians wish and want to preserve their originality, even by getting together in a common state, which would be best created in the form of a federation.⁽²⁸⁾ Supilo desired the Italian form of union, not the Prussian with the strong hand, as Serbia had managed in its exclusivistic spirit in Macedonia. In other words, Supilo demanded that the historic and national traditions be respected.⁽²⁹⁾

Since Serbian exclusivism evidenced itself more and more in Pašić's political moves, and knowing that Pašić had his men in the Yugoslav Committee (like Milan Srškić), Supilo watched the Committee doubtfully. Having learned from experience, Supilo concluded that the Serbian Government's policies towards union were unacceptable, and that the Croatian question, in all its tragic dilemma, had to be presented at once to the Entente governments.⁽³⁰⁾ Supilo, however, thought that this was impossible to realize through the Yugoslav Committee with its present composition; "therefore - in one of the talks with Trumbić and De Giulli - he suggested the creation of a new committee."⁽³¹⁾

Ljubo Radić - who was engaged in the office work of the Committee's branch in Paris - in his speech in 1920 about Supilo, reported that Supilo, in June of 1915, asked Trumbić that "the remainder of the Yugoslav Committee [be transformed] into the Croatian Committee" and that Trumbić undertake special action in England and Italy.⁽³²⁾ This unknown fact was discovered - according to D. Šepić - several years ago in the Archives of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb, among the bundles

of Trumbić's manuscripts. Trumbić wrote about this fact as follows:

At the Hotel Medison, 20 March [1915?] 6:30 evening. Present: Supilo, De Giulli, and Trumbić. Supilo proposed to call in the session all of the Croatians of the Committee, as well as those from America and perhaps the Slovenians, [in order] to break with Serbia and with the Yugoslav Committee, so that we may create a Croatian Committee which will work independently. I declared myself against the Croatian Committee, for it would have meant war with Serbia, that's grist to Italy's mill [and] the wrecking of our question in general. (33)

After renouncing his membership in the Yugoslav Committee (on 5 June, 1916), Supilo freed his hands. Thus, on 2 July 1916, he sent a long letter to the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, to whom he declared that the Croatians, Serbs, and Slovenians belong to the same "race", and speak the "same language"; together with the Moslems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one side and the Serbs on the other, they are about equal - each one having around six and a half million people. In order to escape the division of the Croatian countries between Italy, Hungary, and Serbia, Supilo proposed that all the South Slavic countries of the Monarchy be given the alternative: to decide freely among themselves whether to unite with Croatia or with Serbia. Supilo believed that in such a case all the countries in the South of the Monarchy, except perhaps Bačka and the Banat, would vote for Croatia, including the Slovenian countries. Supilo concluded this letter with a "clear cut" proposition: either a union of the Serbs, Croatians, and Slovenians as equal to equal, in all aspects, regardless of the differences in traditions, characters, and mentalities; or if this was not possible, that the Serbian majority of people should then go to Serbia and that the Croatian majority to Croatia, while the remaining minorities on both sides would be treated with equal conditions on both sides. (*)

(*) [About the significant part of this document see footnote # 34, p. 288]

The same thoughts were also submitted by Supilo - in the form of a promemoria - to the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, Sir Edward Grey, under the significant title:

"The Basic Criterion and Principles for the Union, Liberation, and Fusion of the Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croatsians, Slovenians) in One Strong State, and for the Successful Closing of the First and Main Door to the Pangermanic Imperialism, which [door] is Situated Along the Adriatic and in the North-Southern Balkans."

Meanwhile, on 5 December 1916 the Asquith Government fell. Nevertheless, this memorandum was still submitted to the Foreign Office which translated it into English.⁽³⁵⁾ Therein Supilo expressed the idea that the future Yugoslav state should be divided into 4 compact zones:

- a) the zone of the Serbian-Orthodox majorities,
- b) the zone of the Croatian Western majorities,
- c) the Slovenian zone, and
- d) the Bosnian-Herzegovinian zone.

His thoughts and views about this were also expressed in his letter of 15 September 1916 to Milan Pribićević, colonel in the Serbian Army and chief of the Serbian military mission in North America. In this letter Supilo wrote:

"... We, Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians are the children of two worlds of culture, civilization [and] even, if you wish, of religion - from which powerful influence only individual men of culture can tear themselves away; but neither the average intelligentsia, nor, least of the majority of the common people can do this. ...

Without taking into consideration these two worlds, which also - even though we speak one language - de facto - still separate us; and without taking into account the consequences which such a policy would then bring - ... the idea of Yugoslavia, ... will be realized neither morally nor physically, among ourselves. ...

The Serbian Government proclaimed [this] idea solemnly but then did not do anything about it. Now there only remains this alternative: either the Serbian Government did not know what - after these programmatic declarations and obligations - should have been done in Europe, or it did not want [to do it] ? ..." (36)

When the campaign to drive Bissolati out of the Italian Government began in Italy, Supilo warned the Foreign Office in London of Bissolati's aims and of the importance of making an agreement between Italy and the Southern Slavs. He wrote to Bissolati in December 1916,

"Italy, France, and Great Britain do not wish on the Adriatic-Ionian-Danubian sphere either German or Russian domination, for the small Slavic nations in Middle Europe it is better that they come under the protection of Western Europe ... [and] to accept as a war-aim of the Entente the liberation of the Slavs from Austria-Hungary since any solution of their national question on the basis of autonomies in the frame of the Habsburg Monarchy could only be favourable to the revival of German Imperialism." (37)

Before the Corfu conference Pašić asked Supilo - through the Serbian Ambassador Jovanović in London - to work out a scheme for the inner arrangement of the future Yugoslav state. Supilo prepared this plan, which was founded upon the federalistic basis.⁽³⁸⁾ He divided all state matters into two groups: the common and the autonomous ones.

The Common Matters referred to: the constitution based "upon the full democratic and equal foundation for all the national and cultural life of the state and the people"; foreign policy; state defence; economy and transportation which is of importance for the whole state; money and finance for the common works and higher education.

The Autonomous Matters: to this part would belong "all the other affairs not yet defined in the previous section".

For the common matters, according to Supilo's plan, there would be two bodies: the "State Parliament", that is, the "National Assembly", and the "National Parliament", that is, the "People's Council"; while for the autonomous matters there would be the "Parliaments and Assemblies of the respective provinces" (Sabori i skupštine dotičnih zemalja), or more precisely, of the federative units. Besides these "legislative bodies"

there would be also the "executive power" for the common matters of the Federal Government, and the autonomous governments for the autonomous affairs.

Supilo considered that the future Yugoslav state should be divided into five autonomous federative units: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Then Supilo wrote to J.Jovanović (on 22 July 1917) that such a constitution would certainly satisfy the greatest majority of the "various names, religions, traditions, and mentalities," as well as the European Great Powers which are favourably inclined towards the South Slavs. In addition, the federalistic state-arrangement would prevent any premature "leveling" (liveliranje):

"... I am against any premature leveling which, even by the larger nations, has not brought the expected results - but let us leave this leveling for the [proper] time and the future generations, ... We are not [yet] mature enough for this leveling; ..." (39)

Nevertheless, at the Corfu conference the federalistic proposition of Supilo was not accepted, only some ideas, at least pro forma, which gave Supilo the impression that these ideas were, in essence, victorious. But his nervous-system was already so weak that he died soon after (on 25 September 1917), not seeing the days of hard disappointment brought about by the exclusivistic spirit and intolerance of official Serbia, which he feared in his efforts towards protecting the integrity of the Croatian people. About a month before he died, Supilo wrote:

"... La mia lotta non era contro il serbismo come tale (e lotta discreta era) ma contro quel certo esclusivismo clericale ortodosso, che dipendeva da [sic] Santo Sinodo. ..." (40)

Supilo lived quite intensely during the great moments of his time; for example, such was the case during the Russian revolution of 1917. The impact of the Russian revolution - the one in March [and] not the one in

October which he did not live to see - was very strong upon Supilo. He dreamed about it, that with the destruction of Russian czardom was also destroyed the Holy Synod - symbol of exclusive Greek Orthodoxy, under which there was no possibility of existence for the Catholic and Occidental Slavic world, neither for Croatians, nor for Poles. He saw this influence by the Serbs and by Pašić. ... Supilo did not live long enough to see that his Holy Synod, in the Serbian form, remained further in its full medioeval power, and that it did suppress the Croatians until the point to place them - between the two World Wars [and] during the [Second World] War - against Yugoslavia, destroying all their dreams about yugoslavism and causing them to regret the Austrian times, wrote Professor Bogdan Radica. (41)

As a person Supilo was simple, sincere, honest, with great and dynamic imagination and intuition; his personal influence was undoubtedly great. So Steed, in 1945 in London, spoke to Professor Radica about Supilo with similar words:

"He inspired everyone with enthusiasm, also Lord Grey and all of us, with his simple sincerity, unimportunacy, and spontaneity, so that Grey preferred much more to talk with him than with the formal-minded Yugoslav [i.e., Serbian] diplomatists." (42)

Footnotes to Appendix I

- (1) Bogdanov, Vaso, com.: Supilo, Frano: Politika u Hrvatskoj. (Zagreb, Kultura, 1953), p.7.
- (2) [Radica, Bogdan: "Pogledi na Supila; život, misao i djelo Frana Supila." In: Hrvatska Revija (La Revista Croata) (Buenos Aires, 1957) vol. 4 (28) p. 386. Letter no. X: London, 2 maggio 1917]
Professor Radica translated this letter as well as other letters from Supilo into Croatian which are parallely cited in the above mentioned Hrvatska Revija.
- (3) "... Najumniji, najsposobniji ... političar potkraj devetnaestog i u prvim decenijima dvadesetoga stojeća bio je, dakle, samouk: bez fakultetske naobrazbe ..."
[Bogdanov, V., comp., Op.cit., p. 8]
- (4) Za Supila nije toliko važno, da li su Hrvati i Srbi jedan ili dva naroda, već "da li idu istim ili suprotnim političkim pravcem."
[Šepić, Dragovan: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama Frana Supila." In: Forum. (Zagreb, 1968) God.VII, knj. XV, no. 2-3, p. 344]
- (5) Supilo piše u srpnju 1896 u "Crvenoj Hrvatskoj", da su Hrvati i Srbi "jedan [narod], ali dva plemena [t.j., nacionalnosti], dvije prošlosti, dvije političko-narodne težnje, a možda i dvije kulture."
[Šepić, D.: Ibid.; see also Dragovan Šepić: "Politička koncepcija Frana Supila." In: Frano Supilo: Politički spisi; članci, govori, pisma, memorandum [comp. by] D. Šepić. (Zagreb, "Znanje", 1970), pp. 7-95]
- (6) Bogdanov, V., comp.: Op.cit., pp.8-9, note 2.
- (7) Supilo piše Trumbiću da traži suradnju s ostalim južnoslavenskim narodina i "što tjesnije veze s južnim slavenstvom, u kome Hrvatska - (ujedinjena sa slavenskim zemljama) - ima biti faktor ravnopravan Srbiji i Bugarskoj."
[Cited by D. Šepić: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p. 345]
- (8) Supilov politički credo bio je: "... sjediniti ili, bolje, sporazumjeti Hrvate sa Srbima, s Madjarima i s Talijanima u jednom zajedničkom idealu, koji bi trebao, da ih, sjedinjene i sporazumne, suprostavi rastu pangermanstva."
[Radica, B.: Op.cit., p. 350]
- (9) Jedino tako ujedinjeni može se srušiti Dvojna Monarhija i spriječiti svoju" sigurnu nacionalnu, političku i ekonomsku smrt."
[Radica, B.: Ibid.]
- (10) Radica, B.: Ibid., p. 392, letter no. XIII (17 maggio 1917).
- (11) "Taj stav Ferrero prihvaća i u svojim člancima u "Secolu", i ne će ga napustiti sve do svršetka Prvog svjetskog rata. Taj će stav uskoro prihvatiti i britanska publicistika, na čelu s Wickham Steedom, ...

[a isto tako i] R.W. Seton-Watson, s kojima Supilo vrlo rano dolazi u doticaj."

[Radica, B.: Ibid., p. 351]

- (12) See also: Seton-Watson, R.W.: The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy. (New York, Howard Fertig, 1969, Reprint of 1911 ed.) Appendix XII: "The Resolution of Fiume", pp. 393-394.
- (13) Ibid., Appendix XIII: "The Resolution of Zara", pp. 395-397.
- (14) "... Supilo u ovo vrijeme vodi nepomirljivu borbu protiv Franka ... [kao i] ... protiv klerikalaca kao drugog glavnog stupa austrijske vladavine."
[Bogdanov, V.: Op.cit., p. 11]
- (15) Radica, B.: Ibid., pp. 309-392, letter no. XII (14 maggio 1917).
- (16) About Friedjung Process see: Seton-Watson, R.W.: "The Friedjung Trial". In: The Southern Slav Question and ..., Op.cit., pp. 209-287.
- (17) Srpski članovi Hrvatsko-srpske koalicije "... nisu htjeli da skupa sa mnogom povedu isto tako žestoku borbu i proti vladi u Pešti, kao i proti sistemu samome, nego su joj se svim silama opirali. [Oni su tražili] da se nadje makar kakva formula i da dodju na vladu. Tu su počeli naši sukobi."
[Supilo, Frano: Politika u Hrvatskoj. (Rijeka, 1911), p. 201. Cited by V. Bogdanov, Op.cit., p. 15]
- (18) Svetozar Pribićević je kazao za Supila:
"Ja vama kažem, da je dobro, da smo se mi ovoga čovjeka riješili. Jer mi s njime nikada ne bi bili dobili vladu u Hrvatskoj, pošto ga oni gore [i.e., u Beču] ne trpe. ..."
[Supilo, Frano: Politika u Hrvatskoj, Op.cit., p. 232. Cited by V. Bogdanov, Op.cit., p. 15]
- (19) "Vlada Nikole Pašića podržavala je težnje srpskih stranaka u Hrvatskoj za sporazum s hrvatskom opozicijom i stvaranje koalicije, ali je kasnije [kad je Koalicija stvorena] pokušala da spriječi sukob Koalicije s madjarskom vladom ... jer joj [i.e., Srbiji] nije odgovaralo zaoštrenje na Slavonskom Jugu."
[Šepić, D.: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p. 348]
- (20) "Koalicija je u to vrijeme uz odobrenje srpske vlade zaključila sporazum s madjarskom vladom i formirala svoju vladu, spremna na najveća popuštanja samo da izbjegne zaoštrenje odnosa s Budimpeštom i Bečom koje nije odgovaralo Srbiji, iscrpljenoj u nedavnim ratovima."
[Šepić, D.: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p. 349]
- (21) "Jugoslavia ili ništa!"
[Šepić, D.: Ibid., p. 350]
- (22) Salvemini, Gaetano: Dal Patto di Londra alla Pace di Roma (Torino, 1925) p. LII, cited by B. Radica, Op.cit., p. 355, note 4.

- (23) Radica, B.: Op.cit., p. 388, letter no. XI ([London ?] 3 maggio 1917).
- (24) Radica, B.: Ibid., p. 355.
- (25) L'Ambasciatore a Londra, Imperiali, al Ministro degli Esteri, Di Sangiuliano. (Londra, 2 ottobre 1914) In: I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani. Quinta Serie, 1914-1918. Op.cit., vol. I (2 agosto - 16 ottobre, 1914), p. 516, Doc. 868, Tel. 1406/360.
- (26) Radica, B.: Op.cit., p. 394, letter no. XIV (25 maggio 1917) - italics mine.
- (27) "Kao realista, Supilo je morao naslućivati, da će život Hrvata sa Srbima biti više nego težak, ali ispred alternative, da se hrvatske zemlje razbiju na komadiće i postanu plijenom svojih susjeda, napose Talijana, on je vjerovao, da i ravnopravni savez sa Srbima, kako je on to zamišljao, vrijedi više, nego li razbijena mala Hrvatska u jednoj smanjenoj Austriji i pojačanoj Velikoj Srbiji."
[Radica, B.: Op.cit., p. 361]
- (28) Šepić, D.: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p.355.
- (29) Ibid.
- (30) Ibid., p. 369.
- (31) Supilo "... stoga je u jednom razgovoru s Trumbićem i De Giullijem predložio osnivanje jednog novog odbora."
[Šepić, D.: Ibid.]
- (32) Supilo je tražio u lipnju 1915. od Trumbića: "prekrštenje Jugoslavenskog odbora u Hrvatski odbor" i da se poduzme posebna akcija u Engleskoj i Italiji.
[Šepić, D.: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p. 369]
- (33) Trumbićeva bilješka glasi: "U Hotelu Medison 20.III [1915?] 6 1/2 večer. Prisutni: Supilo, De Giulli, Trumbić. Supilo predlaže da se pozovu na sjednicu svi Hrvati [Jugoslavenskog] odbora i oni iz Amerike i valjda Slovenci, da prekinemo sa Srbijom i jugosl[avenskim] odborom i da osnujemo Hrvatski odbor koji će raditi samostalno. Ja sam se izjasnio protiv Hrv[atškog] odbora, jer bi to značilo rat sa Srbijom, voda na mlin Italije, upropašćenje našega pitanja uopće."
[Cited by D. Šepić: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p. 370]
- (34) "... Noi Croati-sloveni (6 milioni; con mussulmani di origine religione [sic] o setta bogomili o patarenì, oggi tutti coi croati sei milioni e mezzo) e serbi (6 1/2 milioni) siamo è vero di una razza e di una lingua, ed il fondere tutto in un insieme [sic] nazionale e politico dove non sarebbero né conquistatori né conquistati, ma semplicemente dei fratelli di lingua e razza liberati, con doveri e diritti eguali [sic] per tradizioni, religione, coltura, ecc., questo sarebbe l'ideale per la nostra nazione di tre nomi, due tradizioni ed una lingua. Questo

[sic] sarebbe la concezione nazionale politica jugoslava, il Piemonte balcanico (la Serbia) trasformato in Italia (Jugoslavia) dove ognuno dei tre apporterebbe i suoi diritti, le sue tradizioni e i suoi doveri, lasciando poco a poco che l'evoluzione degli spiriti e soprattutto le nove [sic] generazioni plasmino queste e questi spiriti in una forma nazionale fusa, come dalle gare tra la Scozia e l'Inghilterra si è plasmata la nazione britannica e come oggi ancora si sta plasmando la nazione italica, da diverse razze e dialetti che sono senza paragone più lontani dai nostri.

Questo sarebbe anche il mio ideale!"

"... Se domani per le terre jugoslave dell'Austria-Ungheria si proponesse una alternativa senza scampi di dichiararsi o pro Croazia o pro Serbia (tutti gli altri voti nulli) solo Bačka e Banat meridionale (in Ungheria) darebbero una maggioranza pro Serbia. Tutte le altre terre e provincie slave dell'Austria-Ungheria si dichiarerebbero in grande maggioranza pro Croazia, e cioè:

1. Croazia e Slavonia con 78%
2. Dalmazia " 86% (3% di Italiani come astenuti)
3. Istria orientale " 100% (10% di Italiani come astenuti)
4. Bosnia e
Herzegovina " 64% (tutti cattolici [sic] e mussulmani
slavi)
5. Inoltre tutti [gli] Sloveni, nelle terre slovene."

"... Dunque per una giusta, equa e durevole soluzione della questione dei Slavi meridionali io non vedo che due vie:

- 1) O unirci tutti insieme Serbi, Croati e Sloveni a base di pari e eguaglianza [sic] in tutto quello che concerne diversità di tradizioni, indole e mentalità, per poter fondare e formare una unità forte, un incrocio [sic] di Jugoslavi, sotto la dinastia Kara-gjorgjevic. Questo [sic] sarebbe la più alta, la più bella soluzione.
- 2) O se non è possibile e se non si vuole per diverse ragioni questo, allora: le maggioranze serbe colla Serbia, le maggioranze croate colla Croazia, con obblighi reciproci di trattare le rispettive minoranze croate o serbe a parità di condizioni. E il tempo farebbe il resto.

Ma tagliarci noi Croati in diversi pezzi, assegnarci un pezzo quà uno là, per la consumazione ed il nostro sterminio, questo per la parte dell'Europa sarebbe un vero crimine, un cannibalismo politico, per la parte del mondo slavo un fratricidio, che nella storia slava resterebbe terribile, indelebile. ..."

[Frano Supilo to Sergei D. Sazonov. (Paris, 2.VII.1916) Šepić, D.: Pisma i memorandumi Frana Supila (1914-1917). (Beograd, Naučno delo, 1967) pp. 137, 139, 140-141, Doc. 88, italics in original]

(35) Šepić, D.: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p. 375.

(36) "... Mi Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci smo djeca dvajuh svjetova kulture, civilizacije, pa ako hoćete i religije, čijem strahovitom utjecaju mogu da se otrgnu samo posebno disponirani snažni duhovi kulturnih pojedinaca, a nikada neće ni većina prosječne inteligencije, najmanje

pako većina prostoga puka. ... Bez računanja na oba ona dva svieta, koja i nas, premda jednim jezikom govorimo, faktično još diele i bez računanja sa posljedicama, koje ovakova politika onda donosi - ... ideja narodnoga jedinstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, ideja Jugoslavije, ... se ... neće ni moralno kamo li fizički medju nama ostvariti. ... Srpska vlada je ideju svečano proklamirala, a onda za nju, ..., nije ništa učinila. ... Sada ne ostaje nego ova alternativa: Ili srbska vlada nije znala da napravi sve ono što je poslie ovih programa-tičkih objava i obveza morala u Evropi da napravi, ili nije htjela?..." [Frano Supilo to Milan Pribićević. (London, 15.IX.1916) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 147-148, Doc. 93]

- (37) "Italija, Francuska i Velika Britanija ne žele na jadransko-egejsko-podunavskom kompleksu ni njemačku ni rusku dominaciju, [s toga] za male slavenske narode Srednje Evrope bolje je da budu pod zaštitom zapadne Evrope ... [i] prihvatiti kao ratni cilj Antante oslobodjenje Slavena Austro-Ugarske, jer bi svako rješenje njihovih nacionalnih pitanja na temelju autonomija u okviru Habsburške monarhije moglo samo pogodovati obnovi njemačkog imperijalizma." [Cited by D. Šepić: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama ...", Op.cit., p. 376]
- (38) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp.349-350.
- (39) "... Ja sam protiv svakom preranomu liveliranju koje ni u većim narodima nije donielo očekivana ploda nego to liveliranje ostavimo vremenu i budućim generacijama, ... Mi nismo [još] dozreli za liveliranje,..." [Frano Supilo to Jovan M. Jovanović. (London, 22.VII.1917) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 202, Doc. 125, italics in original; compare with: Dragovan Šepić: Frano Supilo: Politički spisi; ..., Op.cit., pp. 536-539]
- (40) "... Moja borba nije bila protiv Srpstva kao takvog (a bila je to diskretna borba), nego protiv onog stanovitog klerikalno-pravoslavnog ekskluzivizma, koje je zavisilo od Svetog Sinoda. ..." [Radica, B.: Op.cit., pp. 402-403, letter no. XVIII (Londra, 14.VIII. 1917)]
- (41) Professor Radica piše: "Na Supila je jako utjecala Ruska Revolucija, ona ožujaska, ne ona listopadska, koje nije doživio. On je sanjao o tome, kako se s rušenjem ruskog carstva srušio i Sveti Sinod, simbol ekskluzivnog pravoslavlja, pod kojim nema mogućnosti opstanka katoličkom i zapadnjačkom slavenskom svijetu, ni Hrvatima ni Poljacima. On je taj utjecaj vidio i kod Srba i kod Pašića. ... Supilo nije poživio, da vidi, da je taj Sveti Sinod, u srbijanskom obliku, ostao i dalje u punoj svojoj srednjovjekovnoj snazi, i Hrvate davio do te mjere, da ih je postavio, izmedju dva rata, i za rata, protivu Jugoslavije, srušio u njima sve sanje o jugoslavenstvu, i učinio, da požale za austrijskim vremenima." [Radica, B.: Op.cit., pp. 361-362]
- (42) Steed kaže o Supilu: "Oduševljavao je svakoga, i Lorda Greya i sve nas, svojom priprostim iskrenošću, nenametljivošću i spontanošću, tako da je Grey volio uvijek više s njim razgovarati, nego li s ukočenim jugoslavenskim [i.e., srpskim] diplomatima." [Cited by B. Radica, Op.cit., pp. 351-352]

Appendix II

IVAN MEŠTROVIĆ

Ivan Meštrović, an internationally-known Croatian sculptor, was one of the founders of the Yugoslav Committee. With Dr. Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo he undertook a number of common diplomatic actions with the Entente Powers. Meštrović, throughout the war-years (1914-1918), was in close contact with the members of the Committee, particularly with Supilo, and exercised his influence on the course of the Committee's policy.

Here we are mainly interested in presenting Meštrović's understanding of the national and Southern Slavic problem. In fact, his humane concerns - as the concerns of an artist - extended far beyond the national boundaries of Croatia, for he saw his nation as being but a small, yet integral part of the concerns of mankind as a whole. It can be stated that Meštrović's comprehension of politics was primarily based on the system of ethical values, while the national idea was often reflected in his numerous creations. It is difficult, therefore, to distinguish the artist from the politician.

After a short biographical^(*) sketch, we will quote some citations from Meštrović's writings from which, we hope, one can get some idea of the greatness of his spirit.

The artist's ancestor, Ivan Meštrović, called "Aga", came from Fojnice (Bosnia) prior to one of the Turkish invasions, and settled at Kosovo Polje near the town of Drniš in the Croatian littoral (Hrvatska Zagora); he was wounded and died in 1668 while fighting against the Turks near Livno.

(*) The biographical information is taken from the unnumbered preface of the monograph Kečkemet, Duško, ed.: Ivan Meštrović: Jedini put da se bude umjetnik jest raditi. (Ivan Meštrović: The Only Way to be an Artist is to Work). (Zagreb, 1970); while the citations are taken from the Appendix: "Izbor iz Meštrovićevih citata", of the same book.

From that time on Meštrović's family lived in the neighbouring village of Otavice. Mate (Mathew), his father, was a peasant and mason; they lived in poverty, with the parents working in the cornfields of Slavonia. In the Slavonian village of Vrpolje, Ivan Meštrović was born on 15 August 1883.

As a boy Meštrović did not attend school and learned to read and write by himself. Until he was fifteen, he was a shepherd in the mountains of Svilaja where he "listened to poems and legends about heroes in the struggle against the Turks," stories narrated by old shepherds. On the grasslands he carved in wood with great talent and a sense for images. He obtained some money with the aid of the priest of the village, Franciscan Marko Čačić and some other local officials, who sent him to Split in 1900, in order that he might register at the school of applied art. Unfortunately, he was rejected there as well as in Zagreb under the pretext that he had never before attended school. Thus his helpers sent him to learn the stone-worker's trade in Split. During the evening Meštrović attended the school for applied art.

Captain Grubišić, a retired officer, tried to persuade Alexander König, a Viennese owner of a mine in Dalmatia, to send Meštrović to Vienna for further schooling. Grubišić succeeded in his task, and Meštrović, after ten months of apprenticeship in the stone-worker's trade left for Vienna, still wearing his peasant clothes and not knowing a single word of German. But his benefactor soon changed his mind and discontinued his support. However, Meštrović refused to return and continued his schooling through much hardship. Eventually he received a little financial support from the Croatian Association of Artists in Zagreb; later the Dalmatian Diet

decided to send him the sum of 30 florins a month, a sum which was sufficient to pay his basic expenses. With this aid Ivan Meštrović was able to complete his studies in the Academy of Arts in Vienna.

In Vienna Meštrović met Augustin Rodin (1840-1917). A spontaneous friendship developed between the two artists and was particularly warm during the last years of Rodin's life. Rodin's high regard for Meštrović is evidenced in the following statement: "Meštrović is the greatest phenomenon among the sculptors."⁽¹⁾

Between 1903 and 1910, Meštrović regularly exhibited his works in the Viennese Secession. In 1907 he moved to Paris where he exhibited ten works at the "Salon d'automne" and five at the "Salon national des artistes français". In 1909 he displayed eighteen of his later creations in the "Salon d'automne". He worked feverishly in Paris, where he maintained only regular contacts with Rodin and Emile-Antoine Bourdelle (1861-1929).

At that time Meštrović became more involved with political activities and became a leading personality among the Croatian and Southern Slavic nationalists.

In 1911 he exhibited his works in Rome at the international show. Since Austria-Hungary refused to allow him to open a Croatian pavillion there, Meštrović asked the Serbian Government if he could exhibit his work in the Serbian pavillion. His request was granted.

The English painter, John Lavare; the Italians, Vittorio Pica, Giovanni Papini, Ardengo Soffici, and F.F. Marinetti; the Russian, Maxim Gorki, ... were extremely impressed with the achieved harmony between the old oriental and contemporary European art. The critic, Ugo Ojetti, acknowledged the work of Meštrović, stating that he had opened a new dimension in the field

of sculpture, and that he had destroyed academism. Only Benedetto Croce saw an expression of barbarism in Meštrović's sculptures. The Roman correspondent of "Il Messaggero" reported:

"... The visitors, specialists, and laics leave the pavillion with deepest and unforgettable impressions. Here live history and legend ... A new art, elemental and magnificent, opposes the aristocratic Europe of today, ... Ivan Meštrović - this Homer of stone, this creator of a forgotten world, was a shepherd fifteen years ago in the Dalmatian mountains, [while] today, he is almost another Michelangelo." (2)

The international jury awarded Meštrović (who was only twenty-six years old at that time) the first prize.

Meštrović was informed about the assassination in Sarajevo while he was in Venice for an exhibition. During the war-years he lived as an emigrant in Rome with Trumbić, Supilo, and other emigrés. Then, however, due to the Italian pretensions regarding Istria and Dalmatia, he left Rome and went to Paris, from there went to London, where he received a most cordial welcome. In the summer of 1915 Meštrović presented his works at the Victoria and Albert Museum. For the very first time, this Museum presented an exhibition of a living artist. Due to the efforts of Seton-Watson, the political problem of Croatia as well as that of the Southern Slavs was propagated at the same occasion. The Scottish Academy, after a show in Edinburgh, nominated Meštrović as an honorary member.

At different times during 1916 Meštrović lived in Nice, Cannes, and Geneva where he worked on sculptures of wood. In 1917 he opened another exhibition in London; when the First World War ended, he was in Switzerland - sick on account of the "Spanish fever".

Up until the outbreak of the First World War, Meštrović's works were permeated with the political idea of national liberation and with a desire

of an equal union of the Southern Slavs. However, this national idea during the war-years did not dominate his conscious concerns. In fact, it reappeared as a universal religious idea brought about by the disappointment and tragedy of the war.

In this regard Meštrović wrote the following:

"Right after the Balkan War, and mainly [after] the [First] World War, it seemed to me that the ideal of a nation was too small in [comparison] to all of the sacrifices and the real victory of all [the people]. But the victory of all can only be [achieved] when there are no [more] "friends" or "enemies", when we all become brethren and men. Thus, in view of these ideas I related myself to various objects from the Bible. The feeling of the universal suffering of man was - as of then - more important to me than the suffering of my own nation ..." (3)

A close friend of Meštrović, Jozo Kljaković, the Croatian painter, wrote about him at that period in this way:

"In those difficult years of war (1914-1918) and "suffocated evaporation" of human blood, he [Meštrović] left the heroes of the sword and began to celebrate, in his sculpture, the heroes of the spirit..." (4)

From the time of the war-years the most important work of Meštrović is the "Crucifixion" (Raspeće), sculptured of wood in Geneva (1917) and now on display at the Citadel in Split. The son of Meštrović, Mate (Mathew), gave an interesting explanation about this creative work:

"I often think that his soul is best reflected in his works. In several hundred works of sculpture created over a period of time of more than sixty years, a flow of Meštrović's feelings, of his convictions and aspirations, of his understanding of himself and the surroundings, of the religious mysticism of his mature and old age was chiseled in stone. The horror of false slogans for which millions [of men] were called to give [their] lives in the First World War, was expressed in an impressive and "distorted" figure of the Crucifixion, which Meštrović fashioned in 1917."

"This Crucifixion", wrote Mate Meštrović later, "was not created with the intention of representing the historic Christ, but with the intention of displaying the distortion of the Christian ideal by man." (5)

Disappointed with the Yugoslav idea, Meštrović gave his allegiance, after the war, to the Croatian national consciousness, which he propagated in his creations. In his Stories, published in 1970 in Zagreb, eight years after his death, Meštrović related the conversations of the people - to whom he was always close, particularly to the common men of his district - about those times and about the political disappointment of the entire Croatian nation regarding the unjust Serbian rule in their countries.

"They [i.e., the Serbs] came here (to the Croatian country) among Croatian people with theirs [i.e., the Serbs with their people], saying since the beginning [1919] [when] we liberated [it], and later, we have conquered [it], this is ours. How 'liberated', how 'our', I beseech you with God! Ah, they said, we have created the state; it is [our]common[state], but we were in it first. We defended it and, therefore, everything must be as we wish. But finally, the state forbids everything to one - one is forbidden to do this, to do that - while to the other [side] it permits everything. To one it is mother, to the other step-mother. But when the step-mother does not give anything to the step-children, and she comes with hers on theirs, then she must be thrown out of the house, or the step-children will separate themselves [from her]. Look, what Stipica(*) started to talk saying what belongs to you let that be yours and what belongs to us let that be ours, and that which belongs to both of us let us make an agreement regarding it (svakom svoje); and they throw him into jail. They imprison a just man in order that unjust men can reign." (6)

Between the two World Wars, Meštrović lived and worked in Zagreb as President of the Academy of Arts (Umjetnička Akademija). In his capacity he wanted to prove:

"... that this corner of earth is also both near and far to all of the leading powers than any other one; moreover, it is nearer to me than any other. It is necessary, I think, that every [nation as well as individual artist] work on his - and from his [own basis], about himself and from himself. I believe that we will not be the last among the last ones, but will slowly become equal to the best [ones]." (7)

(*) [i.e., Dr. Stjepan Radić, the leader of the strongest political party in Croatia (The Croatian Peasant Party) between two World Wars; he, together with several other Croatian political leaders, was assassinated in the Federal Parliament in Belgrade, in 1928.]

Meštrović overcame and united the religious and cultural complexity of the Croatian people - Catholic and Islamic, Occidental and Arabic culture - in his numerous religious sculptures, elevating his spirit above narrow confessional dogmatism. This was more a faith in a wider notion than it was a religion in a narrower sense. "I see in all religions that which is in essence the same in all of them - an identity, since divine truth is the same everywhere,"⁽⁸⁾ said Meštrović.

In 1941 Meštrović was confined in Zagreb by the authorities who were - at least pro forma - devoted to Hitler and Mussolini; in 1943 he first emigrated to Italy and then to Switzerland; in 1947 he went to the United States, where he became a Professor of sculpture at Syracuse University. In 1955 he moved to South Bend - to the University of Notre Dame. President Eisenhower in 1954 personally granted him American citizenship in a ceremony at the White House. Ohio's Wesleyan University, Marquette University, Notre Dame University, Columbia University, the University of Vienna, and others, honoured Meštrović with honorary doctorate degrees. In 1960 he was chosen a member of the American Academy of Arts and Literature, which has only fifty members. In addition to this, Meštrović also received numerous other awards.

Throughout all of his life, Ivan Meštrović worked very diligently. "The only way to become an artist is to work. I am used to that. My students wish to work two to three hours per day. In this way they will not accomplish anything,"⁽⁹⁾ wrote Meštrović several weeks before his death.^(*)

(*) In 1960 a small group of Croatian people from Cleveland visited Ivan Meštrović at South Bend. There we had the honour of having dinner with Meštrović and talked with him for seven or eight hours about a variety of interesting subjects.

During the sixteen years that he lived and worked in the United States - as an old man - Meštrović created close to 100 large or small sculptures. The most important work, and perhaps the main work in his whole life, is the sculpture of Job (Syracuse 1947, today located in Split). Meštrović had the idea about this naked and exhausted sitting figure in mind as early as 1941 when he was a prisoner. In essence the figure represents the suffering and disappointment of tired and prostrated mankind - a cry without response and without help, forsaken "when heaven and earth are deaf".

On the occasion of his seventieth birthday, Meštrović said:

"... During my life I have been burdened with unparalleled inheritance - poverty; the poverty of my family and of my people. The first poverty enabled me never to fear the material difficulties, for I knew that I would never have less than what I had at the beginning. The other poverty led me to persistency in my work, so that at the end in my own field the poverty of my nation was reduced. I have always listened to a whisper deep in myself which said: 'My poor, small native land, in all the world you are the greatest and the most dear to my heart.' This consciousness enabled me to achieve several important things in my life. ..."(10)

Ivan Meštrović died on January 16, 1962, donating - a few years before - almost all of his sculptures to his nation. His body was moved to the family mausoleum at the native village of Otavice.

Selection from Meštrović's Citations

"You would like to know how, in my work, I passed from national-historic to religious-biblical motives. I have often been asked this question. Here is a rudimentary explanation. [Those] who have followed my work more intimately, will find my later works logical and in connection with former ones. This can also be seen from what I said a short while ago. My nationalism was never of an every day kind, neither were my works of a historico-illustrative [character]; [but] they do have a tendency to embody an expression of the soul of our people, the soul which is in essence universal and human. I do not consider as heroes those individuals or nations who fight only for their [own] liberty or material benefit, and I hope that you also feel about this as I do. I consider as heroes only those who fight for universal freedom, for universal benefit; however, this cannot only be as regards material things. It is common to envisage as heroes such individuals as army-leaders, but I believe that the real heroes are those people who fight for the highest ideals of mankind. Perhaps we are in agreement when I say that St. Paul is a greater hero than is Caesar. ...

My art is expressed in wood or stone, but that which the art expresses consists neither of wood nor stone; it is outside of space and time. Art is poetry and prayer at the same time. As in mankind as a whole, so in our national life, I hope that harmony can be found; a harmony between people and the land on which they live and from which they live, harmony between village and city, between the uneducated and the educated, and above all between our [South Slavic] nations. Because of the love for this harmony, I participated - in my own way - in the struggle for the liberty and union of our people, as I was convinced that the power of spirit can be expressed better in liberty and harmonious tones of strings be achieved ..." (11)

"... Personally I have such a high opinion of Michelangelo that I hardly dare to write about him. If I do so any way, I do so only in order to satisfy my conscience, for I often very much enjoyed to stand in front of Michelangelo's work. Precisely on account of this I do not wish to write as much about him as about my [own] feelings and contemplations which are elicited by his creations ... Our works on earth are nothing more than the impressions of the pinions of our soul, which in this way manifests its actions; even though these impressions are not eternal, they are representations of an internal being. The pinions of Michelangelo's soul were stronger - stronger was their impulse - therefore his works are greater and longer lasting. When we think in this manner, we often think of comparing the Vatican Torso with Michelangelo who so often caressed it. Just the Torso has lasted even though it has no legs and hands, it nevertheless has remained beautiful and powerful; likewise Michelangelo's works will last. From the great [masters] the torso survives for an indefinite time; one may break the fingers, hands, and legs, but the torso is unbreakable in [the creation] of the great [masters], but from the minor [masters], the torso breaks first. This is the difference between work and work! It is essential that one be in love with eternity, so that a creation becomes at least its shadow. Eternity is imprisoned in us as

if in a jail; it is necessary to release it - in harmony with what is immortal around and above us. This is inspiration, music, and revelation.

Love for eternity is a sacrifice and sacrifice is a searching for eternity. Evil and good are also temporal; beatitude is eternal and eternity is God. To fight against evil is the best way of praying to God, while to fight for beauty is to sing to His glory. It is written that the word was first and that [it] is from God; but it was not written whether this word was spoken first or engraved [first]. Surely, art is derived from the time when the word was not separate from deed, and prayer [was not separate] from wisdom and poetry. A right artistic endeavour ... has to be poetry and prayer at the same time; and that which it contains has to be beyond dimension and time; that what others do not know or cannot see has to be unveiled, and one should not imitate what others see and comprehend superficially; they have to uncover truth which is [real] and not which seems to be [real] ...

That aspect of art which is called "fine art" (lijepa umjetnost), the art which has visible forms and which comes - at least partially - to our brain through the sense of seeing - and these are: architecture, sculpture, and painting -, [this art] is composed of two elements: of a material being, and of a spiritual being which both bring realization. The material being is visible and the spiritual invisible. They are thus diametrically opposed. But the subject of this type of art exists for us only when these two elements intermix, for even though matter exists in reality, it does not exist as a building, a statue, etc., until the other element [i.e., the spiritual] fructifies it; [on the other hand] it is true that a spiritual creation actually exists in the mind where it is born, but it does not exist for others to see before it unites with matter. ...

... Perhaps in terms of quality of work (in its extra-sensory age - [i.e., where the senses have no influence]), there are - unknown and not directly communicated to us - elements which influence [our] wishes and feelings and which belong to our ancestors, this perhaps also being true of their virtues, and faults. What is unknown to us is the manner of and the quantity of combination of these elements. ... Therefore, the genuine artistic conception, in its essence, is very similar to natural conception. Its cause is a mystery as is our life and their origin. This means that with life-affirmation, that is, with the necessity of life-affirmation, also goes a spiritual one. ... It [i.e., the artistic conception] is evidence that mankind is eternal as a whole, but temporal as an individual. ...

Since time immemorial, art has been a way of comprehending what is most beautiful in man, and has represented his highest aspirations in a spiritual (u idejnom) and moral sense..." (12)

"Sometimes acquaintances ask me: Why do I remain here [in Zagreb] and how much of what I have wanted and proposed has been accepted? Do I have something in common with these people and do we understand each other? ...

I want, I reply, to show that one can also live and work here, ... I believe that the sun will rise and will bask the earth. I believe that women will give birth to children, and fields [will give] fruits. I believe that love and callous hands will always build and never destroy. ... I believe that mad-men and parasites destroy. ... I believe that

chemistry will not devastate and also will not lead mankind to salvation. I believe that abundance is not a prime-mover of the world and that stock exchanges, banks, and tariff-walls will not bring harmony, nor will wealthy-men bring justice ..." (13)

"The contemporary [artists and critics] are not a threat to me, nor am I afraid or ashamed of them, but the "previous" and "future" [ones] - in the time where these characteristics disappeared lies my fear before examination. For this feeling before myself does not excuse me; nor my case, or time, or conditions, even though all of these were in larger part the reason [for it]. ...

Besides this, my real ambitions in my work have not been to become first in my country (na mom ognjištu) since I saw rather early that even a small tree [as well as the large one] can also be easily noticed where there are no woods. ... I have never hated or belittled my time, nor have I tried to overrate it or to consider it without also considering earlier times. As far as I could, - I have integrated it with past times, thereby preparing ties with the future and have always fostered enthusiasm for the era which will come, and which must be better and more positive than ours. I have read from the works of our predecessors that they also had such a feeling. The spiritual and emotional integration (povezanost) leads all of us and always has to the same fountains - which are identical regardless of the changing of colour or of the rustle [of leaves]; their flood and pressure is the same: search for the harmony of the entirety which is called justice, truth, beauty, wisdom, which - so divided - lighten and disappear as does a glow-worm, while only faith remains as a true leader, as it wants the whole of life, and true life wants it [the faith], since it wants to exist [to become a being] (jer hoće da bivuje). For this reason, the right and only aim of art, as well as of every spiritual human endeavour, is eternal as is life and is not separate from life. Its value is such and as much as its [integral] relation is with this aim. ...

I have never felt that art has to serve a certain conception or any system which contradicts the spirit and conviction of people; and that real art can be created against or without a personal conviction of the individual who creates it. ... I also agree with those who state that art has to be free from intrude autocracy and from false democracy, as well as from doctrinarian religiosity; moreover, I can well imagine that those unnamed [workers] who worked on the French cathedrals, who laboured with free will and with full persuasion - as well as all true artists before and after them - that they believed in what they were transposing into figures and images. And this believing, ..., has also been the basis of my motivation regarding national motives ..." (14)

Footnotes to Appendix II

- (1) "Meštrović je najveći fenomen među kiparima."
[Kečkemet, Duško, ed.: Ivan Meštrović: Jediní put da se bude umjetnik jest raditi. (Zagreb, 1970), [Appendix B]: "Izbor citata o Meštroviću" [Selection of citations about Meštrović].]
- (2) Dopisnik rimskog "Messagere" pisao je: "...Posjetioci, stručnjaci i laici, zaista napuštaju paviljon sa najdubljim i nezaboravnim impresijama. Tu povijest i legenda žive... Jedna nova umjetnost, elementarna i veličanstvena, suprostavila se danas aristokratskoj Evropi, ... Ivan Meštrović - taj Homer kamema - taj stvaralac iščezlog svijeta, pred petnaest je godina bio pastir u dalmatinskim planinama, a danas je skoro Michelangelo."
[Cited by D. Kečkemet, Op.cit., preface - italics in original]
- (3) U vezi napuštanja uske nacionalne ideje i prihvatanja jedne opće religiozne ideje, Meštrović kaže:
"Odmah nakon balkanskog rata, a osobito svjetskog rata, meni se učinilo da je premalen ideal jednoga naroda, da su od premalog značaja žrtve ili pobjede jednoga naroda prema svim žrtvama i prema pravoj pobjedi svih. Nu, pobjeda svih, može biti samo ako ne bude "prijatelja" i "neprijatelja", kad budemo svi braća i ljudi. Eto, u nizu tih ideja došao sam na predmete iz biblije. Osjećaj opće patnje čovjeka zauzeo je otada jače mjesto od patnje samog svog naroda..." [Ibid.]
- (4) Jozo Kljaković je pisao o Meštroviću: "U tim teškim godinama rata (1914-1918) i zagušljivom isparivanju ljudske krvi, on [Meštrović] ostavlja junake mača i započinje u svojoj skulpturi slaviti junake duha..."
[Ibid.]
- (5) Sin Ivana Meštrovića, Mate, piše: "Često mislim da se njegova [Ivana Meštrovića] duša najvjernije odrazuje u njegovu djelu. U više stotina skulptura, razasutih u vremenskom razdoblju od preko šezdeset godina, uklesana je bujica Meštrovićevih osjećaja, njegova uvjerenja i težnje, njegovo shvaćanje sebe i okoline, vjerski misticizam njegove zrele dobi i starosti. Užas nad lažnim parolama, kojima su milijoni bili pozvani da polče živote u prvom svjetskom ratu, izražen je u velikom iscrpljenom i iskrivljenom liku Raspela, koje je Meštrović izradio 1917. ... To raspelo nije bilo izradjeno s namjerom da prikaže povijesnog Krista, nego izobličenje kršćanskog ideala po čovjeku."
[Ibid.]

- (6) Ivan Meštrović bilježi govor iz naroda: "Došli oni [Srbi] ovamo sa svojijem u rvacku [Hrvatsku] zemlju, u rvacki narod, pa kažu, s početka, mi oslobodili, a poslije, mi osvojili, ovo je naše. Kako osvojili, kako naše, zaklinjem vas Bogom. E, vele, mi napravili državu, ona je zajednička, al smo u njoj mi prvi. Mi je čuvamo, i zato mora sve biti kako mi očemo. A kad tamo, država brani jednom sve, ne smije ovo, ne smije ono, a drugom pušta sve. Jednom mati, a drugom maćuha. A kad maćuha ne da pastorčadi ništa, a došla sa svojim na njiovo, onda mora letjeti iz kuće, oli će se pastorčad odijeliti. Eno, što je Stipica [Stjepan Radić] počeo govoriti, nego da bude svakom svoje, a za ono što je jednih i drugih, da se dogovorimo, a oni s njime u tamnicu. Strpaše prava čovjeka u tamnicu, da nepravi mogu vladati."
- [Meštrović, Ivan: Ludi Mile; pripovijetke. (Zagreb, Matica Hrvatska, 1970), p.66]
- (7) Meštrović je kazao za Zagreb, gdje je živio, i o Hrvatima:
- "... da je i ovaj kut zemlje isto tako blizu ili daleko svim pokretnim silama kao i ma koji drugi, dapače da je za mene bliži nego i jedan drugi. Treba, mislim, da svaki radi na svome i iz svoga, o sebi i iz sebe. Vjerujem da nećemo biti posljednji među zadnjima već polako postati ravni najboljima."
- [Cited by D. Kečkemet, Op.cit., preface]
- (8) Meštrović kaže o religijama: "... Vidim u svim religijama u onome što im je suština, istovjetnost, i posvuda je božanska istina jedna."
- [Ibid.]
- (9) "Jedini put da se bude umjetnik jest raditi. Ja sam na to navikao. Moji učenici žele raditi 2, 3 sata na dan. Na taj način neće ništa postići [kaže Meštrović]."
- [Ibid.]
- (10) U povodu 70 godišnjice svoga života, Meštrović je govorio: "... ja sam u životu bio opterećen neuporedivim nasljedstvom, siromaštvom: siromaštvom svoje obitelji i svoga naroda. Prvo mi je siromaštvo pomoglo da se nikad ne bojim materijalnih poteškoća jer sam znao da nikad ne mogu spasti na manje nego sam imao na početku. Drugo me je siromaštvo uputilo k ustrajnosti u mom radu, da tako najposlije na mom vlastitom polju siromaštvo moga naroda bude umanjeno. Uvijek sam duboko u sebi slušao šapat koji je govorio: 'Moja siromašna, malena rodna grudo, na čitavom svijetu ti si najveća i najdraža mom srcu.' Ta mi je svijest omogućila da izvršim u svom životu nekoliko važnih stvari. ..."
- [Ibid.]

- (11) "Želite da znate kako sam u svome radu prešao iz nacionalno-historijskih na vjersko-biblijske motive. To sam pitanje vrlo često čuo. Evo malo razjašnjenja.

Tko je intimnije pratio moj rad, tome će biti moji kasniji radovi logični i u vezi sa ranijima. To se vidi i iz onoga što sam malo prije kazao. Moj nacionalizam nije nikad bio svakodnevni, niti su moji radovi onoga doba bili historijsko-ilustrativni, - oni su nastojali da budu izražaj historije duše našega naroda, duše koja je u svojoj suštini i opća i čovječanska. Ja ne smatram, a držim ni vi, za heroje one pojedince, ili narode, koji se bore samo za svoju slobodu, ili materijalnu dobit, nego one koji se bore za opću slobodu, za opću dobit, a ta ne može biti samo na materijalnom polju. Uobičajilo se je da se pod pojmom heroja razumijevaju vojskovođe, dok ja držim da su pravi heroji oni koji se bore za najviše ideale sveukupnoga čovječanstva. Mi ćemo se valjda složiti ako kažem da je sv. Pavao veći heroj od Cezara. ...

Moja se umjetnost izražava u tvrdom drvu i kamenu, ali ono što umjetnost sadržava nije ni od drva ni od kamena, ono je izvan prostora i vremena. Umjetnost je pjesma i molitva u isti mah.

Kao što u općem, čovječanskom, tako i u našem narodnom životu, ja želim da se nadje harmonija: harmonija između ljudi i zemlje na kojoj žive i od koje žive, između sela i grada, između neukoga i učenoga, a nada sve harmonija između naših plemena. Za ljubav te harmonije ja sam, na svoj način, učestovao u borbi za slobodu i ujedinjenje našega naroda, jer sam bio uvjeren da se u slobodi može bolje da izrazi snaga duha i postigne skladno zujanje žica...."

[" O mojoj umjetnosti" [About my art] In: "Kolo" (New York, 1924). Cited by D. Kečkemet, Op.cit. [Appendix A]: "Izbor iz Meštrovićevih citata"]

- (12) "... Ja lično imam tako visoko mišljenje o Michelangelu, da se jedva usudjujem da o njemu pišem. Kad to ipak činim, činim samo zato da udovoljim svojoj savjesti za tako česta i tako velika uživanja što sam ih imao stojeći pred Michelangelovim djelom. Zato se, upravo, i ne usudjujem da pišem toliko o njemu, koliko o svojim osjećajima, i razmatranjima izazvanim njegovim djelom...

Naša djela na zemlji nisu drugo do otisci krila naše duše, koja iako nisu vjekovječna, ali su otisci besmrtnog bića. Krila Michelangelove duše bila su jača, jači je bio njihov zamah, i zato su njegova djela veća i trajnija. Kad ovako mislimo, odmah nam pada na pamet vatikanski Torzo, da ga uporedimo sa Michelangelom, koji ga je toliko puta pomi-
lova. Kao što je Torzo, odolijevajući vremenu, izgubio noge i ruke a ipak ostao lijep i snažan, tako će ostati i Michelangelovo djelo. Od velikih ostane torzo i u nedogledno vrijeme, a malima ni za dogledno ništa; velikima se najprije slome prsti, pa onda ruke i noge, a torzo

im je neslomljiv, - a malima se najprije slomi torzo. Eto, to je razlika između djela i djela! Treba biti zaljubljen u vječnost, da djelo bude bar sjena njezina. Besmrtnost je u nama zatvorena kao u tamnici, treba da je pustimo na svjetlost - u harmoniju sa onim što je besmrtno oko nas i iznad nas. To je inspiracija, muza, i otkrovenje.

Ljubav k vječnosti je žrtva, a žrtva je traženje vječnosti. Zlo je prolazno, i dobro je prolazno; blaženstvo je vječno, a vječnost je Bog. Boriti se protivu zla najbolja je molitva Bogu; a boriti se za lijepo, znači pjevati mu u slavu. Napísano je da je riječ bila prva, i da je od Boga; ali nije rečeno da li ta riječ bijaše prije izgovorena ili urezana. Svakako je umjetnost još iz onog vremena kad riječ nije bila razdijeljena od djela, ni molitva od mudrosti i pjesme. Pravo umjetničko nastojanje... treba da je pjesma i molitva u isti mah; a ono što sadrži, da je izvan dimenzija i vremena, - ono treba da otkriva ono što drugi ne znadu i ne vide, a ne da oponaša ono što drugi površno vide i površno poimaju, da razotkrije istinu koja jeste a ne koja se pričinjava.

Ona strana umjetnosti što je zovu "lijepa umjetnost", i to baš ona koja ima vidljive oblike i koja nam, bar djelomično, dopire do moždana preko čula vida., - a to je: arhitektura, skulptura, i slikarstvo, - sastoji se iz dva elementa: iz materijalnog bića i iz spiritualnog bića koje oživotvorava. Materijalno biće je vidljivo, a spiritualno nevidljivo. Dakle, sasvim oprečno jedno drugom. Ali, predmet ove vrste za nas postoji tek onda kad se ova dva elementa ukrste, jer, koliko god da materija postoji uistinu, ona ne postoji kao građevina, kip, itd., prije nego što je onaj suprotni elemenat ukrsti, oplodi; kao što uistinu postoji duhovno djelo u moždanima, gdje se je rodilo, ali ne postoji za druge oči prije nego što se spoji sa materijom. Kad kažemo za jedno umjetničko djelo da je harmonično, savršeno, ili upotrijebimo sličan izraz, mi smo već time rekli da je složeno iz dva elementa koji su u ekvivalentnom odnosu među sobom, tako da nam daju precizan smisao onoga što ima da predstavlja dotični plastični predmet. Koja bi ta dva elementa mogla biti ako ne ona dva koja smo naprijed spomenuli: spiritualni i materijalni...

... Možda na kvalitet djela imaju upliva (u tom njegovu vančulnom stadiju) nama nepoznate i nesaopćene misli, želje i osjećaji naših predaka do u prageracije, njihove vrline i njihove mane. Na koji način, u koliko jedne, u koliko druge, - to nam je nepoznato...

... Prema tome je i prava umjetnička koncepcija, u svojoj suštini, najsljednija prirodnoj koncepciji. Njen uzrok je misterija, kao i naš život, a izvor im je isti. Znači, da sa životnom afirmacijom, tj. sa potrebom životne afirmacije ide naporedo i duhovna. ... Ona je posvjedočenje da je čovječanstvo vječno kao cjelina, koliko god je prolazno kao individua. ...

Umjetnost je oduvijek sačinjavala ono što je najljepše u čovjeku i

išla je naporedo sa njegovim najvišim nastojanjima, u idejnom i u moralnom pogledu...

[Meštrović, Ivan: "Michelangelo" In: "Nova Evropa" (Zagreb, 1926), cited by D. Kečkemet, Op.cit., [Appendix A]: Ibid.]

- (13) "Pitaju me ponekad znanci: Zašto sjedim baš ovdje, [u Zagrebu] i šta se je prihvatilo od onoga što sam htjeo i predlagao ? Da li imam što zajedničkoga sa ovim svijetom i da li se razumijemo ?... Hoću, kažem, da pokažem da se i ovdje daje živjeti i raditi,... Vjerujem da će sunce izlaziti i grijati zemlju. Vjerujem da će žene radjati djecom i njive plodom. Vjerujem da će ljubav i žuljevite ruke uvijek graditi a nikad obarati. Ruše samo bezumnici i paraziti. ... Vjerujem da kemija neće uništiti, a isto tako ni izvesti na put spasenja čovječanstvo. Vjerujem da blagostanje nije pokretač svijeta i da burze, banke i carinske ograde neće donijeti harmoniju ni bogataši pravdu... [Meštrović, Ivan: "Predgovor katalogu izložbe u Zagrebu 1932. godine." Cited by D. Kečkemet, Ibid.]

- (14) "Savremenici mi nisu opasni, niti ih se bojim ni stidim, već "bivši" i "idući", - u vremenu gdje ove oznake nestaju leži moja trema pred ispitom. Za ovaj osjećaj pred samim sobom ne ispričavaju me ni moj slučaj, ni vrijeme, ni prilike, iako je sve to, dobrim dijelom, bilo razlogom. ...

Pored toga, moje stvarne ambicije u mome radu nisu bile da budem prvi na svome ognjištu, jer sam to vrlo rano vidio da se i malo stablo lako zapazi gdje nema šume. ... Nikad nisam svoje vrijeme mrzio ili potcjenjivao, ali sam nastojao da ga i ne precjenjujem i ne izdvajam iz prošlih vremena, već da ga - koliko sam mogao - povežen sa prošlim vremenima, pripravljaajući veze sa budućim, gajeći uvijek oduševljenje za ono vrijeme koje će doći, koje treba da bude i bolje i ljepše od našega. Čitam iz svih djela naših predšasnika da su i oni svi imali taj osjećaj. Povezanost duhovna i osjećajna vodi nas sve uvijek na iste izvore koji su isti ma koliko im bile promjenljive boje ili šum, - tok i pritisak im je isti: traženje harmonije sveukupnosti, koju se naziva pravdom, istinom, ljepotom, mudrošću, koje ovako razdijeljene bljesnu i nestanu kao krijesnice, dok pravi vodj ostaje samo vjera, jer ona hoće vas život, a pravi život hoće nju jer hoće da bistvuje. Zato je pravi i jedini cilj umjetnosti, kao i svakog duhovnog ljudskog nastojanja vječan kao i život, i nerazdjeljiv je od života. Njezina vrijednost je takva i tolika kakva je i kolika joj je veza s ovim ciljem. ... Nisam nikada mislio da umjetnost treba da služi nekoj koncepciji ili nekom sistemu koji je u opreci sa narodnim duhom i uvjerenjem; a najmanje da se prava umjetnost može praviti protivu ili bez vlastitog uvjerenja onoga ko je pravi.... I ja se slažem s onima koji kažu da umjetnost mora biti slobodna i od nametljive autokracije i od lažne

demokracije, i od doktrinarske religioznosti; ali mogu potpuno zamisliti, da su oni bezimeni što su radili na francuskim katedralama radili i slobodnom voljom i sa punim uvjerenjem kao i svi pravi umjetnici prije i poslije njih, koji su vjerovali u ono što su pretvarali u likove i prikaze. I to vjerovanje, eto, rukovalo me je i pri mojim zahvatima u nacionalne motive...

[Meštrović, Ivan: "Predgovor monografiji (1933)." Cited by D. Kečkemet, Ibid.]

Appendix III

THE CORFU DECLARATION

"... The authorized representatives of the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians - establishing[the fact], without contest, that the only and inalienable demand of our people, a demand which they defined according to the basis of the principle of free national self-determination, to be completely liberated from all foreign yoke and united in one free, national, and independent state - agreed that this common state of them should be established upon the following modern and democratic principles.

1. The state of the Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians - known also under the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs - will be a free, independent kingdom with undivided (jedinstven) territory and with united citizenship (s jedinstvenim državljanstvom). It will be the constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy, headed by the Karadjordjević dynasty, ...
2. This state will be called: Kingdom of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians, and the regent, King of Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians.
3. It will have one state coat of arms, one state flag, and one crown. These state emblems will be composed by our present specific emblems. The state integrity will be expressed (obeležavat će se) by the state coat of arms and by the state flag. ...
4. The separate flags: Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian, are equal, can be flown and can be freely used in all occasions. Also, the separate coat of arms can be used freely in all occasions.
5. All the three people's names: Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians are entirely equal on all the territory of the Kingdom and everyone can use them freely in every occurrence of public life by all authorities.
6. Both alphabets, the Cyrillic and the Latin, are also completely equal and everyone may employ them freely over all the territory of the Kingdom. All state and autonomous authorities are obliged by law to use one and the other alphabet, conforming in this to the wish of the citizens.
7. All recognized religions can be exercised freely and publicly. The Orthodox, Roman-Catholic, and Moslem religion, which are the strongest among our people by the number of its followers, will be like and equal towards the state (bit će jednake i ravnopravne prema državi).
8. The calendar should equalize as soon as possible.

9. The Kingdom's territory of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians will embrace all of the area where live our trinamed people in a compact and continuous mass, and should not be detracted without [taking into consideration] the violating of the living interests as a whole (Bez povrede životnih interesa celine).

Our people do not ask anything that does not belong to them; they only solícite theirs and wish that all of them, as a whole, liberate and unite themselves. Therefore, they consciously and decisively exclude any partial solution regarding their national liberation and union. Our people assert the problem of their liberation from Austria-Hungary and their union with Serbia and Montenegro in one state as one inseparable entity.

According to the principle of free national self-determination, no part of this entity can be rightly separated and annexed to another state without consent of the people themselves.

10. The Adriatic Sea, in the interests of freedom and equality of all nations, will be free and open to all and for all.
11. All the inhabitants (citizens) of all the territory are like and equal towards the state and before the law.
12. The right of voting to elect the people's representatives for the National Assembly as well as the right of voting for the municipalities and other administrative units is equal and general, and will be performed through a general direct and secret ballott in the municipalities.
13. The Constitution - which will bring the Constituent Assembly after the conclusion of the peace [and] elected upon the basis of the general and equal direct and secret right of vote - will be the foundation of state life, the fountain and recourse (izvor i utoka) of all the authorities and rights, and by it [i.e., the Constitution] the entire state life will be governed.
14. The Constitution will also give the people the opportunity of developing their specific energies in the autonomous units, characterized by the natural, social, and economic conditions. The Constitution has to be accepted as an all in the Constituent Assembly, with the numerical qualified majority (brojno kvalifikovanom većinom).
- The Constitution, as well as the other laws, accepted by the Constituent Assembly, will become valid after the King's sanction [i.e., signature]. ..."

(Krfaska Deklaracija:

"...autorizovani predstavnici Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, konstatujući da je jedini i neodstupni zahtev našega naroda, zahtev koji on postavlja na osnovu načela slobodnog samo-opredeljenja naroda, da bude potpuno oslobođen svakog tudjinskog ropstva i ujedinjen u jednoj slobodnoj, nacionalnoj i nezavisnoj državi, složili su se, da ta njihova zajednička država bude zasnovana na ovim modernim i demokratskim principima:

1. Država Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, poznatih i pod imenom Južnih Slovena ili Jugoslovena, bit će slobodna, nezavisna Kraljevina s jedinstvenom teritorijom i jedinstvenim državljanstvom. Ona će biti ustavna, demokratska i parlamentarna monarhija na čelu sa dinastijom Karadjordjevića, ...
2. Država ova zvat će se: Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, a vladalac: Kralj Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.
3. Ona će imati jedan državni grb, jednu državnu zastavu i jednu krunu. Ovi državni emblemi bit će sastavljeni iz naših sadanjih posebnih emblema. Državna celina obeležavat će se državnim grbom i državnom zastavom. Državna zastava, kao simbol jedinstva, isticat će se na svima nadleštivima Kraljevine.
4. Posebne zastave, srpska, hrvatska i slovenačka, ravnopravne su i mogu se isticati i slobodno upotrebljavati u svima prilikama. I grbovi posebni mogu se isto tako upotrebljavati slobodno u svima prilikama.
5. Sva tri narodna imena: Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci, potpuno su ravnopravna na celoj teritoriji Kraljevine, i svako ih može slobodno upotrebljavati u svima prilikama javnog života i kod svih vlasti.
6. Obe azbuke, ćirilica i latinica, takodjer su potpuno ravnopravne i svako ih slobodno može upotrebljavati na celoj teritoriji Kraljevine. Sve državne i samoupravne vlasti dužne su i u pravu upotrebljavati i jednu i drugu azbuku, saobražavajući se u tome želji gradjana.
7. Sve priznate veroispovesti vršit će se slobodno i javno. Pravoslavna, Rimokatolička i Muhamedanska veroispovest, koje su po broju sledbenika najače u našem narodu, bit će jednake i ravnopravne prema državi. Na osnovu ovih principa zakonodavac će se starati, da se čuva i održava konfesionalni mir,...
8. Kalendar treba što skorije izjednačiti.
9. Teritorija Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca obuhvata svu onu teritoriju, na kojoj živi naš troimeni narod u kompaktnoj i neprekidnoj masi, i ona se bez povrede životnih interesa celine ne bi smela krnjiti.

Naš narod ne traži ništa tudje; on traži samo svoje i želi, da se sav, kao jedna celina, oslobodi i ujedini. I zato on, svesno i odlučno, isključuje svako delimično rešenje svoga narodnog oslobodjenja i ujedinjenja. Naš narod postavlja kao jednu nerazdvojnu celinu problem svoga oslobodjenja od Austro-Ugarske i njegovog ujedinjenja sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom u jednu državu.

Po načelu slobodnog narodnog samoopredeljenja ni jedan deo ove celine ne može se pravilno odvojiti i prisajediniti drugoj kojoj državi bez pristanka samoga naroda.

10. Jadransko More, u interesu slobode i ravnopravnosti svih naroda, bit će slobodno i otvoreno svima i svakome.
11. Svi građani (državljeni) na celoj teritoriji jednaki su i ravnopravni prema državi i pred zakonom.
12. Izorno pravo za izbor narodnih poslanika za Narodno Predstavništvo, kao i izorno pravo za opštine i druge upravne jedinice, jednako je i opšte, i vršit će se neposrednim i tajnim glasanjem po opštinama.
13. Ustav, koji će posle zaključenja mira doneti Ustavotvorna Skupština, izabrana na osnovi opšteg i jednakog, neposrednog i tajnog prava glasa, bit će osnova celom državnom životu, izvor i utoka svih vlasti i prava, i po njemu će se uređivati celokupni državni život.
14. Ustav će dati narodu i mogućnost da razvija svoje posebne energije u samoupravnim jedinicama, obeleženim prirodnim, socijalnim i ekonomskim prilikama.
Ustav se ima primiti u celini, u Ustavotvornoj Skupštini, brojno kvalifikovanom većinom.
I Ustav i drugi zakoni, koje bude donela Ustavotvorna Skupština, stupaju u život kada ih Kralj sankcioniše. ...")

[Source: Šišić, Ferdo, comp.: Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1914-1919. (Zagreb, Naklada "Matice Hrvatske", 1920), pp. 97-99, Doc. 56; and Paulova, Milada: Jugoslavenski Odbor. (Zagreb, Prosvjetna Nakladna Zadruga [1925], pp. 343-345; and Čulinović, Ferdo: "Pravno značenje Krfske deklaracije." In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1966), pp. 209-211]

Appendix IV

THE "YUGOSLAV UNITED YOUTH" IN GENEVA

The ideological roots of the "Yugoslav" oriented youth go back to the time of Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian national revival of the 1830's. One of its decisive moments was in 1895 when the student youth publicly burned the Hungarian flag on the main square in Zagreb during the visit of czar Franz Joseph I. Following the persecution and trials many students left Zagreb for Prague, where they came under the influence of Masaryk. Here the Croatian youth lived through its ideological metamorphose: the distinct Croatian national consciousness was neglected and the South Slavic political ideology was accepted.

The first attempt at uniting the Croatian and Serbian youth was made in Prague upon the occasion of the publication of the first youth-journal; this, however, was without success. The union of the student organizations was achieved at the eve of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, in 1907/1908 the following students' associations united in a unique one, the "Yugoslavia" (Jugoslaviija): the "Croat" (Hrvat) - the Croatian students from Croatia; the "Adria" (Adrija) - those from Dalmatia; the "Illyria" (Ilirija) - the Slovenian students from Slovenia; the "Šumadija" - those from Serbia, while the Bulgarian students' association, "Sedjanka", did not want to unite with the "Yugoslavia". ⁽¹⁾ Its publication was also called the "Yugoslavia", and its principle just before the war was:

"where we united - united we will remain!
where we did not unite - united we will become."⁽²⁾

On 28 June 1914 the "Vidovdan" - (The Serbian national holiday in honour of the memory of the "Kosovo battle" against the Turks in 1389) - held a congress in Vienna, the "Vidovdan-Congress". At this

occasion the "Yugoslavia" and the newcomers from the South of the Monarchy as well as from Serbia, constituted themselves into the "Yugoslav United Youth" (Jugoslavenska Ujedinjena Omladina). The main slogan of these uncritical and politically unexperienced enthusiasts was: "We are not only the South Slavs - we want to become Yugoslavs."⁽³⁾

Jovan M. Jovanović, while Serbian Ambassador in Vienna, wrote in his daily-book (on 29 August 1914) the political standpoint of this youth consisting of the following points:⁽⁴⁾

- 1) that in the Balkans it is necessary to have one strong centralized state for the preservation of the peace in the future - in the Balkans as well as in Europe;
- 2) that this state had to be Serbia with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Dalmatia, Croatia, Istria, and Slovenia;
- 3) that this state will keep the balance of power in the Adriatic Sea, thus, in the Mediterranean Sea as well;
- 4) that Bulgaria may enter into this state upon the federalistic or similar basis.

When these points were later submitted to Pašić as information, he wrote down his remark which stated: "It is already necessary to start to work in this Great-Serbian sense and to express our standpoint."⁽⁵⁾

With the beginning of the war in 1914 one wing of the "Yugoslav United Youth" went abroad - mostly to Italy and gathered after a while in Geneva, where - under the dynamic leadership of Dr. Ljubo Leontić, they started their work. On 8 May 1915 they sent their resolution to the Allied government and expressed their solidarity with the "Nish Declaration" (6 May/23 April, 1915). The Club, under the direction of Ljubo Leontić, also published a pamphlet, the "Yugoslav Program", in French,

with an introduction by Thomas G. Masaryk. This was the very first Yugoslav program published during the years of the First World War. In the program:

"they stressed the absolute necessity of the Habsburg Monarchy's destruction... pointing out the first war-aims of the Allied [Powers]: realization of the principle of nationality [and] national state." (6)

The pamphlet was also published in Croatian in an edition of 100,000 exemplaires⁽⁷⁾ and sent to all of the South Slavs' colonies throughout the world. Leontić said that the Serbian Government, whose real politics were not in the same direction as expressed in this pamphlet, confiscated it - ("Meanwhile our brochure... the organs of the Royal Serbian Government impounded...").⁽⁸⁾ The Club of the "Yugoslav United Youth" in Geneva also brought out thousands of maps "throughout the world";⁽⁹⁾ the maps contributed considerably to the propaganda of the "Yugoslav idea". In addition the Club hold a series of speeches to which were invited well-known personalities living in the international city of Geneva at that time.

When Lloyd-George made his famous speech in January 1918, the Club sent a note of protest saying:

"... that Serbs, Croatsians, and Slovenians are one nation, which fights for its liberty and justfully demands the union in one democratic state, independent from Austria-Hungary.... The Yugoslav Academic Youth in Switzerland... sent a most energetic protest against all attempts which jeopardize its [i.e., national] aspirations and [therefore] declared:
The Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croatsians, Slovenians) will not be satisfied with any partial solution regarding their national question, and demand that it [the question] has to be solved upon the principle of national self-determination upon the largest possible democratic basis. ..." (10)

The members of the "Yugoslav Academic Youth" in Geneva contributed greatly to the work and success of the Yugoslav Committee in London -

members like Dr. Ljubo Leontić, who said the following in one of his writings:

"... As soon as I arrived [in Rome, 1914], I reported to the [Serbian] Ambassador, Mr. Mihajlović, and told him (besides the other less important information about the conditions in Austria-Hungary) also about my plan regarding the "legions" - that he submit it to the [Serbian] Government. Furthermore, I told him that I am ready and in agreement with the [Serbian] Government to venture on a journey to America, among the Yugoslavs from Austria-Hungary, to lead a propaganda for a gathering of volunteers. I had to go there [because] of the decision of the Central Committee of the JUO [Jugoslav United Youth] ([made] before the assault in Sarajevo); [there I intended] to make a series of speeches and to reorganize the American emigrant youth. Because of this, I was already in correspondence with the organizations there, and with my brother in Antofagasta, who was ready to pay the expenses pertaining to my trip....

The formation of the troops of volunteers possessed, thus, all of the necessary pre-conditions. ... The [Yugoslav] Committee took my proposition into consideration. And in fact, after three months, upon the intervention of Mr. Supilo, [the Committee] accepted it unanimously at its plenary session. ..." (11)

Later on Leontić left Europe and went to South America where, at first, he stayed twenty months working among the Croatian... emigrants, - (See ch.II, pt. 3) - whose work brought to the Yugoslav Committee its complete security and independency, and then went to North America where he worked mainly with Milan Marjanović.

We may say that the "Yugoslav United Youth" in emigration, during the first years of the war, was a consistent champion of the "Yugoslav idea". It was enthusiastic about Serbia as a "Yugoslav Piedmont" - a myth which was much too far from reality. The youth, at that time, was not conscious about the deep division between the Committee and the Royal Serbian Government, as well as about the inner split among the members of the Committee. Then, a portion of them - mostly the Croatian wing - adopted a similar attitude towards the Serbian Government as Supilo held. Thus, the "idealized political dream" in their minds was broken and destroyed.

Footnotes to Appendix IV

- (1) Leontić, Ljubo: "Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu i Jugoslavenska omladina". In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1966), p. 256.
- (2) "Jesmo li bili jedno - jedno ćemo da ostanemo! Nismo li bili jedno - jedno ćemo da postanemo!"
[Motto from the introductory article by Ljubo Leontić, appeared in the paper "Jugoslavija" (Prague, 1 May 1914). Cited by Ljubo Leontić, Op.cit., p. 257]
- (3) "Mi nismo samo Južni Slaveni - mi hoćemo da budemo Jugoslaveni."
[Leontić, Lj.: Op.cit., p. 246, note 4]
- (4) Leontić, Lj.: Ibid., p. 251.
- (5) "Treba već otpočeti da se radi u smislu velikosrpskom i iznesti naše gledište. ..."
[Leontić, Lj.: Ibid.]
- (6) U programu su "... naglasili neminovnu potrebu rušenja monarhije ... istaknuvši prvi saveznički cilj rata: ostvarenje načela narodnosti - narodne države."
[Slijepčević, Pero: "L'Unité Yougoslave", [par] P. Slijepčević, Ljubo Leontić, Vladislav Fabijančić, (Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1915). Cited by Ljubo Leontić, Op.cit., p. 39, italics in original]
- (7) Leontić, Lj.: Ibid.
- (8) "Medjutim našu su brošuru ... plijenili organi kr[aljevske] srpske vlade ..."
[Leontić, Lj.: "O Jugoslavenskom odboru u Londonu; Jugoslavenska narodna obrana u Južnoj Americi i Jugoslavensko narodno vijeće u Washingtonu."
In: Starine, knj. 50, p. 42 (Zagreb, JAZU, 1960)]
- (9) Leontić, Lj.: "Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu i Jugoslavenska ...". In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu, Op.cit., p. 257, note 21.
- (10) Jugoslavenska Ujedinjena Omladina u Ženevi šalje protestnu notu povodom govora Lloyd-Geora, u kojoj se kaže: "... da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci jedan narod, koji se ... bori za svoje oslobodjenje i opravdano zahtijevaju ujedinjenje u jednu demokratsku, od Austro-Ugarske nezavisnu državu. ... Jugoslavenska Akademska Omladina u Švicarskoj ... ulaže najenergičniji protest protiv svih pokušaja, koji ugrožavaju njegove [i.e., narodne] aspiracije i izjavnije: Jugoslaveni (Srbi, Hrvati, Slovenci) se neće zadovoljiti nikakvim djelomičnim rješenjem svoga nacionalnog pitanja, i zahtijevaju da se ono riješi po principu narodnog samoopredjeljenja na najširoj demokratskoj osnovi. ..."
[The Declaration of the Central Committee of the General Organization of Union of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Academic Youth in Switzerland. (Bern, 22/9 January 1918) Gradja o stvaranju jugoslavenske države (1.I. - 20.XII.1918) [Comp. by] Bogdan Krizman & Dragutin Janković. (Beograd, 1964), pp. 47-48, Doc. 33, vol. I]

- (11) "... Odmah čim sam stigao [u Rim, 1914] prijavio sam se [srpskom] poslaniku G. Mihajloviću i saopćio mu (pored ostalih manjih informacija o prilikama u Austro-Ugarskoj) i svoju osnovu o "legiji", da je dostavi [srpskoj] vladi. Kazao sam mu takodjer, da sam spreman u dogovoru i s privolom vlade, poći na put u Ameriku da medju Jugoslavenima i Austro-Ugarske povedem agitaciju za sakupljanje dobrovoljaca. Tamo je i inače trebalo da krenem, po odluci Centralnog Komiteta JUO [Jugoslavenske Ujedinjene Omladine] (prije atentata u Sarajevu), da održim ciklus predavanja i provedem rev[iziju] organizacije amer[ičke] emigrantske omladine. Zbog toga sam bio već u prepisci s tamošnjim organizacijama i sa svojim bratom u Antofagasta, koji je bio spreman da mi namiri putne troškove. ...

Obrazovanje dobrovoljačkih četa imalo je dakle sve nužne preduslove. ... [The Yugoslav] Committee uze moj prijedlog na razmišljanje. I zaista, poslije tri mjeseca, na zagovor G. Supila, primio ga je jednoglasno u svom plenumu. ... "

[Dr. Leontić to Professor Boža Marković. (Rome, 7 April 1915). Leontić, Lj.: "Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu; Jugoslavenska narodna obrana u Južnoj Americi i Jugoslavensko narodno vijeće u Washingtonu." In: Starine, knj. 50, pp. 119-122, Suppl. no. 5. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1960)]

Appendix V

TRUMBIĆ'S LETTER TO PAŠIĆ DATED OCTOBER 1918

"Permit me to direct you one frank request at the moment when our trinamed people stay on the cross-roads of their future. England, France, and without doubt America, are ready to give the declaration by which they will recognize to our people their rights as they already did recognize them to others. The governments of France and England, as you know, do not approve your standpoint. On the contrary, they accept those principles which the Yugoslav Committee submitted to them. The governments have not made this step, only for this reason, that you - as chief of the Royal Government - [are] oppose[d to it]. ... You vindicate the Serbs from Austria-Hungary to Serbia, leaving [it] to the Croats and Slovenians to decide for themselves, whether they want [to join] Serbia or not. In this way you separate the Serbs from the Croats and Slovenians, while our people have to be an object of liberation and not a subject of right. Our union and independence have to be created only upon the principles: of the people's union, of complete liberty and of equality. Your point of view is against this as well as against the Corfu Declaration, which was approved by all the factors of Serbia ... The Corfu Declaration does not know the difference between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians. It wants to solve our national problem as an entity.

Please pay attention to these consequences: Our people are [a] component part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Their territory is a part of the Monarchy and, if the Allied troops enter it, they will enter into an enemy territory. Italy will occupy this land in the sense of the Treaty of London. It will try to capture the fleet - navy and mercantile - consisting of many of our ships. The only way to prevent this terrible danger is that our people, in Austria-Hungary, are recognized as an allied nation in the name of their absolute right on independence. As an allied nation, our people become a new juridical individuality and the execution of the Treaty of London cannot be applied on their territory without them [i.e., their consent], [because] it was created without them, but [the Treaty can be executed] only against Austria-Hungary as an enemy. Our people will have the right to counteract successfully against the Treaty of London and take into protection our territories on the Adriatic and our fleet, only as an allied nation. Austria-Hungary is disintegrating and it seems that the moment of its capitulation is near. The [Croatian] "Jelačić-Regiment" occupied Rijeka (Fiume). ... The events alone are passing over your conception, which is against the spirit of time. Therefore, I beseech you with what is most holy to you and to the entire people - leaving aside every improper authority, every personal feeling - that you notify by telegram at once the French, English, and American Government, your unlimited consent to the Declaration by which will be recognized to our people in Austria-Hungary: the right on independence and the status of an allied nation; to the troops of volunteers the character of right belligerents, and

to the Yugoslav Committee the character of the representative of the national interests of our people in Austria-Hungary. ... It is necessary to work with a speed as quick as lightning since the events proceed at full rapidity ..."

("Dozvolite da Vam upravim jednu iskrenu molbu u času, kad naš troimeni narod stoji na raskrsnici svoje budućnosti. Engleska i Francuska, a bez sumnje i Amerika, spremne su da dadudeklaraciju, kojom će priznati našem narodu njegova prava, kao što su ih priznale već i drugima. Vlade Francuske i Engleske, kako znate, ne odobravaju Vaše stajalište. One nasuprot usvajaju one principe, koje im je predložio Jugoslavenski Odbor. Vlade nisu do sada taj korak učinile jedino stoga, što se Vi, kao šef kraljevske vlade, protivite. ... Vi vindicirate Srbe iz Austro-[U]garske Srbiji, prepuštajući Hrvatima i Slovencima, da se opredijele, hoće li sa Srbijom ili ne. Na ovaj način Vi odvajate Srbe od Hrvata i Slovenaca, a naš narod ima da bude predmet oslobodjavanja, a ne subjekt prava. Naše se ujedinjenje i nezavisnost imaju da stvaraju jedino na principima narodnog jedinstva, potpune slobode i jednakosti. Vaše je gledište protivno ovomu kao i Krfskoj Deklaraciji, koju su odobrili svi faktori Srbije. ... Krfska Deklaracija ne poznaje razlike između Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Ona hoće da se naš narodni problem riješi kao jedna cjelina.

Molim, da svratite pažnju na ove posljedice: Naš je narod još sastavni dio Austro-Ugarske monarhije. Njegova je teritorija dio monarhije i ako u nju udju savezničke trupe, ući će u neprijateljsku teritoriju. Italija će okupirati tu teritoriju u smislu Londonskog pakta. Ona će nastojati da zarobi flotu, ratnu i trgovačku, u kojoj ima više stotina hiljada tona naših brodova. Jedini način, da se ta strašna opasnost spriječi, jeste, da naš narod u Austro-Ugarskoj bude priznat kao saveznička nacija u ime njegova apsolutnog prava na nezavisnost. Kao saveznička nacija naš narod postaje novi pravni individualitet i ne može da se na njegovu teritoriju primenjuje bez njega izvršavanje Londonskog pakta, koji je stvoren bez njega, a jedino [može se sprovesti] protiv Austro-Ugarske kao neprijatelj. Naš narod će jedino kao saveznička nacija imati pravo da se uspješno suprostavi Londonskom paktu i da uzme u zaštitu naše teritorije na Jadranu i našu flotu.

Austro-Ugarska se ruši i izgleda, da je blizu čas njezine kapitulacije. [Hrvatska] "Jelačićeva regimenta" okupirala je Rijeku. ... Dogadjaji sami prelaze preko Vašega shvaćanja, koje je protivno duhu vremena. Stoga Vas zaklinjem svim, što je najsvetije Vama i cijelome narodu, da ostavljajući po strani svaku neumjesnu auktoritativnost, svaku ličnu osjetljivost, saopćite odmah telegrafski francuskoj, engleskoj i američkoj vladi Vaše neograničeno pristajanje na Deklaraciju, kojom će se našem narodu u Austro-Ugarskoj priznati pravo na nezavisnost i položaj savezničke nacije, dobrovoljačkim trupama značaj pravih ratnika i Jugoslavenskom Odboru značaj predstavanika nacionalnih interesa našega naroda u Austro-Ugarskoj. ... Treba raditi munjevitom brzinom, jer dogadjaji jure. ..."

[Source: "A. Trumbić to N. Pašić. (Paris, 27 October 1918). Gradja o stvaranju jugoslavenske države (1.I-20.XII.1918). Priredili: Bogdan Krizman & Dragoslav Janković. (Beograd, 1964), pp. 389-390, Doc. 326, vol. 2]

Appendix VI

TRUMBIC'S MEMORANDUM TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT

"The recognition of the right of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak people from the side of the Allies, includes logically the further recognition of the right of the Yugoslav people. In this matter arose conflicts in the views between Mr. Pašić, the Serbian Premier, and the Yugoslav Committee. ...

The view of Mr. Pašić:

1. He demands that the Allies - recognizing Serbia's loyalty and sacrifices as an ally - concede her the claim and right to liberate with her own help [i.e., power] her compatriots (suplemenike) in Austria-Hungary and that she unite with them in one free and independent state (See: "Le Temps" of 27 September). ...
2. He declared that, from his side, he is against the acknowledgment of the Yugoslav volunteers from Austria-Hungary as the allied and belligerent troops.
3. He does not want the Yugoslav Committee to be acknowledged as the representative of the Yugoslav subjects of Austria-Hungary.

The view of the Yugoslav Committee:

- a) It demands that the Yugoslav people, which are now subordinated to Austria-Hungary, will be recognized to Austria-Hungary, will be acknowledged as an allied people, and that they will be given the right on the state independence and union based upon the national principle and the principle of self-determination in one independent state with their brothers from Serbia and Montenegro.
- b) It demands that the Yugoslav volunteers will be recognized as allied and belligerent troops.
- c) It demands that the Yugoslav Committee will be acknowledged as the representative and an organ of the national interests of the Yugoslavs subject to Austria-Hungary and as their mandatary, and that, at the same time, the Committee declares ready to continue its political activity in agreement with the Serbian Government.

These three final points are reassumed in the added supplement which the Yugoslav Committee has the honour to submit to the British Government as its opinion.

Commentary:

To point 1. - The position in which Mr. Pašić wishes to keep the Yugoslavs from Austria-Hungary is a position of subordination and humiliation, because these people would only be an object of the liberation and not a subject for rights and liberty. Pašić's view is anti-liberal and anti-democratic and is against the principle of nationality. This view is inspired, even more by the spirit of conquest and annexation of our territories to the Serbian state.

Such tendencies are against the spirit- and letter of the Corfu Declaration which Mr. Pašić himself signed and submitted to the Allies for their approval. The Yugoslavs outside of Serbia wish the people's union, but none of the provinces will submit herself to the hegemony of some other province. Every tendency which leads to a hegemony will be in conflict with the interior harmony in one homogeneous race, and will endanger the creation of the state which is in the interest of the future civilization and peace in Middle Europe.

To point 2. - The total figure of the Yugoslav volunteers reached at least the number of 30,000. The Government of Mr. Pašić has done everything possible to hide the extension of the volunteers-process and the response of the volunteers, and this, simply for the reason that he wanted to preserve an hegemony on them. ...

To point 3. - The Yugoslav Committee did not refuse nor exclude co-operation with the Serbian Government in relation to our people in Austria-Hungary, while Mr. Pašić wants to monopolize the politics of all the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, excluding all other people's factors from the leading of this politics. ... Our people do not trust such an anti-liberal government, mainly in respect to the treatment towards their brothers in Macedonia, ... The Yugoslav territories in Austria-Hungary are more advanced in civilization and public administration than Serbia, and will not be ready to submit themselves to the Government which is not on the same level. ... Our people wish the union with Serbia and Montenegro for a number of reasons and by their own will, but not by a dictate from another. ..."

(Trumbićev Memorandum Engleskoj vladi:

"Priznanje prava poljskog i čehoslovačkog naroda od strane Saveznika logično uključuje i dalje priznanje prava jugoslavenskog naroda. U toj je stvari došlo do razlike u gledištima izmedju g. Pašića, srpskog premijera i Jugoslavenskog Odbora. ...

Gledište g. Pašića:

1. On traži, da Saveznici, priznavajući lojalnost i žrtve Srbije kao Saveznika, priznaju joj i pravo, da oslobodi svojom pomoći svoje suplemenike u Austro-Ugarskoj i da se s njima ujedini u jednu slobodnu i nezavisnu državu (Vidi "Temps" od 27. septembra). ...
2. On je izjavio, da je od svoje strane protivan priznanju jugoslavenskih dobrovoljaca iz Austro-Ugarske kao savezničkih i ratujućih trupa.
3. On da ne želi, da Jugoslavenski Odbor bude priznat kao predstavnik jugoslavenskih podanika Austro-Ugarske.

Gledište Jugoslavenskog Odbora:

- a) On traži, da jugoslavenski narod, koji je sada podložen Austro-Ugarskoj, bude priznat kao Saveznički narod i da mu bude dato pravo na državnu nezavisnost i ujedinjenje na temelju nacionalnog principa i principa samoopredjeljenja u jednu nezavisnu državu sa svojom braćom iz Srbije i Crne Gore.

- b) On traži, da jugoslavenski dobrovoljci budu priznati kao saveznice i ratujuće trupe.
- c) On traži, da Jugoslavenskih Odbor bude priznat kao predstavnik i organ narodnih interesa Jugoslavena, koji su podanici Austro-Ugarske i kao njihov mandatar, a Odbor u isti mah izjavljuje se spremnim, da će nastaviti svoju političku djelatnost u sporazumu s vladom Srbije.
- Te tri posljednje točke su reasumirane u priloženom formularu, koji Jugoslavenski Odbor ima čast da predloži brit[an]skoj vladi kao svoje mišljenje.

Komentar:

K točki 1. - Položaj, u kojem želi g. Pašić da zadrži Jugoslavena iz Austro-Ugarske, položaj je podčinjenosti i poniženja, budući da bi taj narod bio samo objekat oslobodjenja, a ne subjekat prava i slobode. Gledište g. Pašića je antiliberalno i antidemokratsko i protivno je načelu narodnosti. To je gledište nadahnuto što više duhom osvajanja i aneksije naših krajeva srpskoj državi. Takve tendencije protivne su duhu i slovu Krfske deklaracije, koju je potpisao sam g. Pašić i predložio na odobrenje Saveznicima. ...

... Jugoslaveni izvan Srbije žele narodno ujedinjenje, ali ni jedna pokrajina ne će se podčiniti hegemoniji neke druge pokrajine. Svaka tendencija, koja ide za hegemonijom, poremećavat će unutrašnji sklad u jednoj homogenoj rasi i ugrožavat će tvorevinu države, koja je u interesu buduće civilizacije i mira u Srednjoj Evropi.

K točki 2. - Cjelokupni broj jugoslavenskih dobrovoljaca dostigao je u najmanju ruku cifru od 30,000. Vlada g. Pašića učinila je sve moguće, da sakrije od javnog mišljenja opseg dobrovoljačkog pokreta i odziva dobrovoljaca, i to iz prostog razloga, što je željela da zadrži hegemoniju nad njima. ...

K točki 3. - Jugoslavenski Odbor nije odbijao i ne isključuje suradnju srpske vlade u odnosima prema našem narodu u Austro-Ugarskoj, dok g. Pašić želi da monopolizira politiku svih Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca isključujući sve ostale narodne faktore iz vođenja te politike. ... Naš svijet nema povjerenja u takvu antiliberalnu vladu, naročito s obzirom na postupanje prema svojoj braći u Makedoniji, ... Jugoslavenski krajevi u Austro-Ugarskoj u civilizaciji i u javnoj upravi napredniji su od Srbije i ne će biti voljni da se podvrgnu vladi, koja nije na istoj razini. ...

... Naš narod želi sjedinjenje sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom iz više razloga i po svojoj vlastitoj volji, a ne po diktatu drugih. ..."

[Source: Cited by Milada Paulova: Jugoslavenski Odbor; povijest jugoslavenske emigracije za Svjetskog rata od 1914. - 1918. (Zagreb, Prosvjetna Nakladna Zadruga [1925], pp. [496]-501; and Gradja o stvaranju jugoslavenske države (I.I.-20.XII.1918.) (Beograd, 1964), pp. 333-337, Doc. 267, vol. I]

Appendix VII

STEED'S ACCOUNT ON ORLANDO

"When I reached Paris [said Steed] a message was brought to me by an Italian friend that Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, wished to see me. I replied that I could not see him because he had broken faith with me by not adhering to the policy of the Rome Congress, despite his official pledge to me in June. He answered that he hoped I would suspend judgment until he should have explained the circumstances, and asked me again to call upon him. I went; and, in a long conversation, dealt faithfully with him. He admitted that he had broken his pledge but urged that the difficulties had been such as to make it impossible for him to risk a Cabinet crisis in Italy by getting rid of Sonnino during the summer. He wanted, however, to put things again on to a sound footing in view of the Peace of Conference and to ask my advice as to how it could best be done. I told him that the first step would be for Italy to grant, and to secure from the other Allied governments, recognition of the Yugoslav National Council as an Allied organization both in order to strengthen the position of the Yugoslavs in regard to Serbia and to promote the constitution of a united Serbo-Yugoslav State on a basis of political and religious equality. He asked me to act as his intermediary with the Yugoslavs but, in view of his past tergiversations, I declined and told him he must deal personally with Trumbitch as President(*) of the Yugoslav National Council. Orlando said he was prepared to recognize the Yugoslav National Council and to promote its recognition by the other Allies; and he asked me to invite Trumbitch to call upon him. This I also declined to do, saying that it would be an affront to Trumbitch, whom Orlando knew well, to be invited by a third party. Orlando then promised to invite Trumbitch himself but asked me to ask Trumbitch to be in readiness next day to receive an urgent summons. This I did, after warning Orlando that Trumbitch would be leaving Paris next evening for Geneva to take part in critical negotiations with the Serbian Prime Minister, Pashitch, and with sundry Yugoslav leaders from Austria-Hungary, for the constitution of a Serbo-Yugoslav Coalition Government. Therefore, if Orlando wished to see him, he should lose no time. Orlando promised to send for Trumbitch next morning and to agree with him upon the recognition of the Yugoslav National Council. Trumbitch, whom I saw at once, promised to stay indoors all next day in readiness for Orlando's summons.

But next morning [5? XI.] when I called at 10 a.m. upon M. Philippe Berthelot, the Director General of the French Foreign Office, and spoke optimistically of the Italo-Yugoslav outlook, he said: 'That is excellent, as far as words go. But do you know that Orlando has done ? - [*italics in original*] - He called upon Clemenceau at 8 o'clock this morning and begged him, literally with tears in his eyes, on no account to sanction any recognition of the Yugoslav National Council since Italy was determined not to recognize it; and I have reason to fear that Clemenceau has committed himself.' ..."

[Source: Steed, Henry Wickham: Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922; A Personal Narrative. (London, William Heinemann, 1924), vol. 2, pp. 261-263, *italics mine*]

(*)[i.e., representative]

Footnotes to Abstract and Chapter I

- (1) The first solid undertaking in this direction is a treatise: Konstantin Bastaić: "Hrvatski sabor i Jugoslavenski odbor" (The Croatian Parliament and the Yugoslav Committee). In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu; u povodu 50-godišnjice osnivanja. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1966), pp. 259-367.
- (2) Lederer, Ivo: Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference; a Study in Frontiermarking. (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1963), 351 pp.
- (3) Title for the Governor of Croatia: its equivalent might be found in the following Latin terms: banus, prorex, praefectus regni.
- (4) When converting square kilometers into square miles, the following equivalent can be taken:
- | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1 square kilometer | = 0,39 square mile |
| 1 " mile | = 2,59 " kilometers. |
- (5) Šidak, Jaroslav: Povijest hrvatskog naroda g. 1860-1914. (Zagreb, "Školska knjiga", 1968), pp. 128-129.
- (*) "The former monetary unit or a silver coin of Austria, was about twenty cents worth and also called crown". (Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language) 1957.
- (6) Lakatoš, Josip: Narodna statistika. (Zagreb, 1914), p. 64. Cited by Vješeslav Holjevac: Hrvati izvan domovine. (Zagreb, Matica Hrvatska, 1967), p. 30.
- (7) Holjevac, V.: Ibid., p. 35.
- (8) The "Kolonat" (cf. French system of "métayage") was a specific type of agricultural relation in which the owner of the land received his income of life annuity in natural products. The difference between Kolonat and capitalistic lease-hold lies essentially in the fact that the lease-holders paid their rent in the form of money (monetary capital).
- (9) Source: Statistika pučanstva u Dalmaciji. (Zadar, 1885), p. 52; Juras, J.: Pregled gospodarstva i trgovine u Dalmaciji. (Zadar, 1910), p. 12. Cited by Foretić, Dinko: "Društvene prilike u Dalmaciji pred prvi svjetski rat s osobitim obzirom na radničku klasu." In: "Radovi" Razdio historije, arheologije i historije umjetnosti (1). God. 2, sv. 2, p. 227 (Zadar, 1963).
- (10) "Povezati Hrvatsku što čvršće za Peštu, Peštu povezati s morem, a Hrvatsku ne povezati s morem. Tu svoju politiku dosljedno je sprovodila sve do 1918. godine."
[Jelinović, Zvonimir: Borba za jadranske pruge i njeni ekonomski ciljevi. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1957), p. 34]

- (11) On conditions in Dalmatia preceding the outbreak of World War I, see the speech of Dr. Joseph Smodlaka, the founder of the Croatian Democratic Party in Dalmatia, and member of Parliament for Split (Spalato), delivered in the Austrian Parliament on December 3, 1910. [The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy, by R.W. Seton-Watson. (New York, Howard Fertig, 1969, Repr. of 1911 ed.). Appendix XVI, pp. 406-416]
- (12) In 1867 Pula had ca. 17,000 residents (from this number 4,000 were military people); in 1890 already 32,000, and in 1900 over 36,000 inhabitants - from this number about 8,000 were naval personnel.
- (13) With the falsification of the Croatian-Hungarian Agreement, the so-called "Riječka krpica" - (a small paper strip was pasted on the original text of that document, upon which a new text was written proclaiming that Rijeka was "Corpus separatum", that is, a separate entity from Croatia connected with the Hungarian crown (separatum sacrae regni coronae adnexum corpus)) -, Rijeka received its juridical status - status which ascertained the city to be an autonomous district sui generis; it lasted till 29 October 1918 when Rijeka was incorporated with Croatia, but very soon occupied and annexed to Italy. The maritime trade of Rijeka improved fast: in 1891 there were 6,284 vessels in its port with 930,589 tons of maritime goods, and in 1913 already 9,539 vessels with 2,898,743 tons(*), while the railway transportation, at the beginning of the 20th century, was over 5,000 wagons per year(**).
[(*) Kos, Lucijan: "Rijeka kao slobodna luka u razvoju od 1719-1939 godine." Analji Jadranskog instituta. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1968), vol. 4, p. 346]
[(**) Gorničić-Brdovački, Josip: Razvoj željeznica u Hrvatskoj do 1918 godine; gradjenje, organizacija i financijski odnosi. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1952), p. 19]
- (14) Holjevac, V.: Op.cit., p. 36.
- (15) Šidak, J.: Op.cit., p. 182.
- (16) Dimitz, Ludwig: Die forstlichen Verhältnisse und Einrichtung Bosniens und der Herzegovina. (Wien, 1905), p. 291. Cited by Zvonimir Jelenić: Borba za jadranske pruge ..., Op.cit., p. 22.
- (17) Lakatoš, Joso & Despić, Aco: Industria Bosne i Hercegovine. (Zagreb, 1924), p. 14. Cited by Z. Jelenić: Borba za jadranske pruge ..., Op.cit., p. 22.
- (18) Mandić, Dominik: Rasprave i prilozi iz stare hrvatske povijesti. (Rim, Hrvatski Povjesni Institut, 1963), p. 61.
- (19) Pilar, Ivo: Južnoslavensko pitanje; prikaz cjelokupnog pitanja. (Die Südslawische Frage; Übersichtliche Darstellung des Gesamt-Problems) [by] L.V. Südland (pseud.). ([Zagreb] Izdanje Matice Hrvatske, 1943), pp. 166-167.

- (20) See also: Seton-Watson, R.W.: German, Slav, and Magyar; a Study in the Origins of the Great War. (New York, Howard Fertig, 1968, Reprint of 1916 ed.), pp. 87-88; Seton-Watson, R.W.: The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy. (New York, Howard Fertig, 1969, Reprint of 1911 ed.), pp. 109, 118-128 and Appendix XVII: "The Correspondence of Bishop Strossmayer and Mr. Gladstone", pp. 416-444.
- (21) "The "Illyrians" were so named because they originally espoused the idea that the Croatians, along with the Serbs and Slovenes, were descended from the ancient Illyrians of Roman times."
[Eterovich, Francis H., ed.: Croatia: Land, People, Culture. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970), vol. 2, p. 39]
- (22) The Croatian language comprises three dialect groups distinguished by their respective words for "what"?: što, ča, and kaj. Hence the names of these dialects: Shtokavian, Chakavian, and Kajkavian. Another classification of Croatian dialects is made on the basis of the triple development of the Common Slavic sound "yat": e, i, (i)je. Hence the names Ekavian, Ikavian, and (I)jekavian for variants that occur, for example in words such as "child": dete, dite, dijete. Whereas the Serbian literary language is Shtokavian and Ekavian, the Croatian literary language is Shtokavian and (I)jekavian.
[Eterovich, F.: Croatia: Land, People ..., Op.cit., vol. 2, p. 160]
- (23) "... Dalmacija je bila dugo vremena središte hrvatskoga političko-narodnoga života. Hrvati su mnogo sabora držali u dalmatinskim gradovima. Upravo onda se je najviše razvio slovenski [t.j., hrvatski] život i slovenska [hrvatska] izobrazjenost, kad je Dalmacija bila u političkom savezu sa Hrvatskom i Slavonijom. ..."
[Cepelić, Mirko & Pavić, Mate: Josip Juraj Strossmayer, biskup bosansko-djakovački i srijemski. (Zagreb, 1900-1904), p. 436. Cited by Kosta Milutinović: "Strossmayer u borbi za sjedinjenje Dalmacije s Hrvatskom." In: Radovi. Razdvo historije, arheologije i historije umjetnosti (1). (Zadar, 1963), God. II, sv.2, p. 149]
- (24) "Starčević je dubok mislilac, a svoj misaoni svijet doživljava u vidu etičko-pravnih vrijednosti ... [Starčević] je dubokog uvjerenja, da pravo počiva na prirodnim zakonima ljudske razumno-čudoredne naravi."
[Nevestić, Franjo: "Stogodišnjica pravaštva; osnovne misli hrvatskog nacionalizma-njegova suvremenost?" In: Hrvatska Revija (La Revista Croata), (Buenos Aires, 1961) God. XI, vol. 3(43), pp. 201-202]
- (25) "Ideja prava kod Hrvata je u politici uvijek prevladavala nad idejom sile."
[Ibid., p. 201]

- (26) "I. Hrvatska sjedinjena opozicija, stojeći na temelju državnog prava i narodnog načela, radit će svim zakonitim sredstvima, da se hrvatski narod, koji stanuje u Hrvatskoj, Slavoniji i Dalmaciji, na Rijeci (s kotarom), te u Medjimurju, Bosni, Hercegovini i Istri, sjedini u jedno tijelo u okviru habsburške monarhije; podjedno će svom snagom podupirati nastojanja braće Slovenaca, da se tom državnom tijelu prikupe i slovenske zemlje.
- II. Isto će tako sjedinjena opozicija raditi, da se kraljevina Hrvatska uredi kao pravna država ustavno i slobodno tako, da će narod po svojim zastupnicima u svim granama državnog života - po načelima parlamentarne vladavine vršiti u hrvatskom saboru zakonodavnu vlast sporazumno s krunom. Na čelu parlamentarne vlade stoji ban kraljevine Hrvatske.
- III. One poslove, koji su skupni cijeloj monarhiji, a potječu iz pragmatičke sankcije, rješavat će kraljevina Hrvatska - ravnopravno kraljevini Ugarskoj s ostalim zemljama Nj. Veličanstva.
- IV. Hrvatska će sjedinjena opozicija uopće raditi, da se ustav, sloboda i zakonitost kraljevine Hrvatske oživotvori i zajamči svim zakonitim sredstvima, napose pak slobodnim izbornim redom, pravom sakupjati se i sastajati se, te slobodom savjesti, govora i štampe."

[Source: Horvat, Rudolf: "Hrvatska politika od god. 1860-1895", Obzorova Spomenica. (Zagreb, 1935), pp. 12, 15. Cited by Franjo Nevestić: "Stogodišnjica pravaštva; osnovne misli hrvatskog nacionalizma-njegova suvremenost?" In: Hrvatska Revija (La Revista Croata). (Buenos Aires, 1961) God. XI, vol. 3(48), pp. 199-200]

(27) For more about this point see: "Frano Supilo", Appendix I, p. 270.

(28) "...IV: Naši bi novi Srbi dužni bili dobro promisliti, da ova zemlja u koju se oni pred stoljeća preseliše radi turskih progona, nije od vajkada drugo nego hrvatska zemlja i da u praktičnom životu ime zemlje pada na njezine svekoličke stanovnike ... da su kao srodni nam doseljenici u sto, dvie, tri stotine godina u narodnom i političkom pogledu posve ujedinili, i bi reći srasli, pa im je odatle s nami jedina historija, jedini običaji, jedine pjesme, jednaka prava i jednake dužnosti. ..."

[Novak, Grga: "Podvojene narodne snage u Dalmaciji." In: Radovi Instituta Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti u Zadru. (Zadar, 1963), Sv. X, p. 18]

(29) Ibid., p. 24.

(30) Juraj Biankini (1847-1928) was a Catholic priest, publicist, politician, and deputy in the Dalmatian Diet and in the Federal Parliament (Carevinsko vijeće) in Vienna; from 1871 till 1919 he was the editor of the newspaper at Zadar, "Narodni List" (The National Paper), and the founder of the known journal "Jadranska Straža" (The Adriatic Guard).

- (31) Mihovil Pavlinović (1831-87), a Catholic priest, was a leading man in the movement of national revival in Dalmatia and the "fighter" for its union with Croatia; from 1873-80 he was a representative in the Federal Council, in Vienna. He was a first-class expert in people's language and collected folk-songs, wrote poems, political and ideological treatises, and articles. Pavlinović also wrote works for the common people, e.g., "Ognjištar", "Pjesme i besjede", "Hrvatski razgovori".
- (32) "Hrvati i Srbi, da, jesu narod, što no se kaže jedan te isti po krvi i po jeziku, ali nisu jedan po životu duševnom; nisu jedan povjesnicom i težnjom; nisu jedan narodno-državnim pravom: u jednu rječ, Hrvati i Srbi neimadu jedne [te] iste narodne svijesti, ni jedne težnje."
[Cited by Šidak, Jaroslav: Povijest hrvatskog naroda ..., Op.cit., p. 110, italics mine]
- (33) For detailed information regarding Dalmatia and Istria since ca. 1850 until 1914, see: Hrvatski narodni preporod u Dalmaciji i Istri; zbornik. (Zagreb, Matica Hrvatska, 1969), 498 pp.
- (34) See: "The Times" (31 December 1909). Cited by R.W. Seton-Watson: The Southern Slav Question ..., Op.cit., p. 85.
- (35) See also: Kecmanović, Ilija, comp., "Jedna epizoda iz borbe Bosne i Hercegovine za Crkveno-školsku autonomiju: Memorandum bosanskohercegovačkih Srba ruskom caru." In: Glasnik Arhiva i Društva arhivskih radnika Bosne i Hercegovine. God. 1964-65, knj. 4-5, pp. 369-396. (Sarajevo, 1965) [Memorandum: pp. 371-396] This Memorandum was intended to be handed over to the Russian czar at the occasion of the visit by the Serbian King Alexander, in August 1902. However, as this visit did not take place, it was sent - after its translation into Russian - to the Czar through the Serbian Ambassador, Stojan Novaković.

Footnotes to chapters II - VII

- (1) Of Jewish background Dr. Josua Frank, a Croatian politician, was born in Osijek in 1844 and died in Zagreb in 1911. Frank closely collaborated with Dr. Ante Starčević, founder of the very influential political party, "The Party of Right" (Stranka prava), which - after the death of its founder in 1895 - split into two factions: the Croatian Party of Right (Hrvatska stranka prava) led by Dr. J. Frank and also called "frankovci"; and Starčević's Party of Right (Starčevićeva stranka prava) led by Mile Starčević, a nephew of Dr. Ante Starčević; it was therefore also called "milinovci".
- (2) "... da u novoj državi smije vrijediti samo princip individualne ravnopravnosti građanske, a nikakav kolektivni, pogotovo ne historijski princip, koji bi podupirao plemensku [i.e., nacionalnu] narodnu ekskluzivnost."
[Paulova, Milada: Jugoslavenski Odbor. (Zagreb, Prosvjetna Nakladna Zadruga [1925]), p. 27]
- (3) "... da se do potpunog narodnog jedinstva može doći tek postepenom evolucijom ..."
[Ibid.]
- (4) "... kao ideju vodilju narodne politike i da Srbija kao nezavisna država treba da tu ideju zastupa u međunarodnoj politici, osobito ako dodje do rata s Austro-Ugarskom."
[Ibid., p. 7]
- (5) "... zajednička orijentacija u osnovnoj misli jugoslavenskog ujedinjenja."
[Ibid.]
- (6) Paulova, M.: Ibid., pp.8-9.
- (7) Mandić, Ante: Fragmenti za historiju ujedinjenja. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1956), p.15.
- (8) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp.8-9.
- (9) Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p.15.
- (10) Stojanović, Nikola: Jugoslavenski odbor. (Zagreb, 1927), p.10. Cited by A. Mandić, Op.cit., p. 16.
- (11) Šepić, Dragovan: "Politika rušenja Austro-Ugarske i Južni Slaveni."
In: Naučni skup. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1969), pp.109-110.
- (12) "... da, ako nakon rata dodje do raspada Austro-Ugarske, mora se zahtijevati oslobodjenje od nje cijeloga našega naroda troimenog, jer da smatramo za vrlo opasno, ako bi se naš narod oslobadjao na dijelove, što bi moglo osobito za Hrvate i Slovence, stvoriti situaciju goru od današnje u Austro-Ugarskoj. Složili smo se i u tome, da bi bolje bilo da one naše zemlje, koje ne bi mogle doći do svoje slobode, ostanu u

Austriji, nego da dodju pod Italiju."

[Šepić, Dragovan: Trumbić "Dnevnik". In: Historijski pregled. (Zagreb, 1959), no. 2, p. 167-168. Cited by: D. Šepić: "Politika rušenja ...", Op.cit., p. 110, note 1 - italics in original]

- (13) "The High Contracting Parties, having in mind only the maintenance, so far as possible, of the territorial status quo in the Orient, engage to use their influence to forestall any territorial modification which might be injurious to one or the other of the Powers signatory to the present Treaty. They shall communicate to one another all information of a nature to enlighten each other mutually concerning their own dispositions, as well as those of other Powers. However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers aforesaid, based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present status quo, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well founded claims of the two Parties."
[Second Treaty of the Triple Alliance, 1887; (b): Separate Treaty between Austria-Hungary and Italy. (Berlin, February 20, 1887) Article I. In: Pribram, Alfred Franzis: Texts of the Treaties and Agreements. Transl. by Denys P. Myers and J.G. D'Archy Paul. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1920), p. 109. Series: The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, vol. I: 1879-1914]
- (14) "... talijanska diplomacija prosudila je ... navještaj rata Srbiji kao širenje austro-ugarskog gospodstva na Balkanu."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 3]
- (15) Grey of Fallodon, K.G. Viscount: Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916. (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1926), vol. II, Appendix D: "Speech by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914," p. 300, and pp. 206-208; see also: John A. Thayer: Italy and the Great War; Politics and Culture, 1870-1915. (Madison and Milwaukee, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 277-278, 315; William A. Renzi: "Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War: A Re-examination." In: "The American Historical Review", vol. LXXIII, no. 5 (June 1968), pp. 1414-1432.
- (16) Tadjman, Franjo: "Jugoslavenski odbor i stvaranje zajedničke države jugoslavenskih naroda." In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1966), p. 395.
- (17) In his work - (The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957) - Victor S. Mamatey says on page 23 that the "Croatian Committee" protested

"against the New Year's message of the Hungarian Premier, Stephen Tisza, ...". According to Professor Vaso Bogdanov's explanation this is not so, for

"Tisza did not make this his speech 'in the [Buda]Pest Parliament in the month of December', but at the first, so-called, 'confederate concert' in the [Buda]Pest conservatoire on 30 January 1915. (See the editorial of the [newspaper] "Hrvat" [The Croatian]: "Tisza about the Croats and Croatia", published in the issue of 1 February 1915."

("Tisza nije taj svoj govor održao 'u peštanskom parlamentu mjeseca decembra', nego na prvom takozvanom 'savezničkom koncertu' u peštanskom Glazbenom zavodu 30. januara 1915.

(Vidi uvodnik "Hrvata": "Tisza o Hrvatima i o Hrvatskoj," objavljen u broju od 1.II.1915.))

[Source: Bogdanov, Vasa: "Problem rješenja hrvatskog pitanja izvan okvira Habsburške monarhije na početku Prvog svjetskog rata; prilog historiji oslobođenja južnoslavenskih zemalja. In: Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti i Umjetnosti. Rad. Odjel za društvene nauke. Knj. 15, p. 67, note 14. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1969)]

- (18) Michael, Paul Henri: La question de l'Adriatique. (Paris, 1938).
Cited by V.S. Mamatey, Op.cit., p. 23.

- (19) "... Ako se želimo osloboditi Austro-Ugarske, mi još manje želimo doći pod Italiju, jer bi nam svakako u svakom pogledu bilo gore pod Italijom, nego nam je pod Habsburškom Monarhijom. Ne radi se o mijenjanju gospodara, nego o oslobođenju od tuđe tutule, da postanemo nezavisni. U Austro-Ugarskoj možemo se donekle nacionalno razvijati, uživamo neku iako ograničenu pravnu sigurnost, sve to zato jer je ona država više-narodna pa je izgradila jedan sistem vladanja, po kojem narodi drugog reda, kao što su Slaveni uopće, a mi na jugu napose, ~~imaju~~ ne sva prava, kao što imaju Nijemeci i Mađari, nego dio prava. Bilo i to, ipak neka prava imamo i smatramo ovo jednim provizornim stanjem, u kojem se može živjeti, dok dodje dan narodne slobode. U ekonomskom pogledu je slično i već činjenica da živimo u jednoj velikoj cijelini od 50 milijuna i to bogatoj i u Centru Evrope, daje i nama stanovite koristi življenja i razvitka sa napredkom. Nasuprot i to, što sada imamo, sve bi pod Italijom propalo."
[Šepić, D.: Trumbićev "Dnevnik", Op.cit., pp. 169, 173-174. Cited by:
D. Šepić: "Politika rušenja Austro-Ugarske ...", Op.cit., p. 110, note 1.]

- (20) "I[z] dugoga razgovora, koji smo mi dva imali, iz mnogobrojnih njegovih uputa i odgovora provijala je velika njegova skepsa, da će se jugoslavensko pitanje moći riješiti u Srbiji i sa Srbijom na bazi narodnoga jedinstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, te se je iz svega vidjelo, da on drži, da je i bolje i za uspjeh stvari sigurnije, ako se naše zapadne većine okupe oko Hrvatske, a istočne oko Srbije. Naročito je, ... u to sumnajo, ... da su Srbi voljni i dozreli, da spoje i sliju ova dva naša narodna svieta, koje su vjekovi, civilizacija, tradicije uvijek dosle [sic] razdijeljena držala. Po njegovim upitima sudeći, on je držao, da mi Hrvati, ako se u ove kombinacije upuštamo, nećemo ništa postići, ...

Ja sam njegovu tezu probijao, bolje rekuć odgovorima zagovarao tezu naše kooperacije i fuzije sa Srbijom i Srbima. Na njegove primjetbe da svi Hrvati tako ne misle, priznao sam, da ih ima prilično, koji ne bi bili za ovu kombinaciju, ali da se mora sa Srbima i Srbijom napraviti taka baza, na kojoj će se svi Hrvati osjećati oslobođenima, a ne absorbirana, da je moje uvjerenje, da će nam Srbija htjeti i moći dati tu bazu, a onda, da je bolje da budemo jedno veliko, nego dva manja, i t.d. Mi smo se razišli, a da meni nije pošlo za rukom razbiti njegovu skepsu.

Ono isto veče ja sam sadržaj celoga ovoga razgovora priobćio dru A. Trumbiću. Mi smo o[vu] pojavu svestrano razpravljali, te smo zaključili, da se svakoj separatističkoj osnovi mi kao Hrvati moramo opirati i da moramo raditi za jedinstvo sa Srbijom i sa Srbima, uz uvjet da nam Srbija i Srbi priznaju svu ravnopravnost i sve ono što naš Hrvatski individualizam u kompromisu i slievanju s njima neće učiniti ni zapostavljenim, ni pobiedjenim ni absorbiranim u srpskom ekskluzivismu. Ovo je bio zaključak našeg razgovora, ... Ja sam Trumbiću dao ruku i poštenu rječ, da ću u ovom pravcu kod engleskih i francuskih državnika zagovarati našu stvar i naše ugrožene obale, a on mi je za sebe sa poštenom rječ i isto potvrdio. ..."

[Frano Supilo to Ivo De Giulli. (Paris, 29.VI.1916) Pisma i memorandumi Frana Supila, 1914-1917. (Letters and Memorandums of Frano Supilo, 1914-1917) (Beograd, Naučno delo, 1967), p. 125, Document no. 86, pp. 124-133]

- (21) Count Alexander Petrovich Izvol'ski (1856-1919), the Russian diplomat and statesman, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1906-1910), Ambassador in Paris (1910-1917).

- (22) "... jučer sam bio u Izvolškoga. Razgovarali smo 2 ure. ... On [mi] reče, da će se svim silama boriti, da se na jugozapadu Balkana, i na Jadranskom moru stvori jedna velika država, koja bi imala zadaću jaka bedema budućoj provali Germanstva na Adriju. ..."
[Frano Supilo to Ante Trumbić. (Bordeaux, 6.X.1914) Šepić, D.: Pisma i..., Op.cit., p. 6, Doc. 4, pp. 6-7, italics in original.]
- (23) "... Sa Delcasséom sam govorio takodjer vrlo dugo. ... I on je za našu ideju. Ako pobjedimo Njemačku, reče svejedno će ostati 80 mil[ijuna] Niemaca i treba se boriti. Veliki zid te obrane morate biti vi, Južni Slaveni na Adriji! ..."
[Frano Supilo to Ivan Meštrović. (Bordeaux, 11.X.1914) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 7, Doc. 5, pp. 7-8.]
- (24) "... Prirodno bi bilo, da se naš narod, u ovoj obrani od germanske invazije, nadje rame o rame sa Italijom. To bi Italiji još i s druge strane koristilo. Takav savez i državni sporazum otvorio bi vrata njenoj kulturi, trgovini, industriji u novu državu na veliku obostranu korist. Poznato je da Italija gaji velikih, neopravdanih aspiracija na istočne obale Jadranskoga mora. ... sporazum može slijediti samo na temelju pravednog uređenja medjusobnog graničenja, uzimajući u obzir narodnostni princip kao glavni regulator. ..."
["Solution of the Yugoslav Question." (Bordeaux, 12.XI.1914) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 19, Doc. 8, pp. 15-20 - italics mine]
- (25) "... [borba] za stvaranje jedinstvene jugoslavenske ili eventualno srpsko-hrvatske države, odbijajući mogućnost stvaranja posebne hrvatske ili hrvatsko-slovenske države unutar Habsburške Monarhije."
[Tudjman, F.: Jugoslavenski odbor i..., Op.cit., p. 395]
- (26) "... Odbor mora biti i ostati stvarno samostalan i nezavisan od koga god bilo, pa i od same srpske vlade ... Odlučeno je stoga, da će se rad Odborov financirati dobrovoljnim priložima, koji će se sabirati medju emigrantima, specijalno onima u Amerikama."
[Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 16]
- (27) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p.XIX.
- (28) "... Srbi ovu stvar jedinstva i ujedinjenja shvaćaju sasvim jednostrano, ekskluzivistički, tako da po njihovim kriterijima to za naš hrvatski, zapadni dio ne bi bilo nikakovo oslobođenje, nego jedno novo osvajanje, u kome će se osjećati zarobljenim u srpsko-ortodoksnom ekskluzivizmu, te ne će moći da vrede ništa."
[Cited by D. Šepić: "Hrvatska u koncepcijama Frana Supila." In: Forum, God. VII, Knj. XV, no. 2-3 (Zagreb, 1968), p.352, no indication of the source of citation.]

- (29) [K tome da Srbi teže za] "svojom absolutnom dominacijom." [Trumbić i Supilo su zaključili] "da se stvar dovede na bazu ekvilibrija, kompromisa i uvidjavnosti," [stoga je potrebna] "oprezna ali intenzivna naša hrvatska akcija u Evropi, osobito u Zapadnoj Evropi, naročito u Engleskoj."
[Ibid.]
- (30) Mamatey, V.: Op.cit., p.15.
- (31) "... njena zadaća bila bi braniti u prvom redu hrvatsko-dalmatinsko primorje, ako dodje do talijanske invazije."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 25]
- (32) "... ljudi opremljenih autoritetom, koji proističe iz njihova predratnog rada na narodnom polju, koji će svojom osobom uvjeriti Antantu, da rad emigracije nije individualno djelo, nego izraz volje cjelokupnoga naroda."
[Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 60]
- (33) "... emigracija mora voditi isključivo spoljašnju politiku."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Ibid., p. 61]
- (34) On the meeting in Trieste were the following persons: Dr. Otokar Rybař, Professor Matko Mandić, Dr. Gustav Gregorin, Dr. Gregor Žerjav, Dr. Josip Mandić, Dr. Đinko Trinajstić, Vjekoslav Spinčić, Dr. Matko Laginja, Dr. Ivan Lorković, Dr. Ante Pavelić - (not the same person as Dr. Ante Pavelić who was head of the Croatian state, 1941-45) -, Dr. Julije Križan, Dr. Ivan Marija Čok, and other.
[Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 17, see also p. 160, note 1; and Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 62]
- (35) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 17.
- (36) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 62.
- (37) Ibid., p. 23.
- (38) Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 18.
- (39) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 23.
- (40) If two dates are given, the second date will always refer to the old calendar. (Namely, the difference between the old or Julian calendar - established 46 B.C. by Julius Caesar, which Eastern Orthodox Church followed till 1918, and the new or Gregorian calendar - established by Pope Gregory XIII (1582) was 13 days.)
- (41) "... 11. aprila [29. marta] se je u Trstu vršio prvi oficijelni sastanak 16 slovenskih i hrvatskih prestavnika najkrupnijih stranaka Trsta, Istre, Gorice, Kranjske, Hrvatske i Slavonije. Politički program Supila, koji je ... primljen, medju inima čak i od katoličkog svećenstva. Konstantiralo se, da je cilj Slovenaca i Hrvata, da postignu samostalnost i

ujedinjenje triju jugoslavenskih naroda pod srpskom državom. Odlučeno je, da se to objavi proklamacijom u pogodnom momentu, isto tako kao što i to, da Slovenci i Hrvati ne će nikada pristati da zamijene sadanje ropstvo, koje oni smatraju vremenskim, sa smrću pod konačnim talijanskim gospodstvom. Polazući nade u pravednost Saveznika i u zaštitu Rusije, oni će se ipak u slučaju potrebe oprijeti silom svome podčinjenju Italiji..."

[Poggenpol to Sazonov. (Rome, 19./6. April 1915) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., pp. 159-160, Doc. 78, Tel. 71, M.O.-VII/2: Doc. 560, transl. from Russian]

- (42) "... da hrvatske i slovenačke zemlje moraju u svakoj kombinaciji ostati jedna nerazdjeljiva cjelina ... Na Italiju gledaju kao na glavnog neprijatelja, pošto ona želi rasčlaniti južno Slavenstvo."

[Poggenpol to Sazonov. (Rome, 24./11. April 1915) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 161, Doc. 80, Tel. 76, Dim. 1915-77, transl. from Russian original transcript]

- (43) Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 18.

- (44) "... Srbi u Koaliciji upirali su oči u srpsku vladu, a djelovanje su emigracije slabo ocijenili."

[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 64]

- (45) "... kako ćemo pred svijetom dokumentovati tvrdnju da smo Slovenci, Srbi i Hrvati jedan narod i tako opravdati naš zahtjev za narodno ujedinjenje. Svijet nas pozna pod tolikim imenima: Srbi, Hrvati, Slovenci, Bošnjaci, Dalmatinci i t.d., svako to ime znači narod [za strance]."

[Potočnjak, Franko: Iz Emigracije, III: U Americi. (Zagreb, Tisak "Tipografija", 1926), p. 22]

- (46) "... ići u "Sjedinjene Države Sjeverne Amerike, pa da se [naš] svijet uputi u čemu je stvar i da ga se privoli na to da stvori odluku u tom smjeru."

[Potočnjak, F.: Ibid., p. 23]

- (47) This journey was financed by the Serbian Government with 5,000 liras - a minimum that one could cover his basic expenses, said F. Potočnjak.

[Potočnjak, F.: Ibid., p. 25]

- (48) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 66.

- (49) "... Skoro svi ti emigranti bijahu radnici i rudari, ... [sa] nešto trgovaca, gostioničara i neznatan broj farmera. ... Ponajznatniji dio toga žiteljstva bio je bez ikakvog političkog odgoja, narodna svijest ne bijaše razvijena, obrazovanje bilo je maleno. ... Neke kolonije bile su do 90% austrofilске ..."

[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 66-67]

- (50) "... Jednom riječi, ... naše prilike u Americi živi [su] odraz staroga kraja ... Jugoslavensku ideju razumijevali su neki, rijetki, Hrvati, - taki Slovenci skoro su iščezavali, a u Srba nije nikoga takoga ni bilo. Srpski element bio je nacionalno - srpski vaspitan i osviješten, znao je dobro svoju dužnost naprama srpstvu i Srbiji, a dalje od toga ni makac. On je rado slušao o nacionalnom ujedinjenju i proširenju prema hrvatstvu i slovenstvu, nu za nj je to značilo à tout prix [i.e., pod svaku cijenu] i isključivo srpstvo koje je eo ipso potencirao na velikosrpstvo ..."
- [Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., pp. 34-35]
- (51) "... Ni ovdje [i.e., u Hrvatskoj] ni tamo [i.e., u Americi] nije vladala puna i jaka nisao narodnoga jedinstva i ujedinjenja, ni ovdje ni tamo nije se ni mislilo ni težilo za tim da se stvori ova i ovaka država [i.e., Jugoslavia] ... Ipak, bilo je nešto ... : odanost i vjernost dinastiji Habsburga i monarkiji i spremnost na svaku žrtvu za nju."
- [Potočnjak, F.: Ibid., pp. 35-36]
- (52) "... Ako je istina da su svi ljudi jednaki i djeca božja, ... I za što da mi [onda] robujemo ni Njemcu ni Madjaru [sic!]? Za nas je ... dužnost da kidamo sve veze koje su nas s njima vezale, ne pitajući je li to na štetu, monarkiji. ... Naša je dakle dužnost ... da pazimo samo sebe i svoju korist i potrebu koja nam [sada] diktuje da na principu narodnoga jedinstva tražimo naše ujedinjenje i slobodu."
- [Potočnjak, F.: Ibid., pp. 87, 89]
- (53) Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., pp. 94-96.
- (54) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. [226]-227.
- (55) "... Novaca treba, a nema ih. Stoga se Odbor obraća svim Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima, koji su raštrkani po svijetu, da pomognu što mogu."
- [Archives of the J.N.O. South America I-IV, first circle 1934-1936, pp. 10-11. Cited by: Zorka Stefanović-Djačić: "O ulozi naših iseljenika u Južnoj Americi za vrijeme Prvog svjetskog rata." In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu, Op.cit., p. 521]
- (56) Leontić, Ljubo: "O Jugoslavenskom odboru u Londonu." In: Starine, Knj. 50, pp. 80-81 (Zagreb, 1960).
- (57) Stefanović-Djačić, Z.: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu, Op.cit., p. 523.
- (58) Ibid.
- (59) ... ujedinjenje u jednu "slobodnu državnu cjelinu."
- [Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 229]
- (60) "... preko 200 delegata ... iz svih južno-američkih kolonija."
- [Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 230]

- (61) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 230-231.
(*) - See: ch.III, pt. 1, p. 95.
(**) "... we are putting ourselves at the unconditional disposal of the Serbian Government ..." ("... stavljamo se na bezuvjetno raspolaganje srpske vlade ...").
(***) "... expressing our complete trust in the Yugoslav Committee in London, which we consider as our lawful representative of all the Yugoslav countries under the dominion of Austria-Hungary." ("... izričući naše potpuno povjerenje Jugoslavenskom Odboru u Londonu, kojega smatramo svojim zakonitim predstavnikom svih jugoslavenskih zemalja pod gospodstvom Austro-Ugarske.")
[Paulova, M.: Ibid.]
- (62) Paško Baburica, born at Dubrovnik, was a zealous Croatian. He came to South America in his seventeenth year of age with empty hands. During the years with diligent work, he became an industrialist of saltpetre and the owner of four big mines. During the time of the national movement among the Croatian colonies in South America, soon after the outbreak of the war in 1914, Paško Baburica was among the first to take an active part in it. One can see his patriotic feeling from the fact that "he contributed with a monthly sum of 6,000 \$ to the Yugoslav Committee [in London], in addition to the regular contributions for other funds of the J.N.O. [Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana = The Yugoslav National Defence]." (*) In gratitude for his contributions, the Yugoslav Committee elected him as its regular member.
(*) [Archives of the J.N.O. South America, VIII, 1938-1939, p. 975.
Cited by: Z. Stefanović-Djačić, Op.cit., p. 526]
- (63) "J.N.O. šalje Jugoslavenskom odboru mjesečno 10,000 franaka u zlatu, dakle godišnje 120,000 franaka u zlatu; ... doprinosi [su] kasnije znato povišeni, tj. za Jugoslavenski odbor na 400,000 zlatnih franaka godišnje, a i veće svote slale su se za ratnu siročad kao i za izbjeglice."
[Iseljenička Nedelja, 27.XI. - 4.XII, 1932. Priredio N. Travica, p. 30.
Cited by Zora Stefanović-Djačić: "O ulozi naših iseljenika ...", Op.cit., p. 527]
- (64) Stefanović-Djačić, Z.: Op.cit., p. 527.
- (65) "... Ako bi zbrojili sve sume koje je J.N.O. sakupila i poslala Jugoslavenskom odboru i ostalim ustanovama mogli bi konstantirati da je taj iznos za čitavo vrijeme rata prešao sumu od 10,000,000 franaka."
[Stefanović-Djačić, Z.: Ibid.]
- (66) The task of creating the Yugoslav Committee continued, in fact, from September 1914 until the 1st of May 1915, when the Committee formally constituted itself in Paris. But the date of its establishment and constitution is still a matter of controversy in historiography. For instance, Dr. Ljubo Leontić, a former political emigré in Italy from the very beginning of the First World War, and one of the most active leaders of the younger emigrés generation, as well as a partaker in the formation of the Committee, affirmed that: "The Yugoslav Committee in London was already established in November 1914 (de facto), and was

constituted (de iure) at the plenary session in Rome on the 24th of January 1915." ("Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu osnovan je već novembra 1914 (de facto), a konstituiran (de iure) na zasjedanju plenuma u Rimu 24. januara 1915.")

[Leontić, Ljubo: "O Jugoslavenskom odboru u Londonu; ..." In: Starine, knj. 50. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1960), p. 22]

- (67) The other members were: Frano Supilo, Professor Ivan Meštrović, Milan Marjanović, Jovo Banjanin, Milan Srškić, Dr. Bogumil Vošnjak, Dr. Gustav Gregorin, Dr. Hinko Hinković, Dr. Franko Potočnjak, Dr. Julije Gazzari, Dr. Dinko Trinajstić, Dr. Mića Mičić, Dr. Nikola Stojanović, Dušan Vasiljević, Dr. Niko Županić, Dr. Ivo De Giulli, and Josip Jedlowski. Several months later joined also the "Committee": Dr. Ante Mandić, Dr. Ante Biankini, don Niko Gršković, Ćiro Kamerović, Paško Baburica, Vjekoslav Mitrović, Franjo Petrinović, Mihailo Pupin, and Pavle Popović. [Tudjman, F.: Jugoslavenski odbor i ..., Op.cit., p. 396; Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 73]
- (68) Frano Supilo to Edward Grey. (London, 7.I.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 40-45, Doc. 18.
- (69) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 125, note 1.
- (70) ... Jusupov "koji je u velikom prijateljstvu i rodu s [ruskim] carem ... i slovi kao, iza cara, najbogatija ličnost Rusije." [Frano Supilo to Ante Trumbić. (Nish, 14.II.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 48, Doc. 20]
- (71) "... Vrlo se ugodno dojmila svih, moja upravo slijepa i neograničena vjera u Rusiju i njezinu konačnu pobjedu. ... Jest, Rusija ima veliku budućnost, samo bi, čini mi se, trebalo nešto više discipline u koordinaciji duševnog i državnog života. Nešto alla Česi.... Ovdje se rat skoro ne opaža ... Ni u Moskvi se ne opaža. ... Velika je Rusija i ruski narod! ..." [Frano Supilo to Ante Trumbić. (Petersburg, 25.II.1915) Šepić, D.: Op.cit., pp. 49-50, Doc. 21]
- (72) ... u Rusiji za "Hrvate i Slovence, nije bilo ... nikakvog razumijevanja. ... o Hrvatima i Slovencima znali su i pismeni ljudi samo to, da su neprijatelji, "Austrijaki," koji se bore protiv ruske vojske." [Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 50]
- (73) Maurice Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre, 20 juillet 1914 - 2 juin 1915. (Paris, Plon, [1921])vol. I, p.120.
- (74) Frano Supilo to Edward Grey. (Petersburg, 29.III.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 59-60, Doc. 30.
- (75) "Iz oduljih razgovora sa gospodinom Sazonovom uvjerih se o podpunom njegovu nepoznavanju naših jadranskih prilika. Tako on nije znao, da je postojala dubrovačka republika, nego mi je tvrdio da je moj Dubrovnik bio mletački grad. Kad mu razložih poviest Dubrovnika, reče, da to prvi

put čuje. Nadalje mi je uporno i sa uvjerenjem tvrdio da su u Dalmaciji ostrva, gradovi i obale talijanske a unutrašnjost slavenska, a u Istri gdje smo velika većina mislio je da Slavena ni nema. Ova tvrdnja najbolje dokazuje totalno nepoznavanje zemalja sa strane čovjeka koji o našoj sudbini govori jednu od najodlučnijih rieči. ..."

[Frano Supilo to Alexander P. Izvol'ski. (Petersburg, 29.III.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 58, Doc. 28]

- (76) ... na kome području "mi Slaveni imamo ili ogromnu većinu od preko 90%, ili smo većinom u razmjeru od 100% te osim Slavena drugih elemenata niti nema."

[Frano Supilo to Theophile Delcassé. (Petersburg, 3.IV.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 62-63, Doc. 33]

- (77) See: Gradja o stvaranju Jugoslavenske države, 1.I - 20.XII.1918. Priredili Dragoslav Janković & Bogdan Krizman. (Beograd, 1964). vol. I, Doc. 252; vol. II, Docs. 541, 593; see also Ivo Lederer: Op.cit., pp. 7-9, 113-116.

- (78) See ch.3,pt. 3, p.114 Pašić's statement on the conference to the Russian Press in St. Petersburg.

- (79) "... Idea dei Serbi, Trieste, Gorizia, ed Istria sarebbero annesse all'Italia se essa intervenisse a tempo con le armi ma non già rimanendo neutrale poichè in tal caso quelle tre regioni sarebbero reclamate dagli Slavi." ... "All'Italia oltre a quelle quattro provincie sopra-nominate spetterebbero anche, secondo i Serbi, Valona essendo tutti convinti che uno Stato d'Albania vitale non si riuscirà a formare e che quella regione sarà ripartita tra il Montenegro, Serbia e Grecia." [Il Ministro a Belgrado, Squitti, al Ministro degli Esteri, Di Sangiuliano. (Nisch [Serbia], 28 settembre 1914) I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani. Quinta Serie: 1914-1918, (Roma, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la Pubblicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici, 1954), vol. I (2 agosto - 16 ottobre 1914), p. 497, Doc. 837, Tel. 9645/111]

- (80) This Treaty was signed on 26 April 1915 between: Italy, England, France, and Russia, by which Italy - on the side of the Entente Powers - received all of Istria, Gorizia, and Trieste, as well as Northern Dalmatia extending to the town of Trogir including most of the islands from Krk to Korčula - from the Slovenian and Croatian territories. (For detailed arrangements of these negotiations, see: Milan Marjanović: Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1960); René Albrecht-Carrié: Italy at the Paris Peace Conference. (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1938); M. Toscano: Il Patto di Londra. (Bologna, Zanichelli, 1934). For the text of this Treaty see: René Albrecht-Carrié: Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, Op.cit., pp. [334]-339.

- (81) "... Sazonov [je] opširno govorio o našem vjerskom pitanju. Pošto upozoren da je vrlo religiozan bio sam oprezan jer se radilo o narodnoj stvari a ne o mojim liberalnim nazorima. Glede naših katolika rekoh držim sada dovoljnim protegnuti na njih novi srbski konkordat s Vatikanom koji daje toli očekivano slavensko bogoslužje te će u slavenskom pravcu omogućiti katolicima etapno približenje pravoslavlju do boljih vremena. ... Sazonov mahne prezirno rukom i odvрати, da konkordat, slavenska

služba božja i sve te kombinacije nisu ništa dokle god se bude papa priznavao vrhovnom glavom crkve. ... Sazonov [je] opetovano izjavio sumnju u uspjeh zajedničkih naših ideala te kategorički rekao da će Srbija dobiti liepu odštetu i doći na more, ali da je naš veliki narodni program neostvariv. On ne vjeruje u njegovo postignuće i Rusija se toliko ne može angažirati. Moguće da su ove dvije stvari, koje sam čuvao tajnom, međusobno u savezu ? ... Knez Jusupov s kojim sam slučajno učinio poznanstvo ... Bio je u cara, govorio mu i bio je dvaput u Sazonova ... [rekao] mi je sliedeće: Ja ću vam iskreno kazati, što vam drugi neće reći. Sva je nesreća u tome, što su tih vaših pet milijuna katolici. Da su pravoslavni, kako bi to sve drukčije išlo! Ali vi slušate papu, dakle glavaru izvan države. ... Kako vidite sredovječna shvaćanja i pogledi. ... naišao sam, osobito kod Sazonova i Schillinga(*), ali i kod drugih, samo na skepsu, objekte, prigovore i nepovjerenje. ... Dočim čim izadjem iz ovih sfera u nezavisnu narodnu rusku inteligenciju odmah nalazim na toplo shvaćanje i oduševljenje ..."

[Frano Supilo to Nikola Pašić. (Petersburg, 11.IV.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 67, Doc. 38]

(*) Count Morice Fabianovich Schilling was a Russian diplomat and the director of the Bureau of Foreign relations from 1911 until 1917.

- (82) "... Kao delegat ovoga naroda bio sam u Londonu i Vaša Preuzvišenost je izjavila, da je načelo englezke vlade riješiti naše pitanje na temelju principa narodnosti. Ovaku istu izjavu i osjeganje podao mi je Preuzvišeni gospodin ministar predsjednik Asquith. Povodom glasova da se naše obale kane žrtvovati Italiji i da u Londonu mnogo ovisi, dapače da je tamo odlučna riječ, ... [s toga Supilo moli Greya] da ne dopusti da se na našem narodu počini ovaj novi i historički delikt, ... [jer da Italija ne ulazi u ovaj rat] da oslobadja, nego da pljačka i otimlje zemlje i gradove našega naroda. ..."
- [Frano Supilo to Edward Grey. (Nish, 29.IV.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 74-75, Doc. 43]
- (83) Frano Supilo to Sergei D. Sazonov. (Athens, 27.V.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 81-82, Doc. 50, italics in original.
- (84) "... Možda i engleskoj politici konvenira da Slaveni na Jadranskom moru ne ojačaju, ... Ali kombinacija sa Italijom glede Jadrana jesu uglavnom stvar ruske vlade i ruske diplomacije. Ove osnove bijahu u Petrogradu određene davno prije ... I osnova o posebnoj Hrvatskoj niknula je u flirtu između Rima i Petrograda. ..."
- [Frano Supilo to Ante Trumbić. (Athens, 20.V.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 80, Doc. 48]
- (85) See ch.3, pt.3, p. 114 Pašić's statement to the Russian Press done in Petersburg.
- (86) "... Ruska diplomacija je nad Istrom i Dalmacijom bila davno prekinula štap i odredila ih Italiji, ako Italija stupi u savez. Početkom rata počeo je flirt na toj bazi ... Srbija je imala dobiti trgovački izlaz na more, a sve ostalo Italija ... Ovo je osobito išlo u račun Engleske, ... Osim dobre pomoći, ona je tako faktično Rusiji ... zatvorila izlaz na Sredozemno More sa Italijom ...

... Sazonov hoće liepu Srbiju, veću Srbiju (sa trg[ovinskim] "izlazom" na more), ali pravoslavnu Srbiju, koja bi morala stupiti u konfederaciju (ili barem savez) pravoslavnih država na Balkanu ... pod zapoviednič[s]tvom Rusije, gospadarice Carigrada. ... Dakle, kako vidiš velebna koncepcija: Mjeste [i.e., mjesto] Svetog Rimskog Carstva, Sveto Bizantsko Carstvo - jedinstveno i u narodnoj politici i u crkvenoj organizaciji i disciplini. ... [K tome] Italija, u ovim kombinacijama, ... stavlja se u borbu protiv Germanstva i postaje saveznik. ... Osjećam, ako Ententa pobiedi Austro-Njemačku, a naša stvar propane i naše obale dodju pod Italiju, da će tome biti glavni krivac ruska diplomacija, ..."

[Frano Supilo to Ante Trumbić. (Athens, 28.V.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i..., Op.cit., pp. 84-86, Doc. 51, pp. 83-88, italics in original; see also: Renzi, William A.: "The Russian Foreign Office and Italy's Entrance Into the Great War, 1914-1915; A Study In Wartime Diplomacy." In: The Historian, vol. XXVIII, no.4, (August 1966), pp. 648-668. On page 656, Mr. W.A. Renzi said: "... Frano Supilo, a prominent Serb leader in exile, ...". This is not correct, for Frano Supilo was a prominent Croatian leader ...]

Chapter III

- (87) ... da "srpska vlada zahtijeva Solun kao izlaz na more i da vjeruje da ona zaslužuje grad."
- [The U.S.A. Representative on Corfu to Lansing. (Corfu, 24.VI.1916). The National Archives, Washington. Decimale File, No. 763 72/2769. Cited by: Ekmečić, Milorad: "Stavovi Nikole Pašića prema američkim planovima pretvaranja Austro-Ugarske u federativnu državu." In: Naučni skup, Op.cit., p. 159, the name of this Observer was not indicated.]
- (88) Janković, Dragoslav: "O Niškoj deklaraciji." In: Naučni skup. Op.cit.... p. 136.
- (89) "... Madjarski interesi bili su, jesu i bit će uvijek jedni sa talijanskim: da se u Evropi suviše ne osile ni Germani, ni Slaveni. ... Općenito je poznato, da je snažna Ugarska, gospodarica Podunavlja, najsilniji nasip protiv najezde Slavena, koji prijete interesnoj sferi Italije, Zato se prijateljstvo Italije i Ugarske nameće samo po sebi kao politička nužda."
- [Cited by Milan Marjanović: Londonski ugovor iz 1915. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1960), p. 229]
- (90) ... Pašić izdao nalog da se otpočne raditi" u smislu velikosrpskom"...
- [Cited by Janković, Op.cit., p. 136 - without indication of the source.]
- (91) ... u kojoj će biti sačuvane "bez posebne organizacije ... nacionalne osebine svakog plemena."
- [Janković, D.: Ibid.]
- (92) Janković, D.: Op.cit., pp. 136-137.
- (93) U pogledu Slovenaca "mogu se učiniti slični ustupci uz posebnu garanciju njihovog sadašnjeg jezika."
- [Janković, D.: Op.cit., pp. 136-137]
- (94) "... Razume se da oni [i.e., Trumbić i Supilo] nisu mogli biti oduševljeni takvim koncepcijama srpske vlade o ujedinjenju i da su [niški]

zaključci izazvali u njima bojazan od 'srpsko-ortodoksnog ekluzivizna', ali u tadašnjoj situaciji, u kojoj se pre svega kao najvažnije postavljalo: braniti zajednički sa Srbijom jugoslavensko pravo na Dalmaciju i Istru, oni nisu smatrali za oportuno da i otvoreno izidju sa svojim sumnjama i strepnjama."

[Janković, D.: Op.cit., p. 137]

- (95) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 47.
- (96) ... Radilo se o "kolebanju radikala u slovenačkom pitanju."
[Janković, D.: Op.cit., p.138]
- (97) ... " u poslednjem trenutku".
[Janković, D.: Ibid.]
- (98) Ibid.
- (99) "... Vlada Kraljevine [Srbije] smatra kao svoj najglavniji i u ovim sudbonosnim trenutcima jedini zadatak da obesbedi uspešan svršetak ovog velikog vojevanja koje je, u trenutku kad je započelo postalo ujedno borbom za oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje sve naše neslobodne braće Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca ..."
[Iz izjave Srpske vlade u Narodnoj skupštini. (From the Declaration of the Serbian Government in the Parliament). (Nish, 8 December/25 November 1914) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 115, Doc. 23]
- (100) Srpska socijaldemokratska stranka bila je protiv "oslobadjanja i ujedinjenja jugoslavenskih naroda koje bi proizašlo iz pobede u ratu "
[Janković, D.: Op.cit., p. 139]
- (101) Hrvatski emigranti strahovali su "... i to ne bez povoda i bez osnova, da li iza cilja ujedinjenja koji Deklaracija ističe ne stoji težnja ... srpske buržoazije da u stvari izvrši ... aneksiju jugoslavenskih krajeva Austro-Ugarske i njihovo apsorbovanje u Srbiju."
[Janković, D.: Op.cit., p. 140]
- (102) Il Ministro a Nisch, Squitti, al Ministro degli Esteri Di Sangiuliano. (Nisch, 24 settembre 1914) I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani. (Quinta Serie, 1914-1918) Op.cit., vol. I, p. 464, Doc. 788, Tel. 1364(2).
- (103) Tudjman, F.: Op.cit., p. 400.
- (104) Ljubomir Stojanović, one of the most prominent politicians in Serbia, was Minister of culture, President of the Serbian Government; as a philologist, he was known in his field and was a Secretary of the Serbian Academy of Sciences.
- (105) Alexander Belić, a well-known Serbian scientist and politician, Professor at the Belgrade University, member of the Council of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, honorary member of the University Moscow.
- A. Belić and Lj. Stojanović were sent to Russia in connection with the Bosnian crisis in 1908.

- (106) Tudjman, F.: Op.cit., pp. 400-401.
- (107) "... U skladu s izloženim tezama na njoj [i.e., na geografskoj mapi] je prikazano rasprostiranje Srba (pravoslavaca, muslimana i katolika), Hrvata i Slovenaca iz koga proizilazi da hrvatsko stanovništvo živi samo sjeverno od Kupe i u uzanom obalnom pojasu."
[Tudjman, F.: Op.cit., p. 401]
- (108) Sazonov je bio pripravan dati Srbiji od hrvatskih zemalja "otprilike toliko, koliko bi srpska država mogla apsorbirati."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 43]
- (109) "Ne ćete mi zameriti, gospodo, što sam pre svega Rus i što su mi najbliži interesi Rusije, ali Vas uveravam, da sam odmah posle toga Srbin i da su mi najbliži interesi srpskoga naroda. ... Srbi su pokazali junaštvo, ... Srbijine će zasluge biti stostruko nagrađene. Posle rata ona će biti nekoliko puta veća, nego što je danas! ..."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., pp. 53-54]
- (110) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 55.
- (111) "To ću ja svakako izvesti."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Ibid.]
- (112) "Kada bi bilo potrebno, da se ruski narod bori pod oružjem samo pola dana, pa da se Slovenci oslobode, ja ne bih pristao na to."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 54]
- (113) "Memorandum poslan Nj. C.V. Gospodaru Imperatoru od strane nekih predstavnika Jugoslavenskog Komiteta ne može se uzeti u obzir, pre nego što se dozna gledište srpske vlade o tom predmetu. Treba napomenuti, da ovaj memorandum apsolutno ne odgovara onome memoiru, koji je predat od strane g. Lj. Stojanovića, člana Akademije nauka u Beogradu, i koji se ovde smatra da sadrži teritorijalne pretenzije srpske nacije."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 55, Tel. No. 817]
- (114) Izvol'ski je kazao, "... da je baza ruske državne politike pravoslavlje i da Rusija iz razloga državne politike ne može dopustiti, da se Hrvati i Slovenci kao katolici združe s pravoslavnim Srbima u jednu državu. Katolici su kulturni, a pravoslavni zaostali pa bi kulturniji element dobio premoć u toj zajedničkoj državi; da podpuno povjerenje Rusije uživaju samo pravoslavni Srbi i da ona ne može dopustiti zajedničku državu, na koju se ne bi mogla osloniti. ..."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 77, italics in original]
- (115) Izvol'ski je kazao Steed-u: "Ne možemo katolike združiti s pravoslavnima. Hrvati neka ostanu sami za sebe."
["Masaryk Osvoboditel". Sbornik. (Prague, 1920) p. 192. Cited by: M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 77]
- (116) Tudjman, F.: Op.cit., p. 401.
- (117) Lederer, Ivo: Op.cit., p. 6, italics mine.

- (118) "... Stolypin je medju ostaloga uputio bio sledeće pitanje Supilu: 'Kakvu formu zajednice želite?' Supilo je odgovorio: 'I ako izgleda paradoksalno, ali mi želimo centralističku federaciju.' Kad ovome dodam, [nastavlja Cemović] da znam sigurno i pouzdano, da u svim predstavkama, koje je dobilo do sad rusko ministarstvo inostranih dela, Hrvati i Slovenci vode naročitu brigu o svojim budućim autonomnim pravima, sasvim je razumljivo, da mi već treba da o tom vodimo računa i da [to] sprečavamo, ... [jer inače] time bi nam bile svezane ruke za dugo vremena u tako bitnim pitanjima naše buduće unutrašnje politike, koja, svakojako, mora težiti narodnoj i državnoj unifikaciji." [Djordjević, M.: Srbija i Jugoslaveni za vreme rata, 1914-1918. (Beograd, 1922) Cited by: M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 32, italics mine]
- (119) Professor Seton-Watson je pisao: "Ujedinjenje Jugoslavena je jedan od životnih problema ovoga rata, i stvaranje snažne jugoslavenske države, osnovane na jedinstvu svih Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca predstavljat će najsigurniju garanciju mira na jugoistoku Evrope. Južni Slaveni su naši prirodni saveznici protiv germanske navale i zato je interes i dužnost Velike Britanije da pruži svoju pomoć za realizaciju njihovih aspiracija." [Southern Slav Bulletin (1.X.1915) no. 1. Cited by: Kosta Milutinović: "R.W. Seton-Watson i Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu." In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu, Op.cit., p. 452; see also: Harry Hanak: Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First War. (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 33-34]
- (120) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 74-75.
- (121) Ibid., pp. [82]-89.
- (122) "... srpska je država, po njegovu [i.e., Pašićevu] shvatanju, imala proširiti svoju vlast i moć na hrvatske i na slovenske zemlje i njih osloboditi." [Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 83]
- (123) ... Dalmacija je "od pamtivijeka sastavni dio hrvatske države;" [a po postojećim austro-ugarskim zakonima, Dalmacija je bila] "nerazdruživi dio trojne kraljevine Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije." [Cited by: M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 85]
- (124) "... da se naš narod u Dalmaciji nadje ujedinjen s cijelim jugoslavenskim tijelom." [Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 86]
- (125) "... Srbija je gradila [dalje] od onoga, što je već postojalo - to bijaše srpska država. To je bio zametak, koji je trebao po srpskom shvaćanju da postane ognjište buduće nove velike države, koliko pobjeda u svjetskom ratu dopusti, da se njemu počnu pridruživati nove i nove zemlje. Političari radikalne stranke smatrahu stoga za svoju prvu dužnost da sačuvaju ono, što su imali i što im je bilo povjereno, t.j. Srbiju i srpske interese; oni su bili spremni da se brinu i za Jugoslaveni[i.e., Hrvate, Slovence i Srbe u Habsburškoj Monarhiji], ali tek u drugom redu [već] prema tome, kako to situacija dopušta! ... [Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 39]

- (*) Dr. Milada Paulova, a Czech historian, spent enormous energy in compiling the original documents, investigating personally the points of indistinctness by the politicians on both sides - the members of the Yugoslav Committee (Trumbić, ...) and the members of the Serbian Government of that time. For this reason her work in this attempt is quite often cited; it is conditio sine qua non when studying the Yugoslav Committee, etc. Madame Paulova is still living in Zagreb (Croatia) and actively works at the University of Zagreb.
- (126) "... Pašićeva vlada nepokolebljivo se držala teze da samo Srbi treba da budu stvaraoci zajedničke države do koje će se doći proširenjem vlasti srpske države na srpsko-hrvatske i slovenačke krajeve."
[Tudjman, F.: Op.cit., p. 399]
- (127) "Rečeno mi još da je Italija prvobitno tražila protektorat nad Hrvatskom, no da se je zadovoljila sa obavezom, da će Hrvatska biti separirana od Srbije."
[Frano Supilo to Nikola Pašić. (London [17.VII.1915]) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 98, Doc. 60]
- (128) Frano Supilo to Nikola Pašić. (London, 4.VII.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 93, Doc. 56.
- (129) "Konvencija Trojnoga Sporazuma i Italije svršena je stvar. ... Ovom konvencijom je Trojni Sporazum teško povriedio princip narodnosti, Italija je pogazila moralne temelje, na kojima je sagradila svoje ujedinjenje i oslobodjenje, ..."
[The draft for the letter of the Yugoslav Committee to Nikola Pašić. (London, n.d. [July ? 1915]) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 95, Doc.57]
- (130) "Doznao sam da u konvenciji koju je Rusija u ime Trojnoga sporazuma sastavila sa Italijom glede Jadranskog Primorja imade klauzula, u kojoj se za slučaj pobjede jamči i ustanovljuje separata Hrvatska sa Slovencima koji neće podpasti pod Italiju. Ne radi se dakle o raspoloženju ili neraspoloženju pojedinih vevlasti, da Hrvatska i Srbija budu jedinstvena država, nego o gotovu i uglavljenom ugovoru izmedju trojnoga sporazuma i Italije, po kome je naša separacija već odredjena. Očito je, da je Italiju kod toga vodila ustrijska deviza "divide et impera" kako bi bolje sutra osjegurala eventualni posjed naših obala i dalje planove na Balkanu. Konzervativne pako ruske državlike mogla je voditi ili ljubomornost nad relativno jakom ekspanzijom Srbije i bojazan kakove emancipacije, ili pako briga da pravoslavna Srbija dobije samo toliko Hrvata, katolika i inovjeraca, koliko će ih kao pravoslavna Srbija moći probaviti. Samo tako mogoše se susresti ovi protivni motivi.
- Ova klauzula mijenja našu situaciju. ... što da uradimo prema ovoj po vevlastima već prihvaćenoj odluci, da ona ne bude provedena i što da uradimo, ako ona, sa pobjedom saveznika ipak ima da bude provedena ? Stvar je za sve nas od važnosti prvoga reda. ... nama Hrvatima ... nameće se imperativna dužnost, da u ovoj posve novoj situaciji pora-

dimo, da se barem kao Hrvatska nekako održimo i da u to ime učinimo što se učiniti dade.

... Nama je sada prije svega ostaloga nužno znati u ovoj stvari stanovište Srbije i srpske vlade, a imenito je li i koje je obaveze ona spravna preuzeti, da zaprieči ovaj atentat na narodno i državno jedinstvo Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Zato se obraćam Vama gospodine predsjedniče."

[Frano Supilo to Nikola Pašić. (London, 15.VII.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 96-98, Doc. 59]

- (131) ... a ostali dio Hrvatske, "da služi za bazu eventualnih kombinacija sa Magjarima kao izlaz Ugarske na more."

[Frano Supilo to Nikola Pašić. (London, 13.VIII.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 101, Doc. 63]

- (132) "Nakon rata Bosna, Hercegovina, Južna Dalmacija, Slavonija i Hrvatska bit će slobodne. One će moći da odluče o svojoj sudbini." [Supilo javlja Pašiću da] "on [i.e., Grey] reče kategorički, da Engleska odmah usvaja ovo stanovište, a tako isto i njene Saveznice, ali pod uvjetom, da ovo stanovište prihvati Srbija."

[Frano Supilo to Nikola Pašić. (London. 1.IX.1915) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 104, Doc. 67; there is no indication of this statement in Grey's Twenty Five Years ..., Op.cit.]

- (133) "Da Srpska Vlada, pored datog obećanja, dobije u što kraćem vremenu od sila Četvornog Sporazuma formalno obećanje, da će se Hrvatska sa Rijekom ujediniti sa Srbijom, i da će se slovenačke zemlje osloboditi i dobiti pravo samoopredelenja; ... Srpska vlada moli Sile, da sve ovo drži u najvećoj tajnosti."

[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 127; see also: Ivan Meštrović: Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje. (Buenos Aires, Knjižnica Hrvatske Revije, 1961), pp. 67-68]

- (134) "I. Hrvati, Srbi i Slovenci jedan su genetički narod sa tri imena, različitih historijskih, državnopravnih i kulturnih tradicija, ali jednog jezika i jedne plemenske rase.
II. U ovome narodu u Habsburžkoj Monarkiji Hrvatskoj pripada vodeća politička uloga kao prima inter pares. Izvan Habsburžke Monarkije ta uloga u istom svojstvu pripada Srbiji. U svakom slučaju vrijedi podpuna ravnopravnost plemenskih [i.e., nacionalnih] elemenata raznoga naziva, kao i podpuna sloboda i ravnopravnost vjeroispovijedanja.
III. Hrvatska, u užem smislu ove riječi, sa glavnim gradom Zagrebom, jest za sve Hrvate, ma gdje oni boravili, glava i srce Hrvatstva, kao što je Srbija u užem smislu, sa Beogradom na čelu, glava i srce Srbstva. Hrvatima je Hrvatska sa Zagrebom integralni dio njihova narodnoga i državopravnoga bića, njihova individualizma, a druge su hrvatske zemlje uda toga bića. ... Ali ovaj proces narodnoga jedinstva i fuzije ne može se uspješno provesti, ako u njemu ne bude saučestvovala sa svim svojim narodnopolitičkim kapitalom Hrvatska sa Zagrebom kao prava predstavica Hrvata i Hrvatstva. ... Drugim riječima potrebno je, da se Srbija tako interno reformira,

da ona jedina bude i ostane stjegonoša jedinstva Jugoslavena. ... [Ali ako to Srbija nije u stanju izvršiti, onda je] "dužnost svih Hrvata tako raditi, da se sve jugoslavenske zemlje, u kojima bi se većina naroda po slobodnoj svojoj volji izjavila za Hrvatsku, budu sjedinjene sa Hrvatskom."

[Frano Supilo to Edward Grey. (London [30.IX.1915]) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 106-107, Doc. 71]

- (135) Frano Supilo to the Director of the paper "L'Idea Nazionale". (Rome, 11.IV.1916) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 113-114, Doc. 78, italics in original.

- (136) Renzo Larco javlja "Corriere della Sera" Pašićeve izjave:

"Pašić je dao intervju predstavnicima ruske štampe. ... Glede odnošaja talijansko-srpskih on je izjavio: 'U štampi se je više puta nišaniilo na nekakve razmirice izmedju Srbije i Italije. Ja imam mogućnost opovrgnuti ove glasine i kategorički izjaviti, da nema nikakva ozbiljna nesporazuma medju ovim zemljama, no ako i ima povoda, da se izmijene misli medju Srbijom i Italijom, ipak ove nisu takve vrste, da bi mogle, ..., probuditi ikakvo uznemirenje.

Mi Srbi ne možemo ne priznati neosporivo pravo Italije na hegemoniju na obalama Jadranskog mora. Mi takodjer težimo k moru, no nipošto ne tražimo ratnih luka i pravo da tamo zatvorimo flotu. Mi jedino nastojimo, da dobijemo jedan ekonomski izlaz. Italija se ovome ne protivi, te ako se može govoriti o oprekama i raznim nazorima, to takovi postoje samo glede broja baza potrebnih Italiji za obranu njene vojničke prevlasti na Jadranu. Ova rasprava nije baš od tako eminentne važnosti. Srbija i Italija imaju odveć zajedničkih interesa, a da bi mogle niknuti ozbiljne poteškoće kod rješavanja sličnih problema.'..."

[Pašić to Renzo Larco. (Petersburg, 6 May/23 April 1916) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., pp. 22-23, Doc. 149, transl. from "Corriere della Sera" (9 May, 1916)]

- (137) "Rimska Tribuna" je pisala: "... Izlaz Srbije na Jadran i uspostava potpune nezavisnosti kraljevstva kralja Petra, to su stožeri naše balkanske politike, ..."

[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 188]

- (138) Supilo kaže da je srpska Vlada "počinila mnogo propusta i krupnih načelnih pogrešaka protiv tome programu. Ovo mogu dokazati sa mnogo primjera i podataka. Naročito je učinila propusta i pogrešaka u tretiranju hrvatskoga pitanja, ..."

[Frano Supilo to the Yugoslav Committee. (Paris, 5.VI.1916) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., p. 119, Doc. 84, pp. 119-122]

- (139) Supilo traži da "Trojedna Kraljevina - [Hrvatska, Slavonija i Dalmacija] - ... jeste i mora da budu Srbiji i iztočnom dielu našega naroda ravnopravni faktor, jer jedino tako može se Jugoslavensko pitanje riješiti na pravednom narodnom temelju."

[Ibid.]

- (140) Supilo navodi: "... Najteže pogreške, po mome mnijenju, počinila je svojim držanjem [srpska vlada] ... u pitanju parcelacije Slavonije na

katoličku i pravoslavnu, zatim u svome stanovištu glede Hrvatske, koju je srpska vlada u svojoj noti tražila ne kao drugi ravnopravni faktor u koncepciji našega narodnoga ujedinjenja, nego naprosto kao kompenzaciju za žrtve, što će ih Srbija učiniti ostupcima u Makedoniji. Izmjerite, gospodo, zamašaj ovoga kriterija, ..."
[Ibid., p. 120]

- (141) "Produkt mojih [zasebnih] akcija bijahu poznatih 7 tačaka mog pro-memoria ... Svi su naši prijatelji u Londonu i Parizu, koji poznaju i zastupaju našu stvar one punktacije odobrili kao pravedne, daleko-sežne europske i moderne, te neophodno nužne za ispravno rješenje našega pitanja. Medju Hrvatima svi članovi Odbora kojim sam pokazao [promemoriju, odobrili su ju]. Samo ih nisu odobrili srbski ekskluzivisti i dr. Trumbić. On ... plovi njihovim [srpskim] vodama, premda sam uvjeren, da drukčije misli. Ali nema kuraže, nema eneržije za svoje intimno stanovište. To mi je govorio i Meštrović, koji me je uvijek bodrio, da uzdržim i ustrajem, jer da je Trumbić slabić."
[Frano Supilo to Ivo De Giulli. (Paris, 29.VI.1916) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 130-131, Doc. 86, pp. 124-133]
- (142) "... Mi Hrvati moramo uzeti stvar kako ona stoji, pa prema tome i raditi. Moje je najdublje uvjerenje, da se Srbija može proširiti samo pomoću Rusije, ali da se jugoslavensko pitanje neće i ne može riješiti samo pomoću Rusije, nego sporazumom i kompromisom izmedju Rusije i Zapada, u prvom redu Englezke, ..."
[Ibid., p. 129, italics mine]
- (143) Supilo piše De Giulliu: "Izjave predstavnika srbske vlade [Pašića], učinjene prošlog travnja u Londonu, koncediraju [i.e., dopuštaju] Hrvatima katolicima, koji će doći u sklop sa Srbijom - vjersku toleranciju! Ako pomislimo kakav položaj katolici i Hrvati, kao takovi, uživaju u Austro-Ugarskoj; ako uvažimo, da je katolicizam-abstrahirajući od vjerskih dogma, u koje se može vjerovati i ne vjerovati - u čovječanstvu jedna tako kolosalna kulturna i humanitarna institucija, da joj se nikakva druga niti iz daleka ni prisposodabljati ne može i prema kojoj je čitav ortodoksizam jedna blijeda slika, ... možemo pomisliti kako bi se našeg naroda dirnula ova poruka, da će njihova vjera u novoj [državnoj] organizaciji biti tolerirana! Ja ovo ne ističem kao katolik, još manje kao klerikalac, nego kao pravi slobodni mislioc, koji je ujedno i političar i koji pri ovako važnim prelazima mora da računa sa čuvstvima i osjećajima naroda o čijem se boljitku radi, ... Ako na koncu zabilježimo, da je i izjava o "toleranciji" bila koncedirana nakon borbe i kolebanja, kako sam iz pouzdanih izvora doznao, onda je to najbolji simptom koliko smo još daleko od izpravnih kriterija politike narodnog jedinstva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. ..."
[Frano Supilo to Ivo De Giulli. (Paris, 29.VI.1916) Šepić, D.: Pisma i ..., Op.cit., pp. 128-129, Doc. 86]
- (144) Ostović, Pavle D.: The Truth about Yugoslavia. (New York, Roy Publishers, 1952), pp. 130-131.

(145) "... Sastanke smo držali ili u Nici, gdje je živio Protić, ili u Cannes-u, gdje smo živjeli Trumbić i ja. ... Sastanak je bio u mojoj kući. Osim Trumbića i Protića, bili su još dr. Trinajstić, dr. Gazzari i ja. Trumbić je predsjedao, kao obično. Bila je riječ o vjerama i o pokrajinama. Trumbić je iznio, što se vjera tiče, da smo jedamput diskutirali u užem krugu [Jugoslavenskog] Odbora, te da je bilo mišljenja, kao Hinkovićevo, da su sve vjere slobodne od države i ona od njih i da su dvije kao državne, pravoslavna i katolička. Drugo je mišljenje bilo, navodeći mene, da su tri vjere, koje ispovijeda naš narod, pravoslavna, katolička i muslimanska, priznate kao narodne. Protić je samo rekao, da je logično, da katoličkoj vjeri treba zagarantirati isto pravo kao i pravoslavnoj, iako je prvoj poglavar izvan zemlje. Kad se je govorilo o pokrajinama, Trumbić je zastupao mišljenje, da je najprikladnije, da se za neko vrijeme ostavi pokrajine kako jesu, a poslije će se vidjeti, jer će nas zajednički život naučiti, kako je najbolje, da se konačno uredi. Protić nije imao ništa protiv toga, samo je rekao, da ono stanje, kako ga je Austrija stvorila u Bosni i Hercegovini, ne će moći ostati, jer to Srbi ne će moći dopustiti, posebno u tim pokrajinama. Trumbić je odgovorio, da je to najdelikatnije pitanje u cijelom našem kompleksu i da će pitanje, kako će se postupiti s Bosnom biti ispit naše političke zrelosti. ... Bosna je jedna od najvažnijih pokrajina u smislu dobrog ili lošeg zajedničkog života, te da je u prijašnjim sukobima bila glavni razlog nesloge izmedju Srba i Hrvata, zato će trebati naći načina, da nas Bosna veže, a ne da nas dijeli.

No to je Protić uzvratio:

- Pustite vi to nama. Mi imamo rješenje za Bosnu.
- Kakvo, gospodine Protiću? - pitao je Trumbić znatiželjno.
- Kad predje naša vojska Drinu, dat će se Turcima [i.e., muslimanima Bosne i Hercegovine] dvadeset i četiri sata, pa makar i četrdesetosam, vremena, da se vrate na pradjedovsku vjeru, a što ne bi htjelo, to posjeći, kao što smo u svoje vrijeme uradili u Srbiji. ...

[Na to je Trumbić upitao Protića]: Govorite li Vi to ozbiljno, gospodine Protiću? - Najozbiljnije, gospodine Trumbiću, [odgovori Protić]. U Bosni se s Turcima ne će moći po evropsku, nego po našu. ..."

[Meštrović, Ivan: Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje. (Buenos Aires, Knjižnica "Hrvatske Revije", 1961), pp. 72-73]

(146) Program Draže Mihajlovića (20.XII.1941), točka:

"4. Čišćenje državne teritorije od svih narodnih manjina i nenacionalnih elementa.

5. Stvoriti neposredno-zajedničke granice izmedju Srbije i Crne Gore, kao i Srbije i Slovenačke čišćenjem Sandjaka od Muslimanskog življa i Bosne od Muslimanskog i Hrvatskog življa."

[Mužić, Ivan: Hrvatska politika i jugoslavenska ideja. (Split, 1969), p. 250]

(146-a) "Malo prije nego sam uspio otići u Švicarsku, boravio je u Rimu na vrlo kratko vrijeme nadbiskup Stepinac. Stigao je zrakoplovom i povjerio mi razlog svog dolaska, a taj je bio, da je Papi donio sve dokumente o zlodjelima, počinjenim od nacista i fašista na našem području, uključujući okupiranu Dalmaciju. On je bio potajice poslao svim župnicima poruku, da mu isto tako povjerljivo pošalju podatke. Odazvalo ih se je 85 posto, i on je sve te izvještaje stavio u torbicu za spise, te doletio u Rim, da ih preda Papi. ...

Stepinac je ovaj puta bio vrlo uzrujan i ispričao mi je, kako su mu nacisti pred osam dana strijeljali rođenog brata, radi suradnje s partizanima. Istakao je, kako su okupatori sve okrutniji i prilike u Hrvatskoj sve žalosnije, čemu su najvećim dijelom krive borbe između četnika i ustaša, koji su jednako okrutni, što je dovelo do dotad nevidjene mržnje između Hrvata i Srba. Iznio je činjenicu, da se na obje strane generalizira mržnja. Kao dokaz, da nije točno, da svi Srbi mrze Hrvate, iznio je, što je nedavno doživio s jednim srpskim časnikom. Taj časnik mu je došao na Kaptol i ispričao slijedeće:

- Poslan sam od generala Mihajlovića, da predam pismo talijanskom generalu. Do Beograda su me pratili Mihajlovićevi ljudi i predali Nedićevima, a ovi Nijemcima, koji su me pratili do Sarajeva, a od Sarajeva do Zagreba Talijani. U Zagrebu su me Talijani smjestili u hotel Esplanadu i rekli mi, da čekam, dok ne dodju po mene, da me otprate generalu. Čekao sam, evo, danas je četvrti dan. Bilo mi je dosadno, a vani je padala kiša, pa sam oprezno otvorio pismo i, kad sam vidio, što je u njemu, obuzeo me je stid i odlučio sam, da pismo ne ću predati, pa bilo sa mnom ne znam što. Ja sam, Preuzvišeni, Srbin iz Srbije, zakleo sam se na vjernost jugoslavenskoj državi, a ovo je pismo izdaja te države, i ja ga ne ću živ nositi, nego sam ga donio Vama, da se sačuva za povijest, a sa mnom, što bude, ionako mi nije stalo do života, poslije toliko nesreće i sramote.

- Čovjek je otišao, a pismo je kod mene, - završio je Stepinac.

- A sjećate li se, Preuzvišeni, njegova sadržaja? - pitao sam.

- Kako da ne, sjećam se svake riječi, ... Otpočeto je s tituliranjem "Ekselencijo" i "kolega", a onda je Mihajlović prešao na stvar istakavši, kako su uvijek bili ne samo dobri, nego i prijateljski odnosi između Italije i Srbije, sve, dok nisu ušli Hrvati u sastav srpske države. Od tog vremena su se pokvarili i bivali sve teži i teži. Medjutim, sada su i Srbi i Talijani upoznali Hrvate, te je došlo vrijeme za prisnu suradnju, jer su "nam ciljevi isti: vaši, da istrijebite Hrvate iz Dalmacije, a naši da ih istrijebimo u Bosni i Hercegovini". ...

- ... držim, da bi bilo uputno, da se dade jedna kopija Rooseveltovu izaslaniku kod Vatikana, Mr. Mironu Tayloru.

Stepinac se je s tim složio, a Mr. Taylor mi je u New Yorku potvrdio, da je stvar dobio. ..."

[Source: Meštrović, Ivan: Uspomene na političke ljude i ..., Op.cit., pp. 377-378, italics mine]

Chapter IV

(147) "Znalo se da tamo [i.e., u Rusiji] imana par stotina tisuća vojno-pljenika: Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca iz austro-ugarske monarkije od kojih su jedni zarobljeni lege artis, dakle može se reći pravi zarobljenici, dok su se drugi sami predali. Iz tih elemenata nastojalo se stvoriti legije koje bi imale oslobodilačku zadaću ..."

[Potočnjak, Franko: Iz Emigracije, IV: U Rusiji. (Zagreb, Tisak ... Narodnih novina, 1926), p. 4]

- (148) "Legija je nazvana "jadranskom" s razloga što je naše Jadransko more sinteza ideala svih Jugoslavena koji žive na njegovim obalama ili prema njemu teže i s razloga što bi djelatnost Legije mogla eventualno da se razvije u našim krajevima Jadranskoga mora. ... Legija bi u svakom pogledu imala da stoji pod komandom koju bi odredila srpska Uprava."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 88]
- (149) "Jednom riječi, dobrovoljačke čete imale su izvršiti jednu veliku, eminentno narodnu zadaću, sve svoje sile imale su posvetiti samo i jedino narodnoj našoj stvari, bez obzira na bilo kog inoga, pa i na same saveznike. ... kada se dovrši rat, trebati će tjerati njemačke i mađarske čete iz naših krajeva, ... [to će biti] tribut naš što smo ga žrtvovali za slobodu ljevanjem krvi."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., pp. 89, 102]
- (150) "Stojeći da konca rata uvijek na stajalištu, da je Srbija jedini faktor 'koji oslobadja', ona [i.e., srpska vlada] je ljubomorno čuvala srbijanski karakter armije i čitave ove akcije. Iako su njeni organi, kad je trebalo, u svojoj propagandi za stupanje u vojsku rado operirali frazama o jugoslavenstvu, tražila je ona, da armija i po imenu i u stvari ostane isključivo srpska i samo srpska, i spriječila je u istoj svaku pojavu jugoslavenstva, ... od oficira tražilo [se], da dobrovoljce 'zadoje zdravim srpskim duhom' te ih oduševе za srpsku stvar. Po svemu se čini, da se srpska vlada pobojavala i republikanskih i federalističkih struja, ... [a isto tako] da nije htjela dopustiti formaciju jedne krupne jedinice, koja je kasnije mogla, pod stanovitim uvjetima, služiti kao oslon federalistima kao neka vojska koja je mogla i da izmakne njenoj kontroli."
[Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 40]
- (151) "'Jadranska legija' bila je zazorna Pašiću lično i radikalnoj većini na vladi već i samo zato, što su oni stalno mislili na sporazum s Italijom."
[Leontić, Ljubo: "O Jugoslavenskom odboru u Londonu; Jugoslavenska narodna obrana u Južnoj Americi i Jugoslavensko narodno vijeće u Washingtonu." In: Starine, Knj. 50, p. 25 (Zagreb, JAZU, 1960)]
- (152) "... jer su se koliko srpska vlada, toliko i srpske vojne vlasti odupirale stvaranju takve posebne jedinice."
[Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 40]
- (153) "... do dana današnjega ostao je nepoznat broj dobrovoljaca, koji su se anonimno borili u srpskoj armiji."
[Mandić, A.: Ibid.]
- (154) "... da se u Rusiji vrši "akciju i propagandu sa svrhom da se što više i što boje zadobiju za našu narodnu stvar odlučni ruski krugovi."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 3]
- (155) "Rečeno mi je da je [Supilo] susretan s nepovjerenjem, čemu da je mnogo pridonjelo njegovo ... i suviše često posjećivanje u talijanskom poslanstvu ..."
[Potočnjak, F.: Ibid., p. 2]

- (156) "... preko 20,000 većinom veoma dirljivih pisama i molbi zarobljenika ..."
[Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 43]
- (157) "... prepuštajući Odboru i srpskoj vladi, da u Srbiji organiziraju legiju, kako bolje znadu. Taj rad se nastavio do jeseni 1915., kad je Srbija, napadnuta sa svih strana, pretrpjela slom, koji je ... prekinuo i veze preko Dunava i onemogućio dalje odašiljanje dobrovoljaca."
[Mandić, A.: Ibid., p. 43]
- (158) Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 104]
- (159) Tako se "u roku od neka dva mjeseca sakupilo ... tamo [oko] 19,700 momaka - za koje nijesu bile spremne ni potrebne prostorije, ni hrana, ni odijela, ni oficirski kadar, i uopće ništa."
[Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 44]
- (160) "Tako su mnogi naši ljudi, dovedeni već u Odesu i predani konzulu, govorili da se nijesu dobrovoljno prijavili, već da su nasilno dotjerani u Odesu, a da hoće da ostanu vjerni svome caru [i.e., Franji Josipu I] i da žele da se vrate u Sibir."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 104]
- (161) "Oni su jasan dokaz da nacionalno i politički jošte nijesmo bili zreli za posao koji smo poduzeli ..."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 105]
- (162) Potočnjak, F.: Ibid., p. 108]
- (163) "... Slabijemu odazivu Hrvata i Slovenaca pridonijelo je i to što se je sa zvanične strane naglašavalo da se imaju kupiti pravoslavni Srbi, dok se je mukom prelazilo preko Slovenaca i Hrvata."
- (164) "... da bi se Odred, obzirom na to da ga sačinjavaju sva tri plemena [i.e., nacije] zajedno, nazvao jugoslavenskim. To se nije odobravalo, još manje primalo ..."
[Ibid., p. 110]
- (165) "... ta je misao u srpskim krugovima bila primljena kao jeres."
[Cemović, Marko: "Domovina" (January 1, 1920) (Zagreb), cited by F. Potočnjak: Op.cit., p. 110 - italics mine]
- (166) "Ako se je što pouzdana htjelo razgovarati u pojedinoj grupi ili skupini, pitalo se: je li prisutan koji Hrvat, Slovenac ili Srbin, već prema tome ko su bili oni koji su se imali porazgovarati i sporazumjeti."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 110]

- (167) "... da je Odred jedna politička tvorevina sa vojničkom organizacijom, da ga je politička ideja rodila i cilj mu i svrhu opredijelila, a vojnička organizacija da je tome sredstvom. ... Otuda odvratnost od imena jugoslavenskoga, hrvatskog i slovenačkog i grožnje da će svakog onoga ko o tome bude govorio mrak izjesti, ili da će biti ... strijeljan."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 111 - italics mine]
- (168) "Ove neprijateljske prilike spretno je iskorištavala ruska vlada u svrhu, da u dobrovoljačkom odredu izazove medju Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencim sukob na političkoj osnovi u korist ideje jedne federacije imedju Hrvata, Slovenaca, Čeha, Madjara i, eventualno austrijskih Nijemaca, te da na taj način spriječi ujedinjenje katoličkih Jugoslavena sa [pravoslavnom] Srbijom."
[Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 46]
- (169) "Stvari su do vrhunca zaoštrene, pa treba s mjesta da tamo dodje neko od jugoslavenskog komiteta da prilike u Odredu dovede u red."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 7]
- (170) "... prilike u Odredu ... bile su gore nego sam sebi i predstavljati mogao," [piše Potočnjak]
[Ibid., p. 9]
- (171) "Ime Srbin ... označuje jedan dio naroda našega, kao što to označuju i imena Hrvat ..., Slovenac ... Nijedno od tih imena ne označuje čitav narod. A [Srpski] Odred niti sačinjavaju niti imaju da sačinjavaju sami Srbi. Imaju da ga sačinjavaju sva trojica zajedno: Srbi, Slovenci i Hrvati i sva trojica upravo i idu za tim da zajedničkim radom i silama stvore zajedničku, jedinstvenu, ujedinjenu i oslobođenu domovinu. ... To se rezonovanje na žalost nije uzelo kao izraz osjećaja i rezultat shvaćanja mladih ljudi, već kao neka opreka srpstvu. Oni koji su rukovodili Odred, a to je bilo par srpskih oficira ... bili su jednostrani i nedostupni razumijevanju ideja koje su pokretale i onima koji su započeli pokret za legije i onima koji su se tome odazvali. Oni su bili još potpunoma u ekskluzivizmu srpskom, te su krivim okom gledali svakoga ko se je usudio da samo i riječ progovori protiv naziva Odreda [i.e., Srpskog Odreda]."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 9]
- (172) "... a ako on [i.e., Jugoslavenski Odbor] ne bude kadar da ih namiri, učiniti će to umjesto njega srpska vlada."
[Ibid., p. 14]
- (173) Potočnjak, F.: Ibid., pp. 7-8, 20.
- (174) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 48.
- (175) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 249-250.
- (176) "Ruski car bio je njome [i.e., s Dobrovoljačkom divizijom] toliko oduševljen, da je odmah naredio, da se stvori [kompletira] i Druga dobrovoljačka divizija, ..."
[Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 48]

- (177) "... Petnaest dana poslije Dobriča (Barardžika) vidio sam ih u Odesi: blatni, prljavi, poderani i zanemareni, ležali su oficiri, u svojim krvavim košuljama, bez odijela, bez rubenine da se preobuku, bez prebite pare u džepu. Ležali su i čekali ... da dodju engleski lazareti te ... da im se plati plaća od jula dalje. Zatim su ih otpremili u unutrašnjost Rusije i - la comedia e finita! O njima nitko više ne misli, nitko se za njih ne brine, ..."
[Supplement to Mandić's letter to Hinković. ([St. Petersburg ?] 18./5. November 1916) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., p. 233, Doc. 155, (pp. 231-237), AJO, Fasc. 84 - I - Mandić. Original]
- (178) "... od kojih je većina uvrštena u legiju protiv svoje volje."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 253]
- (179) "... s rezultatom od 13 mrtvih i 18 ranjenih."
[Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 46]
- (180) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p.254.
- (181) Ibid.
- (182) Ibid., p. 255.
- (183) "... Prva divizija srpskog Odreda potpunoma je razbijena, upravo se može reći da više ne postoji. Prijeti pogibelj da i druga divizija, tek prikupljena, ali još neuvježbana i nepodgotovljena, bude istim načinom upotrebljena i do istog rezultata dovedena. Ranjenici [su] silno ogorčeni, medju dobrovoljcima oficirima i momčadi [vlada] opšte nezadovoljstvo za to što su upotrebljeni u prethodnim borbama koje ne rješavaju [naše] stvari, na tudjemu teritoriju, a oni su i skupljani i odazvali se na poziv da se biju za svoje narodne ideale i interese za koje su i sada i uvijek spremni sve žrtvovati sa željom da izvojuju pozitivnih rezultata. ... Na komandu prve divizije jedan je glas općega nezadovoljstva, ogorčenja i proklinjanja. Preka je nužda da se poduzmu koraci koji će, po mogućnosti, prvo ispraviti drugo spriječiti. ..."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., pp. 34-35]
- (184) Srpski oficiri tukli su vojnika-dobrovoljca "korbačem, šakama i nogama ... i psuje [mu se] oca i mater - i još uz dodatak 'hrvatsku' ili 'slovenačku', da ga se nazivlje marvom, ... i svinjom austrijskom itd. ..."
[Potočnjak, F.: Op.cit., p. 39]
- (185) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 318-319.
- (186) "... [Hoćemo] Jugoslaviju osnovanu na principu demokracije i ravnopravnosti svih triju narodnosti. Svaku drugu platformu za naše ujedinjenje držimo nemogućom i štetnom za svaku od tih triju narodnosti. ... Dosljedno provedeni princip ravnopravnosti može dati jedino federaciju srpskih, hrvatskih i slovenskih zemalja po uzoru Švicarske ili Sjedinjenih Država. Naš ideal dakle jeste: federativna Jugoslavija. ...

...Težeći za osnivanjem Jugoslavije, mi želimo u isto vrijeme, da bude ona elementom mira na Balkanu, ... Mi želimo slobodu i ujedinjenje zato, da bi naši nesretni i izmučeni narodi u mirnom i skupnom životu mogli posvetiti sve svoje sposobnosti radu oko podignuća materijalne i duhovne kulture, ... Velika Srbija - to je plod šovinstičkog i prirodnog ludila. Po našem dubokom uvjerenju veliko-srpska ideja ne odgovara srpskome narodu i ona je plod fantazija i duševnog stanja vojničke grupe, koja želi zveckati oružjem na Balkanu i pod firmom demokratizma prisiliti sve Jugoslavene služenju idolu grube sile. Velika Srbija protivna je našem idealu rada i mirnog razvića, ona [i.e., ideja "Velike Srbije] znači parasitizam, koji je u vezi sa ekspanzivnošću te služi vječitom prijetnjom u odnošaju sa svim njenim susjedima."

[From the Declaration of the Croatian and Slovenian Officers of the Corps of Volunteers. (Odessa, Mart 1917) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., pp. 238-239, Doc. 158, AJO, Fasc. 8, Jugoslavenski odbor in Russia.]

- (187) "Stremljenje k oslobodjenju i ujedinjenju svih Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca u jednu nezavisnu državu, u kojoj će svaki od triju imenovanih elemenata uživati potpunu ravnopravnost u svakom pogledu, dovelo nas je u redove "Srpskog Dobrovoljačkog Korpusa". Mi nijesmo priznali i ne priznajemo nikakve hegemonije ili supremacije jednog plemena [i.e., nacije] nad drugim, ... Nikakve Velike Srbije, nikakve Velike Hrvatske ili Velike Slovenije! Naš ideal bio je i ostat će: federativna Jugoslavija.

Od samog početka postojanja Dobrovoljačke Vojske starali smo se, da provedemo ovaj naš politički program kao jedino moguću i pravičnu osnovu za zbliženje triju do tada razjedinjenih narodnosti u geografskom, političkom, kulturnom, religioznom i historičkom pogledu. Naša nastojanja bila su uzaludna. Prevareni od početka raznim obećanjima, ... mi smo se na koncu konca uvjerali, da ne služimo našem idealu, nego imperijalističkim i osvajačkim ciljevima srpske megalomanije.

Ovo je prvi razlog, s kojega mi više ne možemo da ostanemo u Srpskom Dobrovoljačkom Korpusu.

Ova megalomanija nije ostala u okviru ideoloških i principjalnih diferencija; ona se odrazila i na odnošaj prema nama i našim vojnicima, te je poprimila konkretnu formu neprijateljstva, ... [Vršena su razna] ... nasilja i zločini: grabeži, izbijanja, mučenja, čak ubijstva, počinoci kojih su ostali nekažnjeni. ... Što se nas, oficira dobrovoljaca tiče, to je naš boravak u korpusu bio ispunjen poniženjem i vrijedjanjem od strane t.z. pravih Srba, t.j. oficira nadošlih iz Srbije. ... Sve je to dovelo do postojanja krize u samom korpusu. ... [Zbog toga] došli smo do zaključka, da je bolje da prolijemo našu krv ... u redovima Velike Ruske Armije za rusku slobodu, koju smatramo jamstvom za našu slobodu, te za pravdu, nego li za novo zarobljavanje našega naroda i za nepravdu. S toga razloga mi molimo, da nas se prevede u rusku službu. [Nadalje se moli da] treba poduzeti odgovarajuće mjere [za slobodnu izjavu vojnicima i oficirima] da li su oni [doista] dobrovoljci Srpskog Korpusa ili ne. ..."

[The Volunteer-Officers to Velihov. (Odessa, 7 April/25 March, 1917) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za, Op.cit., pp. 239-240, Doc. 159, "Slovenski Jug" (1. June/ 19. May 1917) No. 17, Odessa - italics in original]

- (188) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 320-321.
- (189) Ibid., p. 238.
- (190) Ibid., p. 241.
- (191) Ibid., p. 233.
- (192) Uprava Jugoslavenske Narodne Obrane nije znala "da je došlo do spora između Jugoslavenskog odbora i Srpske Vlade u Evropi, jer su smatrali da Odbor i Vlada rade sporazumno."
[Stefanović-Djačić, Z.: Op.cit., p. 533]
- (193) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 259-260.
- (194) "Stanovište našega Odbora bilo je još od početka rata to, da se naši dobrovoljci imadu da bore kao zasebna jedinica pod vrhovnom komandom, a ne anonimo, i tako smo više puta obavijestili Vladu. Njihovo je pravo i korist opće stvari, da se znade, odakle su ti i zašto se bore. Pri tome ostajemo i danas. ..."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 260, italics in original]
- (195) ... učesnici Kongresa ... "pozdravljaju s oduševljenjem svoga kralja i svoju vladu, stavljajući mu na raspolaganje svoje imetke i živote."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 231]
- (196) "... stavljam se na bezuvjetno raspolaganje srpske vlade, izričući naše potpuno povjerenje Jugoslavenskom Odboru u Londonu, kojega smatramo svojim zakonitim predstavnikom svih jugoslavenskih zemalja pod gospodstvom Austro-Ugarske. ..."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Ibid.]
- (197) "... Ali se mora konstantirati, da se od strane Srbije, pored svih prijedloga našega Odbora, nije ništa pozitivna učinilo za oživotvorenje dobrovoljačke jugoslavenske jedinice ..."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 269; Paulova also gives the minutes as well as a larger part of Trumbić's letter: pp. 264-270.]
- (198) ... da bi Jugoslaveni Južne Amerike organizovali jednu dobrovoljnu ekspediciju aeronautičku od barem šest aeroplana s potrebnim brojem ljudi."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Ibid., p. 263]
- (199) Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 271.
- (200) Trumbić je pisao Pašiću: "... Ako pak mislite, da možete principijelno pristati na tu misao [t.j., ideje aeronautičke eskadrile], Odbor bi dao uputstva, da se poradi na izvršenju te misli. Eskadrila bi bila avijatičko odjeljenje Jugoslavenske legije, ... pod rukovodstvom Srpske Vrhovne Komande."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Ibid., p. 272]
- (201) "Može se reći, da ni kod jednog naroda i ni u jednom dijelu svijeta

nijedan politički savez nije bio tako organiziran i idealno požrtvovan kao Jugoslavenska Narodna Obrana u Južnoj Americi."
[Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 271]

- (202) "... Poznato je, da imam kod njih [i.e., među Hrvatima i Slovencima] lep glas, pa ipak nisam bio u stanju da u broju od 3,000 dobrovoljaca koje sam poslao otpremim više od 200 Hrvata i Slovenaca. Ovaj mali broj upravo iščezava. Kad se uzme u obzir da Hrvata i Slovenaca ima ovde tri do četiri puta više od Srba, što znači da sam ih trebao otpremiti najmanje 10,000. Ako ostane ovako, doći će dobrovoljačka akcija ovde u isto stanje, u kojem je završena ona u Rusiji, a danas nas već ovaj rezultat sa Hrvatima i Slovencima kompromituje, jer očigledno pokazuje, da oni nisu uz nas u pokretu."
[M. Pribićević to [M. Rašić]. (New York, 5.II.1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 85, Doc. 66, vol. I]
- (203) Ljuba Mihailović piše da je vojna misija Milana Pribićevića "bila ograničena samo na srpsku sredinu. ... Element hrvatsko-slovenački ostaje i dalje indiferentan, a jedan dobar deo i neprijateljski. ..."
[Lj. Mihailović to N. Pašić. (Washington, 14/1. March 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 129, Doc. 101, vol. I]
- (204) Milenko Vesnić piše Pašiću: "Naše jugoslavensko pitanje u Americi stajalo je do prispevanja srpske misije tamo mnogo slabije, nego što smo mi to u Evropi mislili. Izuzev Srba, čiji patriotizam stoji izvan svake sumnje, dva druga naša plemena [i.e., nacije: Hrvati i Slovenci] držala su se u velikoj rezervi, ... Izuzev nekoliko svetlih primera hrvatski i slovenački sveštenici bili su do skora protivnici ovom novom [i.e., jugoslavenskom] pokretu, ... na samom čelu jugoslavenskog pokreta u Ujedinjenim Državama nema dovoljno jedinstva; može se šta više reći da se tu sretamo sa otvorenim razdorom. ..."
[M. Vesnić to N. Pašić. (Paris, 20/7. March 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., pp. 136-137, Doc. 107 (pp. 134-139), vol. I]
- (205) Mandić, A.: Fragmenti za ..., Op.cit., pp. 217-218, Doc. 146.
- (206) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 337, Doc. 267, note 2, vol. I.
- (207) "Ali, ako se uzme na um, da je srpska armija na solunskom frontu maksimalno brojila 55,000 oficira i vojnika, te da se u njoj nalazila - osim crnogorskih i ostalih dobrovoljaca iz Amerike - momčad "Dobrovoljačkog korpusa Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca" iz Rusije, koji je 30. maja 1917. brojio 19,472 vojnika i 779 oficira i kome se do 1. augusta 1917. bilo pridružilo još 2,008 vojnika i 112 oficira, moglo se s pravom tvrditi, da je oslobođenje čitave teritorije pa i same Srbije, uz pomoć Saveznika, zajednički provedeno."
[Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 74, note 26]
- (208) The Salonica-front stretched from the Adriatic till the Ionian Sea in the span of ca. 500 kilometers. The operative powers of the Allies amounted to ca. 600,000 soldiers on the whole front against approximately equal military forces of the Central Powers. The fights started

on 14 September 1918 at 8 o'clock in the morning. A significant victory was the capture of the mountain Kajmakčalan (2,521 meters high) as the main foothold of the Bulgarian troops.

- (209) "Na Solunskom frontu, prema obavještenjima srpskog generalštaba, a koje mi je dao vojvoda Mišić, bilo je 28,000 jugoslavenskih dobrovoljaca, broj jednak broju srpske vojske, a celokupna naša vojnička snaga predstavljala je petinu ukupnih snaga na Solunskom frontu. I kad se u Beogradu govori o Kajmakčalanu (see # 208), treba znati da je Kajmakčalan toliko i naš koliko i njihov."
[Pribićević, Svetozar: Diktatura kralja Aleksandra. (Beograd, 1952), p. 64, cited by A. Mandić: Op.cit., p. 74, note 26]
- (210) "Jugoslavenskih dobrovoljaca iz iseljeničkih naselja i zarobljeničkih logora u Prvom svjetskom ratu bilo je valjda svega skupa oko pedeset hiljada. (Dobrovoljački korpus SHS [Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca] u Rusiji brojio je sam oko 42,000 boraca!) Vjerojatno bi porastao njihov broj do čitave armije od najmanje stotinu hiljada prvorazrednih boraca, da se poštivao ljudski razum i osjećaji a.u. [austro-ugarskih] zarobljenika i jugoslavenskih dobrovoljaca. Velikosrpski oficiri (osim izuzetaka ...) tjerahu skupljene dobrovoljce u disidente surovim postupcima i primoravanjem na zakletvu [srpskom] kralju, dok su jugoslavenske dobrovoljce iz iseljeničkih naselja svrstavali jednakim načinom u srbijanske jedinice ... Svima "prečanima" (bez ikakve razlike) htjeli su da zametnu broj - i s političkog razloga prikraćujući tačan omjer - poglavito i zato, što je redovna vojska sa svojim rezervama u neprekidnim borbama (i bolestima iza povlačenja kroz albanske klanace) bila svedena na dvadesetak hiljada "efektivnih pušaka"."
[Leontić, Ljubo: "O Jugoslavenskom odboru u Londonu; ..." In: Starine, knj. 50. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1960), p. 79]
- (211) "Šef diplomatsko-vojne misije kraljevine Srbije M. Vesnić ustvrdio je pred izvršnim odborom JNV [Jugoslavenskog Narodnog Vijeća] u Washingtonu, da je srpska vojska svedena na devetnaest hiljada boraca. Svojim ušima sam čuo tada tu njegovu izjavu."
[Ibid., note 86, italics in original]
- (212) "... po planu [srpske] Vrhovne komande (rokađom u pravcu albanskih klanaca) ... dapače osujećen [je] i pobjednički povratak u oslobođenu domovinu. Dopustilo im se [i.e., južnoslavenskim pukovima] da udju kroz Albaniju - "na stražnja vrata" - kako bi zatim bili zadržani što dulje u Crnoj Gori i Boki[Kotorskoj]. I bezobzirnim postupcima pri demobilizaciji bio je njima skoro sasvim onemogućen utjecaj u političkom zbivanju neposredno iza rata."
[Leontić, Ljubo: Ibid., p. 80]
- Chapter V
- (213) "... Promjena vlade nije uzmijenila naše aspiracije: mi želimo više nego ikada posjed Carigrada, koji je neophodan za našu ekonomsku slobodu. Mi hoćemo oslobodjenje potlačenih naroda Austro-Ugarske. Naš program je stalno vodjen brigom za ostvarenje legitimnih aspiracija svih naroda. ... Mi namjeravamo osnovati Jugoslaviju solidno organi-

ziranu. ..."

[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 314, italics in original]

- (214) "Ali kud i kamo veće zaprepaštenje izazvala je [Miliukova] deklaracija u velikosrpskim krugovima, koji su na istu gledali kao na pravu nacionalnu nesreću."
[Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 55]
- (215) Mandić, A.: Ibid.
- (216) Ministar Ljuba Davidović piše iz Geneve (8.III.1917) Pašiću:
"Najjača naša nada za ostvarenje naših nacionalnih aspiracija - Czar Nikola [II.], nije više na mestu, sa kojega se rešava ili odsudno utiče na rešenje ... [s toga traži da se hvataju nove veze] sa onima, koji [sada] govore i rade u ime Rusije."
[Cited by M. Paulova (Op.cit., p. 337), who published this long letter almost in whole.]
- (217) U sva tri navedena slučaja "mogli su da dodju u opasnost ne samo dinastija i dotadašnji režim, nego i sam suverenitet Srbije kao takve, te ona prevlast srbijanskog elementa, koju je on [t.j., Pašić] pod svaku cijenu želio protegnuti na ostale jugoslavenske krajeve koji će pripasti Srbiji."
[Mandić, A.: Op.cit., p. 59]
- (218) "Kraljevina Srbija bila je dakle ... osnovka ... vanjsko-političke linije Nikole Pašića i njegove vlade, a kako sve pokazuje, i samog regenta Aleksandra."
[Čulinović, Ferdo: "Pravno značenja Krfske Deklaracije" In: Jugoslavenski Odbor u Londonu, Op.cit., p. 169]
- (219) Letter of Cromer to Evans on 10 October 1916 in the Records of the Serbian Society. Cited by Harry Hanak: Great Britain and Austria-Hungary During First World War; a Study in the Formation of Public Opinion. (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 193.
- (220) Seton-Watson, R.W.: German, Slav, and Magyar; a Study in the Origins of the Great War. (New York, Howard Fertig, 1968 [Reprint of 1916 ed.], p. 51.
- (220a) Address of the Serbian opposition to Regent, Alexander. In: Stojanović, Nikola: Jugoslavenski Odbor. (Zagreb, 1927), pp. 38-40. Cited by F. Čulinović, "Pravno značenje ...", Op.cit., p. 174, underlined in original.
- (221) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 341.
- (222) Trumbić je tražio da konferencija donese jedan akt, "koji bi sadržavao program uređenja buduće države, sa kojim bi se pred javnošću vezala i srpska vlada."
[Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 342]
- (223) Lederer, Ivo J.: Yugoslavia at ..., Op.cit., p. 26; Ostović, P.D.: The Truth about ..., Op.cit., p. 83. For the complete text of the Declaration, see: Šišić, Ferdo: Dokumenti o postanku ..., Op.cit., pp. 96-100.

- (223-a) "... što je praktički imalo značiti da bi se ipak imala održati stara [srpska] država, kojoj bi se prisajedinili svi drugi, oslobođeni jugoslavenski krajevi. Drugim riječima, Pašić je i dalje nastojao da dodje do Velike Srbije, ali samo drugim putevima i drugim načinom."
[Čulinović, F.: Op.cit., p. 178, italics in original]
- (224) The Archives JAZU, Trumbić's notes from the Conference, p. 37; Čulinović, F.: Op.cit., p. 183.
- (225) Trumbić's notes from the Conference (24 June 1917); Op.cit., Čulinović, F.: Ibid., p. 184.
- (226) "... treba voditi računa o specifičnostima" jugoslavenskih zemalja, kaže Trumbić.
[Cited by F. Čulinović: Op.cit., p. 184.]
- (227) Čulinović, F.: Ibid., p. 185.
- (228) "... da [seljak] nije rob, nego gospodar zemlje ..."
[Trumbić's notes from the Conference (13 July 1917). The Archives JAZU. Op.cit., p. 3, cited by F. Čulinović, Ibid., p. 185]
- (229) Trumbić kaže "... da se agrarno pitanje ne može kratkim putem rješavati, ... nego samo zakonodavnim putem ..."
[Cited by F. Čulinović: Ibid., p. 186]
- (230) Čulinović, Ferdo: Jugoslavija između dva rata. (Zagreb, JAZU, 1961), vol. I, p. 45]
- (231) "Krfskom deklaracijom je dakle jugoslavensko pitanje stavljeno u okvir međunarodnog problema, a kojime treba rješavati u vezi s uređenjem poslijeratne Evrope."
[Čulinović, F.: "Pravno značenje ...", Op.cit., p. 214]
- (232) Za Pašića je Krfska Deklaracija tek "politički manifest", koji srpsku vladu ne obavezuje.
[Čulinović, F.: Ibid., p. 213, italics in original]
- (233) "... uperena protiv omrznutog režima Habsburga."
[See about this: "Bulletin Yougoslave". (Paris, 1918), no. 31, p. 26. Cited by F. Čulinović: Ibid., p. 213]
- (234) "... neki politički manifestacioni akt ..."
[Marković, Lazar: "Hrvatsko pitanje". (Zagreb, 1920), p. 58, cited by F. Čulinović: Ibid., p. 214]
- (235) Trumbić, Ante: "Quelques mots sur la Déclaration de Corfou." In: "Bulletin Yougoslave". (Paris), no. 26, 1 November 1917. Cited by F. Čulinović: Ibid.

- (236) Krfska Deklaracija je "... ostala mrtvo slovo na papiru."
[Trumbić, Ante: "O federaciji u vezi s Krfskom deklaracijom". In: "Hrvatska sloga". (Zagreb), no. 156, 3 August 1925. Cited by F. Čulinović: Ibid., p. 218, italics in original]
- (237) "The Serbian Daily" (Srpski Dnevnik) u New Yorku pisao je, da će srpska pobjednička vojska sama izvršiti "ujedinjenje" i onda "dati Hrvatima izvjesne slobode."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 363]
- (238) "... u Chicagu je, inicijativom socijalista vodjenih Etbinom Kristanom, počela akcija, da se svi Slovenci separatno organizuju na bazi anti-austrijskoj, ali republikanskoj, federativnoj, te da se traži primanje Bugara u federaciju. Ovu akciju podupriješe predstavnici skoro sviju većih novina i organizacija slovenačkih."
[Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 367]
- (239) "... Glavna je i osnovna točka Deklaracije: Saziv Ustavotvorne Skupštine. Učesnici Krfske Deklaracije smatrali su i smatraju ovlast, da govore u ime naroda, samo privremenom, dok se narod ne bude mogao da izjavi u svojoj Ustavotvornoj Skupštini. A ta Skupština ima biti i bit će apsolutno suverena.
Ustavotvorna Skupština moći će da stvori ustav, kakavgod bude željela. Taj ustav ne mora da bude onaj i onakav, koji i kako ga zamišlja Krfska Deklaracija. Konstituenta, dakle narod, čija volja će doći u njoj do izražaja, može da odredi, kakovugod želi formu države i vladavine, i imat će da bira glavu i prestavnika države.
Ovo tumačenje Deklaracije - [ističe dr. Hinković] - odgovara cijelom duhu, u kojemu su vodjene Krfske konferencije, pa ga kao jedan od učesnika tih konferencija mogu proglasiti autentičnim."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 372, italics mine. (Paulova gives the full text of Hinković's interpretation of the Declaration.)]
- (240) "Srpski Dnevnik" (New York) je pisao: "... srpski će žandari naučiti Hrvate i Slovence kako se treba pokoravati zakonima Velike Srbije ..."
[The Yugoslav National Council to the Yugoslav Committee. (London-Washington), 12.I.1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 29, Doc. 17, vol. I, italics in original]
- (241) Ibid.
- (242) Saveznici će se osloniti na "prokušanu vjernost Srbije i njene dinastije."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 373]
- (243) Trumbić traži od Jugoslavenskog Narodnog Vijeća
"... da se obustavi svaka daljna polemika o pitanju monarhije i republike i da se o tom pitanju ništa dalje u javnosti ne piše. ..."
[A. Trumbić to the Yugoslav National Council in Washington. (London, 1.I.1918), Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 11, Doc. 1, vol. I]

- (244) "... Potpuno smo solidarni s Hinkovićevim tumačenjem [Krfske Deklaracije], koje je pogrešno shvaćeno u Evropi. ... S obzirom na predmete, daljinu, iskorišćivanje ovdašnjih situacija, a nepoznavanje prilika s vaše strane, u interesu daljih uspjeha smatramo nužnim imati slobodne ruke u taktici."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 375]
- (245) "Don Niko Gršković i Dr. Hinko Hinković odbili su moju sugestiju, [piše Dr. Ljubo Leontić] da povuku javno svoj proglas; ..."
[Leontić, Ljubo: "O Jugoslavenskom odboru ...", Op.cit., p. 101]
- (246) "... Čujemo da se tamo zaoštravaju odnosi zbog pitanja forme vladavine buduće naše države. Krfska Deklaracija je baza na kojoj treba da se razvija naš narod. Nju su donjeli ustavni faktori Srbije i naš Odbor. ... Predsjednik je Wilson proglasio princip slobode i samoodredjenja, što je i Krfska Deklaracija usvojila, a nije ni jednom narodu propisao republikansku formu. ..."
[A. Trumbić to the Yugoslav National Council in Washington. (Paris, 21.X.1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 377, Doc. 313, vol. II]
- (247) Republikanski orjentirani američki Hrvati predali su američkoj Vladi memorandum o kojem ističu "...da oni stoje na osnovi Wilsonovih načela, i pred njom optužuju Jugoslavenski Odbor da ... hoće nametnuti [srpsku] monarhiju i dinastiju [Karadjordjevića]. ..."
[The Yugoslav National Council to A. Trumbić. (Washington, 8.X.1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 345, Doc. 273, vol. I]
- (248) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 377.
- (249) Krfska Deklaracija je ostala tek "... sporazumom izmedju Jugoslavenskog Odbora i srpske vlade, koji je bio doduše stavljen do znanja Saveznicima, ali time u medjunarodnoj diplomaciji nije obvezivao vevlasti, a budući da nije službeno (notom) stavljen kao zahtjev, nije obvezivao ni samu Srbiju, osim samo kao časna obaveza."
[Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 378]
- (250) Proglas Jugoslavenskog Narodnog Vijeća u SAD Hrvatima, Srbima i Slovencima u Americi:
"... Očekivali smo od kralj[evske] srpske vlade, da će jugoslavenski problem u svojoj cijelosti zastupati pred saveznicima, te tražiti odlučno ujedinjenje naše cjelokupne narodne teritorije ... Naše se nade na žalost nisu ispunile. ... [Naprotiv] kralj[evska] srpska vlada, ... stala je raditi sad za Proširenu, sad za Veliku Srbiju. ... nedavne izjave Pašićeve, iz kojih slijedi da bi se, po njegovu mišljenju, ujedinjenje Jugoslavena imalo da provede 'pod egidom Srbije' ... [što bi značilo] ne samo da bi se srbijanskom dijelu naroda na štetu ostalih priznao povlašten položaj, već da bi se ovima à priori nametnuo monarhiski ustav i nametnula dinastija srpska. To bi bila teška povreda narodnog prava samoopredeljenja. ..."
"... Mi se tim laglje odričemo danas Krfske deklaracije i srpske vlade što su veliki svetski događaji iz temelja promijenili položaj Jugoslavena. Sjedinjene Države Amerike priznale su 'u potpunoj mjeri pravednost narodnih težnja Jugoslavena za slobodom'. ... Ne treba da

žalimo za Krfskom deklaracijom, dok nam je priznati predvodnik cijelog čovječanstva [t.j., Predsjednik Wilson] svečano priznao ne samo pravo samoodluke, već i samu državnu nezavisnost. To je hiljadu puta više od Krfske deklaracije. Izjava predsjednika Vilsona od 19 oktobra je Magna Karta Jugoslavena. ...

... Pouzdajmo se u revolucionarnu jugoslavensku vladu u Zagrebu, koja je očit izražaj volje cjelokupnog našeg naroda, ... Stojmo dušom i tijelom uz nju i za nju. ..."

[The Proclamation of the Yugoslav National Council in the U.S.A. to the Yugoslav people: the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenians in the U.S.A. (Washington, 1.XI.1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 444-448, Doc. 374, vol. II]

Chapter VI

- (251) Mamatey, V.: Op.cit., p. 96, *italics mine*.
- (252) Šepić, D.: "Politika rušenja Austro-Ugarske i Južni Slaveni". In: Naučni skup ..., Op.cit., p. 112.
- (253) Italija je želila "... [da] organizira blok antislavenskih država od teritorijalno smanjene i reorganizirane Habsburške Monarhije ... [i] ... Madjara i Rumunja ..."
[Šepić, D.: "Politika rušenja ...", Op.cit., pp. 112-113]
- (254) Hancock, W.K.: Smuts; the Sanguine Years, 1870-1919. (Cambridge, At the University Press, 1962) [vol. I.], p. 467; see also: Lloyd-George, David George, 1st earl, 1863-1943: War Memoires, [vol. 5]: 1917-1918. (Boston, Little Brown, 1936), pp. [19]-36, and also: Vol. 4: "The Austrian Peace Move", pp. [218]-261]
- (255) Prema javljanju srpskog poslanika u Švicarskoj, Dr. Slavka Grujića (3.XI.1917) Pašiću, Mensdorff je rekao:
"... da bi ojačali pozicije austro-ugarskog ministra inostranih poslova grofa O. Černina u pregovorima sa Berlinom, ako bi Britanija javno iznela svoje ratne ciljeve, uključujući u njih i njeno benevolentno držanje prema Dvojnoj monarhiji ..."
[The Notes of Ante Trumbić. (London, 8.I.1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 20, Doc. 8, note 5, vol. I; see also: W.K. Hancock: Smuts; the Sanguine Years, 1870-1919, Op.cit., [vol. I.], pp. 466-468]
- (256) "... Rasparčanje Austro-Ugarske nije naš ratni cilj, [ali] smatramo, da je nemoguće nadati se uklanjanju uzroka nemira u tom kraju Evrope, ... dok god se ne dadne stvarna autonomija na čisto demokratskim principima onim austrougarskim narodnostima, koje je odavna žele. ..."
[From the Speech of Lloyd-George. (London, 5.I.1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 14, Doc. 2, vol. I]
- (257) Vexler, Robert J., ed.: Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924; Chronology, Documents, Bibliographical Aids. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1969), p. 92.
- (258) Mamatey, V.S.: Op.cit., p. 74.

- (259) Vodeći američki finansijski krugovi, "smatrali su Austro-Ugarsku ekonomskom cjelinom koju nije preporučljivo cijepati."
[Ekmečić, Milorad: "Stavovi Nikole Pašića prema američkim planovima pretvaranja Austro-Ugarske u federativnu državu." In: Naučni skup ..., Op.cit., p. 161]
- (260) Percival Dodge to Robert Lansing. (Corfu, 14 September 1917). The National Archives, Washington. Decimal File, No. 763 72119/886. Cited by M. Ekmečić: Op.cit., p. 161, note 9.
- (261) Wilson je smatrao "da bi samoopredjeljenje, kad bi se konsekvantno primijenilo, vodilo ka internacionalnoj anarhiji."
[Ekmečić, M.: Ibid., p. 162]
- (262) "... Vesnić je ... imao da govori u [Američkom] Senatu. Iznenadno istog dana, i pred govorom g. Vesnića, predsjednik Vilson je učinio onu poznatu izjavu [i.e., "14 točaka"] o ratnim ciljevima Sjedinjenih Država među kojima je bilo govora i o Srbiji, o njenoj rekonstrukciji i islasku na more. I ne samo to nego je g. Vesnić u oči toga dana bio pozvat od pukovnika Hausa, intimnog saradnika predsjednika Vilsona, koji mu je pokazao tu točku o Srbiji i tražio njegove primedbe koje je g. Vesnić dao u duhu naših traženja. Pa ipak je predsjednik Vilson u svojoj izjavi pred Kongresom ostao [samo] pri rekonstrukciji Srbije i izlasku na more. ..."
[Lj. Mihajlović to N. Pašić. (Washington, 29/16 April 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 179, Doc. 138, vol. I]
- (263) The House Diary, 9 January 1918. Cited by V.S. Mamatey: Op.cit., pp. 186, 187.
- (264) Robert Cecil je kazao da govor Lloyd-Georga predstavlja trenutno "... minimum bazom za pregovore o evropskom miru [i ako ga Centralne sile ne usvoje] a one ga neće usvojiti to je sad sigurno, onda on ne važi dalje."
[The Day-Book of J.M. Jovanović. ([London] 9 January 1918). Archiv Jovana M. Jovanovića. Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 490]
- (265) Robert Cecil je izjavio, da je "jugoslavensko pitanje" poželjno, "ali da li je ostvarivo," upitao je.
[Ibid.]
- (266) "... Utisak toga govora na naše javno mišljenje i na političke prvake svih stranaka pa i na našu vojsku vrlo [je] neprijatan i razočaravajući. Zabrinuo je sve bez razlike za budućnost srpskog naroda. ... Naročito pada u oči da je pravo narodnosti samoopredelenja napušteno za narode u Austro-Ugarskoj a poglavito za Srbe, Hrvate i Slovence pa i za Čeho-Slovake. Za Talijane koji se nalaze u Austro-Ugarskoj kaže se izričito da životna potreba zahteva da se sjedine sa Italijom a za Rumune da će se nastojati da im se učini pravda u njihovim aspiracijama. ... Da li su naši sveznici odstupili od primene u život načela narodnosti za sve narode podjednako ili smo nepravilno shvatili govor Lojda Djordja. ... Vlada srpska još veruje da će naši

saveznici uvrstiti u uslove mira i ostvarenje naših nacionalnih zahteva i da neće pristati da se srpskome narodu nanese takva nepravda kakva bi bila kad se ne bi i ostvarenje njegovih nacionalnih zahteva unelo u uslove mira. ..."

[N. Pašić to the Allied Governments. (Salonica, 17/4 January 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., pp. 37-41, Doc. 25, vol. I]

- (267) Pašić daje upute ambasadorima kod Saveznika: "... Kad naši saveznici nalaze da treba popraviti pogrešku Nemačke iz 1871. odnosno Elzasa i Lotaringije, onda mnogo jači razlozi govore da treba popraviti ili uništiti akt o aneksiji Bosne i Hercegovine i dati srpskom narodu pravo samoopredeljenja ...
Naša braća [i.e., Hrvati] stoje ... na tom zahtevu 'sve ili ništa' ... [Oni] ne rade kao što bi radio dobar otac, koji kad ne može da oslobodi svu svoju decu on oslobadja onoliko koliko može, a za ostale motri [zgodno vrijeme] kad će moći i njih osloboditi. ... Kad o tome govorite [t.j., o pitanju da li će Srbija dobiti barem Bosnu i Hercegovinu] sa merodavnim ličnostima uvek se ogradite i recite da govorite o tom po svom mišljenju, a nikako po uputstvima svoje vlade. Ali molim obratite pažnju na najmanju nijansu u odgovorima i saopštite mi tačno što pre. Ako imate kakvog pouzdanog i lojalnog Bošnjaka možete i njega uputiti, da u smislu toga govori Ministarstvu inostranih dela."
[N. Pašić to Lj. Mihajlović. (Salonica, 22 January 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., pp. 44-45, Doc. 30, vol. I]
- (268) "... Moje je mišljenje da je najopasnije pokazati našim saveznicima i našim saplemenicima da smo gotovi pogadjati se. Naš program o ujedinjenju ne smemo napustiti, ... Krfska deklaracija, osnovana na zdravim principima i jugoslavenski pokret, to pretstavlja danas naše najjače orudje. Napustiti to znači upropastiti se. ..."
[Lj. Mihajlović to N. Pašić. (Washington, 23 January 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., p. 48, Doc. 34, vol. I]
- (269) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 399.
- (270) Trumbić je tražio "... da Srpska Vlada prikaže bezodvlačno savezničkim silama notu, u kojoj će zauzeti stanovište prema govorima Lojd Žorža i Vilsona u smislu Krfske Deklaracije, pobijati ideju zadržavanja našeg naroda u okviru Austro-Ugarske i postaviti formalan zahtjev oslobodjenja i ujedinjenja na principu narodnog samoopredeljenja, ... trebalo bi od njih zahtevati barem to da tim narodnostima zasebno našem sačuvaju pravo samoopredeljenja u apsolutnom smislu a bez ograničenja u okviru Austro-Ugarske. ..."
[A. Trumbić to the Heir to the Throne, Alexander, and N. Pašić. (London, 12 January 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., p. 27, Doc. 15, vol. I]
- (271) Pašić obavještava Trumbića da je "... Kraljevska vlada preuzela ... sve korake [da se] naša braća [ne] ostavljaju u ropstvu Austro-Ugarske [već treba da dobiju] slobodu i pravo za svoje samoopredeljenje."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 389]

- (272) Srpska vlada u svojoj noti od 17/4 siječnja 1918 Saveznicima, bila je bazirana na osnovu srpskih aspiracija, t.j. "tražila je teritorijalnih akvizicija za Srbiju, pa prema tome nije počivala na principu samoopredjeljenja."
[Paulova, M.: Ibid.]
- (273) A. Trumbić to the Heir Apparent, Alexander, N. Pašić [and] J.A. Nikolić. (London, 10 January 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 22-23, Doc. 11, vol. I.
- (274) "... Prvaci naših opozicionih stranaka drže konferencije, na kojima napadaju g. Pašića i celu vladu zbog rdjavo vodjene spoljašne politike. ..."
[Head of the Cabinet Council, Aleksić, to the Minister of the Interior of Royal Serbia. (Pariz, 15/2 January, 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 35, Doc. 22, vol. I]
- (275) Vodje srpske opozicije zahtjevaju od Pašića:
"... Naša nacionalna stvar ušla je u strahovitu krizu, ... stoga tražimo da vlada odmah sazove Narodnu Skupštinu i to samo u ... Francuskoj ... [koju] treba da otvori Njegovo Visočanstvo Prestolonaslednik čije bi prisustvo u ovim momentima bilo veoma potrebno i korisno. ..."
[The Delegates of the Opposition Parties of the Serbian National Assembly to N. Pašić. (Paris, 14/1 January, 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 34, Doc. 21, vol. I]
- (276) The Committee of the Serbian Socialdemocratic Party in France to the President of the Serbian National Assembly. (Paris, 19 January 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 42-43, Doc. 28, vol. I.
- (277) Jugoslavenski odbor je predlagao: "... kolektivnu solidarnu akciju svih narodnih faktora okupljenih u opštoj narodnoj skupštini kao reprezentantu narodne cjeline ... Samo kolektivna akcija može da svrati pažnju savezničkih vlada i javnog mišljenja na našu odlučnost i medjusobnu solidarnost, ..."
[The Yugoslav Committee to the Heir to the Throne, Alexander, to the Serbian Government, and to A. Nikolić. (London, 21 January 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 43, Doc. 29, vol. I, italics in original]
- (278) Trumbić javlja Regentu Aleksandru da:
" ... ako [srpska] vlada ne primi u principu odborov predlog, [Yugoslavenski] Odbor se ne namjerava zaustaviti u svojoj akciji nego namjerava ići dalje svojim putem i mimo vlade, o čemu će nju lojalno predobavijestiti. Ako vlada neće predvoditi narod, ona će ostati iza njega. ... Ne smijem Vam tajiti nezadovoljstvo koje vlada u odboru zbog metoda po kojoj vlada vodi nacijsonalnu politiku. Ta metoda ignorira Krfsku deklaraciju koja posmatra naš narodni problem kao nerazdvojnju celinu i odbija svako delomično rešenje njegovo. Odatle slijedi da se nacijsonalna politika ima voditi u sporazumu i uz učešće svih narodnih faktora koji mogu danas predstavljati naš narod kao celinu. [Kraljevska] Vlada nasuprot drži se još uvijek kabinetske politiku koja je preživjela, ... [Nadalje Trumbić kaže] naša opšta politika i

njezina akcija ne mogu da [se] uspehom vode nikako ni iz Krfa ni iz Soluna daleko od sveta. Treba preneti ih u svetski centar kao što je Pariz ili London, kamo bi trebalo da se preselite Vi i članovi Vlade ..."

[A. Trumbić to the Successor to the Throne, Alexander. (London, 22 January 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 46-47, Doc. 32, vol. I]

(279) Trumbić piše Protiću:

"... treba da se nešto energično učini. ... Trebalo [bi] sazvati jednu opštu skupštinu svih narodnih faktora i elemenata sa zadatkom da donesu zaključke o našem opštem nacionalnom pitanju kao i o daljnjem vođenju nacionalne politike. ..."

[A. Trumbić to S. Protić. (London, 24 January 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 51, Doc. 36, (pp. 50-52), vol. I]

(280) Trumbić piše dr. Gazzariju:

"... Radi se o promjeni metode u vođenju nacionalne politike. ... U tri i pol godine rata ta se je politika pokazala na djelu kao nepodesna i bezuspješna, jer nije uspjela da narodni problem unese u medjusavezničku politiku ... Gorko nas iskustvo uči, da se tim putem nemožemo ničemu nadati pa nastaje neizbježiva potreba da se reformiše ovaj rad i njegov način i to tako da se službena politika Srbije osloni na kolektivnu akciju cijeloga naroda i bude njen izražaj. ... Ovo je osnovna misao odborova predloga. On hoće kolektivno istupanje naroda mjesto osamljene akcije vlade, ... Nova politika imala bi da djeluje na javno mišljenje našega naroda i savezničkih zemalja. ... Velika je pogreška rezignirat se na to da je naša budućnost samo u rukama velikih saveznika. To je fatalizam, ... Naš je problem najprije u rukama našega naroda. ..."

[A. Trumbić to J. Gazzari. (London, 1 February 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 73, Doc. 58, vol. I]

(281) "Najprije sporazumom italo-jugoslavenskim a zatim českim, poljskim i rumunjskim pitanjem. Jugoslavenski bataljoni bili bi se predavali i na talij[anskom] frontu kako su se predavali na srpskom i ruskom da je Italija ušla u rat kao osloboditeljica. ..."

[The Minutes of A. Trumbić. (London, 8 January 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 19, Doc. 8, vol. I; Trumbić had a conversation with H.W. Steed in relation with the speech of Lloyd-George]

(282) "Memorandum on our policy in relation to Austria-Hungary". (May 30, 1918) and "Policy in Relation to the Nationalities Movement within the Austro-Hungarian Empire". (25 June 1918). (Lansing Papers [Confidential Memoranda and Notes]). Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, Cited by Ivo Lederer: Op.cit., pp. 34-35.

(283) Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918 - 1919, Suppl. I, pp. 815-816. Cited by J. Lederer: Ibid., p. 35.

(284) Lederer, J.: Op.cit., p. 35.

- (285) "... Ne mislim da bi bilo pametno da ignorišemo lekciju koja se mora naučiti iz njemačke politike prema ruskom narodu."
[Lansing to Wilson. (10 May 1918) The National Archives, Washington. Decimal File. No. 763 72119/1657-a. Cited by Ekmečić: Op.cit., p. 163]
- (286) "... Govori g. Ljoda Djordja i g. Vilsona samo su odjeci te nove stvarne situacije, koja je došla, ... kao posledica ruskog uklanjanja sa bojnog polja, ... Italija se, posle nesreća u Rusiji, Rumuniji, pa i su njoj samoj, i posle govora Lojda Djordja i Vilsona, rešila da svoje držanje promeni prema jugoslavenskom pitanju. Ona, istina, nije još potpuno usvojila naše gledište, ali je uglavnom napustila ono, na kome je stajala u vremenu, kad je stvarala sporazum sa Silama Sporazuma na našu štetu. ..."
[N. Pašić to A. Trumbić. (Corfu, 26/13 March 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., pp. 144-145, Doc. 115, vol. I]
- (287) "... Iz diskusije se osjetilo, da Talijani ne računaju na Dalmaciju i da će svako insistiranje s pretenzijama u Dalmaciji od danas predstavljati samo taktično sredstvo za naša popuštanja na drugim točkama."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 407]
- (288) "... Ide se zatim da se pokaže Saveznicima, koji se boje ticati u Austriju, jer misle da će mjesto nje nastati kaos da je moguć savez naroda, koji će je zamijeniti, i u isto doba biti pouzdani za Ententu."
[Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i...", Op.cit., pp. 493-494]
- (289) List "L'Unità" dokazivala je "... neopravdanost talijanskih aspiracija na Dalmaciju."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 415]
- (290) Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 413, note 1.
- (291) "Italija i Jugoslavija upućene su na to, da Jadransko more ima biti talijansko i jugoslavensko, jer inače prijeti opasnost da bude njemačko. Dosta je naći principijelne linije, detalja teritorijalnih ne treba, može se prepustiti konferenciji ili arbitraži, n.p. Vilsona."
[The Minutes of Trumbić. Cited by Dragovan Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i Rimski pakt." In: Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu, Op.cit., pp. 484-485]
- (292) Steed, Henry Wickham: Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922. (London, W. Heinemann, 1924), vol. II, p. 169.
- (293) General Mola je zahtjevao Pulu i Trst i da "... te dvije tačke ne bi se mogle držati bez veze s Italijom i bez hinterlanda, [s toga on] zahtjeva svu Istru, Trst i okolicu, jugozapadnu Kranjsku i svu pokrajinu Gradiška-Gorica. ..."
[A. Trumbić to N. Pašić. (London, 11 February 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 98, Doc. 74, vol. I]
- (294) Steed, H.W.: Op.cit., p. 174, vol. II.
- (295) Šepić, D.: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 487.

- (296) Te su zemlje "... u najvećem dijelu čisto slovenske, dočim su priznavali [Trumbić i članovi] samo to da se talijanski govori djelomično u gradićima zapadne Istre, u Trstu i Gorici. Oni su i u pogledu ovih zemalja stajali na stanovištu principa narodnosti i narodnog samoodredjenja."
[Transcript of Trumbić's letter to M. Paulova. AJO, JAZU, Zagreb. Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., pp. 488-489, note 9]
- (297) Amendola usvaja: "... ne samo narodnosni princip, nego takodjer [i] drugi princip: potpune nezavisnosti malih država. ..."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 418]
- (298) Senator Esterela izjavljuje:
"Čini se, da su težnje Italije, da dobije iza rata Dalmaciju ... puke fantazije. Izjave Engleske i Amerike zovu nas k realnosti, a ona traži sporazum s Jugoslavenima pored Čeha i ostalih revolucionarnih naroda austrijskih i zajedničku borbu."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 421]
- (299) "Željelo se Italiji osigurati političku i moralnu korist tog vodstva kako radi vođenja rata tako i prilikom zaključenja mira."
[Amendola, Giovanni: "Il Patto di Roma e la 'Polemica'". In: Il Patto di Roma . (Roma, 1919) Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 495]
- (300) Trumbić je bio odlučno protiv osnivanja "Srpsko-talijanskog društva", ... "... jer nije htio da se na sporazumu s Talijanima radi mimo [Jugoslavenskog] Odbora. S toga je u tom mislu i intervenirao kod Pašića."
[Transcript of Trumbić's letter to M. Paulova (20 September 1924), AJO, JAZU, Zagreb. Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 497]
- (301) "... Beneš hoće kad podje u Italiju da nas može 'predstvaljati'. Izričito morate mu reći, da mu mi taj mandat u nikakvoj formi ne dajemo, da ne želimo da se on za nas miješa i neka zna da mi nismo zadovoljni s njegovim radom u Italiji u koliko se tiče našega pitanja. Neka se on bavi svojim pitanjem u koje se mi nismo nikada uplićali, ... Ništa nas ne zanima što on vami privatno kaže da on pristaje na Krfsku Deklaraciju, koju nije htio donijeti kao saopćenje u "Nation Tchèque", dok nije vidio da može poslije nekoliko mjeseci bez opasnosti. ..."
[A. Trumbić to J. De Giulli. (London, 6 February 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., p. 91, Doc. 69, pp.(89-91), Vol. I]
- (302) Trumbić piše Gazzariju: "... Dobro nam je došlo pitanje naših odnosa s talijanima i to je našu stvar podiglo tako da se za nju zanimaju krugovi politički i novinarski ovdje [t.j., u Engleskoj], u Italiji i u Francuskoj. Ovdje bi jedva dočekali da se dodje do sporazuma između nas i talijana a u Francuskoj jednako. U Italiji se čitavo javno mnijenje podijelilo na dva tabora za ili protiv akcije protiv Austro-

Ugarske. Pitanje sporazuma s nami osnov je tomu a to svraća pažnju više nego ikad do sada na pitanje jugoslavensko. Ja nisam tražio audijenciju kod Orlanda nego je on to udesio sa Steedom. ..."

[A. Trumbić to J. Gazzari. (London, 9 February 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 95, Doc. 72, vol. I]

- (303) Steed, H.W.: Mes souvenirs: II, 1914-1922 (Paris, 1927), pp. 176-181. Šepić, D.: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 499; see also: Reginald Pound & Geoffrey Harmsworth: Northcliffe. (London, Cassell [1959]), pp. 624, 635.
- (304) Trumbić to De Giulli (5.III.1918). Archives DG., Zagreb, Šepić, D.: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 499.
- (305) Trumbić javlja De Giulliju da je potrebno jasno ustvrditi "... fundamentalni princip da se teritorijalni sporovi izmedju oba naroda imaju riješiti u smislu principa narodnosti i prava narodnog samoopredijeljenja. To je opće načelo koje nas može da pokrije u pogledu odgovornosti pred našim narodom i pred našom savjesti i to je teški predmet današnjih razgovora. U nikakve teritorijalne konkretne sporove ne ulazimo, jer ne možemo usuditi se da priznamo tudjemu narodu pravo niti ne jedno selo našega naroda. ..."
- [A. Trumbić to J. De Giulli. (London, 5 March 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 115, Doc. 90, vol. I]
- (306) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 432.
- (307) Ambasador Jovanović zapisao je u svoj dnevnik:
 "Od 3:30 do 7:15 p.m. u Savoy Hotel - razgovor o talijansko-jugoslavenskom sporazumu. Bili [prisutni]: Sir Arthur Evans, [Seton-]Watson, Steed, Emanuel, Torre i Trumbić ... Kako je Trumbić ostao pri svojem ranijem [stavu?] o jugoslavenskoj državi na osnovi Krfske deklaracije, svi su upotreбили velike argumente, upravo moyens de pression. Torre je rekao da neće više da čeka - do sutra u podne. ... Steed [je] kazao: Trumbić će upropastiti celu stvar sa saveznicima. Vlada britanska (t.j. War Committee) je dala pristanak na plan lorda Northcliffa [i.e., Northcliffe] za rad protiv Austrije. ... Lično Steed diže ruke od svega. ... Trumbić mora ići iz Londona i ceo Jugoslavenski Odbor ... S[ir] A. Evans je kazao, da ako ne primi [Trumbić]ovaj sporazum on će učiniti čitav zločin, otudjiće sve simpatije Engleza, a on lično misli da se neće moći više zauzimati za stvar koju je zastupao. [Seton-]Watson: je tako isto rekao. On će se povući od svega, neće raditi protiv, ali neće raditi ni za. ..."
- [Archives J.M. Jovanović. Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...". Op.cit., p. 503]
- (308) "Trumbić neće da stoje reči: 'da budu sačuvani vitalni interesi oba naroda ... ' jer je to reč koja je elastična, pa se može tumačiti i ovako i onako, ..."
- [Ibid., pp. 503-504, italics in original]

- (309) "Predstavnici naroda podloženih posve i djelimično Austro-Ugarskoj monarhiji u svrhu zajedničke akcije složno utvrđuju ova načela:
- 1) Svaki narod, koji teži da postigne svoje nacionalno i državno ujedinjenje ili da ga upotpuni, ima nesalomljivo pravo na potpunu političku i ekonomsku nezavisnost.
 - 2) Svaki od ovih naroda priznaje da je Monarhija austro-ugarska osnovna zapreka ostvarenju njegovih težnja i njegovih prava.
 - 3) Ovi se narodi stoga zalažu da će se međusobno pomagati u borbi za svoje potpuno oslobođenje od zajedničkog neprijatelja a da uzmognu postići potpuno narodno ujedinjenje u svojoj slobodnoj državi."

"Predstavnici talijanskog i jugoslovenskog naroda zasebno utvrđuju ovo:

- 4) U pogledu odnosa između talijanske nacije i nacije Srba, Hrvata, i Slovenaca, poznatih i pod zajedničkim imenom jugoslovenskim, predstavnici ovih dvaju naroda priznaju da je ujedinjenje i nezavisnost jugoslovenske nacije životan interes Italije, kao što je upotpunjenje narodnog jedinstva Italije životni interes jugoslovenske nacije.
Stoga se predstavnici oba naroda zalažu da će uložiti svu svoju djelatnost u to da za trajanja rata i u času mira budu potpuno oživotvoreni ovi vrhovni zahtevi njihovih naroda.
- 5) Proglašuju da je oslobođenje Jadranskoga mora i njegova odbrana od svakog sadašnjeg i budućeg neprijatelja životan interes njihovih naroda.
- 6) Obavezuju se riješiti prijateljski i u interesu budućih dobrih i iskrenih odnosa između oba naroda pojedine teritorijalne sporove na osnovu načela narodnosti i prava narodnog samoodredjenja i na način da se ne povrede životni interesi jednog i drugog naroda, koji će biti definisani u času mira.
- 7) Skupinama (nuclei) jednoga naroda, koji bi morali biti uključeni u granice drugoga naroda, priznaće se i zajamčiće se pravo na postojanje njihova jezika, njihove kulture i njihovih moralnih i ekonomskih interesa."

[A. Trumbić to A. Torre. (London, 7 February 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., pp. 117-118, Doc. 92, vol. I; see also: Albrecht-Carrié, René: Italy at the Paris Peace Conference. (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1938), pp. [347]-348]

- (310) Transcript of Trumbić's letter to M. Paulova (20 September 1924). AJO, JAZU, Zagreb. Šepić, D.: "Jugoslavenski odbor i...", Op.cit., p. 506.
- (311) "... Za jugoslavene imaju pravo doći na Kongres samo članovi jugoslovenskog odbora koje ću ja ... označiti."
[A. Trumbić to A. Torre. (London, 27 March 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 146, note 2, Doc. 116, vol. I]
- (312) Šepić, D.: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 508.
- (313) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 440-442.
- (314) See: "General Resolution of the Congress of Suppressed Nations of Austria-Hungary." (Rome, 10 April 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., p. 172, Doc. 130, vol. I.

- (315) Il Patto di Roma, Op.cit., p. 121. In: M. Paulova, Op.cit., p.[443].
- (316) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 444.
- (317) Moravec, Zdenko: L'Italie et les Yougoslaves. (Paris, 1919), p. 33.
Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 445.
- (318) Paulova, M.: Ibid., pp. 445-447.
- (319) Talijanska vlada naredila je Vrhovnoj komandi da izvrši popis stanovnika Slovenske narodnosti i da se "Slovenci iz Kranjske, Koruške i Štajerske odvoje od onih koji su rođeni u pokrajinama Gorice i Gradišća, okružja Trsta i Istre."
[Commando supremo del R. Esercito a Bissolati (25.VII.1918). Archivio di Stato a Roma. Archivio Bissolati: 3/12. Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 514]
- (320) "... Sonino ... mi [je] rekao uglavnom ovo: Vašu poslednju notu o jugoslavenskim zarobljenicima srpske narodnosti u užem smislu: Banaćane, Sremce, Bosance i ... [tekst prekinut u originalu] pušćaćemo... Vlada italijanska ne može puštati zarobljenike iz drugih krajeva jer to povlači diskusije teritorijalnih pitanja koje se moraju odložiti za docnije. ... I status jslovenske [sic] jedinice na talijanskom frontu stoji u vezi sa teritorijalnim pitanjima ... Najzad rekao mi [je], ... da mu [je] prijatno reći mi da su vrlo srdačni odnosi izmedju srpskih i talijanskih trupa na frontu solunskom...."
[V. Antonijević to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia, N. Pašić, to the Ambassadors of Serbia in Paris, London, Washington, and Berne. (Rome, 10 September/28 August 1918). Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 287, Doc. 233, vol. I]
- (321) "... Da bi pak [dobrovoljci] postali u prvom [pravom?] smislu riječi vojnici srpski, potrebno je i da polože [sic] zakletvu Kralju Srpskome. Tek tada mogu da budu jednaki jugoslavenskoj svojoj braći na Solunskom frontu. ... Time [bi] se postiglo dvoje:
1. Dokazalo [bi] se ljudima da ima neko ko o njima tačno računa vodi; provela [bi] se organizacija njihova, čime su istrgnuti ispod uticaja talijanskog i podvrgnuti uticaju našem, i
2. Ti ljudi postali su [i.e., postali bi] nosiocima srpske, odnosno jugoslavenske ideje onde, gde je to doista za nas najpotrebnije. ... Oni isti razlozi koji su rukovodili Ministra Sonina da bude protiv zakletve [vjernosti srpskom kralju], nas su rukovodili da budemo za...."
[Colonel M.M. Jovanović to the Supreme [Serbian] Command. (Salonica, 25/12 August 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 267-268, Doc. 212, vol. I]
- (322) "... U poslednjoj ministarskoj sednici Sonino nije bio protiv Jugoslavenske Legije za borbu na talijanskom frontu ali je bio toliko rezervisan da Bisolati zaključuje, da je Sonino protiv Lagije a i Orlando se pokolebao otkako se vratio sa fronta, jer medju Jugoslovenima ima mnogo boljševizma; u pitanju zakletve ni Sonino ni Orlando

ni u kom slučaju ne pristaju da zakletva bude kralju Petru ... Krfska Deklaracija priznaje jedinstvo troimenog naroda [Hrvata, Slovenaca i Srba] i Srbija predstavlja sve Jugoslavena i prema tome ne možemo odstupiti od Krfske Deklaracije, koja priznaje kralja Petra kao svoga vladara pa prema tome imaju Njemu polagati zakletvu naša braća kad stupaju u borbu za oslobodjenje. ... Italija ostaje pri svojoj politici, da Hrvati treba da obrazuju svoju zasebnu državu i da se njima pridruži ostatak Slovenaca. ..."

[N. Pašić to the Ambassadors of the Kingdom of Serbia in Rome, Washington and London. (Paris, 18/5 October 1918) Gradja o..., Op.cit., p. [369-]370, Doc. 301, Vol. II]

Chapter VII

- (323) "... čim taj kredit bude iscrpen poslat će se novi ..." [javlja Vesnić Pašiću].

[Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 238]

- (324) "Državni sekretar želi da objavi, da je vlada SAD s velikim zanimanjem pratila kongres potlačenih naroda Austro-Ugarske, održan u Rimu mjeseca aprila, i da nacionalne težnje Čeho-Slovaka i Jugoslavena za slobodom uživaju iskrenu simpatiju ove vlade."

["The Foreign Relations of the United States, The World War. Supplement I," I, p. 800. (Washington, 29 May 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 203, Doc. 152, vol. I]

- (325) "Na jednom sastanku, održanom u Versaillesu 3. lipnja t.g. [te godine], predsjednici Savjeta Trojice Saveznika Francuske, Italije i Engleske sporazumjeli su se, da dadu ove dvije izjave:

Poljaci. - Obrazovanje jedinstvene i nezavisne poljske države sa slobodnim pristupom na more jedan je od uslova solidarnog i pravednog mira i vladavine prava u Evropi.

Čehoslovaci i Jugoslaveni. - Savezničke vlade su sa zadovoljstvom primile na znanje izjavu Sekretara Sjedinjenih Država i žele da joj se pridruže, izražavajući najživlje simpatije za nacionalne aspiracije čehoslovačkog i jugoslavenskog naroda za slobodu."

[The Declarations of the President of the Council of the Triple Entente (France, Italy, England). (Paris-Versailles, 3 June 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 204, Doc. 153, vol. I]

- (326) Jovanović kaže da je Versailleska nota u stvari "... povratak u stanje januara 1918 ..."

[Ibid., note 2]

- (327) "... jer dok se Poljacima daje nezavisnost, ... pokretu Čehoslovaka i Jugoslavena daju [se] samo simpatije. ..."

[Lj. Mihajlović to the Diplomatic Representatives of the Allied Governments in Washington. (Washington, 14 June 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 210, Doc. 159, vol. I]

- (328) U svom memorandumu Balfour-u, Jugoslavenski Odbor je tražio "osiguranje jednakog priznanja sa strane savezničkih vlada [kao i] svoja prava i aspiracije. ..."

[The Yugoslav Committee to Balfour. (London, 15 June 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 211, Doc. 161, Vol. I]

- (329) Vlada U.S.A. je izjavila: "... da je gledište, koje zastupa vlada Sjedinjenih Država takovo, da sve grane slavenskog plemena treba da budu potpuno oslobođene ispod njemačkog i austrijskog gospodstva." [The Declaration of the Government of the U.S.A. (Washington, 28 June 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 220, Doc. 164, vol. I]
- (330) Salvemini, Gaetano: Dal Patto di Londra alla Pace di Roma; Documenti della politica che non fu fatta. (Torino, P. Gobetti, 1925). Cited by Bodgan Radica: "Pogledi na Supila; život, misao i djelo Frana Supila." In: Hrvatska Revija (La Revista Croata), God.VII, sv. 4(28) (Buenos Aires, 1957), p. 355, note 4]
- (331) "... Srbiji treba priznati pravo zastupanja svih J.[ugo] Slovena t.j. Srbo-Hrvata i Slovenaca koje njoj priznaju [??] naši saveznici u Evropi. ... Zbog toga treba čuvati se koraka i reči koje bi išle na to kao da Srbije nema i kao da bi trebala tražiti neku organizaciju koja bi predstavljala Srbo-Hrvata i Slovence. ..." [N. Pašić to J. Jovanović. (Corfu, 11 July/28 June 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 226, Doc. 174, vol. I]
- (332) "Bio sam kod Pichona, koji je pripravan da i za nas da izjavu kao i za Čehe o priznanju naše nezavisnosti od A.U.-ske [Austro-Ugarske] i o priznanju našega naroda, odbora kao predstavnika naroda pod A. Uom [Austro-Ugarskom]. ..." [Trumbić's notes. (Paris, 19 July 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 233, Doc. 184, note 5, vol. I]
- (333) "... Ovih dana govorio sam ministru Pichonu ... i on je odgovorio da je spreman da učini i za jugoslavene što je učinio za druge te me je potakao da spremim izjavu, kakvu želimo, ... Dodao je ... da je engleska vlada potpuno složna sa francuskom u pitanju Austro-Ugarske u smislu potpunog oslobođenja njezinih potlačenih naroda sa pravom na njihovu državnu nezavisnost. Pre nego se Pichonu podnese nacrt izjave, naš odbor želi da se sporazumi sa kr[aljevskom] vladom i misli da u izjavi ima da budu jasno izražene dvije misli, jedna o pravu našega naroda pod Austro-Ugarskom na potpuno oslobođenje i odcepljenje od nje i ujedinjenje sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom u jednu nezavisnu državu a druga o priznanju da je Jugoslavenski odbor predstavnik naroda Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca pod A.U. [Austro-Ugarskom]. ..." [A.Trumbić to N. Pašić. (Paris, 25 July 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 234, Doc. 185, vol. I]
- (334) "Srbija ... međunarodno predstavlja naš troimeni narod srpsko-hrvatsko-slovenački i u međunarodnim odnosima govori u ime njegovo. Prema tome, bilo bi neko dvojstvo, ako bi naši saveznici postavljali svoje predstavnike kod Jugoslavenskog Odbora. ..." [The Serbian Government to A. Trumbić. (Krf, 5 August/23 July 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 243, Doc. 193, vol. I]
- (335) "Oslobadjaju se narodi A.U. [Austro-Ugarske] u ime njihovog prava na život a ne zato da se anektiraju kojoj drugoj državi. ..." [Ibid., p. 244, note [1], italics in original]

- (336) Trumbić odgovara Pašiću: "... Ni ja ni niko od nas nije poricao niti će poricati Srbiji pravo da naš narod međunarodno zastupa. ... Ali ovdje se radi o nečemu drugomu na ime o tomu da li Srbija ima ekskluzivno pravo da danas zastupa čitav naš narodni problem u međunarodnom životu ili pak imaju i drugi faktori iz našega [naroda?] da sa Srbijom naš narod zastupaju, u njegovo ime govore i rade za njegove interese. ... Srbija je od prilike samo treći dio našega cjelokupnog naroda po teritoriji i po pučanstvu. Izvan nje ima Crnagora koja je država i ima sav narod u A-U-oj [Austro-Ugarskoj], koji predstavlja oko 2/3 cjelokupne naše nacije. ... Moja je misao ... ta da naš narod ima biti zastupan od kr[aljevske] vlade i od Jugosl[avenskog] odbora te oni onda mogu da zajednički govore kompetencijom i ovlaštenjem na ime našega naroda u Austro-Ugarskoj i u Srbiji otvarajući širom vrata Crnojgori kao dijelu istovjetnog naroda da nadje sebi mjesto u zajednici jugoslavenskoj. ..."
- [A. Trumbić to N. Pašić. (Paris, at the end of September 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 313, Doc. 254, (pp. 311-315), vol. I, italics in original]
- (337) "... Mi sažaljavamo što se Predsednik Ministarstva ne pokazuje ni malo raspoložen da dodje do ovog sporazuma. Ovo držanje Srpske Vlade onemogućava svaku inicijativu u korist zbliženja i ujedinjenja Srba sa Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima iz Austro-Ugarske. Mi se obraćamo Njegovom Visočanstvu kao najvišem čuvaru jugoslavenskih i srpskih interesa sa molbom da on uzme lično u ruke svoje to pitanje. Vreme je skupoceno i svako novo ustezanje od strane Srpske Vlade moglo bi imati teških posledica."
- [W. Steed and Seton Watson to Heir Apparent, Alexander. (London, 9 August/27 July 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 246, Doc. 196, vol. I, italics in original]
- (338) "... ja priznajem da mi je nepoznato da su ti nesporazumi potekli usled razlike u pogledima na neko osnovno načelo kojeg bi se trebalo držati. Naprotiv, ... ako ima kakvih razlika, one se mogu samo odnositi na taktičke detalje. Verujem da će i te razlike, u koliko postoje, ubrzo isčeznuti ..."
- [The Apparent Heir to the Throne, Alexander, to W. Steed and Seton-Watson. (Solonica [?], 10 August/28 July 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 247, Doc. 197, vol. I]
- (339) "... da izmedju Sonninovih nazora i nazora ministra predsjednika Pašića nema opreke."
- [Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. [474]]
- (340) Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 477.
- (341) Lederer, Ivo J.: Op.cit., p. 37; Lederer's citation taken from: "New Europe", 8 (1918), 127, italics in original.
- (342) "... Potrebno je da se na što jasniji način od Vaše strane pokaže da Vi niste napustili program iz Krfske deklaracije, jer Englezi, koji su do sada radili na našem ujedinjenju imaju utisak da vlada

ima jedan nov program, koji se može ovako definisati: 'veća Srbija s izlazom na more' i strahovanje da je to u sporazumu s b.[baronom] Soninom učinjeno. ... Nesloga između Srba i neslaganje sa Jugoslav[en-skim] Odborom nije li znak nesposobnosti za ujedinjenje i [znak] slabosti, pitaju se oni ?' ..."

[J. Jovanović to N. Pašić. (London, 24/11 August 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 265-266, Doc. 211, vol. I]

- (343) The answer to Jovanović is included in Pašić's telegram to S. Protić, which reads:

"Poslanik svaki u takvim slučajevima treba da zna činiti svoju dužnost, ... Kad dodjem u London, ako se uopšte rešim dolaziti u zemlju koja pokušava, da se meša u unutrašnju upravu svoje saveznice, učinitću ono što ... mi interesi krune, srpskog naroda i srpske vlade budu nalagali. - Mislim odgovoriti [na Watsonov članak] preko nekog Srbina ili Jugoslavena, jer držim da bi suviše bilo da izilazim lično. ..."

[N. Pašić to S. Protić. (Evian-les-Bains, 2 September/20 August 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 278, Doc. 224, vol. I, italics mine]

- (344) Protić odgovara Seton-Watson-u: "... Vi ste dragi prijatelju, mistificirani, i to ne malo. ... Pašić je odista star godinama, ali ne retko mladji duhom i pogledima od mnoge gospode opozicionara. On je naš nacionalni kapital, koji ni jedan pametan čovek i ni jedna pametna grupa neće odbaciti. ... U Pašićevoj mladosti nema nikakvih poluturskih tradicija; naprotiv, u njoj ima tradicija revolucionarnih i zapadnih, kao i u nas drugih "konzervativnih snaga." U Karadjordjevoj Srbiji nikad nije bilo mesta ni za poluturske ni za poluaustrijske tradicije. Zato je dokaz i sama istorija srpskih vladalaca. I za to je Srbija i bila i jeste zastavnik narodnog oslobodjenja i ujedinjenja. Ona je oličenje i nosilac velikoga, ako hoćete opet revolucionarnog principa, od koga ste se i Vi pre nekoliko godina uplašili bili ... Pre se valja bojati, čini mi se, da tamo, bliže vama, nema dragi prijatelju, poluturskih i poluaustrijskih tradicija, koje smetaju izvodjenju oslobodjenja i ujedinjenja našeg naroda na osnovu Krfske Deklaracije, koju Srbija gleda i radi samo da proširi i udubi a nikako suzi i oslabi. ... Srbija ima svoje teškoće kao i svi drugi ... Da li je to mnogo kad ona od svojih osvedočenih prijatelja, kao što ste Vi, traži da joj ih oni ne uvećavaju ovakvim neosnovanim kritikama ..."

["Velika Srbija" (La Grande Serbie) (No. 367) Salonica, 9 September 1918 - dated by the Julian calendar -, Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 279, Doc. 224, note 4]

- (345) "Srbija ima da bira: da li hoće da vodi pokret za nacionalno ujedinjenje Južnih Slavena, ili da ostane jedna mala balkanska kraljevina ..."
[Cited by K. Milutinović: "R.W. Seton-Watson i ...", Op.cit., p. 473]

- (346) Editor "Velike Srbije" (La Grande Serbie), L. Marković, pokušao je prikazati profesora Seton-Watson-a na taj način što je: "... pomoću proizvoljnog prevodjenja i očitog izvrtanja Watsonovih tekstova na sve moguće načine pokušao da ga prikaže kao neprijatelja Srbije i srpskog naroda ..."

[Milutinović, K.: Ibid., p. 472]

- (347) Colapietra, R.: Leonida Bissolati (Milano, 1958), pp. 260-261. Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 516; about the "Evans' line" see p. 192; and for more about it see: Arthur Evans: Les Slavs de l'Adriatique et la route continentale de Constantinople. (London, The Near East Ltd., 1916), pp. 14-15]
- (348) "Masa tzv. [tako zvanih] 'dobronamjernih gradjana' prožeta davnom i primitivnom averzijom prema 'Croatu' i ne vjerujući da se Austrija može raspasti, što nisu željeli ni plemići, konservativci, diplomati, crkva i klerikalci, bila je protiv nas." [Cited by D. Šepić: "Jugoslavenski odbor i ...", Op.cit., p. 518 - without indication of the source]
- (349) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 484-487.
- (350) "Il consiglio [dei] ministri delibera di informare i governi alleati, che il governo italiano considera il movimento dei popoli jugoslavi per la conquista della indipendenza [sic] e per la loro costituzione [sic] in [un] libero stato come rispondente ai principi per cui la intesa combatte nouchè [sic] ai fini di una pace giusta e durevole." [Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 487, note 1]
- (351) "... Česi i Poljaci nemaju svoje slobodne države i Vlade koja bi ih predstavljale ... ali Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci imaju Srbiju koja vodi rat radi njihovog oslobodjenja i ujedinjenja sa Srbijom. ... Srbija je istakla kao cilj svoga rata: osloboditi i ujediniti Srbo-Hrvate sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom u jednu jaku nezavisnu državu. ... Priznanje J[ugo]slavenskog Komiteta kao predstavnika i zastupnika Jugoslavena u A[ustro]-Ugarskoj ... stvaraju se dva centra politička koji će neminovno povući za sobom nesuglasice ... Molimo naše saveznike da uzmu u ocenu ovu našu predstavku ..."
- [N. Pašić to the Ambassadors of Serbia in Paris, London, and Washington. (Evian-les-Bains, 27/14 August 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 270-271, Doc. 214, vol. I]
- (352) Dne 26.IX.1918, Pašić daje Pariskom "Temps-u" ovu izjavu: "... mi nemamo nikakvih razloga da sumnjamo, da će oni [Saveznici], priznajući lojalnost i žrtve njihove Saveznice Srbije, priznati joj pravo i pomoći joj da oslobodi svu svoju braću i s njima se ujedini u jednu slobodnu i nezavisnu državu. Jedna izjava u ovom smislu, koja bi došla sa strane naših velikih Saveznika bila bi vrlo potrebna; ... Jugoslavija koju bi stvorila Srbija, pomognuta i podržana od strane naših velikih Saveznika, i osnovana na principima ispisanim u Krfskoj Deklaraciji, bila bi i ostala bi ... saveznica sila Sporazuma, Mi očekujemo jednu Deklaraciju u ovom smislu od strane svih naših Saveznika; ..."
- [The Declaration of N. Pašić to the Paris' newspapers. (Paris, 27 September 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 304, Doc. 243, vol. I]
- (353) Pašić izjavljuje Pariškom "Journal de Débats" (od 27.IX.1918) da želi da se formira: "nezavisna južnolavenska država pod egidom Srbije u suglasnosti sa Krfskom deklaracijom; [ali i da je] protivan priz-

nanju jugoslavenskih dobrovoljaca kao savezničkih i ratujućih trupa, [te da] ne želi da Jugoslavenski odbor bude priznat kao predstavnik jugoslavenskih podanika Austro-Ugarske."

[Cited by K. Milutinović: "R.W. Seton-Watson i ...", Op.cit., p. 474]

(354) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 492.

(355) "... Još od početka rata jugoslavenski narod Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca u Austro-Ugarskoj dao je odpora protiv zajedničkog neprijatelja svim sredstvima u njegovoj moći. Mnogobrojni dobrovoljci jugoslavenski stupili su u savezničke vojske, ...

Uvažuc ove napore, Francuska smatra narod jugoslavenski kao savezničku naciju, priznaje joj pravo da razriješi državnu vezu s Austro-Ugarskom i pravo na nezavisnost i, na osnovu principa narodnosti i narodnog samoopredjeljenja, pravo na ujedinjenje sa jednokrvnom braćom u Srbiji i u Crnojgori u nezavisnu državu i smatra trupe jugoslavenskih dobrovoljaca u srpskoj vojsci ... kao savezničke trupe ... Francuska nadalje priznaje Jugoslavenski odbor pod predsjedništvom Dra Ante Trumbića kao predstavnika i organa narodnih interesa jugoslavenske nacije Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca podložnih Austro-Ugarskoj i kao njezina mandatora i prima na znanje izjavu Jugoslavenskog odbora da će nastaviti svoj politički rad u solidarnom sporazumu sa vladom Kr[aljevine] Srbije u smislu Krfske Deklaracije od 20. jula 1917."

[A. Trumbić to S. Pichon. (Paris, at the end of September 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 310-311, Doc. 253, vol. I, italics mine]

(356) Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 495.

(357) "Sve te činjenice i dokumenti mogu samo još potpunije ilustrovati opravdanost i potrebu priznanja Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za ratujućeg saveznika, njihovog prava da se oslobode ispod autrijskog jarma i ujedine sa svojom slobodnom braćom iz Srbije i Crne Gore u narodnu i nezavisnu državu, kao i priznanje Jugoslavenskog odbora za njihova zakonitog predstavnika."

[Trumbić's Memorandum to the British Government. (London, 7 October 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 337, Doc. 267, note 4]

(358) Ibid.: A-JAZU, A-J0, vol. 9, the note is in Italian.

(359) "... najbolji dokaz da su dvor i vlada bili jedno te isto pokazuje činjenica, da je Aleksandar održavao Pašićevu homogenu radikalnu vladu na vlasti i onda, kad je bilo očito, da ona ne uživa povjerenje Narodne skupštine, u kojoj su većinu imale opozicione stranke. ..."

[Milutinović, K.: "R.W. Seton-Watson i ...", Op.cit., pp. 475-476]

(360) Steed, Henry Wickham: Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922. (London, Heinemann, 1924), vol. II, pp. 235-238, italics mine.

(361) Cited by P.D. Ostović: The Truth About Yugoslavia, Op.cit., p. 284.

(362) Ibid.

- (363) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 508-509.
- (364) "...[Jugoslavenski] Odbor stoji kompaktno i odlučno na svom stajalištu i ne može popustiti zbog svoje odgovornosti pred narodom jer se boji da ovako shvaćanje gosp. Pašića, koji hoće da centrališe u svoje ruke pravo odluke o sudbini čitavog naroda, ne bi prejudiciralo sretno rešenje opšteg narodnog problema. ..."
[A. Trumbić to the Heir Apparent, Alexander. (London, 10 October 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 351, Doc. 280, vol. I]
- (365) "... Pašić je imao u Parizu i u Londonu jedino zbog njegova političkog shvaćanja hladan prijem. Pichon ni nitko u Parizu, gde je bio tri nedelje, nije ga počastio ručkom ni inače a tako isto dosada u Londonu...."
[Ibid.]
- (366) Protić javlja Pašiću da "... Za orijentisanje u Ministarstvu [Srbije] i u poslovima neophodno je potrebno znati rezultat vašeg rada sa Trumbićem. ..."
[Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 357, Doc. 285, note 1, Tel. 4057 (received in London: 10.X/27.IX.1918), vol. I]
- (367) Pašić odgovara Protiću: "S Trumbićem razgovarao sam ... Nismo se mogli složiti. ... Sa Stidom govorio sam opširno i prepirali smo se oštro. On smatra da mi vodimo imperijalističku politiku, da želimo Jugoslavenne podčiniti Srbiji i dominirati nad njima. Da smo napustili Krfsku Deklaraciju, ... da mi želimo postupiti u budućoj Jugoslaviji kao što smo postupili s Makedonijom. ...mi smo stavljeni u teški položaj, i predstoji nam pustiti da priznaju Jugoslavenski komitet kao politički faktor, koji prestavlja i govori u ime Jugoslavije, Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, i koji bi u tom slučaju imao svoga prestavnika na konferenciji, koja će rešavati o miru ..."
[N. Pašić to S. Protić. (London, 11 October/28 September 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 355-356, Doc. 285, vol. I, italics in original]
- (368) A. Trumbić to N. Gršković. (London, 14 October 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 359-360, Doc. 287, vol. I.
- (369) "Jugoslavensko Narodno Veće u Vašingtonu intrigiše predstavljajući se kod vlade Američkih Sjedinjenih Država kao predstavnik jugoslavenskog naroda u Americi tražeći kod vlade Američkih Ujedinjenih Država priznanje Jugoslavije sa njima kao predstavnicima privremene jugoslavenske vlade čim će se isključiti srpska vlada kao faktor u jugoslavenskom pokretu. ..."
[Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 378, Doc. 313, note 1, vol. II]
- (370) See: Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 108, Doc. 80, and p. 225, Doc. 171, vol. I.
- (371) Trumbić-Evans-Steed šalju telegram Jugoslavenskom Narodnom Vijeću u Washington: "... pozivamo Vas hitno, da bez odvlake upotrijebite sav upliv, da se osigura upotreba američkih trupa za okupaciju sviju spornih gradova ili teritorija u Austro-Ugarskoj. ... Pošto su

Velika Britanija i Francuska kao stranke ... Londonskog ugovora ... [to] ne mogu da posreduju u toj stvari. Vlada Sjedinjenih Država nije stranka i nije nikad priznala tog ugovora. Američke trupe bile bi svagdje pozdravljene kao dobro došle. 50,000 neizvježbanih momaka bilo bi jamačno dovoljno. Preporučujemo stoga, da one okupiraju glavne tačke u Dalmaciji, Istri, Kranjskoj te Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji. Važno je, da se niti talijanske niti srpske trupe ne upotrijebe, a tome se može izbjeći samo na poruku Sjedinjenih Država." [Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 531, italics mine]

- (372) Gosp. Phillips je pitao dr. Hinkovića: Zašto Jugoslavenski Odbor zazire od srpske okupacije naših predjela ? Hinković je odgovorio: "... da sigurno ima dokaza za velikosrpske prohtjeve zvanične Srbije, koji bi se prohtjevi okupacijom srpske vojske imali da ostvare. Mi, austro-ugarski Jugoslaveni, rekosmo, ne ćemo ni pod koji način Veliku Srbiju, t.j. hegemoniju srpskog plemena [i.e., nacije] nad drugim dvjema, već ujedinjenu državu s potpunom ravnopravnošću za sva tri plemena. Velika Srbija značila bi za nas bankrot naših ideala, veliku nesreću za nas i za Srbe, nosila bi u sebi klicu građanskog rata medju nama i pogibao za svijetski mir." [Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 533]
- (373) "... Državni sekretar ad interim Phillips saslušao je sa vidljivom simpatijom naše objašnjenje, a naročito sugestiju da bi američke trupe trebale okupirati našu teritoriju, ako se s Austrijom zaključi primirje. ... Na našu opasku da je glavna razlika izmedju gledišta sadanje srpske vlade i Jugoslavena iz Austro-Ugarske u tome, što prva želi veliku Srbiju ... dok poslednji zastupaju ujedinjenu Jugoslaviju sa jednakim pravima za sve, državni je sekretar spontano prekinuo rekavši da je to takodjer i naše (američko) gledište. Mi smo objasnili da srpska vlada želi da nametne za vrijeme provizornoga interregnuma monarhiju i dinastiju, dok mi želimo da sačuvamo (rezervišemo) apsolutnu slobodu odluke samom narodu. Nadodali smo da je simpatija austro-ugarskih Jugoslavena za monarhiju i dinastiju u mnogom oslabila, uslijed mnogih pogrešaka (blunders) srpske vlade. Izgleda da je Phillips vanredno dobro informisan. ... Molim Vas ne saopštavajte ništa važna Masaryku. Vama su sigurno poznate njegove talijanske simpatije." [N. Gršković to A. Trumbić. (New York, 1 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 440, Doc. 367, vol. II]
- (374) A. Trumbić to N. Pašić. (Paris, 27 October 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 389-390, Doc. 326, vol. II.
- (375) "... mi, predstavnici bloka opozicije i svih glavnijih radnika na našem nacionalnom pitanju, smatramo kao neophadno potrebno i kao neodložno obrazovanje jednog kabineta nacionalne koncentracije. Tu koncentraciju mi razumemo i kao izraz svih skupštinskih grupa i kao izraz mišljenja najistaknutijih predstavnika nacionalnog rada u Srbiji i kao izraz onoga, što sobom predstavlja Jugoslavenski Odbor. ..." [Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p.[541]]

- (376) "Država Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba, koja se konstituirala na teritoriju Južnih Slavena, što je dosad pripadao u sastav bivše Austro-Ugarske monarhije, ... izjavljuje formalno, da se ne nalazi u ratnom stanju sa aliiranim državama; ... da se ratna mornarica, koja se dosad nalazila u posjedu Austro-Ugarske monarhije, nalazi od danas u vlasti Narodnog Vijeća Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba. Ona [mornarica] je izvjesila narodnu hrvatsku zastavu."
[The Note of the State of Slovenians, Croatsians, and Serbs to the Entente. (Zagreb, 31 October 1918) Šišić, Ferdo, comp.: Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1914-1918. (Zagreb, Naklada Matice Hrvatske, 1920), pp. 216-217, Doc. 129]
- (377) Narodno Vijeće informira Jugoslavenski odbor, "... da ovlaštuje Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu, da zastupa interese države Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba kod drugih država."
[The National Council of the SHS to the Yugoslav Committee in London, (Zagreb, 1 November 1918), Šišić, F.: Dokumenti o ..., Op.cit., p. 218, Doc. 131]
- (378) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 451, Doc. 375, note 3, vol. II.
- (379) "Dogadjaji ne čekaju; oni se takvom brzinom razvijaju, da zahtevaju, da se to pitanje reši za najkraće vreme. Da čekamo, dok se skupština sastane, bilo bi vrlo dugo, trebaće najkraće 20 dana, a možda i više. ... Ako bi se stvar odugovlačila, i ako bi se Jugoslavenski Odbor razišao sa vladom zato, što ne bi bio priznat od Srpske Vlade, i ako bi se on izjasnio protiv nas i držanja Srpske Vlade i protiv njene politike, onda ćemo se pridružiti Jugoslavenskom Odboru, i čini mi se, rekoše, obrazovaće odbor, koji će raditi protiv Srpske Vlade i sa Jugoslavenskim Odborom."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 546]
- (380) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., pp. 547-549.
- (381) Protić javlja Aleksandru da je Trumbić: "... odbio ponudu, da i Jugoslaveni udju u vladu koalicionu, već hoće da Jugoslavenski Odbor ostane nezavisan od vlade. On [Trumbić] predlaže, da srpska vlada i Jugoslavenski Odbor kao dva jednaka i nezavisna faktora delegiraju po dva člana u jedan zajednički odbor, koji će rukovoditi politikom spoljašnjom i Srbije i jugoslavenskom. Opozicija se složila sa njima i neće ući u vladu. Dakle Pašić i sadašnja vlada u tome ne slažu se sa Jugoslavenskim Odborom. ..."
[Cited by M. Paulova: Op.cit., p. 549]
- (382) "... da se za svu jugoslovensku naciju stvori jedan zajednički i jedinstven organ, kome se stavlja u dužnost diplomatska akcija. ... Dok taj organ ne bude stvoren, mi dajemo mandat Dr. Ante Trumbiću, kao predsjedniku Jugoslavenskog odbora u Londonu, da predstavlja jugoslovensko Narodno Vijeće u Zagrebu kod vlada savezničkih i vlade Sjedinjenih Država, i naročito na konferencijama za primirje. ..."
[Demarche of Dr. Korošec to the Allied Governments. (Geneva, 3 November 1918), Šišić, F.: Dokumenti ..., Op.cit., pp. 225-226, Doc. 137]

- (383) Colonel House odgovara Trumbiću da su prestavnici Udruženih Sila: "... održali završno zasedanje već pre podne i to pre nego što je primio Trumbićevo pismo, a popodnevna plenarna sednica biće samo formalne prirode. Zbog toga je nesrećom nemoguće da ispune Trumbićevu molbu. ..."
[Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 463, Doc. 389, note [1], (A-JAZU, A-JO, sv.1), vol. II]
- (384) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 559.
- (385) Ibid., pp. 559-564.
- (386) The Protocol from the Conference about the Yugoslav Union, held in Geneva, from 6 to 9 November. (Geneva, 6-9 November 1918), Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 523, Doc. 451, vol. II.
- (387) "Gosp. Pašić u Parizu, pred naš odlazak u Ženevu, dao mi je reč, da prima moj predlog. Ali je u Ženevi odustao." [Na upit, kako je stano-
više zauzeo Odbor, rekao je Drašković, kaže Paulova:] "Trumbić je
šutio, a nato je Pašić kazao, da se ne može (nacrt) primiti."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 561]
- (388) "... koji [centralizam] je za Srbe prirodna stvar, ali bi kod austrij-
skih Jugoslavena lako moglo da radi toga dodje do reakcije, a tome se
treba ukloniti. Stoga je [Trumbić] savjetovao, da se za prvi put
'zadovoljimo sa manje', t.j. zajedničkim organom (vladom) za spoljne
i zajedničke poslove."
[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 561]
- (389) Vesnić javlja Pašiću: "Danas sam video predsednika Republike i naše
važnije prijatelje. Njegova je iskrena i živa želja da se celo jugo-
slavensko pleme [narod] javi kao jedna duša, bez ikakve i najmanje
podele. Više nego ikad to sad zahtevaju naši životni interesi."
[Djordjević, M.: Op.cit., p. [?], cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 562]
- (390) "1. L[loyd-]George i Balfour na odlasku iz Pariza poručuju da istu-
pimo skupa i stvorimo jednu frontu tako da ojačamo njihovu pozi-
ciju u našoj stvari. Isto to poručuje Clemenceau, a i Orlando
želi to, da bude jači prema Sonninu.
2. Kao zadnja kombinacija zajedničkog istupa jugosl[avena] u Parizu
iznijela se je mogućnost jednog zajedničkog ministarstva sa 8
[članova iz] SHS i 8 iz Srbije; iz toga ministarstva sastavio bi
se jedan war-kabinet u kojem ne bi imao biti Pašić jer mu ne
veruju.
3. L[loyd-]George kaže jedan takav kabinet mi ćemo priznati i on će
imati zastupstvo kod pregovora o miru kao Česi. ..."
[Seton-Watson to A. Trumbić. (Paris, 6 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 490, Doc. 419, vol. II]

- (391) Steed upućuje telegram Trumbiću, gdje se kaže:
"... mora se hitati s formiranjem nove srpsko-jugoslavenske vlade. Svi u Parizu - uključujući francuske i američke predstavnike - očekuju nestrpljivo vest o tome. ... U SAD Narodno je vijeće već uputilo manifest u kojem ... otklanja monarhijsko rešenje ocrtano u Krfskoj deklaraciji i najavljuje prekid svih odnosa s Pašićem. ..."
[Trumbić's notes. (Geneva, 8 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 513, Doc. 437, note [1] (A-JAZU, A-JO, vol. 9), vol. II]
- (392) Dne 8.XI.1918. Pašić oficijelno javlja dr. Korušcu:
"... Čast mi je izvesti[ti] Vas, da sam primio odluku [rezoluciju], koju ste mi dostavili Vašim pismom od 3. novembra 1918. ...
U ime kraljevske srpske vlade čast mi je izvesti[ti] Vas, da ova priznaje Narodno Veće u Zagrebu kao zakonitu vladu Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, koji žive na teritoriji austro-ugarske monarhije, i da sam danas uputio notu vladama Francuske, Engleske, Italije i Severnim Sjedinjenim Državama Američkim moleći ih, da i oni sa svoje strane priznaju Narodno Veće u Zagrebu, kao zakonitu vladu jugoslavenskih zemalja bivše monarhije Austro-ugarske, kao i da priznaju dobrovoljačkim trupama ovih zemalja karakter ratujuće stranke. ...
U isto doba kraljevska vlada prima k znanju, da je Narodno Veće poverilo g. Trumbiću, predsjedniku Jugoslavenskog odbora u Londonu, mandat, da ga predstavlja kod Saveznika sve dotle, dok ne bude stvoren zajednički organ za diplomatsku akciju.
... srpska kraljevska vlada prima k znanju izjavu Narodnog Veća u Zagrebu, kojom ono smatra, da mu je cilj, da oslobodi od svake tudje dominacije Srbe, Hrvate i Slovence iz bivše monarhije Austro-ugarske i da ih ujedini sa njihovom braćom iz kraljevine Srbije i kraljevine Crne Gore u jednu jedinstvenu i nezavisnu državu. ..."
[The Royal Serbian Government Recognizes the National Council in Zagreb. (Genève, 8 November 1918), Šišić, F.: Dokumenti ..., Op.cit., p. 233, Doc. 147]
- (393) "Zajedničkim naporom savezničkih naroda i Sjedinjenih Država Severne Amerike, snagom naroda Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, slomljene su na bojnim poljima i na moru sve nasilne prepreke njegovom ujedinjenju. Predstavnici Vlade Kraljevine Srbije i skupštinskih političkih grupa, predstavnici Narodnog Veća u Zagrebu, predstavnici Jugoslovenskog Odbora u Londonu, skupljeni u Ženevi, varoši slobode, sretni su što mogu jednodušno svečano i pred celim svetom konstatovati svoje ujedinjenje u državu Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Narod Crne Gore, kome je otvoren naš bratski zagrljaj, nesumnjivo će pohitati da pozdravi i pridruži se ovom delu, koje je od uvek bilo njegov najveći ideal. ...
U svim spoljnim manifestacijama prava, snage i volje, tu državnu zajednicu predstavljat će zajedničko ministarstvo Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, preko redovnih organa, za to stvoreno ... Sastav te vlade objavljen je. Naknadno će se objaviti dalji delokrug njenog rada, jer su ... uravnati putovi kojima će se kretati javni, opšti, zajednički poslovi nove države.
Vlada Kraljevine Srbije i Narodno Veće u Zagrebu produžiti će otpravljati poslove svaki u svom unutrašnjem pravnom i teritorijalnom delokrugu na redovan način kakav gde postoji, dok Velika Skupština

ujedinjenih Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Konstituanta), izabrana opštim, jednakim, neposrednim i tajnim glasanjem svih gradjana, ustavom ne propiše definitivno ustrojstvo države. Taj ustav će biti osnova celom državnom životu, izvor i utoka svih vlasti i prava, i po njemu će se, u demokratskom duhu, uređivati ceo državni život.

Granice državne prema susednim državama povući će se po načelu prava narodnosti i prava samoopredjeljenja svakog naroda. U nesalomljivom pouzdanju i veri našeg naroda u svoje pravo, u principima pravde proklamovanim od naših Saveznika, primljenim javnom savešću celog prosvetčenog sveta - leži jamstvo to.

Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci! Naš vekovni san je java. Mi smo ujedinjeni u slobodi. Slavimo ove velike dane ..."

[The [Geneva] Declaration. (Geneva, 9 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 526-527, Doc. 453, vol. II]

(394) Milutinović, K.: "R.W. Seton-Watson i ...", Op.cit., p. 476.

(395) "... Rešenje na koje ste se složili po predlogu Trumbića, ... i ja i ostali drugovi primili smo, ne zato što je dobro po sebi, nego za to što se na bolje niste mogli složiti, jer nam je draže ujedinjenje i u takvom obliku nego nikako. ..."

[S. Protić to N. Pašić. (Corfu, 10 November/28 October 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 541, Doc. 466, vol. II]

(396) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. [565].

(397) Ibid., p. 566.

(398) Tresić-Pavičić kazao je Protiću, "... da je Korošec u Zagrebu u privremenoj vladi bez ikakvog većeg značaja i da je čitava vlast de facto u rukama Svetozar Pribićevića i Dušana Popovića, odnosno [Hrvatsko-Srpske] koalicije i njihovih sumišljenika."

[Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 566]

(399) Protić javlja Pašiću: "... Kad sam vam juče poslao telegram kojim sam dao moj pristanak na predlog Trumbićev o zajedničkom Ministarstvu, ja sam zamišljao da Iz depeše koja nam je noćas stigla, vidim, da sam se prevario. ... Nalazimo ... neumesno da Ministri osim našem Kralju, koji je nas zajednički Kralj, polažu zakletvu još nekome [drugome]. Zato vam moram reći, da mi takve kombinacije odbijamo odlučno i molimo da uvažite naše ostavke, Molimo, ... za dopuštenje izjaviti vam, da po našem mišljenju, u takvoj situaciji, ni vama više nema mesta u takvoj vladi, jer je očigledno da vam se ovakvim načinom izjavljuje nepoverenje. ..."

[S. Protić to N. Pašić. (Corfu, 11 November/29 October 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 553, Doc. 475, vol. II]

(400) Protić javlja Pašiću:

"I ako smo u ostavci, smatramo za drugarsku dužnost saopštiti Vam, kako mi ovde vidimo našu političku situaciju. ... moramo doći u neposredni dodir sa njima [i.e., direktno sa Narodnim Vijećem u Zagrebu, gdje Srbi iz Hrvatske, Svetozar Pribićević i Dušan Popović

imaju de facto vlast u rukama]. Nećemo, da nam zato budu posrednik Trumbić i ona dvojica [dr. Korošec i dr. Čingrija], koji su došli u Ženevu. Jugoslavenski Odbor za nas više ne postoji kao samostalan činilac. Mi imamo razloga verovati, da u Zagrebu ima njih, koji ne misle kao Trumbić, ... treba da pozovete opoziciju pri ovom sastavu koalicionog kabineta, koji ste zajednički bili utvrdili, i na koji je pristala i Kruna i mi, pa da sa njima dodjete odatle u Skoplje, gdje treba odmah sazvati skupštinu. Odatle ili iz Beograda treba dogovoriti se sa Zagrebom i Sarajevom, ... [Ali] ako predstavnici opozicije to ne prime, onda treba da se vratite Vi sami, pa onda postavite pred Krunu kabinetsko pitanje sa ovakvim predlogom: Ako je Kruna saglasna sa našim radom, onda da nas ovlasti izvršiti odmah apel na narod, a posle prema rezultatu dalje postupiti. ... U protivnom slučaju treba povući se i ostaviti, da Kruna i opozicija traže rešenje. Mi smo odlučno protivni onome, kako su u Ženevi stvari upućene, te ćemo se boriti protiv toga svom snagom, ..."
[Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., pp. 567-568, italics mine]

- (401) "... smatrao sam, da je pametnije i umesnije primiti rešenje, koje se ne slaže sa našim osećajima i pogledima, nego li ne složiti se i razići se na dve suprotne strane i stvoriti prelom i raskid, ..."; [dok u vezi zajedničkog ministarstva ili središnje vlade, Pašić kaže Protiću, da] "u najgorem slučaju sve to moralo bi prestati posle zaključenja mira, a to će biti skoro, ..."
[N. Pašić to S. Protić. (Paris, 13 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 566, Doc. 486 (pp. 565-567), vol. II]
- (402) "Trebalo bi raditi na tome, da Narodno Veće u Zagrebu, u sporazumu sa Narodnim Većem u Sarajevu i Ljubljani, imenuje kandidate, koji bi ušli u naše koncentraciono ministarstvo. Po mome mišljenju trebalo bi uzeti kandidate iz svake pokrajine, i to najsposobnije ljude. Držim, da bi trebalo da Narodno Veće u Zagrebu kandiduje tri svoja delegata: za Hrvatsku, Dalmaciju i Slavoniju. Veće u Sarajevu dva, i to jednog pravoslavnog i jednog muslimana. Veće u Ljubljani da kandiduje dva, od kojih jedan mora biti znalac tamošnjeg naseljenja sa etnografskog gledišta. Vojvodina da kandiduje jednog. Na taj način ušli bi u kabinet još osam članova, i tako sastavljen koncentracioni kabinet predstavljao bi ceo naš troimeni narod. On bi vodio našu narodnu spoljnu politiku, kao i našu unutrašnju politiku do Konstituante, a posle ići ćemo redovnim tokom. Gledajte da što pre stupite u vezu sa tim Većima...."
[Djordjević, M.: Op.cit., p. 211. Cited by M. Paulova; Op.cit., pp. 571-572]
- (403) "... Nismo se obradovali preokretu politike G. Pašića i novoj polit[ič-koj] konstelaciji Srbije, jer se njome produžuje i učvršćuje vlast G. Pašića pa i njegovo vogjenje jugoslavenske politike koje se pokazalo kao fatalno. Nažalost i Saveznici neće da daju Jugoslavenima pravo Saveznika dok se ne izvrši armistis. Mi stojimo uvek na stanovištu da se SHS iz biv[še] monarhije prizna to pravo Savezništva, njihovim dobrovoljcima pravo belišerana, njihovu Veću u Zagrebu pravo Vlade, i tražimo da u preliminarima i definitivnim pregovorima o miru to Veće bude zastupljeno preko svojih delegata. ... Ukratko, branićemo energično stanovište Predsednika Wilsona u poslednjem odgovoru Austro-

Ugarskoj, t.j. da i Jugoslaveni imaju pravo samoopredelenja i da niko o njihovoj sudbini ne sme rešavati bez njih. ..."

[A. Trumbić to M. Mičić. (Paris, 19 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 614, Doc. 533, vol. II]

- (404) "... Već od juna meseca radili smo energično na tome da i naš narod kao i česki ne bude više tretiran kao deo Austro-Ugarske, nego da se prizna kao saveznik. ... G. Pašić protivio se ovoj našoj akciji. ... On [Pašić] ozbiljno nije uzimao ni stvaranje jedinstvene vlade u Srbiji, a kamoli stvaranje zajedničke jugoslavenske vlade. G. Pašić nastojao je uvek, da srpska vlada ostane gospodarica položaja to jest drugim rečima, da cela vlast ostane u njegovim rukama i njegovih drugova. Iz svih pojava se vidi, da G. Pašić neće da dolazi u sukob s Italijom, dok uvek naglašuje korekturu granica prema Bugarskoj. Pošto se vidi šta Italija hoće na Jadranskom Moru, to nas držanje g. Pašića toliko uznemiruje, da ne možemo nikako dozvoliti, da on raspolaže s našom sudbinom. ... Pašićeva tendencija je ta, da on sa svojim zastupa na kongresu Srbiju ..., a u isto vreme i sve ostale naše zemlje. ... G. Pašić je već u Ženevi napomenuo, kako otoke i Istru možda nećemo spasiti od Talijana. ..."

[A. Trumbić to the Yugoslav National Council in Washington. (Paris, 19 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., pp. 610-612, Doc. 532, (pp. 610-614), vol. II]

- (405) "ili stvoriti ovde [u Parizu] sporazum iz svih merodavnih činilaca i potpunu vladu, pa izdejstvorati za nju pristanak Krune, posle čega bi njeni svi ovdašnji članovi imali otići što pre u zemlju; ili ako ne bi to bilo moguće ostaviti da Kruna obrazuje vladu ... iz ljudi iz Srbije, Hrvatske, Bosne, itd. ..."

[M. Vesnić to S. Protić. (Corfu, 27/14 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 658, Doc. 569, vol. II]

- (406) Paulova, M.: Op.cit., p. 573.

- (407) "Naše veze s domovinom [su] vrlo teške, ako ne i nemoguće. ..."

[A. Trumbić to M. Mičić. (Paris, 19.XI.1918), Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 614, Doc. 533]

- (408) Pribićević konstantira da "... naši izaslanici u inozemstvu [i.e., dr. Korošec i drugovi] ne imadu prava sklapati na svoje ruke obvezatne ugovore s antantinim vlastima u ime Nar[odnog] Vijeća Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca u Zagrebu. Oni se imadu samo informirati o izvanjempoložaju."

[Cited by M. Paulova, Op.cit., p. 573]

- (409) Paulova, M.: Ibid., p. 574.

- (410) "... da provedu fuziju poslova sa Srbijom pod jedinstvenom vladom i sa Aleksandrom kao šefom. ..."

[J. Gmajner to A. Trumbić. (Geneva, 28 November 1918) Gradja o ..., Op.cit., p. 661, Doc. 575, vol. II]

- (411) Ostović, P.: Op.cit., p. 94.

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